Legislature(1999 - 2000)
03/24/1999 01:06 PM House JUD
| Audio | Topic |
|---|
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
March 24, 1999
1:06 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Pete Kott, Chairman
Representative Joe Green
Representative Norman Rokeberg
Representative Jeannette James
Representative Lisa Murkowski
Representative Eric Croft
Representative Beth Kerttula
MEMBERS ABSENT
All members present
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 29
Relating to the division of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
- MOVED CSHJR 29(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 82
"An Act relating to immunity for certain claims arising out of or
in connection with the year 2000 date change; and providing for an
effective date."
- HEARD AND HELD; ASSIGNED TO SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 18
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
relating to an office of administrative hearings.
- HEARD AND HELD
GOVERNOR'S APPOINTMENTS
-SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
(* First public hearing)
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: HJR 29
SHORT TITLE: ENDORSE FED. CT. OF APP. FOR 12TH CIRCUIT
SPONSOR(S): JUDICIARY
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
3/17/99 492 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
3/17/99 492 (H) JUDICIARY
3/24/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 82
SHORT TITLE: IMMUNITY:CLAIMS ARISING FROM Y2K PROBLEMS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) ROKEBERG, Dyson, Halcro
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
2/05/99 144 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
2/05/99 144 (H) L&C, JUDICIARY
2/12/99 (H) L&C AT 3:15 PM CAPITOL 17
2/12/99 (H) HEARD AND HELD
2/12/99 (H) MINUTE(L&C)
2/16/99 228 (H) COSPONSOR(S): DYSON
2/26/99 (H) L&C AT 3:15 PM CAPITOL 17
2/26/99 (H) HEARD AND HELD
2/26/99 (H) MINUTE(L&C)
3/03/99 (H) L&C AT 3:15 PM CAPITOL 17
3/03/99 (H) MOVED CSHB 82(L&C) OUT OF COMMITTEE
3/03/99 (H) MINUTE(L&C)
3/03/99 350 (H) COSPONSOR(S): HALCRO
3/05/99 361 (H) L&C RPT COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE(L&C) NT
3DP 3NR
3/05/99 361 (H) DP: ROKEBERG, HALCRO, HARRIS;
3/05/99 361 (H) NR: SANDERS, CISSNA, MURKOWSKI
3/05/99 361 (H) 2 ZERO FISCAL NOTES (LAW, COURT)
3/05/99 361 (H) REFERRED TO JUD
3/24/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HJR 18
SHORT TITLE: CONST. AM: ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) OGAN, Foster, Dyson, Rokeberg
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
2/24/99 300 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
2/24/99 300 (H) STA, JUD, FIN
2/26/99 328 (H) COSPONSOR(S): FOSTER
3/04/99 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
3/04/99 (H) HEARD AND HELD
3/04/99 (H) MINUTE(STA)
3/05/99 377 (H) COSPONSOR(S): DYSON, ROKEBERG
3/09/99 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
3/09/99 (H) SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
3/16/99 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
3/16/99 (H) MOVED CSHJR 18(STA) OUT OF COMMITTEE
3/16/99 (H) MINUTE(STA)
3/17/99 489 (H) STA RPT COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE(STA) NT
4DP 2DNP
3/17/99 489 (H) DP: JAMES, COGHILL, WHITAKER, OGAN;
3/17/99 489 (H) DNP: SMALLEY, KERTTULA
3/17/99 490 (H) FISCAL NOTE (GOV)
3/17/99 490 (H) REFERRED TO JUD
3/24/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
CORY WINCHELL, Legislative Assistant
to Representative Pete Kott
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 118
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-3777
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided introduction to HJR 29.
JOANNE GRACE, Assistant Attorney General
Natural Resources Section
Civil Division
Department of Law
1031 West 4th Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-1994
Telephone: (907) 269-5100
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on HJR 29.
JANET SEITZ, Legislative Assistant
to Representative Norm Rokeberg
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 24
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-4968
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented sponsor statement for HB 82.
MIKE FORD, Attorney
Legislative Legal Counsel
Legislative Legal and Research Services
Legislative Affairs Agency
130 Seward Street, Suite 409
Juneau, Alaska 99801-2105
Telephone: (907) 465-2450
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on HB 82.
BOB LOEFFLER, Director
Central Office
Division of Mining and Water Management
Department of Natural Resources
3601 C Street, Suite 800
Anchorage, Alaska 99503-5935
Telephone: (907) 269-8600
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on behalf of the Department of
Natural Resources with concerns about HJR 18.
DEBORAH VOGT, Deputy Commissioner
Office of the Commissioner
Department of Revenue
P.O. Box 110400
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0400
Telephone: (907) 465-2300
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on behalf of the Department of
Revenue with concerns about HJR 18.
TERESA WILLIAMS, Assistant Attorney General
Fair Business Practices Section
Civil Division (Anchorage)
Department of Law
1031 West Fourth Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-1994
Telephone: (907) 269-5100
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on behalf of the Department of Law
with concerns about HJR 18.
PAUL GROSSI, Director
Central Office
Division of Worker's Compensation
Department of Labor
P.O. Box 25512
Juneau, Alaska 99802-5512
Telephone: (907) 465-2790
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on behalf of the Department of Labor
with concerns about HJR 18.
CATHERINE REARDON, Director
Central Office
Division of Occupational Licensing
Department of Commerce and Economic Licensing
P.O. Box 110806
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0806
Telephone: (907) 465-2534
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on behalf of the Division of
Occupational Licensing, and its 21 licensing
boards, in opposition to HJR 18.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 99-18, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIRMAN PETE KOTT called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting to order at 1:06 p.m. Members present at the call to order
were Representatives Kott, Green, Rokeberg, Croft and Kerttula.
Representatives James and Murkowski arrived at 1:17 p.m. and 1:20
p.m., respectively.
HJR 29 - ENDORSE FED. CT. OF APP. FOR 12TH CIRCUIT
CHAIRMAN KOTT announced the first order of business is HJR 29,
Relating to the division of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
CHAIRMAN KOTT called on Cory Winchell to explain the resolution.
Number 0140
CORY WINCHELL, Administrative Assistant to Representative Pete
Kott, Alaska State Legislature, stated the joint resolution
proposes Senator Murkowski's bill, S.253. That bill would split
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals into three divisions: the
Northern Division, the Middle Division and the Southern Division.
They would be comprised of the following:
Northern Division -
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Eastern Washington and
Western Washington;
Middle Division -
Eastern California, Northern California, Guam, Hawaii,
Nevada and the Northern Mariana Islands; and
Southern Division -
Arizona, Central California and Southern California.
MR. WINCHELL further noted that district judges would appeal their
cases to their respective divisions. The judges would sit in
panels, and appeals from the divisions would go to the Circuit
Division. The intent is to make it more representative or
indicative of some of the other areas in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. There is a powerhouse in Southern California of legal
opinions that contradict some of the tenor in other parts of the
circuit. In addition, 82 percent of the appeals to the U.S.
Supreme Court from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are
overturned. That is well known in jurisprudence.
Number 0352
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Winchell whether the district courts would
appeal their cases to their particular division.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Winchell whether the judges would sit in
panels of three within their division, of which two could come from
that particular division.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes. He read from S.253, "(3) ASSIGNMENT OF
JUDGES - Each regional division shall include from 7 to 11 judges
of the court of appeals in active status. A majority of the judges
assigned to each division shall reside within the judicial
districts that are within the division's jurisdiction as specified
in paragraph (2)...".
Number 0435
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Winchell whether the Circuit Division
consists of 13 judges - 1 chief judge and 12 circuit judges - of
which equal numbers would come from the various divisions.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes.
Number 0464
REPRESENTATIVE GREEN asked Mr. Winchell whether a favorable ruling
that has been appealed to the Northern Division would have to go
back to the full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes. The district court in Alaska would
appeal to the Northern Division, and from there appeal to the
Circuit Division. It would only appeal those issues that are
divided between the three divisions and any others that are
necessary, such as constitutional issues that need to go to the
appeal level quickly.
Number 0556
REPRESENTATIVE GREEN asked Mr. Winchell whether there would be more
judges in the three divisions than the total judges in the Circuit
Division.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes. Each regional division would include
from 7 to 11 judges of the court of appeals, and there would be a
total of 13 judges in the Circuit Division.
Number 0602
REPRESENTATIVE GREEN asked what has Alaska gained with an appeal to
the Circuit Division other than one more hearing.
MR. WINCHELL replied the Circuit Division would be comprised of
judges in equal amounts from each division. The decision making
power would be fractured. He doesn't know whether they would be
all of the same mind, however. There would be friction if the
decision of the majority runs counter to the Supreme Court. In
addition, there would be a judicial council to overview some of the
decisions made. That council would recommend changes to Congress
and to some of the committees as time goes on. There would be a
close eye on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Number 0688
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Winchell whether or not each decision made
within the divisions would be automatically forwarded to the
Circuit Division.
MR. WINCHELL replied he's not exactly sure. There shouldn't be an
appeal to the Circuit Division, if all three divisions are in line,
unless it's right to turn the law over again.
Number 0744
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated an appeal from a district court to the
division wouldn't end up in the Circuit Division, unless there is
disparity among the various divisions or other extenuating
circumstances.
MR. WINCHELL replied ideally yes. It creates a new strata, a new
appeals system, within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Number 0778
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated the en banc proceedings do not apply to
the court of appeals as a whole, but only to the divisions. The
division would, therefore, act as a circuit. If three judges from
the Northern Division rule against or for Alaska, the procedure
would be to ask for that whole division to hear it, not the whole
circuit. He asked where is the part that authorizes the entire
circuit to review differences in en banc proceedings.
MR. WINCHELL replied the Circuit Division is empowered to answer
differences among the three divisions. It oversees contending
points of law or extenuating circumstances, such as constitutional
issues.
Number 0875
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated the Northern Division would hear an
issue such as ANILCA (Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act), and if there is an en banc it would be heard within that
division. It is very unlikely that another portion of the circuit
would rule on ANILCA since it applies to only Alaska. That is an
advantage to Alaska. Only general issues would it go to the next
level. It is an efficiency because the Northern Division would
almost always be the last word before the U.S. Supreme Court.
MR. WINCHELL stated it does regionalize some issues on en ban
proceedings.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said it regionalizes everything, but the
broad, constitutional ideas. It is a significant change.
Number 0975
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated Representative Croft is right on track.
Alaska would take its cases to the Northern Division and unless
there were extenuating circumstances the Circuit Division would not
even take them up.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT noted the last recourse is the U.S. Supreme
Court, not the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as a whole. It
divides up California which has always been the rub in some of
these.
MR. WINCHELL explained there were several bills on this issue.
Some wanted to split the circuit and start a new one, but that was
too contentious.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked Mr. Winchell whether the divisions are
based on population.
MR. WINCHELL replied they are based on districts. He's not
entirely sure, however.
Number 1072
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Winchell, as it presently stands, whether
there are 28 judges in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Winchell whether it is true that 18 of
those 28 judges come from California and only 1 comes from Alaska.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes. There is a disparity.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Winchell whether it is true that 82 percent
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions were overturned by
the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1994-1995 session.
MR. WINCHELL replied yes. It is the most overturned circuit within
the United States Court of Appeals.
Number 1137
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated it is his understanding that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals is overwhelmed compared to the other circuits. It
has 2,000 more cases on its docket.
MR. WINCHELL said it is very cumbersome to bring an appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Number 1189
JOANNE GRACE, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources
Section, Civil Division, Department of Law, testified via
teleconference from Anchorage. The Administration strongly
supports S.253. At any given time, the Department of Law has
several cases pending in the circuit. On average, the Department
of Law has been a party or amicus from 5 to 10 cases that the court
decides every year. The department believes that the court has
grown too large in terms of judges and cases that it handles, and
that it should be split into these divisions. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals is the largest in the circuit in terms of
territory and population. It spans nine states and two
territories. It serves a population of 45 million. It covers a
land area larger in size than Western Europe. It serves 15 million
more people than the next largest circuit and about 20 million more
than the average of the other courts of appeal. Since 1973, its
annual case load has grown from 2,300 to 8,000. It is too large to
efficiently and effortlessly resolve cases in a timely manner.
This situation will only grow worse in the future. The population
that the court serves is expected to increase to 63 million by the
year 2010, and adding judges to serve the increase would only
exacerbate the problems already caused by its size. With 28 judges
and 3 serving on any given panel, over 3,276 combinations of panels
are possible, but in reality since the court uses visiting or
senior judges the number of combinations is much higher and will
increase with the addition of each new judge. This problem
inevitably contributes to conflicting opinions, reduced
communication among judges, and inconsistency with court decisions.
The problems are magnified for the state who's dwarfed by the
heavily populated states within the circuit. Alaskan cases
constitute only 2 percent of the court's case load. Only 12
circuit judges were assigned to all of the Alaskan cases published
in 1997. Given the relatively few Alaskan cases compared to the
whole, Alaskan litigants are far less likely to draw panels of
judges who are familiar with the state. This is aggravated by the
fact that Alaskan cases involve complex federal statutes that the
judges don't encounter in the other 98 percent of the case loads.
She cited ANCSA (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act) and ANILCA as
examples. The issues that they have generated have varied
tremendously from the interpretation of revenue sharing to the
question of Indian country. Regardless of the well intentions of
judges, their opinions reveal a lack of understanding of the people
and places and can seem offensive to the people affected. The
present wait for an oral argument is one year after a briefing is
complete. This delay is even longer for Alaska and according to
the court clerk some are held longer in order to schedule a hearing
during the summer. She has a case pending before the court that
was docketed in October of 1996. There was an oral argument in
December of 1997, and there still hasn't been a decision rendered.
The judges readily admit that they don't read all the decisions
that other judges issue because there are too many. In summary,
this type of legislation is sorely needed and would greatly benefit
Alaska. The Governor has suggested a few changes to Senator
Murkowski's bill. The state would prefer that the Circuit Division
was eliminated. It is not helpful to Alaska because it would still
allow decisions to be made by a majority of judges who are not from
the Northern Division. The state would also prefer that all the
judges live within the division that they are serving.
Number 1680
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated that he could agree with both recommendations.
He asked Ms. Grace to forward her comments in writing to the
committee.
Number 1692
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked Ms. Grace whether taking out the Circuit
Division would allow the three divisions to operate separately.
MS. GRACE replied the state would prefer a separate circuit. The
state would prefer that the Northern Division only hears Alaskan
cases. The state isn't concerned about the administration of the
three divisions as one circuit, however.
Number 1737
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated legally they could be three separate
circuits, but administratively they could keep their offices in one
place to keep track of staff, for example.
MS. GRACE stated that is the way it is set up now, except for the
Circuit Division. She thinks it was a compromise to try to deal
with the concerns of those who didn't want to split the circuit and
the concerns of the Northern states who felt that the circuit was
not serving them.
CHAIRMAN KOTT closed the meeting to public testimony.
Number 1800
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated the two changes mentioned by Ms. Grace
are positive. It would make the circuit a harder, separate
division. It would also remove that last step.
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated that requiring three out of three judges to
reside in their particular division would be even better.
Number 1980
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT referred to page 2, lines 14-16, "WHEREAS
members of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have shown a
surprising lack of understanding of Alaska's people and geography
that has resulted in decisions that have often caused the people of
Alaska unnecessary hardship;". It is more of an attack on
individual decisions. It is correct the way it is written, but it
might get the state into a fight that isn't necessary. He
suggested eliminating the phrase, "that has resulted in decisions
that have often caused the people of Alaska unnecessary hardship".
CHAIRMAN KOTT concurs with the suggestion. It is the harshest
"whereas" clause in the joint resolution. He entertained the
suggestion as a friendly amendment. There being no objection, it
was so adopted.
CHAIRMAN KOTT indicated that he would not object to the suggestions
made by the attorney general's office.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said they are good ideas.
Number 2039
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI asked Ms. Grace whether there has been any
feedback from Senator Murkowski's office regarding the suggested
changes.
MS. GRACE replied she doesn't know. If there was, it didn't come
down to her.
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI asked Mr. Grace when the suggestions were
sent to Senator Murkowski's office.
MS. GRACE replied at about the same time that he introduced the
bill.
Number 2090
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said she is wondering whether he had those
suggestions when the bill was introduced and whether he chose not
to incorporate them for whatever reason. She is curious about the
ensuing couple of months and whether there has been anything done
with them.
MS. GRACE said it is her understanding that Senator Murkowski did
not have the suggestions when he introduced the bill, and it was
thought that they would be considered in committee.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT suggested placing the suggestions in another
"be it resolved" section of the joint resolution.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked whether there is any objection. There being
none, it was so adopted. The language will be left up to the bill
drafter. At the same time, he will have his staff contact Senator
Murkowski's office to determine whether they will jeopardize his
bargaining power. If they do, they will be removed at a later
date.
Number 2206
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT made a motion to move HJR 29, as amended, from
the committee with individual recommendations and the attached
fiscal note(s). There being no objection, CSHJR 29(JUD) was so
moved from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
HB 82 - IMMUNITY: CLAIMS ARISING FROM Y2K PROBLEMS
CHAIRMAN KOTT announced the next order of business is HB 82, "An
Act relating to immunity for certain claims arising out of or in
connection with the year 2000 date change; and providing for an
effective date."
CHAIRMAN KOTT indicated that CSHB 82(L&C) is before the committee
(1-LS0398\I).
Number 2265
JANET SEITZ, Legislative Assistant to Representative Norm Rokeberg,
Alaska State Legislature, stated HB 82 provides immunity for
Alaskan businesses for certain claims arising out of connection
with the year 2000 (Y2K) date change. A lot of money will be
spent, not only on addressing the problem, but on lawsuits and
Alaskan businesses are no exception to this exposure. House Bill
82 says that as-long-as a business goes through certain steps it
will maintain an action. This immunity will assist in encouraging
small businesses to continue or begin to address the Y2K situation.
Number 2310
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Representative Rokeberg what is a "smart
building."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied it is a building that is wired and
computerized. The fire systems and alarms are integrated into a
black box type of computer system.
Number 2386
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG noted that in the bill packet is a copy of
S.96 and letters of support from a few organizations. He also has
a series of amendments.
TAPE 99-18, SIDE B
Number 0001
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG continued. He explained the bill. It sets
up the methodology of asserting a defense by indicating that a
business is not liable for damages arising from the millennium bug.
Section 1(a)(1)(A) - (F) delineates a list of steps to prepare a
plan of due diligence. The way it is drafted indicates that a
business would have to do every one of the steps. It is his
contention that it should be amendment to show an example rather
than a requirement. Section 1(a)(2) provides a more generic
defense. Therefore, there are two different patterns of
reasonableness of what a business has to do.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1(b)(1)
indicates a business that develops or manufactures software and
hardware cannot assert a defense. A retailer in a chain would not
be held to the same standards, however, that a hardware or software
developer would be.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1 (b)(2)
indicates that a defense may not be asserted based on a contract.
He has an amendment that removes the word "contract" and inserts
the words "express warranty". If somebody has warranted by
contract to fix a Y2K problem and they don't, they can't assert
this defense.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1(c) indicates
that a class action suit can only be for damages of economic loss
in excess of $50,000. He suggested that the committee members
discuss the figure; it was a recommendation by the Alaska State
Chamber of Commerce. It may be appropriate to raise it to
$100,000, for example. The federal bill has a million dollar
threshold.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated that Section 1(d) indicates
that if there is a civil action the damages would be limited to
economic losses only, unless fraud was committed. In the event of
fraud, it would revert to the rules of standard common law and the
rules of the court. Section 1(d)(2) provides that before an action
can begin there has to be a curative state. In other words, there
has to be a cure provision, mediation then remediation before
full-blown litigation. Section 1(e)(3) defines the phrase "year
2000 date change". He has an amendment to change that.
Number 0260
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked Representative Rokeberg to address
the changes to Section 1(a)(1)(A) - (F) that he briefly mentioned.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied he has an amendment to create a
substantial efforts standard rather than to require the actual
implementation of each element in the bill [(A) - (F)]. The
elements then become examples of efforts.
CHAIRMAN KOTT said that is nothing more than an either-or
situation. The "or" seems to be inclusive of "either" because
Section 1(a)(2) talks about due diligence.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated there is a choice here because of
the language "or". It could be left alone. He has an amendment to
change the second standard as well.
Number 0344
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said the issue of a list was discussed in
the House Labor and Commerce Standing Committee. The conventional
wisdom of the committee at the time was to try and include some
structure while still making it clear that there might be other
criteria to look to given a standard within an industry. The
language isn't perfect in the committee substitute, but the
amendment gets it closer.
Number 0445
CHAIRMAN KOTT closed the meeting to public testimony.
Number 0568
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 1. It reads as follows:
Page 3:
Delete lines 24-27
Insert: (3) "year 2000 date change" includes processing
date or time data from, into and between calendar year
1999 and calendar year 2000, and leap year calculations;
in this paragraph, "processing" includes calculating,
comparing, sequencing, displaying and storing."
CHAIRMAN KOTT objected for discussion purposes.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated Amendment 1 changes the definition
of the phrase "year 2000 date change" to start on or about July 1,
1999 and to extend through the entire year 2000 when these problems
are expected to crop up. Since there is controversy about when the
next century will start - 2000 or 2001 - it is appropriate to adopt
the amendment for clarification.
CHAIRMAN KOTT removed his objection. There being no further
objection, it was so moved.
Number 0627
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 2 (1-LS0398\I.3, Ford,
3/22/99). It reads as follows:
Page 2, line 27:
Delete "a contract"
Insert "an express warranty"
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT objected.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated Amendment 2 is quite an important
element in the entire bill. According to correspondence with
attorneys, if an action can't be asserted based on a contract then
it would obviate the entire need for the bill. If there is a
contractual obligation to fix a Y2K bug that is not delivered,
there should be a proper course of action to take.
Number 0712
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked whether there can be interference
with the right to contract.
Number 0756
MIKE FORD, Attorney, Legislative Legal Counsel, Legislative Legal
and Research Services, Legislative Affairs Agency, stated he
doesn't feel that there is a constitutional problem including this
provision. As it is written now, it won't allow someone to use
this defense if there is a warranty built in. That doesn't
necessarily rewrite the contract. It simply provides that in those
situations this defense is not available. It reinforces the
contract itself. The federal bill is broader. It says that the
contract provision has to be relied on.
Number 0802
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the selection of the word "express
warranty" was his idea after consulting with Mr. Ford.
Number 0815
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated it should say, "if a contract has
already been negotiated that deals with this, then it should be
left to them to handle it." The word "contract" may be too broad,
but the word "express warranty" may be too narrow. He wondered
what the federal law says.
MR. FORD referred the committee members to SECTION 4, "APPLICATION
OF ACT", in the federal bill. It reads as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-This Act applies to any Y2K action
brought in a State or Federal court after February 22,
1999.
(b) NO NEW CAUSE OF ACTION CREATED.-Nothing in this Act
creates a new cause of action under Federal or State law.
(c) ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR WRONGFUL DEATH
EXCLUDED.-This Act does not apply to a claim for personal
injury or for wrongful death.
(d) WRITTEN CONTRACT CONTROLS.-The provisions of this
Act do not supersede a valid, enforceable written
contract between a plaintiff and a defendant in a Y2K
action.
(e) PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW.-This Act supersedes State
law to the extent that it establishes a rule of law
applicable to a Y2K action that is inconsistent with
State law.
Number 0916
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said it comes closer. He asked Representative
Rokeberg whether he would object to using the phrase, "The
provisions of this Act do not supersede a valid, enforceable
written contract between a plaintiff and a defendant in a Y2K
action."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied he is concerned because is says "in
a Y2K action." Are we talking about a contract to deliver a
commodity and then asserting a Y2K defense for the failure to
deliver, or are we talking about something that relates to a Y2K
contractual fix? He doesn't like the language.
Number 0979
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said: "I mean. We're only talking about in
(a) a specific Y2K thing so, part (b) says, 'The defense in (a) may
not be asserted', and if you said in (2) to supersede the
provisions of a valid, enforceable written contract, it sounds
broad, but it's only applying to (a). The thing in (a) is pretty
well-defined already. So, you just say (a)--(a) doesn't apply and
(a) only applies in these certain Y2K areas anyway. It wouldn't
apply to supersede a valid, enforceable written...I don't know why
particularly written either, but it wouldn't supersede a valid,
enforceable contract."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to SECTION 201, "CONTRACTS
ENFORCED", of the federal bill. It reads as follows:
In any Y2K action, any written term or condition of a
valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant, including limitations or exclusions of
liability and disclaimer of warranty, is fully
enforceable, unless the court determines that the
contract as a whole is unenforceable. If the contract is
silent with respect to any matter, the interpretation of
the contract with respect to that matter shall be
determined by applicable law in force at the time the
contract was executed.
Number 1065
MR. FORD said he has not had time to analyze this version of the
federal bill, but there are several provisions that seem to
overlap. This section is sort of the same thing as the application
section. It could be the federal style.
Number 1118
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked whether the state would be preempted
if the federal bill remains broad. Section 4(e) of the federal
bills says it supersedes state law.
MR. FORD replied the federal law would control because of that
provision. It, of course, depends on the final version of the
federal bill.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said there are certain elements that are
not preempted that allow for statewide control, such as certain
thresholds for class action. They don't completely overlap. The
committee members need to discuss whether they want express
warranty to relate to a Y2K type of phenomenon, or whether they
want it to relate to a universal contract. That's the issue. The
federal law says in Y2K actions. Does that have to do with
hardware, software, etc., or does that have to do with the chain of
transactions based on a contract? In other words, a commodity that
is transferred from a vender to a vendee, such as a widget.
Number 1252
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said the federal bill defines Y2K action
as, "To provide civil action commencing in federal or state court
in which the plaintiff's alleged harm or injury resulted directly
or indirectly from an actual or potential Y2K failure or a claim or
defense of a defendant is related directly or indirectly to a
natural or potential Y2K failure."
Number 1276
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the federal bill also allows for a
defense of reasonable efforts - SECTION 202, "DEFENSES". That is
slightly different than this bill.
Number 1291
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said HB 82 with Amendment 1 defines the
state's terms carefully. He suggested modifying the language to
say, "The defense in (a) of this section may not be asserted to
contradict the provisions of a valid, enforceable contract" [page
2, line 19]. It sounds broad, but it is tied to the defense in
Section 1 (a).
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said Representative Croft's suggestion has
to do with the widget scenario and not the vender-to-vendee
scenario. Does it specifically have to do with hardware/software
or a typical contractual relationship? By saying it is a general
contractual relationship, it is an enforceable contract. The
language in this bill prohibits the use of a defense, while the
federal bill allows the use of a defense.
Number 1414
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said the defense only applies to a Y2K date
change concerning the failure of an electronic computer device. It
can't be used to contradict a contract that says it will fix a Y2K
problem. It only applies to Section 1(a) which is narrowly
defined.
Number 1458
REPRESENTATIVE GREEN asked whether extending an effort to a list of
litanies would create a potential problem that could be solved much
easier with a simple statement like Representative Croft suggested.
A list would inevitably leave something out. Every year the lists
in statute get amended. "It seems to me that the less we depend on
lists and the more we depend on intent, the better off we're gonna
be."
Number 1510
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the point is being missed. The
defense in Section 1(a) can't be used in terms of a contractual
action, if Section 1(b)(2) is not modified. The issue is between
a Y2K hardware/software thing versus a widget. There is a
distinction.
Number 1568
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said the distinction is between saying
contract in general and a valid, enforceable contract in a Y2K
action. There would be a big loophole if it said, "based on
contract none of this applied, and it can't be used to modify the
terms of a contract." He agrees it needs to be amendment, but he's
not sure of the "express warranty" language. He suggested language
that says, "somewhere along the lines that it can't be used to
contradict what the parties have agreed to." "You can still get it
for an action based on contract, as long as it doesn't modify what
they agreed to."
Number 1625
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he agrees with that, but he is
concerned about it becoming too ambiguous. He suggested relying on
Mr. Ford to come up with language.
Number 1633
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said everything that Representative
Rokeberg has said regarding contracts can be turned around and
applied to express warranties. "I think what you want is to say
that if they got the exact, written contract on this topic, you
know, and they've thought about it ahead of time how they're gonna
work it out, then you don't want to interfere with that contract.
They've already thought about it."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he is talking about the terms of a
contract that deals with Y2K.
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said a contract would be dealt with
expressly, but it's not just an express warranty.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said a defense should be able to be used
for a widget, but not if there is an agreement to fix it for a Y2K
problem. That's the distinction. He suggest the language, "an
express Y2K warranty". This is the crux of the whole bill.
Number 1730
MR. FORD said it would be helpful to pull Section 1(b)(2) out of
the provision and to put a separate subsection that embodies
similar language to the federal bill. It would be clearer and
there wouldn't be a hang up on whether it's a defense, claim or
counterclaim.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked Mr. Ford whether he means warranties
of Y2K activities or widgets.
MR. FORD replied he's talking about the provisions in a Y2K action.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked Mr. Ford whether a Y2K action is a
fact-pattern for the defense or is it something that is talked
about in a contract.
MR. FORD replied, if it isn't contained in a contract, it wouldn't
be an action based on a contract.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said that's like putting in an action based
on express Y2K warranty.
MR. FORD said it's all fruit, just different kinds. "We started
out with a provision that says, if it's a contract--if it's based
on a contract, you don't get this defense. If your claim is based
on some provision in the contract, you don't get this defense. You
have to rely on your contract. The amendment we have before you,
actually narrows that a bit to express warranty. Express warranty
is something in a contract. Now, what the federal government has
done here is simply say, well, we're not going to talk about
express warranty, we're going to talk about any provision of the
contract that is rendered unenforceable. If it's a valid,
enforceable contract, that's what you rely on which again is, I
think, the same thing you want to do."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said, but the defense can't be asserted in
the draft of the federal bill.
MR. FORD said the contracts have to be relied on.
CHAIRMAN KOTT laid aside Amendment 2.
Number 1960
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 3. It reads as follows:
Page 1, lines 12-13
Delete "the following efforts to avoid the damages
claimed in the civil action:"
Insert "substantial efforts to avoid the damages claimed
in the civil action, such as"
Page 1, line 14:
Delete "inventory"
Insert "inventorying"
Page 2, line 2:
Delete "identify"
Insert "identifying"
Page 2, line 4:
Delete "identify"
Insert "identifying"
Page 2, line 6:
Delete "prepare"
Insert "preparing"
Page 2, line 9:
Delete "comply with industry regulations or requirements"
Insert "complying with generally accepted practices of a
business sector"
Page 2, line 12:
Delete "develop"
Insert "developing"
CHAIRMAN KOTT objected.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said Amendment 3 removes the necessity to
require every step in provision (A)-(F) before proving reasonable
efforts. It also modifies the industry regulations and/or
requirements. There is concern because there really aren't any
industry standards in this field.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Representative Rokeberg whether he said that
there are no general accepted standards.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied, according to testimony from Scott
Thorsson (ph), there may be some in the banking industries and
certain other areas, but they are rare.
Number 2211
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Ford whether there is a substantial
difference between "generally accepted practices" and "generally
accepted standards."
MR. FORD replied some areas do have written standards, but from
what he's heard they are just practices in this area. Yes, there
could be a difference between a practice and a standard.
Number 2256
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated the bill sets up two different paths to
know whether a business has done the right thing. One is a list
and the other is an exercise of general care. There is the word
"or" on page 2, line 13. He likes the dichotomy; they are proper
options. To generalize both of them does away with some of that
balance.
Number 2394
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG appreciates Representative Croft's
argument. He has been vacillating back and forth between those two
things. The language is disjunctive. He suggested taking up
Amendment 4 as well because it changes the general standard a
little bit. That might help when talking about both of the
approaches.
TAPE 99-19, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIRMAN KOTT noted it is unusual to talk about another amendment
when there is a motion on the floor, but in light of the high
confusion he ruled in favor of the request.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG explained Amendment 4. It reads as
follows:
Page 2, lines 14-6:
Delete ", by following generally accepted standards of
care and effort in the business activity in which the
business was engaged, exercised due diligence and"
Insert "used"
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG further stated he has a letter that
indicates Section 1 (a)(2) sets up three separate standards: an
industry standard of care, a due diligence standard, and a
reasonable care standard. There should only be one. It's nice to
use the word "due diligence", but the reasonable care standard is
the appropriate one. It provides for the general reasonable care
efforts in order to assert the defense. It would be up to the
courts to decide what is and isn't reasonable when asserting the
defense. If Amendment 4 is adopted then Representative Croft's
argument is even stronger.
Number 0184
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated is makes sense to simplify or make
Section 1(a)(2) more generic. He wouldn't object to adopting
Amendment 4 and tabling Amendment 3.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked Mr. Ford whether his analysis is
correct.
MR. FORD replied he is concerned about getting closer to having
standards that are different but substantially closer. "If you
left the first amendment out and left (1) the same, then you have
a specific laundry list which someone could follow and say, 'hey,
I do what you told me to do, I can use the defense.' If they
didn't follow that list and you adopted the second amendment which
changes paragraph (2) then you still have that which is to say,
'but, I didn't follow your list but I used reasonable care.'" It
is the best of both worlds.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he prefers that and thinks that is the
way to go.
Number 0278
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to amend Amendment 3 to
retain the change to Page 2, line 9 and to delete everything else.
There being no objection, it was so moved. It now reads as
follows:
Page 2, line 9:
Delete "comply with industry regulations or requirements"
Insert "complying with generally accepted practices of a
business sector"
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG called the question on Amendment 3, as
amended.
Number 0435
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA referred to Amendment 4 and asked how broad
of a change is it.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied it is going from three different
standards to one.
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked whether reasonable care encompasses
the others.
MR. FORD said he doesn't see a difference between due diligence and
reasonable care. It says the same thing twice which is always
confusing because the court would assume that it means something
different.
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said she feels uncomfortable lessening the
standard.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG agrees with Representative Kerttula. It
also troubles him, but three different standards would allow the
courts to confuse the issue even more.
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said she assumes that due diligence is
within reasonable care.
Number 0612
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI asked whether there is any merit in
defining some parameters within reasonable care.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied they are in Section 1(a)(1). He
wants to leave Section 1(a)(2) in for a didactic kind of
instructional thing.
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said (A) - (F) is limiting. What happens
if there is a (G).
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied (G) is Section 1(a)(2).
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI replied the bill says reasonable care is
(A) - (F).
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said a business could deviate from (A) -
(F) and use Section 1(a)(2). That's the reason for having it.
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI said, "I just don't want to get locked
into those."
Number 0642
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked why would there be a deviation.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG replied a small business doesn't always
have a contingency plan.
Number 0671
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said Section 1 (a)(1) is reasonable care, but
it's not all that could be reasonable. "I mean, so, it is one
avenue that we're gonna sanctify as enough, but I don't think the
record should be that you always have to do that or there wouldn't
be any need for (2). (1) is enough. Other things may be enough,
other lesser...other things. But, it's in the 'or'. If other
things were necessary, you could comply with (1) and still get away
with..."
Number 0722
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG wondered whether defining due diligence in
Section 1(a)(2) as those things found in the list, but not
necessarily those things or other things, would be tighter than
reasonable standard. He's not sure whether that is the direction
the committee wants to go.
CHAIRMAN KOTT noted there is a motion on the floor to adopt
Amendment 3, as amended. There being no objection, it was so
moved.
Number 0785
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG moved Amendment 4. There being no
objection, it was so moved.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT withdrew Amendment 5.
Number 0850
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT moved Amendment 6. It reads as follows:
Page 3, lines 5 & 6
Delete "(1) damages may be awarded for economic losses
only unless the business against whom the action is
brought committed fraud;"
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG objected.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT explained Amendment 6 deletes the limitation
on the categories of damage that can be recovered. A lot of this
legislation is tied together with good definitions and holds
together a logical relationship to Y2K acts, except for Section
1(d)(1). He doesn't see the reason for a general category of
non-economic damages which has already been capped in tort reform
laws. It seems like an arbitrary provision for something that has
already been capped in a more general way. "Y2K may cause--this is
the classic one that will get us trapped in unintended
consequences. I don't know all the other consequences of this, in
my onion, arbitrary provision. We have caps out there that'll
apply to this. But, to say Y2K by its characteristic means no
other--none of these other categories of loss. I don't see the
relationship. And, I'd let the other caps that we already have in
general tort reform law apply."
Number 0984
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the federal bill takes a different
approach. It provides for tort claims with limitations. It takes
a broader look and categorizes contract law, tort law and class
action. It sets a limit on all of those. He chose not to be as
expansive. "I think that the idea here is that the limitation to
economic loss is one that the whole circumstance of this situation
whether it's a Y2K issue does not merit any advantages. Who are
you trying to punish? Unless, you're trying to punish a
noncompliant kind of guy that sat on his hands. Why are we just
not suing for economic losses but--other than damages? That--that
becomes, I think, the real issue here." The reason for the bill is
to minimize vexatious type of litigation intended to merely enrich
a litigator. The resources need to be put into solving the
problem, not litigation. He doesn't want to create a tort claim
because of an unusual fact-pattern, but he wants to limit the type
of economic losses recovered. It's not his intention to entirely
preclude a tort claim because there is probably some scenario were
it would be worth it which is why he included the language "fraud".
Number 1203
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said the reason the federal legislation gets
through the different caps is because there is no general federal
tort reform. "They don't have them if they don't put them in
there. We already have them and we don't need them in here, I
believe." There are unintended consequences with a blanket
description. "If I'm the building manager and Otis Elevator
Company sends me a note, we've got this Y2K, here's the embedded
chip to replace it with, we're providing it for you for free, if
you don't do this they will fall to the ground and kill people.
And, they send me five letters with five chips to do this and I
don't, you could get punitive damages there when--when somebody
dies on the elevator, and you should. If--if--if--if the same
situation happens with an embedded chip in a medical devise and I
ignore it as a hospital, I mean, the problem is you can create
situations where this--it's appropriate to have these. And, you
said the whole point was to get rid of vexatious and frivolous
litigation, I mean. This doesn't do anything about vexatious or
frivolous litigation, in fact, it hits the meritorious claim, the
odd, weird, possibly extremely meritorious claim. We have in other
areas made these other general caps and--and they aren't in the
federal law so if federal law wants 'em they have to put 'em in for
a specific thing. We--we don't have to. We have that luxury that
we've made that difficult public policy decision on how we should
cap punitive and non-economics. And, to just take 'em out here, I
don't see the point. It doesn't address frivolous litigation. It
does greatly impact--eliminate certain weird, but possible cause of
actions in very extreme cases and it's in an area where we've
already declared a cap and the feds haven't."
Number 1322
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said TITLE III of the federal bill says, "A
party to a Y2K action making a tort claim may not recover damages
for economic loss unless--...". There is a very good argument for
a limitation, but this doesn't delete tort theory or wrongful
deaths and egregious types of harm. He just doesn't want to open
the door to unlimited, punitive damages. On the other hand, a case
could be made for medical equipment and maybe there needs to be a
distinction.
Number 1384
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA stated there could be willful misconduct,
extreme recklessness, or death and there wouldn't be any economic
loss. They shouldn't be foreclosed on. She agrees with
Representative Croft. The restrictions are already there.
Number 1419
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Representative Croft to remove his motion in
order for him to take action on putting the bill in a subcommittee.
Number 1438
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT removed Amendment 6.
CHAIRMAN KOTT assigned the bill to a subcommittee consisting of
Representatives Murkowski, Rokeberg and Croft. He charged the
subcommittee with looking at Amendments 2 and 6, and any other
ancillary issues that arise.
HJR 18 - CONST. AM: ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Number 1558
CHAIRMAN KOTT announced that the next order of business is HJR 18,
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
relating to an office of administrative hearings.
BOB LOEFFLER, Director, Central Office, Division of Mining and
Water Management, Department of Natural Resources, testified via
teleconference from Anchorage on behalf of the Department of
Natural Resources. He stated that the department has a number of
concerns about HJR 18. He cited an example of one of the more
controversial permitting decisions the department had, and that
was a winter road they approved to the Pogo Mine. Approximately
250 people commented on that decision, through two public meetings,
and the department needed to balance the private rights of the mine
holders against the potential impacts on those who had cabins and
used the recreational resources of the area. He pointed out that
their standard of review is "the best interest of the public," and
this involves a balancing decision rather than a technical
decision. He felt that their process was quite inclusive, and an
administrative law hearing would disenfranchise those who are
unable to participate. For a proper balancing, he noted, the
department works hard to include all the citizens of the state, and
he was unsure how that would occur in an administrative law
hearing. He related that a number of their decisions were
reasonably technical, and that technical expertise was also an
issue. One of their most recent decisions had to do with fume
chemistry, and the project team worked on this issue for two to
three months. He felt it would be difficult to educate an
administrative law judge (ALJ) on the technical aspects of fume
chemistry. He noted that a number of the other, more technical,
divisions of the Department of Natural Resources have similar
concerns.
Number 1780
CHAIRMAN KOTT referred to Mr. Loeffler's comment about the standard
of review. He asked, "Would you not agree that that particular
standard of review would be somewhat different for every issue, and
that an administrative law judge, in his capacity, would be
required to know that?"
MR. LOEFFLER indicated that he had no doubt the ALJ would know the
standard of review. However, the best interest of the public is a
typical standard for the Department of Natural Resources. He
agreed it would be different for other agencies.
Number 1818
DEBORAH VOGT, Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Commissioner,
Department of Revenue, testified with concerns about HJR 18. She
related that she had a fair amount of experience over the years
with state government, and that she was a hearing officer at the
Department of Revenue for a few years. She is currently
responsible for the formal hearings function at the department, and
she has experience working with a number of agencies from the
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission and the Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities. She felt this background is
part of the reason she was chosen to coordinate the state's
response to, and position on, this legislation. She testified that
the state had two views on HJR 18: first, that a constitutional
amendment requiring administrative adjudications to be performed by
a centralized panel would be dangerous. On the other hand, there
is some merit to the idea of a centralized panel for some
functions. The department envisions some problems with a
constitutional approach to this legislation, including a belief
that the provision, as it is drafted, would make it mandatory for
all adjudicatory decisions to be made outside the agency charged
with the primary underlying function. They understand some people
argue that the phrase in the proposed amendment "jurisdiction will
be prescribed by law" means that the legislature can pick and
choose which functions go to the centralized panels and which ones
do not.
MS. VOGT pointed out that a constitutional amendment is not needed,
if the purpose is to simply give the legislature permission to
create a centralized panel and assign certain functions to it. The
only reason a constitutional amendment would be necessary is if the
centralized panel was made mandatory, and she stated that making it
mandatory would foreclose the legislature from ever making a
specialized solution in any particular area. The courts define
"administrative hearing" very broadly, she noted, and an example of
that is the litigation surrounding the Constitutional Budget
Reserve. For example, in a tax matter, the adjudicatory process
starts as soon as a person objects to an assessment that has been
issued. In the Department of Revenue, the assessments get issued
at a fairly low level; then, at the time of process, it goes into
an informal conference. The formal hearing function for tax
matters has been transferred out of the department, but the
informal procedure still goes on in the department. At that time,
they often catch mistakes that were made, and give the taxpayer an
opportunity to meet face-to-face with individuals to explain that
taxpayer's argument. They read the proposed constitutional
amendment to indicate that the early function of the adjudicatory
process would also go to a centralized panel, and they would not
have the power to make any kind of an adjudicatory decision on a
contested matter.
MS. VOGT noted that the legislature has spent a lot of time over
the years creating different functions in different departments,
and HJR 18 would remove a lot of that structure set up for those
kinds of decisions. She related that the Department of Revenue
handles Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) appeals, child support
enforcement appeals, and appeals in charitable gaming matters, as
well as representing the department in front of the Office of Tax
Appeals that was created a couple of years ago.
Number 2026
MS. VOGT added, "One of the concerns that I have about moving the
function out of my agency is management. Four years ago, when I
started in this position, and Commissioner Condon started in his
position, we had about ... 7000 Permanent Fund Dividend matters
pending, between informal conference and formal hearing. Some of
those matters were very old." She noted that today there are only
about 400 matters pending between the two; almost of them are less
than two months old at informal conference, and all are mostly less
than six months old. She expressed pride at having achieved that,
and she did not believe that could have been done if an outside
agency handled all of their appeals.
MS. VOGT also had substantive concerns. She pointed out that a lot
of individuals win their informal conferences and their formal
hearings, and that is because the hearing or appeals officers are
properly applying the rules the department has set out. The
department has an overall responsibility for making and
implementing those rules, she noted, and taking that function away
from them would put a hole in the continuity. She related that she
learns a lot from those hearings about the way the program is being
administered, and about issues that could be clarified, made easier
or changed. Ms. Vogt and Representative Green worked very hard to
set up the Office of Tax Appeals, at the request of taxpayers, and
this is an outside agency that hears the formal hearing level of
tax appeals. As the department reads the proposed constitutional
amendment, that agency would be subsumed in an administrative law
panel. One of the driving forces in the way that program developed
several years ago was the universal agreement that the tax cases
needed a specialized forum, and tax expertise was important in that
forum. That expertise would be lost by sending those cases off to
a centralized panel.
Number 2150
MS. VOGT summarized by stating, "One size definitely does not fit
all in administrative hearings." She felt that it is a mistake to
try to fit everything under one approach. Some matters are small
and can be handled on a very informal basis, and the concern is
that a centralized panel would make matters much more formal and
would be intimidating. She did agree that some states have had
good experiences with centralized administrative law panels, and
she felt it should be explored, but not mandated by a
constitutional amendment.
Number 2231
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked if there has been any discussion in the years
past on reviewing the possibilities to work in this fashion.
MS. VOGT recalled that there has been, but just in the last couple
of years. It has not, however, been looked at from within the
Administration.
Number 2254
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI wondered if the Administration is looking
at areas that could be candidates for an administrative law panel
as a result of the fact that it has been discussed for the past
couple of years.
MS. VOGT felt that they are beginning to do so, but that a lot of
effort has not gone into that.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked, "In your opinion, could you do that without a
statute change?" He wondered if statutory authorization would be
required or if this administrative law panel could be set up just
through the regulatory process.
MS. VOGT said, "I would imagine eventually you'd run into reasons
that you needed a statute." She did not think it could be
accomplished in its entirety through executive order or that type
of route.
Number 2333
TERESA WILLIAMS, Assistant Attorney General, Fair Business
Practices Section, Civil Division (Anchorage), Department of Law,
testified via teleconference from Anchorage. She referred the
committee to the March 23, 1999, letter and its attachment,
"Analysis of Language of HJR 18," that was sent to Chairman Kott
from Attorney General Bruce M. Botelho's office by Ms. Williams.
She said she was going to reiterate Ms. Vogt's testimony that a
constitutional amendment is not necessary if the intent of this
amendment is to provide discretion for the legislature to
centralize a hearing officer function, as that is already an
authority the legislature has. The problem with a constitutional
amendment is that it is a powerful tool that would have superior
power to later legislation attempted; therefore, it would limit
the legislature's power. She detailed some of the language in HJR
18 that the Department of Law labeled as problematic.
MS. WILLIAMS first referred to "The Office of Administrative
Hearings is vested with the POWER TO CONDUCT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
HEARINGS," and explained that term is very broadly interpreted in
Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court has said that administrative
adjudicative hearing proceedings begin when one party serves
another party a document that sets in motion a regulatory or
statutory procedure for the resolution of a dispute. She pointed
out that testimony given to the House State Affairs [Standing]
Committee pointed out that dispute over a term such as "student
loan" is the sort of procedure that sets forth a regulatory process
for the resolution to dispute. Under this constitutional
amendment, it would go to an ALJ. Necessarily, the proceedings
would become much more formal, and the agency with the
responsibility for the program would lose control over the
day-to-day practices of the program. Also, if the Office of
Administrative Hearings was established under this language, there
would be certain working commissions that would lose their primary
function, and those would include the Alaska Workers' Compensation
Board, State Board of Parole, all of the licensing boards for
occupational licensing, and many others.
TAPE 99-19, SIDE B
Number 0001
MS. WILLIAMS next referred to the language that stated "The Office
of Administrative Hearings is vested with the POWER TO RENDER FINAL
AGENCY DECISIONS," which is a misnomer, because the decision would
not, in fact, be a decision by the agency, and may be very contrary
to the policies of the agency. There would be all sorts of formal
disputes within the scope of the proposed amendment, such as tax
matters, public assistance entitlement, employee relations, state
land allocation, and a number of others. The constitutional
mandate would include agencies of the legislature and the judicial
branch, as well as the executive branch.
Number 0050
MS. WILLIAMS also noted the clause "THE JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE
SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW." She indicated that this language
does not give the legislature the express authority to exempt
agencies or certain levels of proceedings from the constitutional
mandate. The Alaska courts hold that the identical language for
the judiciary does not allow the legislature, by statute, to take
away judicial powers vested by the constitution in the courts.
MS. WILLIAMS noted that the phrase "THE HEAD OF THE OFFICE IS NAMED
'CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'" is a new concept for Alaska, as
Alaska has always used hearing officers, with the understanding
that this term is meant to refer to a hearing that is much less
formal than an administrative law judge. Administrative law judges
are more likely to use hearing chambers and wear robes, and they
are referred to as "judge" and "your honor." Alaska administrative
proceedings are intended to be less threatening to the
participants. In addition, this language contains no provision for
removal of an administrative law judge for cause which would
certainly be an issue in cases of misconduct or gross incompetence.
Number 0140
CHAIRMAN ROKEBERG observed that it was the third item on the list
of concerns that alarmed him the most, "THE JURISDICTION OF THE
OFFICE SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW." He also was concerned that
this did not give the express authority to the legislature to
exempt agencies or certain levels of proceedings. He asked if
there was case law that essentially refers to that particular
issue.
MS. WILLIAMS confirmed that there was, and she referred to the case
Rozkydal v. State. By using identical language in both provisions,
in light of the previously-existing case law, the court may find
that the voters intended to have identical results.
Number 0203
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN commented that other states have done very well
with this system; although, he agreed that they did not have to use
a constitutional amendment. He asked what a hearing officer should
do when they are pressured to find for the agency.
MS. WILLIAMS confirmed that no other state has a constitutional
amendment that creates an office such as the one proposed in HJR
18; however, the final decision is only made in very few cases.
The decision becomes a proposed decision, and is referred back to
the agency. As far as pressure being placed on a hearing officer,
Ms. Williams pointed out that that would be inappropriate. The
hearing officer should advise the parties of the attempt to make
that pressure, and they could certainly avail themselves of various
protections under state law for employees who are being pressured
to do something that is unlawful.
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN pointed out that sometimes the pressure might
not be overt; however, there is certainly pressure to perform for
the commissioner that you work for. He asked, "What if a hearing
officer consistently found more often against ... the commissioner
he worked for than for him? There is an inherent conflict of
interest."
MS. WILLIAMS observed that she has been an attorney in Alaska for
20 years now, and she has always worked in the field of
administrative law. She related that she has never experienced a
hearing officer who felt obligated to rule on behalf of a
particular party. The hearing officers that she has known, in
various capacities and serving various interests, have issued
decisions that they felt to be correct. If there are examples of
particular hearing officers who are a problem, Ms. Williams felt
that this should be looked into closely; however, she is not aware
of any particular person or agency where that has been a problem.
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN stated that he sincerely doubts a hearing
officer would mention to the attorney general that he/she was
feeling pressure to be biased.
Number 0350
PAUL GROSSI, Director, Central Office, Division of Workers'
Compensation, Department of Labor, expressed concerns regarding HJR
18 on behalf of his division and the Department of Labor. One of
their main concerns, he explained, is expertise in deciding these
administrative cases. He also referred to the "one size fits all
concept" that was previously mentioned. He testified that HJR 18
would take away the balanced approach that has been developed over
the years with the Workers' Compensation Board. They are
concerned, he added, that this legislation would move away from a
"compact" that exists between labor and industry.
MR. GROSSI explained that the [Division of] Workers' Compensation
is probably one of the earliest quasi-judicial administrative
agencies. It was established around the turn-of-the-century to
deal with workplace injuries. At that time, work-related injuries
were being dealt with in the courts; consequently, they were tying
up the courts, causing expense to the employers, and taking a long
time for employees to get results. Labor and industry came
together and formed an agreement to compact, and legislation was
passed to deal with workers' injuries by setting up administrative
agencies. Both sides had to give up something, and both sides
gained something. The employers gave up the right to defend a case
because of fault, as [Division of] Workers' Compensation is a
no-fault situation. Employees gave away the right to sue employers
in court, and formulas were developed for compensating employees
for wage loss, permanent disabilities, and paying for medical
losses. On the other hand, industry received an immunity from being
sued in court. Both labor and industry received a faster, more
predictable way of dealing with these injuries.
MR. GROSSI noted that Alaska passed legislation that set up a
Workers' Compensation Board for dispute cases to be heard. This
board consisted of a labor member, usually someone from a labor
union, but always someone from the working side of the formula, and
an industry seat, someone from management or an owner of a company.
The third member of the panel is the commissioner's designee, and
that designee is an expert in workers' compensation law. They feel
this a very balanced approach: using private-sector volunteers to
decide the cases, along with someone who is an expert in the legal
aspects of worker's compensation. He indicated that there is 100
years of case law to refer to, and that volumes have been written
about it. In Alaska, there are as many as 10 supreme court cases
a year that deal with workers' compensation. The case law is
extensive and complicated, Mr. Grossi noted, and it requires a
certain amount of expertise, but it also requires some sort of
input from the private sector, so that a fair decision can be made.
MR. GROSSI disclosed that there are presently approximately 300 to
350 cases a year that are decided by the Workers' Compensation
Board. Of that, approximately 70 are appealed to the courts, and
the board has a very good rate, over 80 percent, of their decisions
being affirmed by the court. The department is concerned that this
law will take away from that success rate, will make their law
unconstitutional, will take away from the balanced approach, and
will eliminate private sector input on their cases. Similar
problems could arise in a number of different agencies within the
department: Fishermen's Fund [Advisory and Appeals Council];
Alaska Labor Relations Agency; Employment Security Division; and
the Department of Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
He mentioned that one of the strongest advocates of this system is
Edwin Felter (ph), and he believed him to be the head of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judges. Mr. Felter (ph)
has indicated that there is no state that has not made exceptions
for certain types of cases, and not all cases are heard by these
agencies.
Number 0671
CHAIRMAN KOTT noted that there seems to be some confusion, if HJR
18 were to pass and the voters were to approve it, as to whether or
not the legislature would have that opportunity to provide for
those exemptions for those certain categories that, perhaps, would
not fit the mold very well. He asked Mr. Grossi whether the
Department of Labor would support the measure, if the legislature
decided to keep them exempt from it in all their capacity.
MR. GROSSI admitted that some of the things their department does
may fit well with this legislation; however, he would have a
difficult time supporting the measure if it had to do with the
Workers' Compensation Board. The reason for that, he explained, is
because the current system has been developed over a number of
years and it works very well. He did express willingness to
discuss it, however.
Number 0738
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN wondered how long it takes for the Division of
Workers' Compensation to adjudicate a workers' compensation case.
MR. GROSSI indicated that it would depend upon the individual case.
Some cases get heard within 60 days from the date the hearing is
requested, and others take longer, depending upon what needs to be
done.
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN asked what would be determined a long case, and
if any have been going on for years.
MR. GROSSI replied that these cases are not usually litigated that
long, but some cases do go on from the date of injury through when
the individual goes off of workers' compensation. It can take some
time; it depends upon the extent of the injuries.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Grossi, "Would you refresh my memory on the
Workers' Comp[ensation] Boards and the time limitations they have
to take up a case?"
MR. GROSSI answered by stating that the vast majority of injuries
are not litigated. There are approximately 26,000 to 30,000
injuries a year; of that, maybe 1200 to 1500 come to the Workers'
Compensation Board for resolution. If an injury occurs and a
medical report is filed along with the bill, the employer either
pays it or controverts the case within 15 days. If the employee
disagrees with the controversion, that employee can then take it
forward to the Workers' Compensation Board. That employee can file
a claim 10 days from that point, and can request a hearing after 20
days. If the opposing party does not oppose the hearing, it will
be set up within 60 days. If it is opposed, a pre-hearing is
scheduled to deal with why it was opposed in the first place.
Number 0858
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT had a question for Teresa Williams, who was
still present on-line from Anchorage. He asked, "Would we be able
to continue the Workers' Compensation Board with it's one industry,
one labor, under this constitutional amendment?"
MS. WILLIAMS said no, unless there was authority expressly in the
legislature and the amendment to exclude an agency.
Number 0883
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN wondered if Ms. Williams was basing that answer
on the case law dealing with judicial power vested by the
constitution.
MS. WILLIAMS explained that she was basing her answer on the
language, "THE JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY
LAW," which she felt was ambiguous as to what it means. She
indicated that this language does not expressly give the power to
the legislature to exempt an agency or certain level of
proceedings. In addition, this is identical language that has
already been interpreted by the courts, and it would be presumed
that the language was intended to have the same result.
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN wondered whether court cases on the judiciary
were based on the intent of the constitutional convention.
MS. WILLIAMS said no, and pointed out that they go to the first
line, which says that the power is vested in the judiciary, just as
in this provision, the power is vested in the Office of
Administrative Hearings. That language is very powerful and cannot
be limited by the legislature.
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN said that it was his understanding of the law
that a record of legislative intent could be built, indicating that
the legislature can decide who is in and out of this provision.
MS. WILLIAMS explained Alaska finds that legislative intent is hard
to determine and cannot be determined by the statement of a person,
because the entire legislature votes on a bill. She pointed out
that there is nothing concrete that says what legislative intent
is, especially in this case, when a constitutional amendment would
need to be voted on by the people. She suggested that it would be
preferable if the language were changed to expressly state what is
intended, rather than having a side-record in which you attempt to
explain what it means.
Number 1032
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT observed that the important thing about a
constitutional amendment is what the people meant when they voted
on it, and that it is not as relevant as what the legislature
intended when it put it before the people. He added that the best
legislative intent in the world might not be (indisc.),
particularly if there is clear language that seems to go the other
way.
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN felt that was not consistent with supreme court
decisions.
Number 1080
CATHERINE REARDON, Director, Central Office, Division of
Occupational Licensing, Department of Commerce and Economic
Development, testified in opposition to HJR 18 on behalf of her
division, as well as 21 licensing boards that it represents. Her
division also administers 16 licensing programs without boards, so
they make the final decisions directly in those cases. She
mentioned that the Division of Insurance and the Division of
Banking, Securities and Corporations, both under the Department of
Commerce, also had concerns, and they use the same hearing officer
that the Division of Occupational Licensing does. She acknowledged
the sponsor's position that certain agencies or decisions could be
exempted through statute; however, the Department of Law has a
different view. She stressed that this is a very important issue
to the licensing boards, who are created for the express purpose of
making decisions like this. She echoed that any attempt to have
the legislature exempt different agencies needs to be very clear in
any constitutional amendment; otherwise, boards are being asked to
support something based on a possibility that the legislature may
be willing and able to exempt them. She has based her testimony on
the assumption that the Office of Administrative Hearings would be
making all the decisions for Department of Commerce, including the
licensing boards.
MS. REARDON declared that she had testified with concerns about the
original comprehensive bill when it was presented by Representative
Ogan last year. One reason that it grew into such a large bill,
she observed, was because there were references to boards making
disciplinary decisions and licensing decisions buried within each
occupation's licensing statute. If a constitutional amendment like
this passes and certain agencies need to be exempted, the
frustrating and difficult work of making those policy decisions in
a 100-page bill will still need to be done. Much of what comes up
for the hearing officer in occupational licensing involves initial
decisions, not appeals. The division gathers evidence and charges
a professional with incompetence. Before any action is taken,
there is a due process hearing in which the division and the
Department of Law present the prosecution case, and the accused
professional presents a defense case. The hearing officer then
hears the case and makes the proposed decision to the Board of
Professionals. The individual has the right to appeal to Superior
Court.
MS. REARDON informed the committee that the Department of Commerce
and its various boards are very concerned that they will be losing
expert knowledge by going to an independent administrative law
hearing. She gave the example of the medical board, which has five
physicians and two representatives of the public on it, being able
to actually decide whether the treatment given by a doctor is
competent or not. In that case, she stressed the value of having
actual doctors involved in making those decisions. Even though a
hearing officer can hear expert witnesses, she did not feel sure
that would be an adequate replacement for the professional and
public input that is present now.
MS. REARDON added that another action coming to a hearing officer
would be appeals of license denials. Licensing boards are
currently deciding if someone is competent for a license, and this
often involves very technical decisions about someone's mental
health, professional training or problems they have had in other
states. She felt that it was valuable having professional peers on
the board, and that it is a very significant policy decision to
change that system.
MS. REARDON related that the director of the Division of Insurance
expressed a concern about the cost of training a hearing officer
who is knowledgeable about insurance law, which is a fairly arcane
subject. The Division of Insurance director does not always use
the department hearing officer. In some cases, such as insurance
cases that involve tax issues, they have hired a tax accountant
from a large firm to preside, as knowledge in a tax law and
accounting is crucial to making the right decision.
Number 1438
MS. REARDON summarized by stating her belief that this seems to be
a switch in philosophy about the definition of administrative
appeals. Initially, these hearings have been a chance to ask a
department or agency to reconsider, looking carefully at what it is
doing one more time, before the case moves to court. By enacting
HJR 18, the shift would be towards moving into a more formal court
situation right away. She testified that administrative hearings
in her department are already very formal from a legal standpoint,
using discovery motions, requests to suppress evidence and offer
evidence, and other legal motions. She suspected that the original
vision, 30 to 40 years ago, was to get the two parties in a room to
just discuss what happened and review the situation. She said, "I
think we are probably moving into a situation where it ...
basically is court, and you better show up with your attorney."
She indicated that she was not surprised that there are lot of
hearing officers that would like this provision, and that there are
number of hearing officers that would like to be judges. She has
been requested by hearing officers to provide funding to build a
courtroom, complete with flags and a seal, for the Department of
Commerce and Economic Development.
Number 1568
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN referred to an interoffice memo addressed to
Commissioner William Hensley from 1997. He read the following into
the record from that memo:
Having worked as a part-time administrative hearing
officer for the Department of Commerce (since a certain
day which I won't disclose ... in the 1980's), there are
a number of observations resulting from the tenure which
may help the section to continue to function in an
efficient and helpful way to the public. ...Before his
departure, Frank Flavin and I discussed many of these
items. The Hearing Officer section sometimes seems to be
an orphaned child, since it belongs to no one, yet serves
everyone. It is vitally important that the hearing
officer remain a truly neutral and impartial party. To
that end, the section should continue to be treated
separately, with its own secretary and offices. The
officer should not be located within the physical
parameters of the Division of Occupational Licensing,
since the tendency to engage in casual conversation is
too great.
In any new space configuration, the department should
also consider giving the Division of Occupational
Licensing, Boards and Commissions, and the Hearing
Officer section, their own separate hearing and meeting
room. Since there will now only be one full-time
administrative hearing officer, rather than a full-time
and part-time position, there will, inevitably, be
conflict of interest questions raised. Although there
should not be many ... it is my recommendation that the
department have one person handle the conflict cases,
rather than signing separate contracts to various
attorneys. That procedure was tried in [the] early
1980's, resulting in inconsistent results, poorly-written
opinions, lost files, missed hearings, and, in general,
was unsatisfactory. I would also recommend that any
person who is chosen to do the contract have some
litigation or judicial background, since it is proven
helpful in learning to do hearings...
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN summarized the letter by stating that it brings
out some interesting points as to how this legislation, HJR 18,
came about, addressing general conflicts of interest, neutrality
and impartiality.
MS. REARDON commented that she had read this letter approximately
two years ago, but she does not have perfect memory of it. The
decision to go from one full-time and one part-time hearing officer
to one hearing officer was based on budget cuts, she explained, and
that outgoing hearing officer's suggestions should not be taken to
mean that any of her concerns were actually going on. Ms. Reardon
testified that she worked in the division at the time the letter
was written, and that hearing officer was not housed in the
Division of Occupational Licensing; rather, she is reinforcing that
it should never happen in the future. The letter was not a request
for change, but a request that it does not change. The fact that
they feel "orphan-like," she emphasized, is a good sign and means
that the system is clean, because they are being left alone without
socialization so that they can act impartially. The letter said
that they worked for everyone, but were not a specific part of
anyone, and Ms. Reardon indicated that is exactly what the goal
should be for an impartial hearing officer.
MS. REARDON summarized by stating that she did not recall that
hearing officer stating, at any time during that letter, that she
felt her decisions were influenced, or that there was an attempt to
influence any of her decisions, by the commissioner's office or any
of the divisions. A new hearing officer has been hired since that
time, she explained, and he had to declare a conflict of interest
in a couple of cases; however, he simply did not take them and they
were assigned to contract hearing officers. There is currently a
central hearing officer with a secretary that keeps all of the
records of what the contract hearing officers are doing at all
times. Ms. Reardon argued that the concern expressed in the
letter, regarding having different hearing officers who might not
be knowledgeable about the process, is exactly what might happen
with a hearing officer office or agency.
Number 2011
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Ms. Reardon how many boards and commissions
would fall under this provision, if the legislature had the option
of determining whether or not an entity could be replaced.
MS. REARDON said there would be 21 statutorily-created licensing
boards, or all of them, that would fall under this provision,
unless a statute was created to exempt specific agencies.
Number 2068
REPRESENTATIVE OGAN said, "That is exactly the point of this bill."
He emphasized that the boards would become regulatory rather than
adjudicatory. He quoted Winston Churchill as stating "when you
have a lack of separation of powers between the judiciary and
executive, you have a tyranny." While he was not implying that the
boards are tyrannical, he did liken the present situation to "the
fox watching the henhouse."
Number 2152
CHAIRMAN KOTT expressed that the bill will be held over at which
time the committee will take up public testimony again.
ADJOURNMENT
Number 2210
CHAIRMAN KOTT adjourned the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting at 4:10 p.m.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|