03/04/2002 01:13 PM House JUD
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+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
March 4, 2002
1:13 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Norman Rokeberg, Chair
Representative Jeannette James
Representative John Coghill
Representative Kevin Meyer
Representative Ethan Berkowitz
Representative Albert Kookesh
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Scott Ogan, Vice Chair
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar
William A. Granger - Anchorage
Violent Crimes Compensation Board
Leslie D. Bogda Wheeler - Wasilla
Commission on Judicial Conduct
Jeffrey M. Feldman - Anchorage
- CONFIRMATIONS ADVANCED
HOUSE BILL NO. 252
"An Act relating to the construction of certain statutes
relating to children; relating to the scope of duty and standard
of care for persons who provide services to certain children and
families; and providing for an effective date."
- MOVED CSHB 252(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: HB 252
SHORT TITLE:STANDARD OF CARE FOR CINA SERVICES
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)COGHILL
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
04/23/01 1136 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
04/23/01 1136 (H) HES
01/17/02 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
01/17/02 (H) Heard & Held
01/17/02 (H) MINUTE(HES)
02/07/02 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
02/07/02 (H) <Bill Canceled>
02/12/02 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
02/12/02 (H) Heard & Held
02/12/02 (H) MINUTE(HES)
02/13/02 2257 (H) COSPONSOR(S): DYSON
02/14/02 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
02/14/02 (H) Heard & Held
02/14/02 (H) MINUTE(HES)
02/21/02 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
02/21/02 (H) Moved CSHB 252(HES) Out of
Committee
02/21/02 (H) MINUTE(HES)
02/25/02 2378 (H) HES RPT CS(HES) NT 1DP 3NR
1AM
02/25/02 2378 (H) DP: CISSNA; NR: COGHILL,
KOHRING,
02/25/02 2378 (H) JOULE; AM: DYSON
02/25/02 2378 (H) FN1: (HSS)
02/25/02 2390 (H) JUD REFERRAL ADDED AFTER HES
02/25/02 2390 (H) FIN REFERRAL ADDED AFTER JUD
03/04/02 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
WILLIAM A. GRANGER, Appointee
to the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar
13810 Jarvi Drive
Anchorage, Alaska 99515
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified as appointee to the Board of
Governors of the Alaska Bar.
LESLIE D. BOGDA WHEELER, Appointee
to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board (VCCB)
PO Box 878885
Wasilla, Alaska 99687
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified as appointee to the Violent
Crimes Compensation Board.
JEFFREY M. FELDMAN, Appointee
to the Commission on Judicial Conduct (CJC)
500 L Street, Suite 400
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified as appointee to the Commission on
Judicial Conduct.
SUSAN COX, Chief Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division (Juneau)
Department of Law (DOL)
PO Box 110300
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 252 responded to
questions.
SCOTT CALDER
PO Box 75011
Fairbanks, Alaska 99707
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments and responded to
questions during discussion of HB 252.
REPRESENTATIVE SHARON CISSNA
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 420
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments during discussion of HB
252.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 02-27, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR NORMAN ROKEBERG called the House Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 1:13 p.m. Representatives
Rokeberg, Coghill, Meyer, and Berkowitz were present at the call
to order. Representatives James and Kookesh arrived as the
meeting was in progress.
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar
Number 0103
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the committee would consider
William A Granger as appointee to the Board of Governors of the
Alaska Bar.
Number 0117
WILLIAM A. GRANGER, Appointee to the Board of Governors of the
Alaska Bar ("the Board of Governors"), testified via
teleconference. He mentioned that he is a lifelong Alaskan,
raised and educated in Alaska; has been a banker all of his
adult life, employed most recently by "National Bank of
Alaska/Wells Fargo"; is currently in private practice making
small consumer and larger commercial loans; has been active for
many years in the "Anchorage bar community" in commercial-type
transactions and bankruptcy transactions; and has friends and
acquaintances who, over the years, have served on the Board of
Governors of the Alaska Bar.
MR. GRANGER noted that from these people he has received glowing
recommendations regarding the Board of Governors' educational
process, and its importance in maintaining the integrity and
quality of the bar at large. He recounted that he's always been
interested in seeing that "that" be kept to the highest standard
possible. He noted that he has been active on the Board of
Governors for the last six months since his initial appointment
in June 2001; has attended two or three regular meetings; and
has been involved in some of the Board of Governors'
disciplinary matters, continuing education matters, and
"planning meetings" for the Bar Association. He said he has
made an effort to become familiar with what the Board of
Governors does and how it operates, adding that his enthusiasm
for his appointment has not waned at all.
CHAIR ROKEBERG thanked Mr. Granger for volunteering to serve on
the Board of Governors. After some discussion regarding the
forms provided to the committee, Chair Rokeberg reminded members
that signing the reports regarding appointments to boards and
commissions in no way reflects individual members' approval or
disapproval of the appointees, and that the nominations are
merely forwarded to the full legislature for confirmation or
rejection.
Violent Crimes Compensation Board
Number 0388
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the committee would consider
Leslie D. Bogda Wheeler as appointee to the Violent Crimes
Compensation Board.
Number 0417
LESLIE D. BOGDA WHEELER, Appointee to the Violent Crimes
Compensation Board (VCCB), testified via teleconference. She
confirmed that she has served on the VCCB for a partial term and
a full term, and is now up for reappointment for a second full
term. She relayed that in the past she had worked with the
Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault (CDVSA) and some
of the programs that it funds, and that she has devoted much of
her professional life, for the last 20 years, to victims'
services and victims' issues.
MS. BOGDA WHEELER said that serving on the VCCB has been a very
rewarding experience for her because the VCCB addresses the
needs and issues of victims in many different circumstances. In
addition to [issues of] sexual assault, domestic violence, and
sexual abuse of children, the VCCB also addresses the entire
spectrum of victims' compensation. She noted that she has been
fortunate, as a member of the VCCB, to attend a national
conference on victims' issues, and this has broadened her
knowledge considerably. "With the unfortunate advent of
terrorism in our country, I was glad to know that we had already
addressed some of the issues involved there, so that we would be
prepared, in Alaska, to provide those services; our policies
reflect those concerns and that preparation," she added.
MS. BOGDA WHEELER said that the VCCB does quite a bit of work
and meets four times a year, and that its staff has done an
incredible job of making sure that victims throughout Alaska
receive the benefit of compensation for out-of-pocket expenses.
She opined that the VCCB is doing a very important job for the
people of Alaska, and stated that she is proud to serve on the
VCCB and would enjoy continuing that service.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked for an example of the highest and lowest
amounts of compensation that the VCCB has awarded, and for what
circumstances those were made.
MS. BOGDA WHEELER said that probably the lowest financial figure
- for example, a few hundred dollars - would be for somebody who
had some expenses related to going to a hospital, or who had
out-of-pocket expenses for a few sessions of crisis counseling.
The highest awards would be for cases where somebody has been
tragically injured and their medical bills go far beyond
anything that the VCCB has the resources to compensate for. The
current high amount for an individual is $25,000, and for
multiple-victim situations, the VCCB can award up to $40,000 for
expenses that may in fact be into the hundreds of thousands of
dollars. For a child who has lost his/her parent due to a
violent crime, the VCCB would be able to pay $25,000, total, to
that child, which, when considering what it costs to raise a
child, is pretty much just a drop in the bucket, she added.
"Those are opposite ends of the continuum, if you will, in terms
of what we are able to award," she stated.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether, in making awards, the VCCB looks
at other factors such as insurance, the victim's net worth, and
other family assets.
MS. BOGDA WHEELER said yes; the VCCB is the "payer of last
resort," so all other ability-to-pay avenues are exhausted
before the VCCB pays anything on any given aspect of a claim.
CHAIR ROKEBERG thanked Ms. Bogda Wheeler for serving on the
VCCB.
Commission on Judicial Conduct
Number 0800
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the committee would consider
Jeffrey M. Feldman as appointee to the Commission on Judicial
Conduct.
Number 0837
JEFFREY M. FELDMAN, Appointee to the Commission on Judicial
Conduct (CJC), testified via teleconference. After noting that
he is up for reappointment to the CJC for a third term, he
explained that the CJC is responsible for enforcing the code of
judicial ethics and making recommendations to the [Alaska]
Supreme Court regarding disciplining judges who have violated
that code. He said he has resided in Alaska since 1975 and is a
lawyer in private practice - predominately a trial and appeal
practice with a mixture of civil cases.
MR. FELDMAN said the CJC fulfills an essential role in the
judicial system by ensuring the integrity of the process. He
explained that the staff of the CJC receives and reviews a large
number of grievances and complaints each year, after which the
CJC also reviews them and then holds hearings where appropriate
in order to make findings and recommendations. He offered that
during the time that he has served, the CJC has been carrying
out its work in a more timely fashion, the caseload is much more
current, and the response to concerns and complaints has
improved.
MR. FELDMAN noted, however, that there is always tension between
rules that keep certain matters at certain stages of the
investigation confidential and the desirability of having an
open process that is available to the public. He elaborated:
We operate under rules that are established both
internally and by statute, and we've attempted to
strike that balance - I think reasonably well. And
Alaska currently has one of the most open systems of
judicial discipline in the country, which I happen to
personally think is highly desirable, and if it were
up to me personally, I'd probably be happy to make it
even more open.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked for an example of a typical complaint that
the CJC receives.
MR. FELDMAN explained that the typical complaint is usually one
that does not fall within the jurisdiction of the CJC; a typical
complaint often comes [from] a prisoner in jail, or sometimes
from a dissatisfied litigant - frequently in a domestic matter -
who has a disagreement with a decision that's been made by the
judge. Unhappy litigants account for a lot of the complaints
that the CJC receives but lacks the authority to review. Of the
complaints that the CJC receives that are within its
jurisdiction, a significant number fall into the category of
judicial demeanor, which is how judges behave and treat people.
Number 1048
MR. FELDMAN noted that the cases that have prompted actual
"positions and discipline" have been instances of judges
crossing the line and engaging in actions that are beyond the
scope of their authority, using judicial power in a way that is
found to be improper, and generally conducted themselves in a
way that is inconsistent with the cannons of judicial ethics.
For example, a judge who was found to have bypassed the normal
procedures for appointing someone into a coroner position, and a
judge who was found to have used the "intent power" in an
improper fashion. Demeanor and use of power, he noted, are the
two main categories that complaints fall into, although there
are few complaints of judicial misconduct that rise to a serious
level; most complaints are simply from unhappy litigants who
don't like what happened to them during the judicial process.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether the CJC is responsible for "grading
for retention."
MR. FELDMAN explained that the Alaska Judicial Council (AJC) is
the body responsible for retention issues and screening
applicants for appointment to the bench, not the CJC. The CJC's
mission is solely limited to judicial discipline, he added.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether there is any communication between
the AJC and the CJC regarding retention.
MR. FELDMAN replied:
There is in the sense that there is a rule that
requires that if a judge is up for retention and is
currently the subject of a "conduct commission
proceeding," certain notification of that proceeding
has to be made to the [AJC] so that they can evaluate
it and determine whether it bears on the judge's
fitness for retention.
CHAIR ROKEBERG thanked Mr. Feldman for his public service.
MR. FELDMAN remarked that he has always considered it an honor
to serve on the CJC.
Number 1263
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that there were no objections to forwarding
the reports regarding the appointments of: William A. Granger
to the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar, Leslie D. Bogda
Wheeler to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, and Jeffrey M.
Feldman to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. Therefore, the
confirmations were advanced.
HB 252 - STANDARD OF CARE FOR CINA SERVICES
Number 1296
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the last order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 252, "An Act relating to the construction of
certain statutes relating to children; relating to the scope of
duty and standard of care for persons who provide services to
certain children and families; and providing for an effective
date." [Before the committee was CSHB 252(HES).] Chair
Rokeberg indicated that he would prefer that the testimony focus
on the legal issues of HB 252, in particular the civil liability
provision - Section 7.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL, speaking as the sponsor, said that HB
252 includes recognition of parental rights and encourages
greater parental participation with regard to children-in-need-
of-aid (CINA) discussions. It establishes a pilot program
regarding intensive family services, and, with regard to section
7, HB 252 addresses the issue of the duty and standard of care
being exempted from [AS] 47.10. He noted that this exemption is
what actually began the whole discussion that resulted in the
creation of HB 252. "The reason I brought this whole bill
forward was [that] I wanted a little higher degree of
accountability in the Department [of Health & Social Services
(DHSS)] under [AS] 47.10," he added.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL noted that although the [DHSS] actually
has "pretty good levels of care," he wanted to tie it to
statute. He noted, however, that placing all of the duties and
standards of care that the [DHSS] currently follows would create
"about a 50-page bill." In addition, although the [DHSS] is
under a lot of pressure to perform its duties with fewer
resources, Representative Coghill said he would still like to at
least provide for departmental accountability and for some form
of civil liability. He pointed out that the [DHSS] has been
given quasi police and judicial powers, and so should be held
accountable for its actions under AS 47.10, much like the
requirement of law enforcement to read a person his/her "Miranda
rights."
Number 1520
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL explained that the Department of law
suggested the current language in Section 7 of HB 252, but he
would rather take that language out and allow for some form
liability. He noted, however, that he did not want to impede
the [DHSS] in asserting its authority under AS 47.10 in cases
where there is danger and harm, but [the DHSS] should still be
held accountable for any misuse of that authority. The whole
intention of HB 252, he said, is to show respect for parental
authority, to encourage families to participate in child-in-
need-of-aid [solutions], to provide for a "family preservation
service," and to address the issue of civil liability pertaining
to [DHSS] actions. He remarked that he objects to the fact that
there is no "standard and duty of care" in statute.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL mentioned that he has a couple of
amendments to suggest, one of them being merely a technical
amendment.
CHAIR ROKEBERG surmised, then, that the goal of HB 252 is to
establish in law the fact that the department has a duty to, or
a standard of care for, the children in the department's
custody, and that Representative Coghill also wishes to retain
some type of immunity that exculpates those [department] people
from any civil liability.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL clarified, rather, that although the
language [regarding immunity from civil liability] was suggested
by the Department of Law, he would prefer to have that language
taken out entirely [so that] if someone felt that there was harm
done by the department, he/she could have some kind of civil
recourse]. "I don't want to have language in statutes that
specifically exempts this department," he added. He recalled
that when the [CINA] statutes were first enacted, there were
many new provisions and the department was concerned that it
would be subjected to lawsuits before all aspects of the [CINA]
program could be instituted. This concern resulted in the
current statutory language pertaining to immunity from civil
liability.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL opined that it is time to remove this
language now that the [CINA] program is up and running. He
relayed his concern that although people in the department
sometimes do an excellent job, occasionally they overstep their
bounds. Under AS 47.10, families can be held to a very high
degree of accountability, so it is important for parents to have
some recourse in cases where the department has abused its
powers, he opined. And although there are currently a lot of
duties and standards in regulation, he said he would rather
there was something more specific placed in statute than what is
currently there. He remarked that his intention at this point
is to at least make sure that the state is not exempting itself
from a standard of care, which, he opined, is what the current
language [in both the statute and HB 252] does.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked whether there were any lawsuits
at this time, and what was the state's potential liability.
Number 1864
SUSAN COX, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division
(Juneau), Department of Law (DOL), said that she represents the
state in personal injury litigation specifically, although she
herself does "not do children's' cases." In response to
Representative Berkowitz, she said that the state does have
cases pending, some related to events that occurred before the
"Smart Start legislation" was enacted four years ago, and some
related to events that occurred afterwards. She went on to
explain that essentially, the standard for liability becomes an
issue when the Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) has
failed to exercise reasonable care in protecting children from
harm, whether they are children in foster care who are not
protected adequately from foster parents or others in the foster
home, or children who are not taken into foster care and
protected from their natural parents. Unfortunately, she noted,
the DOL has cases of both kinds, which the special litigation
attorneys are handling.
MS. COX, turning to Section 7 of HB 252, explained that the
language [in question] was initially placed in statute four
years ago to preserve the status quo with respect to liability.
Thus, this language that says, "nothing in this title creates a
duty or standard of care" did not create an immunity for the
department. The intention was to keep individual provisions,
selectively or collectively, from creating, in and of
themselves, new causes of action or new theories for liability.
Obviously, she noted, it certainly left open the argument that
the [DHSS] or the [DFYS] has failed in, or been negligent in,
protecting children from harm. So this [language] was an
attempt to keep specific provisions of the CINA laws from
becoming, themselves, vehicles for new tort theories - new
causes of action.
Number 2001
MS. COX explained that one of the concerns at the time pertained
specifically to timelines. The legislation in Title 47
regarding children in need of aid set very specific goals; in
fact, she said, Representative Dyson told her that he considers
them to be goals and guidelines and that he expects the [DFYS]
to exercise some flexibility in moving to terminate parental
rights and in making permanent decisions with respect to
children. So, both because of the resource questions regarding
having enough social workers to handle things in the most
beneficial manner, and because the courts can't always do
everything in the timelines required, the DOL does not want to
see failure to act within certain timeframes to become, itself,
a basis for new tort theories. "Again, we always have the
potential for a negligence action claiming that the [DHSS or the
DFYS] or a specific social worker has failed to protect children
adequately," she said
MS. COX mentioned that at the time, Representative Dyson, one of
the architects of the Smart Start legislation, agreed to this
language, and so it became part of the overall package and was
figured into the fiscal note in 1998. She explained that this
language is a term of art, and is certainly not intended to
imply to anyone that the DFYS does not need to have standards
regarding how it cares for or protects children. In fact, that
is certainly not the case, she assured the committee; in
reviewing Title 47, one finds that the process and the whole
system clarify that the [DFYS], the courts, the guardians ad
litem, and the families all have responsibilities in ensuring
that the system works for the benefit of the children.
MS. COX pointed out that there is accountability in that process
in that parents who are aggrieved have the ability to be
represented by counsel, to get court-appointed counsel if they
cannot afford it, or to advocate on their own behalves. In
addition, guardians ad litem are appointed to represent
children's interests, and the [DFYS] has voluminous policies and
procedures, as well as administrative complaint processes for
parents or others involved in the system who aren't happy with
how a situation has turned out. She added that there are many
instances in statute that allow someone who is not satisfied to
go to the court and ask the judge to review the situation.
Number 2102
MS. COX stated that if AS 47.10.960 - Section 7 of HB 252 - was
repealed in its entirety, it begs the question of what the
legislature's intent is in doing that. Is it the legislature's
desire to open the door for new arguments about liability based
on the CINA laws? Is that the intent? Or is it just that the
words that are in the statute are offensive or somehow
misleading to the public? Unfortunately, as a defense attorney,
she said, she can envision new suits, or new theories raised in
existing suits, that if this language were repealed, then some
provision in the CINA law, if not followed to a "T," would
become a new theory of liability, and the attorney general's
office would end up arguing whether it was the legislature's
intention to create new liabilities. Therefore, since it was
the DOL's understanding that the reference to a standard of care
was the problem, the DOL suggested some alternative language
that did not speak in terms of standard of care.
MS. COX explained that the new language proposed in Section 7 of
HB 252 was just one of the suggestions the DOL made, and it was
what the House Health, Education, and Social Services Standing
Committee chose to insert in its committee substitute (CS).
There are certainly other ways that it could be said, she noted,
but if AS 47.10.960 is repealed altogether without some
substitute language, she expected a fiscal impact in her office.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ wanted clarification on whether, under
the existing statute, suits have been initiated and, therefore,
people who feel that the [DHSS] has wronged them do have access
to the courts.
MS. COX said that is true, but it is primarily for people who
believe that children have been harmed, either from being placed
in foster care that was not appropriate - not safe - or from not
being placed in foster care at all. At this point, she
explained, the parents who do not like the way the process has
handled things do not necessarily have a right of recourse for
themselves; the current lawsuits maintain that the children have
been negligently harmed as a result of the [DFYS's or the
DHSS's] actions. Therefore, she said, she would not say that
the DOL has ongoing litigation involving parent's allegations
that they have somehow been aggrieved; the current cases pertain
to failing to protect children.
Number 2251
MS. COX, in response to a question regarding the standard prior
to the enactment of HB 375 [by a previous legislature],
explained that before that time, the laws in Title 47 relating
to child protection were not as mandatory or as extensive, and
so did not impose as many statutory obligations upon the [DHSS].
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL remarked that parents don't have a lot of
latitude on timelines [imposed by the DHSS/DFYS]; parents are
held civilly liable if they don't make a court date, they are
held civilly liable if they don't follow through with even
suggestions made by the [DHSS/DFYS], and they are held civilly
liable if they sign something that they don't necessarily
understand and can't comply with because they have not been
properly instructed. Not only are parents held civilly liable,
they may have their children taken away from them. Parents are
held civilly liable by many entities, including the court
system, the DFYS, and a variety of different [agencies].
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL opined that with all of the extra
authority, knowledge, and other advantages that [the DHSS] has
over parents, [the DHSS] should at least be liable for not
following "those timelines." He pointed out that pursuing
litigation is very difficult for a parent who is under
investigation [by the DHSS]. He said that his intent is "to
bring that liability at least to some equity." He asked for an
example of a [new theory of] liability that might result from
repealing Section 7.
MS. COX clarified that in the world of litigation, saying that
someone is civilly liable means that he/she is subject to a
judgment for damages, and this is what Section 7 [precludes].
To say that a parent is held accountable in many instances in
the DFYS and CINA systems is not the same thing as saying that
he/she is civilly liable.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL offered, however, that those parents are
subject to a civil action.
MS. COX acknowledged that a CINA case is a civil action; it's a
children's action, which is a special kind of civil action that
the courts designate differently. Notwithstanding this, she
added, there is a difference between saying civil liability for
purposes of damages and saying that someone is responsible for
following certain processes in the law. To say that parents are
statutorily required to comply with various court and DFYS
requirements - if the CINA statutes are invoked and a process is
initiated - is different than saying parents are civilly liable.
Number 2392
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL argued, however, that the effect of this
kind of civil action is still significant. And while he
understands the concept of civil liability as it relates to a
monetary judgment, he said, what he is referring to is still
considered a civil action.
MS. COX agreed. She then remarked that the responsibilities of
the [DHSS] are spelled out in the same statutes that speak to
the responsibilities of parents, with the court overseeing the
process; hence, recourse for parents is there, currently, via
the courts. Regarding the question of what a new [theory of]
liability might be, she said:
By removing this language [in Section 7] that has, up
to this point, meant that the CINA statutes, in and of
themselves, do not create new causes of action - or at
least [eliminate] that argument - ... it opens the
door to the argument that, in fact, each provision of
Title 47 or 47.10, in itself, if it's not followed,
could create a statutory cause of action for damages.
Now, that's not necessarily going to be the conclusion
reached by the court, but it's certainly going to be
the argument made, and begs the question: What is the
legislature's intent in removing that language? Was
it to open the door to additional types of liability?
So, virtually any provision in [Title] 47.10, if it
wasn't followed to a parent's or a guardian ad litem's
satisfaction, would be arguably the basis for a civil
suit for damages, apart from the interplay that we
already expect under the CINA laws in the court
process in the CINA case itself.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL respectfully submitted, then, that
perhaps [similar language] should be inserted at the conclusion
of almost every set of laws adopted.
CHAIR ROKEBERG recognized the presence of Representative Sharon
Cissna, and asked her to join members at the committee table.
TAPE 02-27, SIDE B
Number 2497
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL, referring to language in current statute
that says "nothing in this title creates a duty or standard of
care for services to children and their families being served
under AS 47.10", said he finds this statement offensive. He
noted that what the legislature is trying to do via these
statutes is protect children, but at the same time, he opined,
the statute is specifically saying that nothing is created that
guarantees responsibility on the part of the [DHSS]. He asked
Ms. Cox to explain to him why this [or similar] language should
remain in statute.
MS. COX, in response, reiterated that the term "does not create
a duty or standard of care" is a term of art [pertaining to]
civil liability, and that the intention was to maintain the
status quo. Liability is still possible. This [language] does
not create an immunity, and it was part of the whole package
that was enacted four years ago during a comprehensive revision
of the statutes.
REPRESENTATIVE MEYER asked Representative Coghill if he feels
that by allowing for civil liability, it's going to "change
anything that's currently going on." He offered that it may
just add more expense [to the state].
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL posited that if the language is removed,
"then all's we're doing is creating 'what if' questions; we're
really not creating a greater liability." However, if the
current statutory language is retained, he added, "then there's
a lot of 'what if' taken away from parents, because we're saying
that there's nothing in this title that creates a duty or
standard of care for services to children or their families."
CHAIR ROKEBERG mentioned that sometimes the use of terms of art
can create confusion regarding the common meaning of words.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ proffered that what Representative
Coghill is saying is that he wants some affirmative statement
that a duty or standard of care exists, and that what the DOL is
saying is that they would prefer that it arise under some
different provision of law than AS 47.10. Is that accurate?
Or, that it [already] does arise under some different
[provision]?
Number 2366
MS. COX said that the DOL would be perfectly content - not
happy, but perfectly satisfied - to have liability remain a
question of the common law breach of reasonable care - the
standard negligence test - and not be a question of statutory
causes of action or, arguably, statutorily created causes of
action.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL indicated agreement with Representative
Berkowitz's assessment. "That's where I'm heading; I want to
try to get something that'll help us bridge this very gap," he
added.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked whether language such as "the
duty or standard of care for services to children and their
families being served does not arise under AS 47.10" or "the
duty or standard of care for services to children and their
families being served arises from the common law" would
alleviate Representative Coghill's concern and bridge the gap.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked Representative Coghill whether he had
considered just omitting [Section 7].
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said yes. He posited that omitting
Section 7 would lead to the same effect as Representative
Berkowitz's proposed language because "it would be assumed
anyway."
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, in colloquy, said:
But you wanted a statement that there is an
affirmative duty or standard of care. And if you
assert that there is a duty or standard of care, ...
at the same time acknowledging that it does arise out
of the common law, but instead of saying it arises out
of the common law, just say it doesn't arise under
[AS] 47.10 ...
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked Ms. Cox to explain the difference between a
common law cause of action for civil liability and a statutory
cause of action.
MS. COX explained that for the common law test for negligence,
the elements are the existence of a duty, the breach of a duty -
typically the duty is to act with reasonable care, and so there
is the duty of reasonable care - failure to exercise reasonable
care, and causation - it causes damages to the injured person.
So the question becomes whether there has been negligence in
either the action toward a child, or the failure to act to
protect a child from harm. That is the law in Alaska, she said,
"but it is not a creature of a statute."
Number 2246
MS. COX then explained that the courts can imply a statutory
cause of action if they view the legislature's intent is to
create a cause of action for damages flowing directly from a
statute. So the argument becomes: Did the legislature's
enactment of a particular law create a specific duty that
substitutes for the general test for negligence? Is that the
legislature's intention, to create specific liabilities flowing
from the statute itself; or rather is it to create a statutory
scheme to accomplish certain things? She noted that ordinarily,
the kind of language in AS 47.10.960 does not need to be said
because it is not presumed that the legislature, in regulating
all manner of legal situations in this state, intends to create
liabilities.
MS. COX said that with HB 375, this language was included
because of the concern that the legislation was getting so
specific and thus the argument could be raised that the
legislature was intending to create mandatory duties, the breach
of which would, in and of itself, create new liabilities. So
this specific sentence currently in AS 47.10.960 was included to
prevent that argument from being raised. The problem that the
DOL has with repealing that language altogether, she said,
relates to the question of construction by the courts
subsequently, because now that it is on the books, the repeal of
it begs the question: What is the legislature's intent? Did
the legislature presume to create new liabilities with its
specific mandates in AS 47.10?
MS. COX mentioned that had the language never been inserted,
perhaps there would not be any need for the current discussion;
however, since the language is part of current statute, repeal
of that language raises the question of legislative intent. She
noted that the proposed substitute language found in Section 7
is an attempt to maintain the status quo while removing the
language that Representative Coghill finds so offensive.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said: So, in essence, the duty or
standard of care that exists currently derives from the common
law. Is that correct?
MS. COX said yes.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked: Why don't we just say that?
Would that be okay?
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he thought that by repealing the
language altogether, the legislature would be saying that.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested stating that specifically:
"The duty or standard of care for services to children and their
families being served derives from the common law."
Number 2110
MS. COX said that would certainly be fine with her. Since
"we've" already said that it doesn't create a duty, it would be
helpful to say that it derives from the common law, and doing so
would maintain the status quo.
CHAIR ROKEBERG indicated agreement. He also expressed concern
with the use of the words "Failure to comply with a provision of
this title...." He asked why all of AS 47 is referenced in the
proposed substitute language for Section 7.
MS. COX suggested that perhaps it is because HB 375 made changes
throughout AS 47 and not just to AS 47.10. She noted, however,
that if the language offered by Representative Berkowitz were
adopted, she would not anticipate having problems elsewhere in
AS 47 because of that change.
CHAIR ROKEBERG reiterated that it troubles him to have that
reference there.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested that "under AS 47.10" could
be added to the language he previously suggested.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether the reference to common law would
apply to both the [DHSS} and anybody else who was statutorily
deemed to have responsibility [over children] - such as a foster
parent.
MS. COX surmised that it would apply to anybody who is affected
by AS 47.10 in terms of his/her responsibilities within the
statutes.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL asked what would be changed by stating
that the duty or standard of care derives from common law if,
currently, individuals have recourse under common law on issues
of liability.
MS. COX said it changes nothing except for removing the
potential argument that the legislature intended to create new
liabilities.
CHAIR ROKEBERG mentioned that the heading for AS 47.10.960 would
need to be changed [if Representative Berkowitz's suggested
language is adopted].
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested "Duty and standard of care."
Number 1840
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Representative
Berkowitz's suggested language as Amendment 1. That section of
statute would then read: "Sec. 47.10.960. Duty and standard of
care. The duty or standard of care for services to children and
their families being served under AS 47.10 is derived from
common law."
Number 1810
CHAIR ROKEBERG objected for the purpose of discussion. He asked
Ms. Cox whether the entire title, or just the CINA chapter,
should be referenced.
MS. COX opined that the language is adequate as suggested. She
acknowledged that presumably common law would apply to the
remainder of Title 47 as well. She posited that the discussion
thus far does clarify that the legislature is not intending to
create new liabilities anywhere in Title 47.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL requested assurance that Amendment 1
would not enable the [DHSS] to exempt itself from liability.
MS. COX assured Representative Coghill that Amendment 1 neither
creates any new liability nor creates any exemption from
liability; it will merely maintain the status quo.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL remarked that the CINA laws are very
complex and difficult to understand, so going to plain English
whenever possible is a much better way to go.
Number 1561
CHAIR ROKEBERG withdrew his objection. There being no further
objection, Amendment 1 was adopted.
Number 1549
SCOTT CALDER testified via teleconference and said that
Representative Coghill has already given voice to many of Mr.
Calder's concerns. Notwithstanding this, he noted that he still
wants to comment on other aspects of HB 252. He began:
First of all, I'd like to debunk the notion that
parents whose children have been harmed by the [DHSS]
have some type of existing recourse or method of
resolution. The existing specifications of recourse
or method of resolution are additional modes of
torture for parents ...; the assumption that there's
possible recourse is a myth. So a lot of the
discussion has focused on kind of an assumption of a
steady state of things being okay or that [there are]
possibilities for resolution, and this is a distinct
falsehood in my opinion and I think that that can be
objectively shown if we ever have a situation in a
venue where these grievances can be aired, which we do
not now.
... The notion that parents have effective counsel is
false. The notion that the child's best interests are
guarded by the court officers is false. The notion
that there is an administrative complaint process,
which deserves that name or description, is false.
And the idea that a person can, in practical terms,
... go to court to resolve difficulties or be
represented in court - or, I might add, in many cases,
not all cases, be represented in the legislature - is
false.
There [were] several statements made by Ms. Cox
regarding maintaining the status quo, leaving the
playing field as we had it, on assuming no change in
state practices in regards to the expected fiscal
notes, and things like this. And, Mr. Chairman, I
have to tell you, from personal experience, as a
witness to human rights crimes perpetrated under the
color of law by this agency, that we should change the
way things are right now. It's not just a little fix
or a little problem in one little paragraph.
Number 1395
MR. CALDER continued:
Nothing has been said about the family preservation
efforts contained in the remainder of the bill, and I
can understand that a person might miss some of the
language contained in those sections, and that a
person might not understand the consequences for
families. ... We could go through line by line - I
have a lot of notes here, and so I'd be happy to
answer your questions about specific suggestions - but
let me just say generally that the problem here,
again, is that placing the idea of family preservation
services, or eligibility for family preservation
services, or really what amounts to mercy by an
oppressor, ... within the discretion of the [DHSS] is
a continuation of the problem.
Now, I think this family preservation services could
maybe be a good thing, but oftentimes the thing that
needs to be done to preserve a family is to remove the
state from the life of the children and the family
members who would become ensnared. And simply
assuming that "oh, they could go to court or they
could complain or do something else," this just adds
additional injury to ... already occurring injuries
and insults. So it's very difficult to break through
this problem conceptually, I can understand that. But
I think ... we have to realize that in this society,
and as a state, ... we have a serious problem here
that needs to be addressed, that it can't just be made
to go away by some polite conversation about the
technicalities of one particularly difficult section
such as Section 7, which was discussed.
Number 1305
We have gone from, as Representative Coghill
indicated, a simple idea of rebalancing things
somewhat, so that parents at least would have some
right or standing as an authoritative individual in
the life of a child, ... to creating a burdensome
presumption that parents are essentially irrelevant
unless the [DHSS] comes along and wants to process
them, based on some kind of state grant or license or
permission, to be preserved as a family. And this is
absolutely ridiculous, but it's also typical of the
thinking that goes into these legislative items, as
near as I've been able to tell.
MR. CALDER continued:
I think that it's only appropriate to have the
parental rights language contained in the construction
section, for example, rather than [in the] intent
section. Now, I'm not an attorney, [so] maybe
somebody could explain why it's better in the intent
section, but it says ... "LEGISLATIVE INTENT. By the
amendment of AS 47.10.005 in sec. 2 of this Act, the
legislature intends to express its recognition that
parents possess inherent individual rights", et
cetera.
Well sir, all it says in that [AS] 47.10.005 is that
... the [DHSS], apparently, can liberally construe the
provisions of this chapter so that [the child coming
within the jurisdiction] may receive the care,
guidance, treatment that will promote the child's
welfare and the parents participation in the child's
upbringing. Mr. Chairman, we need to do something to
correct the problem where the parents' authority to be
responsible and to direct and control the education
and upbringing of their own children is what we have
in law, not simply that the [DHSS] as at liberty to
involve or decide what participation is or make any
other of these types of judgments, based on whatever
the prerogatives of the [DHSS] are.
Now, there are many of us who understand that the
activities of the [DHSS] are motivated by a
progressive, understanding, ... realization that
children do need to be protected, and that there are
very important social issues there. But what is
consistently missed is the fact that while we say
that, what we're doing is, we're stripping parents of
authority and stripping children of their parents and
their families. The very support network that we say
is important to children is consistently eroded by
these laws that we have.
Number 1132
MR. CALDER concluded:
I guess just to kind of sum up, I'm not satisfied with
the amendment process of this bill. Now, I would
defer [to] Representative Coghill's judgment on it,
but I would think that we would be dangerously close,
here, to creating a worse problem than we already
have. So I would hope that there would be some
questions, because I can certainly answer them.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked Mr. Calder if he supported HB 252 or was
against it.
MR. CALDER responded:
That is such a close call ... I absolutely supported
the bill when it was first introduced. I think that
creating additional things for the [DHSS] to do and to
say that it's doing, which are not binding upon it in
any meaningful way, is pointless. It's a verbal
exercise, apparently, to create some visibility for
the claim that maybe something is being done about
this problem. What we have is an institution that's
involved in human-rights crimes against the citizens,
and I would hope that the legislature, at least, would
recognize the standing of citizens with complaints -
citizens of this state - to ... a higher degree than
it does the attorneys of the state. This seems to be
an attorneys' document, not a document for humanity.
Not knowing what common law is, or how to address
that, I don't know if anything has been done with
Section 7 today, other than ... maybe shuffling some
words around.
CHAIR ROKEBERG offered that Amendment 1 has enhanced Mr.
Calder's position.
MR. CALDER said that he does see that that particular amendment
may have improved that particular section, but he is unable to
determine whether that outweighs the damage that's contained in
the remainder of the amendment to the original HB 252.
CHAIR ROKEBERG explained that the House Judiciary Standing
Committee would not be focusing on those other issues today, and
suggested that Mr. Calder take up any remaining concerns with
Representative Coghill, the sponsor. Chair Rokeberg thanked Mr.
Calder for his testimony, and expressed appreciation for Mr.
Calder's work on these issues.
MR. CALDER remarked that the family preservation [section of the
bill] has the parents guilty until proven innocent. That is a
judicial issue, and that is the problem with the other statutes
that are in place, he said. He requested that the committee
consider this issue further.
Number 0879
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Amendment 2 [as
amended] which read [original punctuation provided]:
Page 5, line 25:
Delete "the"
Page 5, line 27:
Delete "should"
Insert "shall"
Page 5, line 29:
Delete "should"
Insert "shall"
Number 0859
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether there were any objections to
Amendment 2 [as amended]. There being no objection, Amendment 2
[as amended] was adopted.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, directing members' attention to page
2, line 1, noted that the term "child's welfare" is used,
although elsewhere in HB 252 the term "best interests of the
child" is used. He suggested that it would be preferable to
have page 2, line 1 say "promote the best interests of the
child".
CHAIR ROKEBERG, noting that this section is to be liberally
construed, asked whether the term "welfare" would be part of
"best interests".
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said that according to his recollection
of HB 375, one of main things that occurred was a shift to "the
best interests of the child"; so if the main goal is to assist
children, "we need to be consistent with the use of that
phrase." He observed that the best interests of the child may
not be the same thing as the child's welfare.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL indicated that such a change would be
appropriate. He mentioned that page 2, line 1 also includes the
addition of the term "and the parents' participation in the
child's upbringing".
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ noted that by having "welfare" and
"parents' participation" the courts are being told to do two
things. Therefore, he suggested, the language should be changed
to say "best interests [of the child], including the parents'
participation in the child's upbringing". Thus, he opined, the
court would know that it should focus first on the best
interests of the child and that then parental participation
should figure prominently.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL surmised, then, that Representative
Berkowitz is suggesting replacing "and" with ", including".
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said yes; if "and" is used, the courts
are being told to do two things, as opposed to having a
hierarchy of responsibilities, as would be the case if using ",
including". In this way, the courts would have discretion with
regard to whether including the parents' participation is in the
child's best interest, which would be the priority.
Number 0625
REPRESENTATIVE SHARON CISSNA, Alaska State Legislature,
commented that sometimes it is desirable to include the parent
in a child's life, but from a distance. Currently, however, the
trend is to exclude the parent completely. She mentioned that
other states are including the parent in the child's life even
after the child is no longer in the parent's custody.
CHAIR ROKEBERG commented that sometimes children are better off
with their foster parents than with their biological parents.
REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA said that although that is true,
[Representative Berkowitz's suggested language change] would not
affect those situations.
Number 0467
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ restated his suggested language change:
page 2, line 1, delete "child's welfare and" and insert "best
interest of the child, including".
Number 0387
CHAIR ROKEBERG, calling the aforementioned proposed change
Amendment 3, asked whether there were any objections to adopting
it. There being no objection, Amendment 3 was adopted.
Number 0362
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL moved to report CSHB 252(HES), as
amended, out of committee with individual recommendations and
the accompanying fiscal note. There being no objection, CSHB
252(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary Standing
Committee.
ADJOURNMENT
Number 0321
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 2:43 p.m.
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