02/17/2006 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB400 | |
| HB384 | |
| HB353 | |
| Adjourn |
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | HB 384 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 400 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 353 | TELECONFERENCED | |
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
February 17, 2006
1:11 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Lesil McGuire, Chair
Representative Tom Anderson
Representative John Coghill
Representative Pete Kott
Representative Les Gara
Representative Max Gruenberg
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Peggy Wilson
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 400
"An Act relating to disasters and confiscation of firearms."
- MOVED CSHB 400(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 384
"An Act relating to fines and offenses; amending Rule 8(b),
Alaska District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; and providing
for an effective date."
- MOVED CSHB 384(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 353
"An Act relating to sentences for sexual offenses."
- MOVED CSHB 353(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
BILL: HB 400
SHORT TITLE: CONFISCATION OF FIREARMS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) COGHILL
01/27/06 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
01/27/06 (H) JUD, FIN
02/13/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/13/06 (H) Heard & Held
02/13/06 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
02/17/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 384
SHORT TITLE: FINES AND OFFENSES
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) ANDERSON
01/20/06 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
01/20/06 (H) JUD, FIN
02/13/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/13/06 (H) Heard & Held
02/13/06 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
02/17/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 353
SHORT TITLE: SENTENCING FOR SEXUAL OFFENSES
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) NEUMAN, LYNN
01/09/06 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 1/6/06
01/09/06 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
01/09/06 (H) JUD, FIN
02/03/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/03/06 (H) <Bill Hearing Canceled>
02/08/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/08/06 (H) Heard & Held
02/08/06 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
02/13/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/13/06 (H) Heard & Held
02/13/06 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
02/15/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/15/06 (H) Heard & Held
02/15/06 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
02/17/06 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
KAREN LIDSTER, Staff
to Representative John Coghill
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 400, presented
information on behalf of the sponsor, Representative Coghill.
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section-Juneau
Criminal Division
Department of Law (DOL)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 400, provided
information and responded to questions; responded to a question
during discussion of HB 384.
HEATH HILYARD, Staff
to Representative Tom Anderson
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 384, provided
comments and responded to questions on behalf of the sponsor,
Representative Anderson.
SARAH A. GILBERTSON, Legislative Liaison
Office of the Commissioner
Alaska Department of Fish & Game (ADF&G)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 384, provided
comments regarding Sections 7, 9-11, and 13-19.
GERALD LUCKHAUPT, Attorney
Legislative Legal Counsel
Legislative Legal and Research Services
Legislative Affairs Agency (LAA)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Spoke as the drafter of HB 384, responding
to questions.
ALLEN STOREY, Captain
Division of Alaska State Troopers
Department of Public Safety (DPS)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments during discussion of
HB 384 and responded to questions.
JOSHUA FINK, Public Advocate
Anchorage Office
Office of Public Advocacy (OPA)
Department of Administration (DOA)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 353, Version F, and
proposed amendments, provided comments and responded to a
question.
QUINLAN G. STEINER, Director
Central Office
Public Defender Agency (PDA)
Department of Administration (DOA)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 353, Version F, and
proposed amendments, responded to questions.
SUSAN A. PARKES, Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Law (DOL)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments and responded to
questions during discussion of proposed amendments to HB 353,
Version F.
SENATOR CON BUNDE
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: As the sponsor of SB 218, provided comments
and responded to questions during discussion of proposed
amendments to HB 353, Version F.
SENATOR GRETCHEN GUESS
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: As the sponsor of SB 223, provided comments
and responded to questions during discussion of proposed
amendments to HB 353, Version F.
ACTION NARRATIVE
CHAIR LESIL McGUIRE called the House Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 1:11:33 PM. Representatives
McGuire, Gara, Kott, Gruenberg, and Coghill were present at the
call to order. Representative Anderson arrived as the meeting
was in progress.
HB 400 - CONFISCATION OF FIREARMS
1:11:58 PM
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the first order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 400, "An Act relating to disasters and
confiscation of firearms." [Before the committee was the
proposed committee substitute (CS) for HB 400, Version 24-
LS1543\F, Luckhaupt, 2/9/06, which had been adopted as the work
draft on 2/13/06.]
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL, speaking as the sponsor of HB 400,
relayed that he'd prefer to keep the bill simple, with its
intention being to keep [law enforcement officials] from
unlawfully confiscating lawfully owned firearms. The bill says
that anyone who confiscates a firearm or orders the confiscation
of a firearm from a law-abiding citizen [would be subject to the
penalty therein]. He said it is clear to him that if somebody
is not abiding by the law, police will have the discretion and
authority to confiscate firearms. He mentioned that his staff
would explain comments that have just recently been offered by
the Department of Law (DOL), and indicated that he, too, is
uncomfortable with making a violation of this proposed law a
class A felony, and would therefore be amenable to a conceptual
amendment that would change that provision even if such a change
has to occur after the bill moves from committee. He noted that
he would also be continuing conversations with Representative
Gruenberg in order to address his concerns.
1:15:25 PM
KAREN LIDSTER, Staff to Representative John Coghill, Alaska
State Legislature, sponsor, relayed that according to
conversations she'd had with Dean Guaneli from the DOL,
[members' concerns could be addressed via] a change in wording
such that a person found guilty of a violation would forfeit
his/her office or governmental position, would be subject to
revocation of his/her certificate issued by the Alaska Police
Standards Council (APSC) thus terminating his/her ability to
serve as a police officer, and could be charged with a crime
such as theft of a firearm - a class C felony. She posited that
such a change would instill the idea that the legislature feels
that this behavior is serious.
CHAIR McGUIRE, after ascertaining that no one else wished to
testify, closed public testimony on HB 400.
1:17:42 PM
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal
Services Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law
(DOL), relayed that Ms. Lidster's comments accurately reflect
his thoughts regarding a possible amendment. He noted that in
considering this issue, he'd given thought to various
hypothetical situations that a police officer might face, the
consequences of making the aforementioned behavior a crime -
particularly a class A felony - and the potential impact that
doing so will have on laws involving citizen's arrest and the
right to use force in self defense. He surmised that the
sponsor's goal is to ensure that law enforcement officers don't
act beyond the bounds of their lawful authority, and that when
they do act beyond those bounds, they ought to face the same
sanctions they face for any other wrongdoing.
MR. GUANELI, offering his understanding that Section 1 of the
bill merely says that nothing within the Alaska Disaster Act
allows the confiscation of firearms, characterized this
provision as a message to policy makers and to agency heads that
there can't be a blanket order to confiscate firearms in a
certain area; instead, an order must be case specific based on
the facts of the situation as discerned by the officer at the
time. He offered his belief that law enforcement agencies face
issues regarding training, supervision, and disciplinary actions
all the time; to change the bill as he's suggested would simply
place the aforementioned behavior in that same context wherein a
violation could result in the loss of one's job, and would
therefore provide the disincentive to act beyond one's
authority.
CHAIR McGUIRE suggested that such a change could be offered as a
conceptual amendment and then they could get the DOL's
assistance with crafting the appropriate language.
1:20:32 PM
MR. GUANELI suggested using the same type of language regarding
excessive use of force and the like, with the idea that law
enforcement officers have no reasonable right to [commit such an
act] nor any reasonable grounds to believe that they have such a
right. Such wording will tell law enforcement officers that
they are not to go beyond the scope of their lawful authority.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG indicated that he will object to such a
change unless he can see the language in writing and know where
it will go in the bill. "If you're going to charge somebody
with a class A felony, ... at least they have a right to a jury
trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and all the
constitutional protections," he remarked, positing that under
the aforementioned suggested change a person would not have any
such protections and would be subject to a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he agrees that this is a serious
issue, and opined that Version F "already covers that." He
mentioned that he may simply just ask for a vote on moving the
bill from committee.
CHAIR McGUIRE suggested that Representatives Gruenberg and
Coghill work on this issue further, and noted that committee
packets contain an Amendment 1 to HB 400.
1:22:22 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GARA made a motion to adopt Amendment 1, which,
along with an accompanying note, read [original punctuation
provided]:
At Page 1, at the end of Line 10
Insert:
"It is not a crime under this section if the person is
a law enforcement officer, and reasonably believes it
is necessary to confiscate the firearm to prevent a
crime involving the firearm."
Note: the language "reasonably believes is necessary"
is from Sec. 11.81.330, Justification for Use of Force
in Defense of Self or Others.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL objected.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA explained that Amendment 1 attempts to
clarify that law enforcement officers cannot confiscate
someone's firearm unless they have a suspicion that it will be
used later in the commission of a crime. He acknowledged that
[the DOL] might be able to offer more precise language.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL suggested that Amendment 1 could result
in everyone being considered to be under reasonable suspicion,
characterizing the determination that there is reasonable
suspicion that a crime may occur later as a judgment call that
he doesn't want in statute, though he agrees with the concept
that they don't want to hamstring law enforcement. Using the
standard of reasonable belief could be problematic in any
ensuing court case.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked Mr. Guaneli whether, without
Amendment 1, the bill would make a law enforcement officer
guilty of a crime if he/she confiscates a firearm under the
belief that that firearm may later be used in the commission of
a crime.
MR. GUANELI noted that there is a "general justification
statute" - the justification of necessity - that says that if in
order to prevent a greater harm from occurring one is required
to commit an offense, that offense is justified. He offered his
belief that that statute could be used to prevent a law
enforcement officer from being prosecuted in the aforementioned
circumstances, though he acknowledged that he would have to
research this issue further to see whether existing law will
address Representative Gara's concern.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA said he is somewhat comforted by that
information, but again questioned whether the bill will have an
impact on the decisions law enforcement officials have to make
while they are legitimately trying to stop a crime from
occurring later in the day.
MR. GUANELI remarked that the concept of, "later in the day" is
nebulous; however, if a law enforcement officer believes that a
crime is eminent or may happen soon, he/she will take whatever
action is necessary to prevent that crime, protect themselves,
and protect others. A law enforcement officer would be
stretching the facts if he/she claims that he/she believes a
firearm will be used in the commission of a crime later in the
day; an officer must instead consider what the known facts are
and what can be reasonably inferred from those facts with regard
to what may happen "shortly."
1:30:04 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GARA indicated that he still has a minor concern
regarding this issue.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL remarked, "We want a police officer to
act expeditiously, we just don't want him to act wrongfully in
violation of my individual rights, which I feel very strongly
about." He said he wants to ensure that the policy is that a
law enforcement officer will not confiscate somebody's lawfully
owned firearm while he/she is acting lawfully. He mentioned
that he is still willing to work on the issue of the proposed
penalty. In response to comments, he acknowledged that in a
disaster situation, law enforcement officials need to maintain
control.
1:33:09 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Gruenberg and Gara
voted in favor of Amendment 1. Representatives McGuire, Kott,
Coghill, and Anderson voted against it. Therefore, Amendment 1
failed by a vote of 2-4.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to what he termed the police
standards sections of statute, and suggested they [instead]
insert in those sections language indicating that in an
appropriate case, the behavior currently outlined in HB 400
would be a violation of those sections.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL remarked, "Yes, I think disciplinary
action as appropriate," adding that he is prepared to make an
amendment to line 10, to change "A" to "C".
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said he would not oppose such a change.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL indicated that he would also look for
language that could be added directly after that which would
reference the disciplinary actions undertaken by the APSC.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG suggested, as a way of addressing
everyone's concerns, that they simply alter the disciplinary
sections of statute rather making the behavior a felony.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he would prefer to see such language
in writing first.
1:35:35 PM
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Amendment 2, to
change "A" to "C" on line 10 after "class". There being no
objection, Amendment 2 was adopted.
1:36:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON moved to report the proposed CS for HB
400, Version 24-LS1543\F, Luckhaupt, 2/9/06, as amended, out of
committee with individual recommendations and the accompanying
zero fiscal note. There being no objection, CSHB 400(JUD) was
reported from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
The committee took an at-ease from 1:37 p.m. to 1:39 p.m.
HB 384 - FINES AND OFFENSES
1:40:23 PM
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the next order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 384, "An Act relating to fines and offenses;
amending Rule 8(b), Alaska District Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure; and providing for an effective date." [Before the
committee was the proposed committee substitute (CS) for HB 384,
Version 24-LS0985\Y, Luckhaupt, 1/30/06, which had been adopted
as the work draft on 2/13/06.]
1:40:43 PM
HEATH HILYARD, Staff to Representative Tom Anderson, Alaska
State Legislature, sponsor, relayed on behalf of Representative
Anderson that members' packets include a memorandum from the
bill drafter, Gerald Luckhaupt, and two sectional analysis - one
from the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and one from the
Alaska Department of Fish & Game (ADF&G) - and that the bill
drafter and a representative from the Department of Law (DOL)
are available for questions. In response to comments, he noted
that although the concept for the bill was originally very
narrow in scope and only addressed concerns that the DPS had
with certain portions of current statute, after discussions with
the DOL and the drafter it was felt that it would be appropriate
to also include proposed changes to certain other sections of
statute, such as Title 16, which pertains to the ADF&G.
1:42:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to adopt Conceptual
Amendment 1, to narrow the title so that it is "as tight as
possible."
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON objected, characterizing Conceptual
Amendment 1 as ambiguous.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG indicated that he is not opposed to
having a long title.
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON said he would maintain his objection at
least until public testimony is heard.
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON made a motion to table Conceptual
Amendment 1. There being no objection, it was so ordered.
1:45:02 PM
SARAH A. GILBERTSON, Legislative Liaison, Office of the
Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish & Game (ADF&G), relayed
that she would be commenting on Sections 7, 9-11, and 13-19.
She explained that many Title 16 statutes still read in part,
"guilty of a misdemeanor, ... punishable by a fine of not more
than $5,000", even though two years ago the legislature changed
the definition of misdemeanor and raised the maximum fine to
$10,000. Therefore, the ADF&G is asking that conforming changes
be made to those statutes that were missed during the
aforementioned revision; doing so would ensure that all of the
ADF&G's statutes pertaining to misdemeanors would automatically
conform with any future changes the legislature makes to the
term, "misdemeanor".
MS. GILBERTSON, in response to a request for more information,
also noted that members' packets contain a sectional analysis
from the ADF&G, and relayed that Section 7 proposes to change AS
16.05.407, which requires non residents to have a guide; that
Section 9 proposes to change AS 16.05.783, which addresses the
issue of airborne shooting; that Section 10 proposes to change
AS 16.05.831, which addresses the issue of intentionally wasting
salmon; that Section 11 proposes to change AS 16.05.905, which
deals with alien persons engaging in commercial fishing
activities.
CHAIR McGUIRE observed that Ms. Gilbertson is simply summarizing
the ADF&G's sectional analysis.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked whether the term, "alien person"
- which is used in Section 11 - is redundant, given that all
aliens are persons.
1:50:05 PM
GERALD LUCKHAUPT, Attorney, Legislative Legal Counsel,
Legislative Legal and Research Services, Legislative Affairs
Agency (LAA), explained that Title 16 already uses the term,
"alien person", adding that he is hesitant to alter that
language via HB 384.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked members to first review the sectional
analysis before asking any further questions.
1:52:34 PM
ALLEN STOREY, Captain, Division of Alaska State Troopers,
Department of Public Safety (DPS), suggested that the language
in Section 4 could be abbreviated to simply say that a violation
of [AS 04.21.065] is a violation as defined under AS 11.81.900
and is punishable under AS 12.55.035(e)(7), and leave it at
that. In response to questions, he noted that typically the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board ("ABC Board") handles
violations of AS 04.21.065, and that although he has no problem
with the language as it is currently proposed, he thinks a
formatting modification might be in order; in this manner,
should the penalty for a violation increase, no further change
would be necessary for that provision of statute.
CHAIR McGUIRE relayed that she would be reluctant to change that
proposed language without hearing directly from the ABC Board,
particularly given that as currently written, the language
specifies that each day the violation continues would constitute
a separate violation. In response to a question, she clarified
that she is not suggesting that they delete Section 4, merely
that they keep the proposed language as it's currently written.
MR. STOREY, in response to a question regarding Section 5,
offered his understanding that proposed AS 05.25.065(f) pertains
to violations involving watercraft and diving.
MR. LUCKHAUPT concurred, adding that it provides penalties
pertaining to the boating safety program, to prohibited
operation of certain boats in certain manners, and to the
registration and numbering system. In response to further
questions, he explained that Section 5 proposes to change the
current fine of $500 for violating the aforementioned provisions
to $750.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG indicated that he supports such a
change.
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON mentioned that he would be offering a
couple of amendments.
2:02:25 PM
MR. HILYARD indicated that those amendments pertain to Sections
32 and 40, which pertain to violations of an order or decision
of the labor relations agency [and the railroad labor relations
agency respectively].
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON made a motion to adopt [Amendment 2],
which read [original punctuation provided but formatting
changed]:
Page 8, Lines 1-5, DELETE *Sec. 32
REPRESENTATIVE KOTT objected for the purpose of discussion.
MR. HILYARD indicated that the change proposed via Section 32
was not specifically requested by any agency.
REPRESENTATIVE KOTT removed his objection to [Amendment 2].
CHAIR McGUIRE asked whether there were any further objections to
Amendment 2. There being none, Amendment 2 was adopted.
2:04:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON made a motion to adopt Amendment 3,
which read [original punctuation provided but formatting
changed]:
Page 9, Lines 16-20
DELETE *Sec. 40
CHAIR McGUIRE objected for the purpose of discussion.
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON relayed that the [Alaska Railroad
Corporation (ARRC)] requested this amendment.
MR. HILYARD indicated that both the labor relations agency and
the railroad labor relations agency felt it would be best to
delete Section 40.
CHAIR McGUIRE removed her objection and asked whether there were
any further objections to Amendment 3. There being none,
Amendment 3 was adopted.
2:04:59 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to take from the table
Conceptual Amendment 1. There being no objection, it was so
ordered.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG again made the motion to adopt
Conceptual Amendment 1.
CHAIR McGUIRE objected for the purpose of having Representative
Gruenberg restate Conceptual Amendment 1.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said, "Tighten the title."
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON asked Mr. Luckhaupt whether that would
be possible.
MR. LUCKHAUPT indicated that he could do that, though he warned
that the title could become rather voluminous.
CHAIR McGUIRE surmised that the goal of Conceptual Amendment 1
would be to prevent mischief with regard to fines and offenses.
CHAIR McGUIRE removed her objection and asked whether there were
any further objections to Conceptual Amendment 1. There being
none, Conceptual Amendment 1 was adopted.
MR. HILYARD, in response to a question, said he is not aware of
any section of the bill that has not yet been discussed.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked whether the bill contains any substantive
changes not yet discussed.
MR. LUCKHAUPT said he has attempted to make HB 384 similar to a
revisor's bill but specifically focusing on the proportionality
of fines pertaining to certain misdemeanors.
2:10:00 PM
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal
Services Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law
(DOL), offered his understanding that any of the penalties set
out in the bill, whether the crimes are deemed misdemeanors or
violations or infractions, require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. A lesser burden of proof would only apply in situations
involving civil penalties.
MR. LUCKHAUPT clarified that although the crimes addressed in
the bill are non-criminal in nature they are still quasi-
criminal offenses.
2:11:10 PM
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL moved to report the proposed committee
substitute (CS) for HB 384, Version 24-LS0985\Y, Luckhaupt,
1/30/06, as amended, out of committee with individual
recommendations and the accompanying fiscal notes. There being
no objection, CSHB 384(JUD) was reported from the House
Judiciary Standing Committee.
The committee took an at-ease from 2:11 p.m. to 2:12 p.m.
HB 353 - SENTENCING FOR SEXUAL OFFENSES
2:13:21 PM
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the final order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 353, "An Act relating to sentences for sexual
offenses." [Before the committee was the proposed committee
substitute (CS) for HB 353, Version 24-LS1449\F, Luckhaupt,
2/10/06, which had been adopted as the work draft on 2/15/06.]
2:13:58 PM
JOSHUA FINK, Public Advocate, Anchorage Office, Office of Public
Advocacy (OPA), Department of Administration (DOA), after noting
that the OPA has as some of its clients both victims of sexual
abuse and those accused of sexual abuse, said that the OPA
doesn't have a position on either the bill or the sentencing
ranges contained therein, but would like to turn the committee's
attention to certain issues of concern to the OPA. The first
issue is that although proposed AS 11.56.767(b) provides a
defense for an attorney for failing to comply with the reporting
requirements found elsewhere in Section 2, an attorney could
still be charged with that proposed crime and have to defend
himself/herself, thus creating a potential conflict of interest
when faced with the prospect of having to advise a client
accused of a sex offense.
MR. FINK suggested that this could raise a constitutional issue
because defendants are entitled to counsel. He suggested that
the bill be changed to exclude attorneys from the reporting
requirement altogether, rather than merely providing a defense
for failing to comply. He referred to the Alaska Rules of
Evidence, noted that it grants certain groups of people the
privilege of abstaining from testifying against a defendant, and
suggested that Section 2 of Version F could subject these groups
of people to criminal liability.
MR. FINK then referred to proposed AS 12.55.125(i)(3), and noted
that in part it will increase the presumptive sentencing ranges
for crimes that could consist of merely touching someone through
clothing or consensual sex between persons when one of them is
16 years of age or older and the other is a minor more than
three years younger; for a first offense for such crimes under
Version F, the minimum sentence is five years, the same as for
the crime of attempted murder in the first degree. Raising the
issue of proportionality, he asked the committee to consider
whether touching someone through clothing or consensual sex
between two teenagers should garner the same punishment as
attempted murder in the first degree. He then spoke briefly
about a proposed amendment he'd heard about but which had not
been included in Version F of HB 353.
2:23:44 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG noted that he has been given two
possible amendments regarding the issue of "privilege" - one by
Quinlan Steiner from the Public Defender Agency, and one by Mr.
Fink.
[Mr. Steiner's suggested amendment would: delete the period
from proposed AS 11.56.767(a)(2) and add the words, "with the
intent to aid the sex offender or child kidnapper in avoiding
the requirements of AS 11.56.840; and"; add a new paragraph (3)
to proposed AS 11.56.767(a) that says, "(3) there did not exist
a bona fide attorney-client relationship between the person and
the sex offender or child kidnapper at the time of the alleged
offense."; and delete proposed AS 11.56.767(b) and reletter the
remaining text of proposed AS 11.56.767 accordingly.]
[Mr. Fink's suggested amendment would: add a new paragraph (3)
to proposed AS 11.56.767(a) that says, "(3) there did not exist
a bona fide marital, spiritual adviser, attorney-client, or
psychotherapist-patient relationship between the person and the
sex offender or child kidnapper at the time of the alleged
offense."; and delete proposed AS 11.56.767(b) and reletter the
remaining text of proposed AS 11.56.767 accordingly.]
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG, after determining that both Mr. Fink
and Mr. Steiner had seen copies of each other's suggested
amendments, asked whether Mr. Steiner's suggested amendment
would be covered under Mr. Fink's suggested amendment.
QUINLAN G. STEINER, Director, Central Office, Public Defender
Agency (PDA), Department of Administration (DOA), offered his
belief that Mr. Fink's suggested amendment only incorporates one
of his suggested changes.
MR. STEINER then referred to proposed AS 11.56.767(a)(2), and
opined that as currently written, it will create an
irreconcilable conflict of interest preventing attorneys from
representing someone convicted of a sex offense, and posited
that his suggested amendment would resolve that issue. Raising
the issue of unconstitutionality, he noted that an act of
omission typically requires three elements - a legal duty, a
defined penalty, and notice of that duty and penalty - and yet
proposed AS 11.56.767(a) only contains the penalty element and
not the legal duty or notice elements; therefore, no criminal
culpability could "attach for this type of conduct." Altering
proposed AS 11.56.767(a)(2) as he's suggested, he remarked, will
make it a specific intent crime and thereby address both of the
aforementioned problems.
2:27:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GARA, referring to the proposed increases in
sentencing, surmised that these increases will place intense
pressure on innocent people to plead guilty to lesser charges.
MR. STEINER concurred that such is an inherent part of the plea
bargain process, and mentioned that a possible increase in
workloads could result as well. In response to another
question, he said it will be up to prosecutors to decide whether
to prosecute certain cases or forgo doing so in favor of
conserving resources. In response to a further question, he
clarified that his suggested amendment has not yet been reviewed
for consistency and is instead simply being offered as a
possible solution.
CHAIR McGUIRE, referring to Mr. Steiner's suggested amendment,
pointed out that there is already precedent for establishing a
state policy that creates a duty to report. That being the
case, why would doing so again with regard to reporting sex
offenders and child kidnappers be considered unconstitutional?
MR. STEINER, offering his understanding that a duty to report
only applies to regulated industries, reiterated that two of the
typical elements of an act of omission are missing from proposed
AS 11.56.767(a), which currently only contains the penalty
element. He relayed that there is a case that states that a
person cannot be punished for a crime of omission if that person
did not know, and the state had not taken reasonable steps to
inform him/her, of his/her duty to act and of the criminal
penalty for failing to do so. This is the counterpart to the
concept that ignorance of the law is no excuse for not following
the law, because there is an exception to that particular
doctrine if the issue pertains to passive conduct - if the
conduct is passive, and one is not notified of a duty to act,
then one will not be held criminally culpable if one is ignorant
of that duty.
2:36:39 PM
SUSAN A. PARKES, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Law (DOL), said
she disagrees with Mr. Steiner on the issue of whether proposed
AS 11.56.767(a) is unconstitutional. She directed members'
attention to AS 11.56.765 - Failure to report a violent crime
committed against a child - and noted that this statute doesn't
apply only to regulated industries; rather, that statute
reflects a policy call requiring people to report crimes against
children that they are aware of, and proposed AS 11.56.767(a)
reflects a similar policy call.
2:37:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG, referring to Mr. Steiner's suggested
amendment, made a motion to adopt it as Conceptual Amendment 1
[text provided previously].
CHAIR McGUIRE objected. Recalling past legislation that
attempted to alter, with regard to members of the clergy, the
statutes pertaining to the duty to report, she reiterated that
it is not unprecedented for the legislature to create an
affirmative duty to report.
MS. PARKES offered her understanding that AS 47.17.060
specifically states that neither the physician-patient privilege
nor the husband-wife privilege is grounds for excluding evidence
regarding a child's harm or its cause in a judicial proceeding.
The legislature does have the ability to establish a policy that
waives certain [privileges]. She also suggested that the
"intent" language in Conceptual Amendment 1 would create
[problems].
2:39:52 PM
SENATOR CON BUNDE, Alaska State Legislature, speaking as the
sponsor of SB 218 and noting that the Alaska State Constitution
sets out citizens' duties as well as rights, said he finds it a
bit outrageous to think that a duty to report must also be
outlined in statute, though he is willing to do so if the
wording of the Alaska State Constitution does not prove to be
sufficient in that regard. He said he doesn't see a
constitutional problem with the language in [proposed AS
11.56.767(a)], and indicated that he opposes Conceptual
Amendment 1.
SENATOR GRETCHEN GUESS, Alaska State Legislature, speaking as
the sponsor of SB 223, indicated that she also opposes
Conceptual Amendment 1.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG noted that he was merely offering
Conceptual Amendment 1 by request.
2:41:47 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Anderson, Coghill,
Gruenberg, Kott, Gara, and McGuire voted against Conceptual
Amendment 1. Therefore, Conceptual Amendment 1 failed by a vote
of 0-6.
CHAIR McGUIRE acknowledged that Mr. Steiner was merely offering
the language of Conceptual Amendment 1 as a suggestion.
2:42:19 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG, referring to Mr. Fink's suggested
amendment, made a motion to adopt it as Conceptual Amendment 2
[text provided previously].
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG then referred to the term, "spiritual
adviser" in Conceptual Amendment 2, and made a motion to amend
Conceptual Amendment 2 such that that term would be replaced
with the phrase, "clergy as defined in Alaska Rule of
Evidence 506".
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON objected for the purpose of discussion.
CHAIR McGUIRE, after ascertaining that Representative Anderson's
objection did not pertain to the amendment to Conceptual
Amendment 2, and that there were no further objections,
announced that the amendment to Conceptual Amendment 2 was
adopted.
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON sought clarification regarding
Conceptual Amendment 2, as amended.
MR. FINK, after relaying that he'd merely provided the language
of Conceptual Amendment 2 for the committee's consideration,
offered his understanding that according to the Alaska Rules of
Evidence, if one is a spouse, an attorney, a member of the
clergy, or a psychotherapist of a defendant, one cannot be
compelled to reveal confidential communications one has had with
the defendant. He acknowledged, however, that a psychotherapist
currently does have a duty to report instances of child abuse.
He suggested that [society] has traditionally recognized that
the relationships one has with the aforementioned people are
fairly inviolate and so those people shouldn't be made to
testify against a defendant, and, by extension, oughtn't be made
to divulge information about a defendant either.
2:47:04 PM
MS. PARKES said that although its a policy call as to who the
legislature wants to exempt from the provisions of the bill, her
concern is that as currently written, Conceptual Amendment 2 [as
amended] will require the DOL to prove, in every case, that a
defendant accused of a failure to report is not an attorney, is
not a member of the clergy, is not a marital counselor, and is
not a psychotherapist to the sex offender or child kidnapper.
In contrast, the bill stipulates that it is an affirmative
defense that the defendant was an attorney to the sex offender
or child kidnapper, thus requiring the defendant to prove that
such a relationship existed. Furthermore, in instances of
failure to report a violent crime committed against a child,
there are some affirmative defense set out currently.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to conceptually amend
Conceptual Amendment 2, as amended, such that it becomes an
affirmative defense that the defendant must raise the issue and,
once the issue is raised with a quantum of evidence sufficient
to allow such to be found by the trier of fact, then it will be
up to the prosecutor to disprove that fact beyond a reasonable
doubt.
MS. PARKES surmised that this would be similar to what occurs in
self-defense cases - one must raise some reliable evidence and
then the state has [the burden of disproving it].
CHAIR McGUIRE, recalling that Ms. Parkes had referenced other
places [in statute] where the legislature established an
affirmative duty to report certain things, asked whether there
are also instances where privileged relationships are not
allowed to serve as an affirmative defense for failure to
report, and, if so, is the list proposed by Conceptual
Amendment 2, as amended, more expansive that what the
legislature has traditionally allowed.
MS. PARKES explained that the different statutes have different
requirements and different exceptions. For example, for a
failure to report a violent crime committed against a child, it
is an affirmative defense that one was in fear of one's own life
for reporting, but merely having a specific relationship with
another person does not exempt one from the reporting
requirement. Therefore, there is precedence for the legislature
to require everyone to report regardless of any relationships,
though there are also some statutes that do exempt certain
people from reporting.
2:51:07 PM
SENATOR BUNDE said he appreciates removal of the term,
"spiritual advisor", particularly in light of the fact that
anyone can claim to be a spiritual advisor; for example, "Papa
Pilgrim" was his daughter's spiritual advisor and he has been
accused of abusing her. Senator Bunde questioned, however, what
would constitute being considered a member of the clergy.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG noted that Rule 506 of the Alaska Rules
of Evidence defines a member of the clergy as: "a minister,
priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious
organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by
the person consulting the individual". Representative
Gruenberg, acknowledging that such a definition could be
misused, indicated that he didn't have a problem with further
amending Conceptual Amendment 2, as amended, on the issue of
clergy members.
MR. STEINER, in response to a question, said that the
affirmative defense currently in the bill doesn't cure the
ethical problem of a defense attorney having to advise a client
accused of a sex offense, because the attorney could still be
charged with a crime thereby creating an adverse interest with a
client who's a convicted sex offender or child kidnapper and who
tells the attorney that he/she has not registered. Normally,
when there is no exposure to being charged with a crime, a
defense attorney can simply tell the client that he/she needs to
register; under the bill, even though there is an affirmative
defense, the attorney still has an interest in avoiding
prosecution, and that interest is directly adverse to a client's
best interest.
MR. STEINER, in response to a further question, indicated that
his solutions to the aforementioned problem were embodied in
Conceptual Amendment 1.
MS. PARKES said her concern with making failure to report an
intent crime is that one would only have to say one never meant
to aid the sex offender or child kidnapper by failing to report
that that person had not registered, and it will be very hard to
prove the intention behind why a person fails to do a particular
conduct.
2:56:30 PM
SENATOR GUESS said she intends to continue working on this issue
further, regardless of whether any of the proposed amendments
are adopted, so as to satisfy everyone's concerns.
CHAIR McGUIRE concurred that the issue needs more vetting, and
said she would be opposing Conceptual Amendment 2, as amended,
because she is not sure that every category of persons listed in
it ought to be exempted from the reporting requirement,
particularly given that some of the most heinous acts committed
against children have actually been committed by members of the
clergy. Furthermore, this provision of the bill is simply
stipulating that the location of sex offenders and child
kidnappers be reported to law enforcement, and the public's
safety should override someone's reluctance to testify against
their spouse or client.
SENATOR GUESS noted that a violation of proposed AS 11.56.767(a)
is merely a class A misdemeanor.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA opined that they oughtn't to make failure to
report the whereabouts of a sex offender or child kidnapper a
crime for the aforementioned groups of people until after they
have determined whether doing so would violate any
confidentiality provisions of current law.
SENATOR BUNDE pointed out, however, that under current law, not
only are sex offenders and child kidnappers required to
register, but everyone is required to report a violent crime
committed against a child. Proposed AS 11.56.767 merely
requires people to report the whereabouts of someone who hasn't
abided by current law.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked whether there were any objections to the
second amendment to Conceptual Amendment 2, as amended. There
being none, the second amendment to Conceptual Amendment 2, as
amended, was adopted.
3:02:25 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representative Gruenberg voted in
favor of Conceptual Amendment 2, as amended [twice].
Representatives McGuire, Coghill, Gara, Kott, and Anderson voted
against it. Therefore, Conceptual Amendment 2, as amended
[twice], failed by a vote of 1-5.
3:02:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GARA made a motion to adopt Amendment 3, which
read [original punctuation provided]:
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CHAIR McGUIRE objected for the purpose of discussion.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA explained that Amendment 3 would reduce the
proposed sentencing ranges - while still raising the current
sentencing ranges - for crimes such as sexual assault in the
second degree and third degree and sexual abuse of a minor in
the second degree; such crimes don't necessarily involve
forcible rape and could consist of merely touching someone
through clothing or consensual sex between persons when one of
them is 16 years of age or older and the other is a minor more
than three years younger. He opined that although such crimes
should still be felonies, a 5-year minimum sentence - as is
being proposed via Version F - is not justified for first-time
offenses not involving violence.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA pointed out that neither the current
sentencing ranges nor the proposed sentencing ranges reflect
what a sentence could end up being once any aggravating factors
are taken into account; in other words, the sentencing ranges
listed in AS 12.55.125(i) are just a starting point. He offered
his understanding that aggravating factors include causing
physical injury, using deliberate cruelty, throwing someone
against the wall, and wrestling someone to the ground. Some of
the crimes that could fall under the categories of sexual
assault in the second degree and third degree and sexual abuse
of a minor in the second degree deserve higher sentences and
some don't.
3:09:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GARA, referring to the crime of sexual assault in
the third degree, recapped the sentencing range under current
law and noted that under Version F, the maximum sentence without
aggravators is 12 years - 12 years for a crime that could simply
involve touching someone through clothing. He then compared
both the current sentencing ranges and the maximum sentences
with aggravators applied with those proposed via Version F and
those proposed via Amendment 3. He mentioned that Amendment 3
won't alter the sentencing ranges proposed via Version F for a
second felony conviction of second degree sexual assault, second
degree sexual abuse of a minor, unlawful exploitation of a
minor, or distribution of child pornography when the first
felony conviction was also for a sex offense.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA opined that a 5-year minimum sentence for
merely touching someone through clothing is not appropriate in
some circumstances - for example, when a person who's been
drinking in a bar starts brushing up against another patron -
and Amendment 3 will give the judge the discretion to increase
the sentence when it is appropriate but won't mandate a 5-year
sentence in less serious cases.
SENATOR BUNDE offered his view that prison sentences have
several roles: punishment, deterrence, and setting policy
standards. In terms of sexual assault crimes, prison sentences
also serves the purpose of keeping perpetrators off the street
so they can't create new victims. He suggested that the
increased sentencing ranges proposed via Version F may convince
some people to be more responsible and less likely to find an
excuse to commit a sex offense. Aggravators are part of the
system, he remarked, and offered his belief that even a single
mitigator can be used to cut a sentence in half.
SENATOR BUNDE pointed out that in Alaska, 16 is the age of
consent, and thus there is no such thing as "consensual sex"
when one of the parties is younger than 16. And although there
have been and may continue to be instances of entrapment or
vindictive parents pressing charges, prosecutorial discretion
and mitigating factors can play a role in ensuring that people
aren't serving inappropriate jail terms.
3:16:00 PM
MS. PARKES noted that the bill does not propose to change the
sentencing scheme for sexual abuse of a minor in the third
degree. With regard to situations involving touching someone
through clothing, she said that in all her years as a
prosecutor, she has never seen single-incident-type cases come
across her desk, surmising that such situations typically don't
get reported; instead, she has only seen cases involving
repeated groping and fondling.
SENATOR GUESS said she opposes Amendment 3. She noted that
child molestation cases that don't involve penetration can only
be charged at the most as sexual abuse of a minor in the second
degree, and so under Amendment 3, many of the cases that have
involved members of the clergy as perpetrators, for example,
would have only resulted in a sentence of 6 years. Such a short
sentence is inappropriate, she opined, given the long-lasting
consequences for the victims in such cases. She offered her
belief that the hypothetical example involving the bar scene
would be difficult to prove, and so it is more likely that this
proposed sentencing increase will apply mostly to molestation
cases. She then offered her understanding of what behaviors
would fall into the category of sexual assault of a minor in the
second degree and sexual assault of a minor in the third degree.
SENATOR GUESS remarked that some of the crimes for which
Version F proposes to increase the presumptive sentencing ranges
are very serious crimes, and pointed out that under the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(U.S., 2004), all sentencing regarding aggravating factors must
go to court. She also said that after reviewing all the current
aggravators, it was hard for her to see where any of them would
even apply in child molestation cases. In conclusion, she asked
the committee to not support Amendment 3.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA pointed out that Amendment 3 does address
mere sexual contact crimes between adults, that mitigators don't
automatically reduce a sentence by half and neither do
aggravators increase a sentence by half, and that there is an
aggravator that can be applied when the victim is considered
vulnerable because of his/her extreme youth. He then said:
Shame on us for passing a law that lets you prosecute
somebody for the crotch-grab circumstance and get them
5 years. Shame on us if our plan is to come back and
say, "Yeah, ... we made that a crime, we made that a
5-year sentence, but we didn't think anybody would
ever take us up on it and prosecute it."
3:22:07 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Kott, Gara, and
Gruenberg voted in favor of Amendment 3. Representatives
Anderson, Coghill, and McGuire voted against it. Therefore,
Amendment 3 failed by a vote of 3-3.
3:22:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GARA made a motion to adopt Amendment 4, which
read [original punctuation provided]:
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REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON objected [for the purpose of
discussion].
CHAIR McGUIRE turned gavel over to Representative Anderson.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA explained that Amendment 4 would reduce the
proposed sentencing ranges - while still raising the current
sentencing ranges - for crimes such as sexual assault in the
first degree; sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree; and
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit first degree
sexual assault or first degree sexual abuse of a minor - all of
which are either unclassified felonies and class A felonies. He
then recapped both the current sentencing ranges and the maximum
sentences with aggravators applied for those crimes with those
proposed via Amendment 4, indicating that it will [for the most
part] increase both the bottom end of the ranges and the top end
of the ranges by 50 percent, though for crimes wherein the
perpetrator has a prior sexual felony, the sentences proposed
via Version F are unchanged.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA said that he doesn't object to the sentences
proposed via Version F for the worst forms of the aforementioned
crimes, and while the lesser forms of those crimes should still
be crimes, they should not, he opined, result in the same
sentences as the worst forms, and offered examples of the types
of behavior that fall under the categories of sexual assault in
the first degree; sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree;
and attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit first degree
sexual assault or first degree sexual abuse of a minor.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA said he has no sympathy whatsoever with
those who commit the crimes being discussed, and he is merely
offering that those who are charged with one of these crimes but
didn't actually commit it shouldn't be sentenced as Version F
proposes.
[Representative Anderson returned the gavel to Chair McGuire.]
3:29:09 PM
CHAIR McGUIRE called the question.
A roll call vote was taken. Representative Gara voted in favor
of Amendment 4. Representatives Kott, Gruenberg, Anderson,
Coghill, and McGuire voted against it. Therefore, Amendment 4
failed by a vote of 1-5.
3:29:39 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GARA made a motion to adopt Conceptual
Amendment 5, which read [original punctuation provided but
formatting changed]:
Sec. 11.41.436 Sexual abuse of a minor in the second
degree.
(a) An offender commits the crime of sexual abuse of a
minor in the second degree if
(1) being 16 years of age or older, the offender
engages in sexual penetration with a person who is 13,
14, or 15 years of age and at least [three] four years
younger than the offender, or aids, induces, causes or
encourages a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years of age
and at least [three] four years younger than the
offender to engage in sexual penetration with another
person;
(2) being 16 years of age or older, the offender
engages in sexual contact with a person who is under
13 years of age or aids, induces, causes, or
encourages a person under 13 years of age to engage in
sexual contact with another person;
(3) being 18 years of age or older, the offender
engages in sexual contact with a person who is under
18 years of age, and the offender is the victim's
natural parent, stepparent, adopted parent, or legal
guardian;
(4) being 16 years of age or older, the offender aids,
induces, causes, or encourages a person who is under
16 years of age to engage in conduct described in AS
11.41.455(a)(2)-(6); or
(5) being 18 years of age or older, the offender
engages in sexual contact with a person who is under
16 years of age, and
(A) the victim at the time of the offense is residing
in the same household as the offender and the offender
has authority over the victim; or
(B) the offender occupies a position of authority in
relation to the victim.
(b) Sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree is a
class B felony.
Sec. 11.41.438 Sexual abuse of a minor in the third
degree.
(a) An offender commits the crime of sexual abuse of a
minor in the third degree if
(1) being 16 years of age or older, the offender
engages in sexual contact with a person who is 13, 14,
or 15 years of age and at least [three] four years
younger than the offender;
(2) being 18 years of age or older, the offender
engages in sexual penetration with a person who is 16
or 17 years of age and at least [three] four years
younger than the offender, and the offender occupies a
position of authority in relation to the victim; or
(3) being under 16 years of age, the offender engages
in sexual penetration with a person who is under 13
years of age and at least three years younger than the
offender.
(b) Sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree is a
class C felony.
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON objected for purpose of discussion.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA offered his understanding that Mr. Fink has
suggested that for the crimes listed in AS 11.41.436(a)(1) and
AS 11.41.438(a)(1)-(2), there should be an age difference of
four years between parties having consensual sex before there is
an automatic minimum sentence of 5 years.
3:31:57 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Kott and Gara voted
in favor of Conceptual Amendment 5. Representatives Coghill,
Gruenberg, Anderson, and McGuire voted against it. Therefore,
Conceptual Amendment 5 failed by a vote of 2-4.
3:32:23 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG moved to report the proposed committee
substitute (CS) for HB 353, Version 24-LS1449\F, Luckhaupt,
2/10/06, out of committee with individual recommendations and
the accompanying fiscal notes.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA objected.
3:32:44 PM
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Gruenberg, Kott,
McGuire, Anderson, and Coghill voted in favor of reporting the
proposed CS for HB 353, Version 24-LS1449\F, Luckhaupt, 2/10/06,
out of committee. Representative Gara voted against it.
Therefore, CSHB 353(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary
Standing Committee by a vote of 5-1.
ADJOURNMENT
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 3:33 p.m.
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