Legislature(2001 - 2002)
04/23/2001 01:15 PM House JUD
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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
April 23, 2001
1:15 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Norman Rokeberg, Chair
Representative Jeannette James
Representative John Coghill
Representative Kevin Meyer
Representative Ethan Berkowitz
Representative Albert Kookesh
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Scott Ogan, Vice Chair
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
SENATE BILL NO. 99
"An Act relating to the DNA identification registration system."
- MOVED SB 99 OUT OF COMMITTEE
CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 172(FIN)
"An Act relating to an annual report by the court system to the
public and the legislature."
- MOVED HCS CSSB 172(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 145
"An Act making a civil remedy available to the state or a
municipality against persons who make false claims for, or
certain misrepresentations regarding, state or municipal money
or other property; and providing for an effective date."
- MOVED CSHB 145(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 228
"An Act relating to the offense of selling or giving tobacco to
a minor, to the accounting of fees from business license
endorsements for tobacco products, to the disclosure of certain
confidential cigarette and tobacco product information, to
notification regarding a cigarette manufacturer's noncompliance
with the tobacco product Master Settlement Agreement, to
business license endorsements for sale of tobacco products, to
citations and penalties for illegal sales of tobacco products;
and providing for an effective date."
- MOVED CSHB 228(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: SB 99
SHORT TITLE:DNA REGISTRATION OF BURGLARS
SPONSOR(S): SENATOR(S) HALFORD
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/20/01 0431 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
02/20/01 0431 (S) JUD, FIN
02/28/01 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ 211
02/28/01 (S) Moved Out of Committee
02/28/01 (S) MINUTE(JUD)
03/01/01 0555 (S) JUD RPT 2DP 2NR
03/01/01 0555 (S) DP: TAYLOR, DONLEY;
03/01/01 0555 (S) NR: THERRIAULT, ELLIS
03/01/01 0555 (S) FN1: INDETERMINATE(ADM)
03/01/01 0555 (S) FN2: ZERO(DPS)
03/14/01 0655 (S) FIN RPT 5DP 1DNP 2NR
03/14/01 0655 (S) DP: DONLEY, KELLY, AUSTERMAN,
WILKEN,
03/14/01 0655 (S) LEMAN; DNP: HOFFMAN; NR:
OLSON, WARD
03/14/01 0655 (S) FN2: ZERO(DPS)
03/14/01 0655 (S) FN3: INDETERMINATE(ADM)
03/14/01 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE
532
03/19/01 (S) RLS AT 10:45 AM FAHRENKAMP
203
03/19/01 (S) MINUTE(RLS)
03/20/01 (S) RLS AT 10:45 AM FAHRENKAMP
203
03/20/01 (S) MINUTE(RLS)
04/06/01 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
04/09/01 1012 (S) RULES TO CALENDAR 2OR 4/9/01
04/09/01 1016 (S) READ THE SECOND TIME
04/09/01 1016 (S) ADVANCED TO THIRD READING
UNAN CONSENT
04/09/01 1016 (S) READ THE THIRD TIME SB 99
04/09/01 1016 (S) COSPONSOR(S): TAYLOR, DONLEY,
LEMAN,
04/09/01 1016 (S) COWDERY
04/09/01 1016 (S) PASSED Y14 N6
04/09/01 1016 (S) DAVIS NOTICE OF
RECONSIDERATION
04/09/01 (S) RLS AT 10:45 AM FAHRENKAMP
203
04/10/01 1052 (S) RECONSIDERATION NOT TAKEN UP
04/11/01 1071 (S) RESCIND PREVIOUS ACTION UNAN
CONSENT
04/11/01 1071 (S) BILL BEFORE SENATE IN FINAL
PASSAGE
04/11/01 1071 (S) PASSED Y14 N4 A1 E1
04/11/01 1081 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H)
04/11/01 1081 (S) VERSION: SB 99
04/12/01 0978 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
04/12/01 0978 (H) JUD, FIN
04/23/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: SB 172
SHORT TITLE:COURT SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT
SPONSOR(S): FINANCE
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
03/30/01 0880 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
03/30/01 0880 (S) FIN
04/06/01 0975 (S) FIN RPT CS FORTHCOMING 6DP
3NR
04/06/01 0975 (S) DP: DONLEY, KELLY, GREEN,
AUSTERMAN,
04/06/01 0975 (S) LEMAN, WARD; NR: HOFFMAN,
OLSON, WILKEN
04/06/01 0975 (S) FN1: ZERO(CRT)
04/06/01 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE
532
04/06/01 (S) Moved Out of Committee
MINUTE(FIN)
04/09/01 1012 (S) FIN CS RECEIVED SAME TITLE
04/11/01 1068 (S) RULES TO CALENDAR 4/11/01
04/11/01 1072 (S) READ THE SECOND TIME
04/11/01 1072 (S) FIN CS ADOPTED UNAN CONSENT
04/11/01 1072 (S) ADVANCED TO THIRD READING
UNAN CONSENT
04/11/01 1072 (S) READ THE THIRD TIME CSSB
172(FIN)
04/11/01 1072 (S) PASSED Y18 N- E1 A1
04/11/01 1081 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H)
04/11/01 1081 (S) VERSION: CSSB 172(FIN)
04/11/01 (S) RLS AT 10:30 AM FAHRENKAMP
203
04/11/01 (S) MINUTE(RLS)
04/12/01 0978 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
04/12/01 0978 (H) JUD, FIN
04/23/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 145
SHORT TITLE:FALSE CLAIMS AGAINST STATE OR MUNICIPALIT
SPONSOR(S): RLS BY REQUEST OF THE GOVERNOR
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/23/01 0416 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
02/23/01 0416 (H) CRA, JUD
02/23/01 0416 (H) FN1: ZERO(LAW)
02/23/01 0416 (H) GOVERNOR'S TRANSMITTAL LETTER
03/15/01 (H) CRA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 124
03/15/01 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
03/20/01 0661 (H) CRA RPT 1DP 5NR
03/20/01 0661 (H) DP: KERTTULA; NR: GUESS,
SCALZI,
03/20/01 0661 (H) MURKOWSKI, MEYER, MORGAN
03/20/01 0661 (H) FN1: ZERO(LAW)
03/20/01 (H) CRA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 124
03/20/01 (H) Moved Out of Committee
03/20/01 (H) MINUTE(CRA)
04/23/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 228
SHORT TITLE:SALE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)HARRIS
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
04/02/01 0809 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
04/02/01 0809 (H) L&C, JUD, FIN
04/03/01 0831 (H) COSPONSOR(S): HUDSON,
MURKOWSKI
04/17/01 1021 (H) COSPONSOR(S): KERTTULA
04/18/01 1053 (H) COSPONSOR(S): CRAWFORD
04/18/01 (H) L&C AT 3:15 PM CAPITOL 17
04/18/01 (H) Moved CSHB 228(L&C) Out of
Committee
04/18/01 (H) MINUTE(L&C)
04/20/01 1092 (H) L&C RPT CS(L&C) NT 5DP 1AM
04/20/01 1093 (H) DP: CRAWFORD, HAYES, MEYER,
04/20/01 1093 (H) ROKEBERG, MURKOWSKI; AM: KOTT
04/20/01 1093 (H) FN1: ZERO(REV)
04/20/01 1093 (H) FN2: (LAW)
04/20/01 1093 (H) FN3: (HSS)
04/20/01 1093 (H) FN4: (CED)
04/21/01 (H) JUD AT 11:00 AM CAPITOL 120
04/21/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
04/23/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
SENATOR RICK HALFORD
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 111
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: Sponsor of SB 99.
JULI LUCKY, Staff
to Senator Rick Halford
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 111
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: On behalf of the sponsor, presented SB 99
and answered questions.
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section-Juneau
Criminal Division
Department of Law
PO Box 110300
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented the department's position on SB
99 and answered questions.
JENNIFER RUDINGER, Executive Director
Alaska Civil Liberties Union (AkCLU)
PO Box 201844
Anchorage, Alaska 99520-1844
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of SB 99, expressed
concern that it does not stipulate that the DNA sample will be
destroyed once the information is entered into the databank.
DEL SMITH, Deputy Commissioner
Office of the Commissioner
Department of Public Safety (DPS)
PO Box 111200
Juneau, Alaska 99811-1200
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of SB 99, answered
questions related to statistical information.
GEORGE TAFT, Director
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory
Department of Public Safety (DPS)
5500 East Tudor Road
Anchorage, Alaska 99507-1221
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of SB 99, answered
questions regarding the storage of DNA samples.
SENATOR DAVE DONLEY
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 506
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented SB 172 on behalf of the sponsor,
the Senate Finance Committee.
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN, Deputy Administrative Director
Administrative Staff
Office of the Administrative Director
Alaska Court System (ACS)
820 West 4th Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-2005
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 172, provided the
ACS's position, answered questions, and suggested an amendment.
JAMES BALDWIN, Assistant Attorney General
Governmental Affairs Section
Civil Division (Juneau)
Department of Law (DOL)
PO Box 110300
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented HB 145 on behalf of the
administration.
JOHN MANLY, Staff
to Representative John Harris
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 513
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: On behalf of the sponsor, Representative
Harris, responded to questions on HB 228 and the proposed
amendments.
ELMER LINDSTROM, Special Assistant
Office of the Commissioner
Department of Health & Social Services (DHSS)
PO Box 110601
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0601
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 228 and proposed
amendments, provided the department's position and answered
questions.
EDWIN J. SASSER, Tobacco Enforcement Coordinator
Division of Public Health (DPH)
Department of Health & Social Services (DHSS)
PO Box 110616
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0616
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 228 and proposed
amendments, answered questions.
CATHERINE REARDON, Director
Central Office
Division of Occupational Licensing
Department of Community & Economic Development (DCED)
PO Box 110806
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0806
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 228 and proposed
amendments, responded to a question pertaining to fines.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 01-72, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR NORMAN ROKEBERG called the House Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 1:15 p.m. Representatives
Rokeberg, James, Coghill, and Meyer were present at the call to
order. Representatives Berkowitz and Kookesh arrived as the
meeting was in progress.
SB 99 - DNA REGISTRATION OF BURGLARS
[Contains mention that HB 143 and SB 99 are companion bills, and
that SB 99 is similar to HB 132 with regard to attempting to
commit a crime.]
Number 0047
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the first order of business would
be SENATE BILL NO. 99, "An Act relating to the DNA
identification registration system."
Number 0050
SENATOR RICK HALFORD, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor, said
simply that SB 99 is a good bill.
Number 0059
JULI LUCKY, Staff to Senator Rick Halford, Alaska State
Legislature, sponsor, added that SB 99 is the companion bill to
HB 143, which was reported out of the House Judiciary Standing
Committee on 4/6/01. She pointed out that the only difference
between the two bills is that the language in SB 99 includes "a
person convicted of burglary or a felony attempt to commit
burglary", whereas HB 143 only had "a person convicted of
burglary". She noted that the Department of Law (DOL) has
indicated a preference for the language in SB 99.
Number 0134
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal
Services Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law,
noted that the language regarding an attempt to commit a
burglary is similar to language in HB 132 (which pertains to
attempts to send alcohol to dry communities) in that when
someone has done everything possible to commit the crime but is
prevented from doing so for some reason, the penalties are the
same as if he/she had succeeded. The kind of danger represented
by an attempt to commit burglary provides the nexus for taking
the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample, he added.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL requested assurance that an "attempt to
commit burglary" is an offense that can be proven.
MR. GUANELI pointed out that most crimes that are defined in
Alaska law are punishable whether the crime is completed or
simply attempted. He explained that the definition [in AS
11.31.100] of an "attempt" reads "with intent to commit a crime,
the person engages in conduct which constitutes a substantial
step toward the commission of that crime." He opined that in
the case of burglary, that substantial step should be more than
simply "casing the joint"; it should require that the person
actually be on the premises and in the middle of breaking in,
which would show that the person intended to carry out that
crime. To pursue any felony charge, he explained, there has to
be a grand jury indictment, and the grand jury must find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the charge is true. He also noted that
attempting to commit burglary could result in a conviction
separate from the charge of burglary.
Number 0477
JENNIFER RUDINGER, Executive Director, Alaska Civil Liberties
Union (AkCLU), testified via teleconference and said:
To sum up ... the position paper you have before you,
the [AkCLU] simply asserts that every time the
legislature looks at moving the line in allowing the
FBI and law enforcement to collect DNA (or any kind of
personal information about its citizens) it needs to
ask itself whether it's justified to move the line in
that case. ... Our position that is articulated in
the position paper is simply that given that all the
data we've seen only points to a 6 percent chance that
burglars might - in Alaska - go on to commit violent
crimes (and this is not like other states, but in
Alaska, it looks like 94 percent do not), it doesn't
make any sense to us to move the line. If it were 75
percent of burglars that were going on to commit
violent crimes - so that having their DNA on file from
the burglary would help you track them in the future -
then it would be more reasonable, but 6 percent is
not, in our opinion, a high enough correlation between
means and ends.
And one other thing that is not exactly spelled out in
the position paper but I've begun to talk with some
folks about, is that if [SB99] is going to move (or
even if its not going to move - regardless of what
happens with this bill), there is a real glaring
problem with the current state of the law. And that
is that nothing in federal law, and nothing in Alaska
State law requires the destruction of the sample....
What happens is that the drop of saliva or the drop of
blood (whatever the sample may be) -- public
safety/the crime lab will draw a strand of DNA out of
that, and they will take 13 specific points along that
strand of DNA (13 genetic markers), and that is what
gets entered into the FBI database (CODIS [Combined
DNA Index System]) - those thirteen markers.
Number 0617
With today's technology, indeed, those 13 markers are
like a fingerprint. Those 13 markers are called "junk
DNA" by scientists because they are among huge
sections of DNA that do not code for specific
proteins. Tomorrow that could change; we may be able
to tell personal information from those markers
besides gender and identification, but today we
cannot. So, if all we were looking at here was taking
13 markers that look like a bar code in the database,
indeed we wouldn't have the privacy concerns today
that I'm raising in my position paper, because what
I'm talking about is the sample. And, once they get
that bar code (for lack of a better term) entered in
the database, and that is 99.9 percent accurate for
purposes of identifying (much more accurate than
fingerprints), that's law enforcement's legitimate
need. That's the legitimate reason for getting the
DNA.
Once that's in the database, they don't need to keep
the saliva; they don't need to keep the blood. And
regardless of what happens with [SB] 99, there is
nothing in Alaska law or federal law that says they
ever have to get rid the sample, and indeed they
don't. ... If identification is the legitimate
rational, they don't need to keep the sample. So the
folks in Alaska, your constituents who contact us all
the time about concerns about government needing
private information and demanding private information
(whether it's social security numbers or census forms
or background checks or DNA and genetic information) -
- something that could be done to alleviate those
folk's concerns, and would go a long way toward
protecting privacy, would be to destroy the sample
once the testing is complete and the data is entered
in the database.
Because, in the future, if this burglar is one of the
6 percent who goes on to commit a violent crime, law
enforcement -- say they show up at the scene of the
crime, and there's a drop of blood that doesn't match
the victim, and they run that drop of blood, they pull
the identifying markers out of that, put it in the
database and [it] pops up: poof, "we've got a match."
What they're comparing it to are the 13 loci - the
other information in the database; they're not going
back to the previous drop of blood. It's all a matter
of running it through the database, and so [we'd]
really like to see Alaska pass some kind of law - and
perhaps start with an amendment to this bill - that
says, once they've finished their testing and get the
data entered, "let's destroy the sample."
Number 0839
MS. RUDINGER, in response to questions, said that the 6 percent
figure that she is using was gathered from the statistical
information provided by Del Smith, Department of Public Safety,
regarding burglars in Alaska that go on to commit violent
crimes. She acknowledged that the legislature will have to
weigh whether that 6 percent justifies moving the line, but she
opined it is a very low correlation given the immense amount of
information, which has nothing to do with law enforcement's
ability to identify criminals, that can be gleaned from that
drop of saliva. She said that she would feel better [about
taking DNA samples from convicted burglars] if the correlation
were higher, but at least if the drop of saliva is destroyed
afterwards, so that the only information law enforcement had
about the person is, in fact, identifying markers, that would
make more sense.
MS. RUDINGER explained that it's the drop of saliva (or blood)
that contains information about up to 4,000 different genetic
conditions and diseases, possibly about sexual orientation,
possibly genetic information about the tendency towards
substance abuse, all kinds of personal information about the
source and everyone related to the source by blood, all of which
has nothing to do with law enforcement's need for identifying
future criminals that may have previously committed burglary.
She opined that regardless of whether the legislature feels that
6 percent justifies obtaining DNA samples from burglars, the
legislature should consider destroying the sample once law
enforcement has completed its job [of entering the data].
Number 0982
DEL SMITH, Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Commissioner,
Department of Public Safety (DPS), regarding the 6 percent
figure used by Ms. Rudinger, explained that of the 3,000 or so
people - since 1/1/96 - who have been obligated to provide a DNA
sample under current law, roughly 6 percent have a previous
burglary conviction. He added that he did not think this
automatically means that 94 percent of burglars don't go on to
commit a [violent] crime. He confirmed that the 6 percent
figure was arrived at retrospectively. He noted that he has not
yet checked to see how many individuals convicted of burglary go
on to commit a violent crime.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked whether DNA evidence has ever
been exculpatory.
MR. SMITH said yes; he recounted a case in which a person in
Anchorage was arrested but the DNA sample proved that this
individual was innocent of that crime.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL asked whether the "bar code" from a DNA
sample is associated with the person's name or other identifier.
MR. SMITH said that according to his understanding, it is not;
if the bar code is in the database it comes back as a series of
numbers without being associated with a name.
Number 1199
GEORGE TAFT, Director, Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory,
Department of Public Safety (DPS), testified via teleconference.
With regard to whether to destroy DNA samples, he said that he
has given the topic a great deal of thought but is not sure why
the samples should be destroyed immediately in case [the DPS]
needs to go back and reanalyze a sample for a particular case.
He, also, said that there are no names attached to the data, and
noted that there are a limited number of people in the
laboratory that even have access to the data or to the sample.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES questioned the need to reanalyze a sample;
"Don't you have to double check that you got your code right?"
MR. TAFT replied, "yes." On the question of storing samples, he
noted that there is a very minimal amount of sample storage
[space], but to date there is no departmental policy regarding
the destruction of the samples.
CHAIR ROKEBERG mentioned that the issue of developing a policy
for destroying DNA samples could be pursued during the interim;
he noted that Mr. Smith was nodding his head in agreement.
Chair Rokeberg then closed the public hearing on SB 99.
Number 1340
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES moved to report SB 99 out of committee with
individual recommendations and the accompanying fiscal notes.
There being no objection, SB 99 was reported from the House
Judiciary Standing Committee.
SB 172 - COURT SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT
Number 1358
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the next order of business would
be CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 172(FIN), "An Act relating to an
annual report by the court system to the public and the
legislature."
Number 1382
SENATOR DAVE DONLEY, Alaska State Legislature, spoke on behalf
of the Senate Finance Committee, sponsor of SB 172. He
explained that SB 172 would establish in statute an annual
report from the Alaska Court System (ACS). Currently the ACS
does an annual report but does so voluntarily because there is
no statutory requirement. Simply, SB 172 will set in statute
that there will be a requirement to provide an annual report to
the legislature; the ACS could have leeway under this bill to
continue with the existing report, as long as it provides the
legislature with the specific information detailed in SB 172.
He noted that some of the information required by SB 172 is not
currently included in the annual report that the ACS provides
voluntarily. That information includes additional information
regarding the time it's taking to provide final disposition on
cases in Alaska; specific information about the [status of]
salary warrants of judges (currently, if a judge doesn't produce
a final opinion within six months, his/her salary is withheld);
and a reporting of travel expenses and per diem for judges and
justices, similar to what is required of legislators and members
of the executive branch. He concluded by stating that SB 172
has a zero fiscal note.
SENATOR DONLEY, in response to questions, said that each year
the administration and the legislature prepare reports on all
the salaries, travel, and per diem for executive branch
personnel and legislators, respectively. He also noted that the
legislature [performs] an annual audit of state government, and
that there is an annual budget report produced by the
Legislative Finance Division. On the issue of withholding
salary warrants, he explained that under existing law, "any
appellant court where there's more than one member is exempt
from the time limit factor of the salary warrants." All the law
requires is for an initial decision to be made; there is no time
limit for any final decision being made.
REPRESENTATIVE KOOKESH questioned why this legislation is
necessary given that the [ACS] has been voluntarily providing
reports since 1961.
SENATOR DONLEY replied that it is because [the ACS] could just
stop doing so at any time, and because he thinks it is really
important that the public be guaranteed this information. He
also noted that SB 172 requires information additional to what
[the ACS] currently provides.
Number 1588
REPRESENTATIVE KOOKESH suggested that if the legislature simply
asked it to do so, the [ACS] would continue providing the
reports and include the additional information on a voluntary
basis. He opined that this might be a situation in which
legislation is not actually needed.
SENATOR DONLEY said, "Hopefully this is legislation that won't
be needed in the future, but it is a safeguard to prevent that
eventuality from ever happening." With regard to the warrant
information, he noted that about three or four years ago, he had
contacted the Alaska Judicial Council (AJC) and asked why the
warrant information was not provided with the analysis for judge
retention. [The AJC] explained that they had asked for the
information but the ACS would not provide it to them, even
though [the AJC] is the body that is constitutionally empowered
to make assessments regarding the retention of judges. He added
that subsequent to that conversation, he received the
information from the ACS, whereupon he provided it to the AJC.
Although currently the ACS is providing this information to the
AJC, he said, this is just an example showing that the ACS could
at anytime - without this legislation - decide not to provide
certain information.
Number 1683
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN, Deputy Administrative Director,
Administrative Staff, Office of the Administrative Director,
Alaska Court System (ACS), clarified that it was not the ACS
that refused to provide this information to the AJC, it was the
Department of Administration (DOA). The ACS has always
considered this information a public record. He pointed out,
however, that the ACS receives the information from the DOA;
once the information is in the ACS's possession, it is provided
to anyone who makes a public records request. He explained that
the [Alaska] Supreme Court produces an annual report and has
done so since the very first year that the ACS has been in
existence; the first annual report came out in 1960. After
noting that the legislature received a copy of the "FY 2000
Annual Report" in January, he confirmed that the report is not
produced because of a statutory mandate, but rather under the
[Alaska] Supreme Court's constitutional authority to administer
the judicial branch of government. In essence, this is the
[Alaska] Supreme Court's annual message on judicial branch
operations.
MR. CHRISTENSEN noted that as originally drafted, SB 172
instructed the ACS to produce an annual report and include some
of the information that is already in the annual report that
[the ACS] provides, and add other information that is not
currently provided. He said that the legislature is the best
judge of what information it would consider useful; the
legislature has the authority to instruct the ACS to provide
statistical or other information related to court operations.
Whereupon [the ACS] will provide the information required by SB
172 in report form. He pointed out that the ACS has submitted a
zero fiscal note. He mentioned that there are several other
examples in statute of reports the legislature requires of the
ACS, such as travel information for justices of the Alaska
Supreme Court and for judges of the Alaska Court of Appeals.
MR. CHRISTENSEN noted, however, that the document that [the ACS]
has identified for over 40 years as its annual report is the
[Alaska] Supreme Court's message; this is akin to reports that
"you" as individual legislators send to Alaskans describing
"your" operations here in Juneau. And much as "you" are the
final authority of what goes into "your" reports, he said, [the
ACS] believes that the [Alaska] Supreme Court is the final
authority for what goes into "this" particular document. The
extra information that SB 172 would require [the ACS] to provide
may very possibly be put into "this" report; in fact, Chief
Justice Fabe assured Senator Donley several months ago that
prior to the time the next annual report went into production,
she would discuss with her colleagues including this extra
information. Alternatively, the extra information that is
required by SB 172 may be put in a separate report, which [the
ACS] would publish and release as instructed per SB 172.
Number 1814
MR. CHRISTENSEN offered the following as a technical amendment:
Remove "annual" from page 1, line 5. In response to questions,
he explained that the term "annual report" is almost considered
a term of art, and that the ACS already produces an "annual
report" and has done so for over 40 years. And although [the
ACS] will be happy to give the legislature whatever kind of
reports it wants, he reiterated that [the ACS] currently
produces its document under the [Alaska] Supreme Court's
constitutional authority to administer the judicial branch, and
would therefore prefer that any information requested by
legislature not be called an "annual report". He said that the
extra information requested may be included in the annual report
that the ACS already produces, or it may come in the form of a
separate report; the intention of his suggested amendment is to
allow [the ACS] flexibility.
SENATOR DONLEY agreed that the intention of SB 172 is to leave
the ACS with flexibility regarding terminology, and therefore he
has no objection to Mr. Christensen's suggested amendment.
Number 1900
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES made a motion to adopt Amendment 1, which
would remove "annual" from page 1, line 5. There being no
objection, Amendment 1 was adopted.
Number 1929
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES moved to report CSSB 172(FIN), as amended,
out of committee with individual recommendations [and the
accompanying fiscal note].
Number 1939
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected for the purpose of discussion.
He said that one point he is always leery about is separation of
powers. He acknowledged that the [ACS] did not have any
objections to the requirements imposed via SB 172, but he
pointed out that:
We're here telling the court to do something,
something that they're already doing. ... I know that
when the court tells us to do things, even simple
innocuous things like maybe striking language from the
budget or something, we find that very troubling. ...
I just think we ought to be a little bit sensitive to
those poor five justices and all their minions.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES noted that the legislature, via SB 172, is
not telling [the ACS] how to make judicial decisions; rather,
the legislature is only telling the ACS what kind of information
to provide.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ countered by saying, "Which is all they
told us." He then withdrew his objection.
Number 1983
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether there were any further objections.
There being none, HCS CSSB 172(JUD) was reported from the House
Judiciary Standing Committee.
HB 145 - FALSE CLAIMS AGAINST STATE OR MUNICIPALIT
Number 2000
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the next order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 145, "An Act making a civil remedy available
to the state or a municipality against persons who make false
claims for, or certain misrepresentations regarding, state or
municipal money or other property; and providing for an
effective date."
Number 2014
JAMES BALDWIN, Assistant Attorney General, Governmental Affairs
Section, Civil Division (Juneau), Department of Law (DOL),
presented HB 145 on behalf of the administration. He noted that
a similar bill was reported out of the House Judiciary Standing
Committee during the last legislative session, and that the
concept of HB 145 is the result of an ongoing claim against a
rather large financial institution concerning unclaimed
property. He explained that California found that its false
claim statute was key in bringing a certain financial
institution to the table to negotiate; California's false claim
statute carries a treble damages clause. When [the DOL] looked
at Alaska laws to see what its remedies might be, it found only
a very skeletal form of a false claim statute, which is located
in AS 37.10.090 and which basically says that the state can
bring a claim on behalf of itself or on behalf of its
municipalities if money has been illegally paid or diverted, but
there is no ability to enhance the amount of damages if the
prosecution is successful.
MR. BALDWIN noted that [the DOL] has begun investigating a
potential claim against that same financial institution, and
although HB 145 may not assist the DOL in that particular
instance, it could become useful in future litigation regarding
unclaimed property or other situations in which a claim is
brought against the state and is later proven false. He
explained that HB 145 is modeled after California's unclaimed
property law with the addition of a few changes that adapt it to
Alaska law. A major difference between the California law and
HB 145 revolves around some of the things that are excluded from
coverage: Alaska would exclude any claims in an amount less
than $500 because it would not be appropriate to subject those
kinds of claims to the treble damages clause; and Alaska would
exclude certain statutory systems (some of which are listed on
pages 3-4) that already have well developed penalty provisions
for submitting false claims, because they stand alone and do not
need duplication.
MR. BALDWIN also said that there is a fairly favorable standard
of proof provided for the state to prove its case against a
false claimant; it will be by a preponderance of the evidence.
There is also a provision which says that if a particular
individual is convicted of a crime involving misrepresentation,
then that conviction can stand as prima facie proof; it can
stand on its own as part of the main proof necessary to prove
the civil claim under HB 145. He explained that HB 145 also has
provisions for cooperation between municipal governments and
state government if, in the investigation of a potential false
claim, the attorney general determines that there is municipal
property involved, there would be a process for either tendering
the prosecution of that part of the case to a municipality, or
retaining it and proceeding along with all the other aspects of
the claim. He noted that these provisions are tailored to the
Alaskan situation; the aforementioned case against the large
financial institution involved both municipal property and state
property, thus [the DOL and the municipalities] have had to find
a way to work out how they would approach the case together,
including how to share costs and share recovery.
Number 2270
REPRESENTATIVE MEYER asked whether HB 145 would pertain to
permanent fund dividend (PFD) applications.
MR. BALDWIN said that HB 145 would not apply to the PFD; the PFD
is paid under AS 43, and as such is listed as one of the
exemptions on page 4.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, referring to Section 3, pointed out
that subsection(c) estops - prevents - the defendant from again
raising the defense if there is a guilty plea or a nolo
contendere plea; if someone is estoped in a civil action after
making a nolo contendere plea, the intent of the nolo contendere
plea is circumvented. He asked why "we" would want to do that.
He also pointed out that "this is different for the government
than it is for an individual citizen."
MR. BALDWIN responded that to his understanding, for many
purposes, a nolo contendere plea is the equivalent of a guilty
plea.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ clarified that nolo contendere - no
contest - merely means that the person is not fighting the
charge, not that he/she agrees with the elements. He explained
that this is different than a guilty plea in which the defendant
acknowledges committing the elements. For example, "If you ran
into a light pole and knocked it over, no contest means that
you're not fighting it, but your not admitting civil liability."
He opined that the current language is saying that if a person
pleads no contest, he/she is essentially admitting civil
liability, which is not the same for a private individual. "If
I ran into your car and was charged with assault, and [I] plead
no contest, you'd still have to prove the case against me in a
civil context."
MR. BALDWIN explained that this provision is based on the
California law, which was used as model.
CHAIR ROKEBERG pointed out that many times people might choose
nolo contendere to avoid the expense of litigation; if he/she is
estoped from asserting a defense in a civil case, it destroys
one of the advantages of pleading nolo contendere.
Number 2450
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ made a motion to adopt Amendment 1,
which would strike "or nolo contendere" from page 4, lines 14-
15.
MR. BALDWIN mentioned that line 18 also has reference to "nolo
contendere".
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL asked what affect Amendment 1 would have
on the July 1, 2001, date referred to in the last sentence on
lines 17-18 of page 4.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ cautioned that there is some question
about what is going on with no contest pleas. It is not always
clear, he said, sometimes a nolo contendere plea can be an
admission, but he could not recall what the parameters are.
TAPE 01-72, SIDE B
Number 2485
MR. BALDWIN, in response to Representative Coghill, explained
that the last sentence in lines 17-18 of page 4 merely prevents
subsection (c) from being applied retroactively.
CHAIR ROKEBERG pointed out that this language reads "a guilty
verdict upon a plea of nolo contendere", and does not refer to
anything else.
MR. BALDWIN, still referring to page 4, offered that if
reference to "nolo contendere" is removed from lines 14-15, then
the last sentence on lines 17-18 should also be removed.
Number 2383
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether there were any objections to
Amendment 1. There being no objection, Amendment 1 was adopted.
Number 2365
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Amendment 2, which
would remove the last sentence from subsection (c) on page 4,
lines 17-18. There being no objection, Amendment 2 was adopted.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, referring to the provision on page 4
regarding limitation of actions, said that to his recollection,
most civil actions are limited to within three years of
discovery. Unless there is a very compelling reason to allow
the state twice as long to pursue an action, he said, it seems
inappropriate that the state has more time than a private
litigant.
MR. BALDWIN noted that this provision is merely mirroring the
California statute. He said that he is not so sure that three
years is the overriding time limit; there is a six-year [statute
of limitations] applicable to some claims, for example. Given
the complexity of some of the cases the state litigates, he
opined, six years is not unreasonable.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he agrees with that point, but he
merely favors consistency.
CHAIR ROKEBERG mentioned that some of the cases faced by the
state could involve unclaimed property.
MR. BALDWIN noted that this provision provides for a special
limitation period for false claims.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, referring to Sections 1 and 2, opined
that at first glance, "you could incur civil liability to the
state if you, for example, asserted a claim that you were owed
money and then it turned out not to be true, or ... made a
denial after the state made a claim against you."
MR. BALDWIN explained that the language in Sections 1 and 2 is
very similar to the false claim statute provisions in many other
states and the federal government; this type of language is not
unusual. If there is a problem of proof, he added, then that's
the state's problem and it will have to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that there has been presentation of such a
claim. He opined that it is unusual that a state such as Alaska
doesn't already have the kinds of statutes as would be added via
HB 145; HB 145 will allow the state to protect the public
treasury from the assertion of false claims.
Number 2141
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL recounted that during litigation between
himself and his municipality, the municipality asserted that he
had done something falsely, when, instead, he was merely unaware
of the regulations regarding that particular action.
MR. BALDWIN, on the topic of penalties, explained that Section 2
of HB 145 provides for a $10,000 penalty for each act, and that
there could then be interest and damages added to that. He
noted that one of the main areas in which the statute was
altered, via Section 1, is in the area of contract claims; if
contractors who have done business with the state submit claims
for additional costs and expenses for the work done, and the
claims turn out to be false, Section 1 would provide a remedy in
dealing with such contractors. He went on to explain that in
the area of unclaimed property, if, for example, a financial
institution holds money that it should pay out, but is instead
merely filing reports that this money is being properly paid
out, these claims by the financial institution would fall under
[HB 145] with regard to making a false claim. He also pointed
out that before an individual can file a lawsuit against the
state, he/she has to go through a claims process under AS 44.77;
he/she has to submit an administrative claim against the state,
and if that claim turns out to be false, HB 145 would provide
the state with a remedy.
MR. BALDWIN, in response to questions, explained that under
current statutory language, someone submitting a false contract
claim must reimburse all sums paid on the claim, for all costs
attributable to review of the claim, and for a civil penalty
equal to the amount by which the claim is misrepresented. By
contrast, under HB 145, a person submitting a false claim would
be liable for to up to three times the amount of the claim, a
civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each act for which liability
is found, and attorney's fees and costs. He noted, however,
that there are other provisions in HB 145 that say the court may
reduce the amount of the damages to an amount not less than two
times the amount of damages sustained and may waive entirely the
civil penalties if the person committing any of the acts gives
the officials of the state (or of the municipality) information
known to that person about the violation within 30 days after
the date in which the person first obtained the information. In
essence this means that if the person cooperates with the state
(or municipality), he/she gets the damages reduced; it becomes
an incentive to help the state (or municipality).
MR. BALDWIN, in response to questions regarding his earlier
reference to a certain financial institution under
investigation, explained that this financial institution was
acting as a fiscal paying agent, or trustee for various forms of
general obligation debt, revenue bond debt, and special
obligation debt, and was therefore responsible for making
payments to bondholders. It was subsequently discovered that in
a small percentage of cases, the bondholders of these
instruments were not claiming their coupon payments, but the
financial institution was keeping the money rather than
returning it to the governmental entities that issued the debt
service.
Number 1890
MR. BALDWIN noted that only one small element of HB 145 might
have a bearing on the state's ongoing investigation of this
financial institution. He then referred to page 2, [paragraph]
(8), which says, "is a beneficiary of an inadvertent submission
of a false claim to the state or a municipality, subsequently
discovers the falsity of the claim, and fails to disclose the
false claim to the state or the municipality within a reasonable
time after discovery of the false claim." He pointed out that
since statutes only work prospectively, [paragraphs] (1)-(7)
would not apply to the financial institution currently under
investigation, unless it knows it has a history of these kinds
of activity and does not disclose this information to the state
or municipality.
MR. BALDWIN, in response to questions about California's case
against the financial institution, said that a settlement was
reached in which California was paid $188 million in damages for
unspecified purposes, and was paid $40 million as an unclaimed
property settlement. He noted that in this example, the
financial institution kept very poor records, and thus the
parties had to resort to a statistical analysis of the records
in order to establish damages and determine what amount should
have been escheated to the state. Mr. Baldwin explained that
[the DOL] was investigating this same financial institution
under the theory that since it is the issuer of some of those
debt obligations, it is entitled to some of that settlement,
whereas the financial institution is working under the theory
that since it is domiciled in California, the funds escheated
belong to California. He mentioned that [the DOL] is hoping to
successfully conclude its case regarding these funds.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, referring to the damages section on
page 3, said that essentially treble damages are going to be
awarded - that's three times the amount of actual damages -
except if [subsection] (c) applies. Then the damages may be
reduced to twice the amount of damages and the civil penalty may
be waived. He pointed out, however, that this provision
precludes the court from using a sliding scale with regard to
damages and civil penalties. He noted that he did not like
taking discretion away from the courts; the more discretion the
courts have, he offered, the easier it can be to craft a
solution for a given problem.
Number 1662
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ made a motion to adopt Amendment 3,
which would delete "of this section to an amount not less than
two times the amount of the damages sustained" from page 3,
lines 7-8. The result would leave the courts with the
discretion of moving between treble damages and zero damages if
all the conditions for such a waiver are met. He also noted
that the language pertaining to these conditions is conjunctive;
a person must meet all of them, not just one.
MR. BALDWIN said he did not have a problem with leaving the
decision regarding the reduction of damages and civil penalties
to the discretion of the court.
Number 1452
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether there were any objections to
Amendment 3. There being no objection, Amendment 3 was adopted.
Number 1435
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ moved to report HB 145, as amended, out
of committee with individual recommendations and the
accompanying zero fiscal note. There being no objection, CSHB
145(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary Standing
Committee.
HB 228 - SALE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS
Number 1427
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the last order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 228, "An Act relating to the offense of
selling or giving tobacco to a minor, to the accounting of fees
from business license endorsements for tobacco products, to the
disclosure of certain confidential cigarette and tobacco product
information, to notification regarding a cigarette
manufacturer's noncompliance with the tobacco product Master
Settlement Agreement, to business license endorsements for sale
of tobacco products, to citations and penalties for illegal
sales of tobacco products; and providing for an effective date."
[Before the committee was CSHB 228(L&C).]
Number 1371
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 1, which read
[original punctuation provided]:
Page 7, line 4:
Delete "The"
Insert "A peace officer, or an agent or employee
of the"
Following "Department of Health and Social
Services":
Insert "who is authorized by the
commissioner of health and social services to enforce
this section,"
Page 7, lines 6 - 7:
Delete "Each day a violation continues after a
citation for the violation has been issued constitutes
a separate violation."
Page 7, line 14:
Delete "the issuance of"
Insert "issuing to its agents or employees"
Page 7, line 18:
Delete "department shall deposit the"
Following "citation":
Insert "shall be deposited"
Page 7, line 21:
Delete "The department may not dispose of a"
Insert "A"
Page 7, line 22, following "issuance":
Insert "may not be disposed of"
Page 7, line 24, following "by":
Insert "an agent or employee of"
Page 7, line 25, following "copies of":
Insert "such"
Page 7, line 27, following "citation":
Insert "issued by its agent or employee"
Number 1347
JOHN MANLY, Staff to Representative John Harris, Alaska State
Legislature, on behalf of Representative Harris, sponsor,
explained that the Department of Health & Social Services (DHSS)
prepared Amendment 1. At the previous hearing on HB 228, it was
suggested that "sideboards" should be placed on the DHSS's
authority to issue citations for selling tobacco to minors. He
offered that Amendment 1 would provide those sideboards; it more
clearly defines who exactly would be authorized to issue these
citations. The person has to be authorized by the commissioner
of the DHSS. He also pointed out that the portion of Amendment
1 affecting line 6-7 deletes a provision that the committee
considered unnecessary since it refers to citations issued under
the criminal statute, Title 11.
Number 1199
ELMER LINDSTROM, Special Assistant, Office of the Commissioner,
Department of Health & Social Services (DHSS), said that the
DHSS has no objections to deleting that provision from page 7,
lines 6-7. He added that the remainder of Amendment 1 is merely
conforming language that changes the voice of the legislation
from an active one to a passive one. With regard to the
sideboard stipulating that aside from a peace officer, only an
authorized agent or employee of the DHSS could issue citations,
he noted that similar authority exists in other statutes, for
example, those pertaining to park employees.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether any special training would be
required in order for a person to become a "tobacco cop."
Number 1154
EDWIN J. SASSER, Tobacco Enforcement Coordinator, Division of
Public Health (DPH), Department of Health & Social Services
(DHSS), mentioned that the provision being deleted via Amendment
1 dealt with the issue of vending machines being moved and
cigarettes not being locked up. Regarding the sideboard
pertaining to who will be authorized to issue citations, he
explained that the language inserted in the first portion of
Amendment 1 is patterned after language in AS 45.75.131 that
gives authority to issue citations related to weights and
measures violations. In none of the language already in statute
relating to issuing citations, he added, is there any reference
to training requirements. He suggested, however, that the
language stipulating that the commissioner of the DHSS must
authorize the agent or employee does imply training requirements
and standards. He offered that it would not be hard to expand
any Memorandum of [Understanding] (MOU) that the DHSS has with
the Department of Public Safety (DPS) to include specific
standards for any agent or employee selected to issue citations.
Number 1045
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether there were any objections to
Amendment 1. There being no objection, Amendment 1 was adopted.
CHAIR ROKEBERG mentioned a concern regarding the potential for a
disgruntled employee to subject the endorsement holder to
cumulative fines and penalties simply by continuing to sell
tobacco products to minors.
MR. MANLY said that he did not know whether any of the cases
that have been prosecuted thus far have included such
circumstances. Most of the time the sale is inadvertent or done
in ignorance.
REPRESENTATIVE MEYER opined that it would be hard for such a
situation to occur; the employee would have to know in advance
that he/she was selling to an undercover minor in a sting
operation.
MR. SASSER said that he is not aware of any such situations
occurring, nor was he aware of any state that has adopted
language that would allow such a situation to be an affirmative
defense.
MR. LINDSTROM, on the issue of penalties to the endorsement
holder, noted that current statute stipulates that the
endorsement may be suspended up to 45 days for a first offense
and up to 90 days for a subsequent offense occurring within a
24-month period. On the issue of compliance, he remarked that
surveys done last September indicate that on a statewide basis,
minors were able to purchase tobacco up to 34 percent of the
time notwithstanding all the preventative measures that have
been taken to date. He added that this noncompliance rate is
unacceptably high.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL pondered whether the high noncompliance
rate is "a vendor responsibility."
CHAIR ROKEBERG said he has received a letter from Costa Alton of
C.J. Enterprises, expressing the concern that Section 8(l) is
unfair to the owner of vending machines. Chair Rokeberg offered
the point that if there is a problem with one machine, the
people at that location who are responsible for supervising the
vending machine should be subject to the penalties, rather than
the vending company. Section8(l) stipulates "if an endorsement
... for the sale of tobacco products through vending machines is
suspended or revoked, the person may not sell ... tobacco ...
products through any of the person's other vending machines".
He suggested that this provision should be altered to apply to
the owner of the establishment where the vending machine is
located.
MR. SASSER clarified that this provision does apply to the
endorsement holder of the establishment in which the machine is
placed. He said that the only time the endorsement of the
vending company can be suspended is if the company negligently
places the machine in an unsuitable location.
CHAIR ROKEBERG called an at-ease from 2:46 p.m. to 2:55 p.m.
Number 0382
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Conceptual Amendment 2:
Section 8, subsection (l) should conform ... to the
concept that the vending machine company's tobacco
business license/endorsement can not be suspended for
one violation. However, the machine on the premises
could be removed or immobilized; the operator would be
prohibited from operating it at the particular
location, not all of his locations.
CHAIR ROKEBERG explained that with the adoption of Conceptual
Amendment 2, a violation would result in the machine operator
being suspended from operating that particular machine at that
location, and penalties would also be imposed on the owner of
the establishment for a lack of supervision at that location.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL remarked that anyone who has an
endorsement, whether vending company or establishment owner,
should be aware of the laws regarding sale to minors and the
possible penalties for violations.
MR. MANLY noted that there is a provision in HB 228 requiring
that vendor education materials accompany the endorsement when
it is sent out.
TAPE 01-73, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether "they" would be subject to a
monetary fine in addition to having his/her endorsement
suspended for having a vending machine in an inappropriate
location.
Number 0089
CATHERINE REARDON, Director, Central Office, Division of
Occupational Licensing, Department of Community & Economic
Development (DCED), explained that having a vending machine in
an inappropriate location is a crime under AS 11.76, and would
therefore be punishable.
MR. SASSER added that AS 11.76.100(d) provides that a vending
machine operator who negligently places a vending machine will
be subject to a $300 fine. He noted that this fine does not
increase for multiple violations.
Number 0177
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether there were any objections to
Conceptual Amendment 2. There being no objection, Conceptual
Amendment 2 was adopted.
Number 0234
REPRESENTATIVE MEYER moved to report CSHB 228(L&C), as amended,
out of committee with individual recommendations and the
accompanying fiscal notes. There being no objection, CSHB
228(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary Standing
Committee.
ADJOURNMENT
Number 0270
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 3:03 p.m.
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