Legislature(1997 - 1998)
04/30/1998 01:25 PM JUD
* first hearing in first committee of referral
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE April 30, 1998 1:25 p.m. MEMBERS PRESENT Representative Joe Green, Chairman Representative Con Bunde, Vice Chairman Representative Brian Porter Representative Norman Rokeberg Representative Jeannette James Representative Eric Croft Representative Ethan Berkowitz MEMBERS ABSENT All members present COMMITTEE CALENDAR CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 234(FIN) "An Act extending the termination date of the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association." - MOVED HCS CSSB 234(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 218(FIN) "An Act relating to the crimes of murder, manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide; relating to homicides of children; and relating to the crime of interference with custody of a child or incompetent person." - MOVED HCS CSSB 218(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS: Violent Crimes Compensation Board Carol L. Alley, M.D. - CONFIRMATION ADVANCED Commission on Judicial Conduct Mary Matthews Jeffrey M. Feldman, Esq. - CONFIRMATIONS ADVANCED CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 304(RLS) "An Act relating to the bail or fine for an offense committed in a highway work zone; and providing for an effective date." - MOVED CSSB 304(RLS) OUT OF COMMITTEE HOUSE BILL NO. 196 "An Act relating to wills, intestacy, nonprobate transfers, and trusts; and amending Rule 24, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure." - HEARD AND HELD (* First public hearing) PREVIOUS ACTION BILL: SB 234 SHORT TITLE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF AK BAR ASSN SPONSOR(S): LABOR & COMMERCE Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action 1/14/98 2193 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S) 1/14/98 2194 (S) JUD, FIN 1/21/98 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ ROOM 211 1/21/98 (S) MINUTE(JUD) 1/22/98 2260 (S) JUD RPT 4DP 1/22/98 2260 (S) DP: TAYLOR, ELLIS, MILLER, PEARCE 1/22/98 2260 (S) FISCAL INFORMATION FORTHCOMING 2/11/98 (S) FIN AT 8:30 AM SENATE FINANCE 532 2/24/98 (S) FIN AT 8:30 AM SENATE FINANCE 532 2/26/98 (S) FIN AT 8:30 AM SENATE FINANCE 532 3/26/98 (S) FIN AT 3:30 PM BUTROVICH RM 205 3/31/98 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE 532 4/01/98 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE 532 4/02/98 3110 (S) FIN RPT CS 7DP SAME TITLE 4/02/98 3110 (S) DP: SHARP, PEARCE, PHILLIPS, PARNELL, 4/02/98 3110 (S) ADAMS, TORGERSON, DONLEY 4/02/98 3111 (S) ZERO FISCAL NOTE TO SB & CS (COURT) 4/03/98 (S) RLS AT 12:00 PM FAHRENKAMP RM 203 4/03/98 (S) MINUTE(RLS) 4/06/98 3159 (S) RULES TO CALENDAR 4/6/98 4/06/98 3162 (S) READ THE SECOND TIME 4/06/98 3162 (S) FIN CS ADOPTED Y13 N6 E1 4/06/98 3162 (S) ADVANCED TO THIRD READING UNAN CONSENT 4/06/98 3162 (S) READ THE THIRD TIME CSSB 234(FIN) 4/06/98 3163 (S) PASSED Y19 N- E1 4/06/98 3167 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H) 4/07/98 2898 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S) 4/07/98 2898 (H) JUDICIARY 4/30/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120 BILL: SB 218 SHORT TITLE: CRIMES OF MURDER & CHILD MURDERS SPONSOR(S): SENATOR(S) HALFORD, Green, Donley, Taylor, Leman, Duncan, Lincoln, Parnell, Kelly, Pearce, Sharp, Miller Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action 1/12/98 2167 (S) PREFILE RELEASED 1/9/98 1/12/98 2167 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S) 1/12/98 2167 (S) JUD, FIN 2/04/98 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ ROOM 211 2/09/98 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ ROOM 211 2/09/98 (S) MINUTE(JUD) 2/11/98 (S) JUD AT 2:00 PM BELTZ ROOM 211 2/12/98 2495 (S) JUD RPT CS 3DP NEW TITLE 2/12/98 2495 (S) DP: TAYLOR, MILLER, PEARCE 2/12/98 2495 (S) INDETERMINATE FN TO SB & CS (ADM) 2/12/98 2495 (S) ZERO FN TO SB & CS (COR, LAW) 3/31/98 (S) FIN AT 9:00 AM SENATE FINANCE 532 4/02/98 3110 (S) FIN RPT CS 7DP NEW TITLE 4/02/98 3110 (S) DP: PEARCE, SHARP, PHILLIPS, PARNELL, 4/02/98 3110 (S) ADAMS, DONLEY, TORGERSON 4/02/98 3110 (S) PREVIOUS INDETERMINATE FN (ADM) 4/02/98 3110 (S) PREVIOUS ZERO FNS (LAW, COR) 4/03/98 (S) RLS AT 12:00 PM FAHRENKAMP RM 203 4/03/98 (S) MINUTE(RLS) 4/06/98 3159 (S) RULES TO CALENDAR 4/6/98 4/06/98 3160 (S) READ THE SECOND TIME 4/06/98 3161 (S) FIN CS ADOPTED UNAN CONSENT 4/06/98 3161 (S) COSPONSOR(S): DUNCAN, LINCOLN, PARNELL 4/06/98 3161 (S) KELLY, PEARCE, SHARP, MILLER 4/06/98 3161 (S) ADVANCED TO THIRD READING UNAN CONSENT 4/06/98 3161 (S) READ THE THIRD TIME CSSB 218(FIN) 4/06/98 3161 (S) PASSED Y19 N- E1 4/06/98 3166 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H) 4/07/98 2897 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S) 4/07/98 2898 (H) JUDICIARY, FINANCE 4/30/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120 BILL: SB 304 SHORT TITLE: REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES & HWYS SPONSOR(S): SENATOR(S) DONLEY, Wilken, Taylor, Duncan, Kelly, Pearce Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action 2/16/98 2524 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S) 2/16/98 2524 (S) TRA, JUD 2/24/98 (S) TRA AT 1:30 PM BUTROVICH ROOM 205 2/24/98 (S) MINUTE(TRA) 3/12/98 (S) TRA AT 1:30 PM BUTROVICH ROOM 205 3/12/98 (S) MINUTE(TRA) 3/19/98 (S) TRA AT 1:30 PM BUTROVICH ROOM 205 3/19/98 (S) MINUTE(TRA) 3/20/98 2916 (S) TRA RPT CS 1DP 3NR SAME TITLE 3/20/98 2916 (S) DP: WARD NR: WILKEN, HALFORD, GREEN 3/20/98 2916 (S) ZERO FISCAL NOTE TO SB & CS (DOT) 3/25/98 (S) JUD AT 1:30 PM BELTZ ROOM 211 3/25/98 (S) MINUTE(JUD) 3/26/98 3006 (S) JUD RPT 1DP 3NR (TRA)CS 3/26/98 3006 (S) DP: TAYLOR; NR: PARNELL, MILLER, PEARCE 3/26/98 3006 (S) PREVIOUS ZERO FN (DOT) 3/30/98 (S) RLS AT 4:00 PM FAHRENKAMP RM 203 3/30/98 (S) MINUTE(RLS) 4/01/98 (S) RLS AT 12:10 PM FAHRENKAMP RM 203 4/01/98 (S) MINUTE(RLS) 4/03/98 (S) RLS AT 12:00 PM FAHRENKAMP RM 203 4/03/98 (S) MINUTE(RLS) 4/06/98 3159 (S) RLS TO CALENDAR CS NEW TITLE 4/6/98 4/06/98 3159 (S) PREVIOUS ZERO FN APPLIES (DOT) 4/06/98 3163 (S) READ THE SECOND TIME 4/06/98 3163 (S) RLS CS ADOPTED UNAN CONSENT 4/06/98 3163 (S) ADVANCED TO THIRD READING UNAN CONSENT 4/06/98 3163 (S) READ THE THIRD TIME CSSB 304(RLS) 4/06/98 3163 (S) COSPONSOR(S): WILKEN, TAYLOR, DUNCAN 4/06/98 3163 (S) KELLY, PEARCE 4/06/98 3164 (S) PASSED Y19 N- E1 4/06/98 3164 (S) EFFECTIVE DATE(S) SAME AS PASSAGE 4/06/98 3167 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H) 4/07/98 2898 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S) 4/07/98 2898 (H) TRANSPORTATION, JUDICIARY 4/15/98 (H) TRA AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 17 4/15/98 (H) MINUTE(TRA) 4/16/98 3013 (H) TRA RPT 7DP 4/16/98 3013 (H) DP: HUDSON, ELTON, KOOKESH, SANDERS, 4/16/98 3013 (H) COWDERY, MASEK, WILLIAMS 4/16/98 3013 (H) SENATE ZERO FISCAL NOTE (DOT) 3/20/98 4/30/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120 BILL: HB 196 SHORT TITLE: WILLS, TRUSTS, & OTHER TRANSFERS SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) RYAN, Therriault Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action 3/14/97 667 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S) 3/14/97 667 (H) JUDICIARY, FINANCE 4/23/97 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120 4/23/97 (H) MINUTE(JUD) 3/06/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120 3/06/98 (H) MINUTE(JUD) WITNESS REGISTER BRETT HUBER, Legislative Assistant to Senator Rick Halford Alaska State Legislature Capitol Building, Room 121 Juneau, Alaska 99801 Telephone: (907) 465-4958 POSITION STATEMENT: Presented CSSB 218(FIN) on behalf of Senator Halford. KEVIN JARDELL, Legislative Administrative Assistant to Representative Joe Green Alaska State Legislature Capitol Building, Room 118 Juneau, Alaska 99801 Telephone: (907) 465-4990 POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions regarding the proposed HCS CSSB 218(JUD). DEAN GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General Legal Services Section - Juneau Criminal Division Department of Law P.O. Box 110300 Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300 Telephone: (907) 465-3428 POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions regarding the proposed HCS CSSB 218(JUD). JAMES ARMSTRONG, Legislative Assistant to Senator Dave Donley Alaska State Legislature Capitol Building, Room 508 Juneau, Alaska 99801 Telephone: (907) 465-3892 POSITION STATEMENT: Presented CSSB 304(RLS) on behalf of Senator Dave Donley. DAVE PREE, Legislative Assistant to Representative Joe Ryan Alaska State Legislature Capitol Building, Room 420 Juneau, Alaska 99801 Telephone: (907) 465-3875 POSITION STATEMENT: Presented proposed committee substitute for HB 196 on behalf of Representative Joe Ryan. STEVE NOEY TITLE AND AFFILIATION UNKNOWN POSITION STATEMENT: Commented on proposed committee substitute for HB 196. ACTION NARRATIVE TAPE 98-78, SIDE A Number 0001 CHAIRMAN JOE GREEN called the House Judiciary Standing Committee meeting to order at 1:25 p.m. Members present at the call to order were Representatives Green, Bunde, Porter and James. Representative Berkowitz arrived at 1:26 p.m., Representative Rokeberg arrived at 1:33 p.m. and Representative Croft arrived at 1:40 p.m. CSSB 234(FIN) - BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF AK BAR ASSN Number 0025 CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the first order of business would be CSSB 234(FIN), "An Act extending the termination date of the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association," sponsored by the Senate Labor and Commerce Committee. He noted the board would be extended to the year 2000. Number 0039 REPRESENTATIVE BRIAN PORTER made a motion to amend page 1, line 6, delete "2000" and insert "2002". REPRESENTATIVE ETHAN BERKOWITZ objected. CHAIRMAN GREEN stated the amendment would extend the board from 2000 to 2002. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ removed his objection. CHAIRMAN GREEN announced Amendment 1 was adopted. Number 0145 REPRESENTATIVE JEANNETTE JAMES made a motion to move HCS CSSB 234(JUD) out of committee with individual recommendations and with the attached zero fiscal note. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected for the purpose of discussion. He indicated he was going to offer some amendments. He informed the committee he is a member of the Alaska Bar Association and it is very expensive. He said, "The last survey that I know that the [Alaska] Bar [Association] made regarding its membership was '90/'91. It is time to survey the membership again. The [Alaska] Bar [Association's] dues are among the most expensive in the state. The Bar examination is among the most expensive in the country and I don't - as a sole practitioner, I don't know exactly what I'm getting for my money. I also take a little bit of offense to the fact that as a sole practitioner, my income stream is not as guaranteed as say someone working for a large firm or working for the government. And so if I opt to pay my [Alaska] Bar [Association] dues in two increments, I have to pay a penalty for that. Now that seems to be unfair. People who need to pay in two increments probably are doing so out of reasons of poverty or cash flow and to penalize them for that condition is really unjust. And I've spoken with the [Alaska] Bar Association on this and they have rationalizations for it, but it would seem appropriate for the [Alaska] Bar [Association] to develop some kind of way of allowing graduated fees for its members. It has more than $1 million in back trusts which seems to me should be used in some way to offset these or at least offset the cost of the [Alaska] Bar [Association] examination. And I would just encourage the [Alaska] Bar [Association] to use this opportunity to put out a survey so we are clear here in the legislature what it is the [Alaska] Bar [Association] membership thinks the [Alaska] Bar [Association] ought to be doing and ensure that the [Alaska] Bar [Association] is not overcharging. Number 0294 REPRESENTATIVE CON BUNDE said he thinks there should be a resolution that indicates that the Alaska Bar Association is definitely overcharging Mr. Obermeyer and they should stop stealing his money if they can't provide any service for him. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES stated she understands the concern of Representative Berkowitz and said she believes he should take it up with the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association. CHAIRMAN GREEN stated he thinks there is probably significant support for Representative Berkowitz's position. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ responded, "There is and occasionally, Mr. Chair, you get to use a 'bully pulpit,' so the Board of Governor pays more attention and I think they'd probably pay more attention with my title wrap than they would with the little 'J.D.' after my name. So I'm going to use this 'bully pulpit' to make that point." REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said since she has been in the state, she has observed the number of attorneys and she doesn't believe there is a shortage. She said she thinks they also seem to be doing pretty well. Representative James said she doesn't know that she is so sympathetic. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ informed the committee there is a wide range in remuneration for attorneys. He said the last statistics he saw showed the average salary that an attorney makes is somewhere in the $40,000 range. Not all lawyers strike it rich and it is not the business to go into if you want to make money. That's particularly true of lawyers in the public service and lawyers who are doing public interest law. He indicated he has to pay $450 a year regardless if he practices law or not. The alternative is go on inactive status which means if he wants to become active again, he has to retake the Alaska Bar examination which is not an experience he ever wants to repeat again. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES pointed out that $450 is less than she has to pay to be a member of her rotary club. VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE asked if there were objections to moving HCS CSSB 234. There being none, HCS CSSB 234(JUD) moved out of the House Judiciary Standing Committee. CSSB 218(FIN) - CRIMES OF MURDER & CHILD MURDERS Number 0519 VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE announced the committee would hear CSSB 218(FIN), "An Act relating to the crimes of murder, manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide; relating to homicides of children; and relating to the crime of interference with custody of a child or incompetent person," sponsored by Senator Halford. Number 0550 BRETT HUBER, Legislative Assistant to Senator Rick Halford, Alaska State Legislature, came before the committee to explain CSSB 218(FIN). He stated the death of a child is always among the gravest of situations under any circumstance. When a child's death results from the commission of a crime, the consequences should be certain and the punishment should be severe. Mr. Huber explained that Senator Halford introduced the legislation to give law enforcement, prosecutors and the courts additional tools to address crime involving the murder of children. MR. HUBER informed the committee that CSSB 218(FIN) amends the current law by adding a new form of first degree murder when the death of a child results from the commission or attempted commission of kidnaping or a sexual offense. It expands the list of offenses constituting felony murders and includes sexual abuse of a minor in the first and second degree. It also elevates criminally negligent homicide from a Class C to a Class B felony. It establishes a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for a person convicted of a murder of a child under the age of 16. It increases the mandatory minimum sentence from five to seven years for manslaughter when the victim is a child under the age of 16. The legislation also establishes a new sentencing provision, which allows for a term of unsuspended imprisonment that exceeds the presumptive term for certain felony offenses if the victim is a child under the age of 16. Mr. Huber explained the bill would also establish the crime of custodial interference in the first degree if a person violates AS 11.41.330 and causes a child or incompetent person to be removed or kept outside the state. He explained that children are society's most vulnerable members and they deserve the most responsible level of care when entrusted to an adult. MR. HUBER explained the bill is intended to establish a level of punishment that's more commensurate with the severity of the crime and send a clear message of deterrence. If a criminal act results in the death of a child, you're going to go to jail for a very long time. He stated the Alaska Peace Officer's Association and Victims for Justice endorses the legislation. Number 0680 VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE explained the committee also worked on HB 375 which addresses elevating the charge in the murdering of a child. He asked if the bills are complementary or contradicting in any way. MR. HUBER informed the committee stated HB 375, as well as the Senate's companion measure, do include some of the provisions of this bill. The companion measure in the Senate moved out of the Senate Health, Education and Social Services (HESS) Committee the previous day. The provisions of the Senate's companion bill that were duplicative of CSSB 218(FIN) were removed. He noted he doesn't see a problem with the provisions being contained in both vehicles. VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE asked, "Is it the intent that if a child is killed in an automobile accident and the charge of manslaughter [is] brought that -- I guess in my mind, sometimes they use manslaughter when they would like to do murder, but there isn't quite the evidence. But in other cases, it truly is a case where the charge of murder isn't warranted and I was just wondering if all the cases of manslaughter would then be elevated? Is that the intent?" MR. HUBER said referred to page 4, subsection (A) and said it has the 5-year sentence for other cases of manslaughter and then (B) offers, "for manslaughter and the victim is a child under the age of 16, 7 years. So it only elevates 5 to 7 years in the case of the victim is a child under the age of 7. Number 0804 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said, "I have the same recollection of what we talked about in [HB] 375 is that we modified the definition of 'manslaughter' for the elevated penalties is to ensure that manslaughter with elevated penalties only apply to the crime. I believe it -- Kevin might have the wording and if I could ask him to say what it was." KEVIN JARDELL, Legislative Administrative Assistant to Representative Joe Green, came before the committee. He referred to "manslaughter," and said the language adopted in HB 375 stated that for manslaughter and the conduct resulting in a conviction was knowingly directed toward a child under the age of 16 would be 7 years. VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE said, "And then my question about an automobile crash - obviously in that case, I wouldn't be knowingly directed against the child." MR. JARDELL said if his recollection is correct, that was the debate - to have some causal connection to the child's age. VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE asked if that definition of manslaughter would be applicable to CSSB 218 or does it need to be redefined to maintain consistency with HB 375. MR. JARDELL said if the manslaughter provision is kept the way it is in CSSB 218, then it would encompass all the situations in HB 375. It wouldn't necessarily be inconsistent, but it would take a lot of cases that HB 375 would exclude and include them. Number 0935 VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE said he would like to propose a conceptual amendment. He said, "To try to keep this consistent with [HB] 375 so that manslaughter is knowingly. And then I would ask Mr. Huber to comment on that proposed amendment." MR. HUBER said, "I can only think of a few concerns, the first concern being, of course, we're late in the session now. The bill has not yet been amended in this body - would require a concurrence. I think that would be the first concern. And it's my understanding that there is certainly a degree of prosecutorial discretion of what level of charges brought depended on the circumstances of the incident that took place. I think between first and second degree murder and then manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide there is an opportunity for both the officers and the prosecutors involved to use some discretion on what charges are involved." REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said there is always discretion of which charge you can bring, but if you opt for a manslaughter charge, there is no discretion and you have a victim under 16. You're either in the manslaughter realm or you're out of the manslaughter realm. That is the discretion. He indicated the bill would prevent any discretion. Representative Berkowitz said you could always aggravate the sentence or argue for an aggravation of sentence. He said, "I think that while we incorporate the aggregator that the conduct was knowingly directed towards a victim under the age of 16, that's the kind of aggravator that's appropriate. I'm concerned about those DWI (driving while intoxicated) cases and I'm not trying to minimize this, they're tragic, but it's a different type of tragedy. And the punitive part should be viewed differently, that's where you need the discretion." Number 0927 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER asked if there is a fiscal note from the Department of Corrections. MR. HUBER stated there is a zero fiscal note from the Department of Corrections. VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE called for a brief at-ease for the purpose of proposing an amendment. Number 1111 VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE called the meeting back to order and asked Mr. Jardell if he had some proposed amendatory language. MR. JARDELL responded that the committee could use some of the same language that is in HB 375 which reads after the word "the," insert "conduct resulting in the conviction was knowingly directed toward a child under the age of 16." He noted that would be on page 4, line 16. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER interjected, "Also on line 27." VICE CHAIRMAN BUNDE asked if there was an objection to the amendment. There being none, the amendment was adopted. CHAIRMAN GREEN returned to the meeting and Vice Chairman Bunde explained the amendment to him. Number 1203 CHAIRMAN GREEN asked, "Does partial incapacitation get over here if the person is drunk driving an automobile [and] doesn't intend to knowingly hit the child, but is out of whack?" Number 1226 REPRESENTATIVE NORMAN ROKEBERG said, "Just a point of information, Mr. Chairman, we're making the manslaughter conviction on a knowingly but (indisc.) basis. In this state, do we ever prosecute under first or second degree murder for a vehicular accident if it was really aggravated, and then wouldn't the same principle apply then?" REPRESENTATIVE PORTER said "knowingly" is in the wrong place. He said, "What we have done is said that if you have committed manslaughter under the elements of manslaughter, which isn't knowingly, but knew that whatever your action was put a child in jeopardy in effect, then you're presumed for a 7-year sentence instead of a 5." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG questioned why that wouldn't apply to a homicide. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said Section 5 sweeps up Representative Rokeberg's concern. He said, "You can charge murder two if the victim is under 16. It will cause all the elements of homicide, which are elevated over the elements of manslaughter in terms of level of proof. See, all we've done with the manslaughter is say the only part that has an elevated level is if you have to know that the victim was 16. With manslaughter or with homicide, all the elements have to be at a higher level of proof." REPRESENTATIVE ERIC CROFT referred to page 3, Section 5, and said, "Defendant convicted of murder, and going to your point, that if it's -- we don't have to say there 'and knew it was child,' because once we're in murder and say, 'murder of a' -- on page 3, line 25, 'is convicted of the murder of a child,' the court is going to read 'knowingly' into that because it's an element of a murder charge." Representative Croft stated, "We are not making it a knowingly manslaughter. We're making it manslaughter with all its criminal, negligence, recklessness-type standards, but then the 'knowingly' comes in only for the age of the victim." Number 1401 MR. HUBER said one important provision to point out that is contained in CSSB 218 that isn't in HB 375, is the elevation of a Class C felony to a Class B felony for criminally negligent homicides contained in Section 3. That provision is not contained at all in HB 375 and the Department of Law agrees that it is an important provision to have in the bill. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked how many (indisc.) cases do we have in the state annually. DEAN GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services Section - Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law, came before the committee. He explained the number is fairly small, probably about six or less every year. Mr. Guaneli referred to the provision of making criminally negligent homicide a Class B felony and said the way the criminal homicide statutes are currently structured, there is first and second degree murder and then there is manslaughter is a Class A felony. Criminally negligent homicide is a Class C felony which makes it comparable to burglary of a warehouse or stealing a television set worth more than $500. It is comparable to a fairly low level felony conduct. The idea to elevate it to a Class B felony, so there is not that great distinction between manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide, has been around for a long time. Mr. Guaneli referred to the Sentencing Commission that met in the early 1990s, which he was a member of, and said a majority of that commission voted that this should be a change in the law. He said a lot of defense attorneys tend to think this might be a good result in a lot of cases -- a lot of cases where prosecutors are unsure whether they'll get a Class A felony manslaughter conviction, don't want to agree to a Class C felony criminally negligent homicide conviction, they might feel better about something in the middle, a Class B felony negligent homicide conviction. He stated he believes a lot of defense attorneys think that they may be able to negotiate pleas that might be more appropriate to the particular circumstances. MR. GUANELI said, "The other thing that we have found, particularly in child homicide deaths, some of them do end up criminally negligent homicide for one reason or another. The kinds of sentences that we have seen in those cases are typical of other criminally negligent homicide sentences and they're in the 1-year to maybe 18-month range. A lot of people feel that for the death of a child, that's just too little. And so a Class B felony range, which is more in the 2- to 3- to 4-year range, people feel a lot more comfortable with. And so that was the reason why this was suggested. This was originally in [HB] 375, and I had a big fight with the legislative attorneys who won out saying that there was a single subject problem and so Senator Halford's bill didn't have the problem in it and so it's here. That's why I prefer this bill rather than the comparable homicide provisions in [HB] 375." Number 1572 CHAIRMAN GREEN said, "Is it your understanding, I think we've discussed this before, when you have an omnibus bill like that, there is section -- assuming both were to pass, this is an elevated penalty. Would that then, in bill drafting -- and you pass both of them. The net result of statute would be the more -- this would take precedent over what's in [HB] 375?" MR. GUANELI responded, "Mr. Chairman, I believe that because HB 375 does not make any change in this particular provision and this bill does, that the bill that makes the amendment would take effect." Number 1607 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ referred to Class B felonies and said there was the Jackson case where there is mandatory minimums. He asked if that will have any impact of suggested minimums, through the court, on first felonies. MR. GUANELI explained that the Jackson case suggested a sentence benchmark range, generally in the 1- to 3-year area, the 1-year side being for mitigated offenses and the 3- to 4-year side being more aggravated Class B felony offenses. He noted that was guidelines by the court. It wasn't presumptive sentencing or mandatory minimum sentencing. Number 1643 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER made a motion to move CSSB 218(FIN), as amended, from committee with individual recommendations and with the zero fiscal note. There being no objection HCS CSSB 218(JUD) moved out of the House Judiciary Standing Committee. CONFIRMATION HEARING Number 1670 CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the next order of business would be confirmation hearings. Violent Crimes Compensation Board CHAIRMAN GREEN said the first confirmation would be Carol L. Alley, M.D., to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE made a motion to move the name Carol L. Alley, whose appointment is the Violent Crimes Commission, from committee with individual recommendations. There being no objection, Carol L. Alley's confirmation was advanced forward. Commission on Judicial Conduct Number 1775 CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the second confirmation would be Mary Matthews to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES indicated she knows Ms. Matthews. REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE made a motion to move the name Mary Matthews, whose appointment is to the Commission on Judicial Conduct, from committee. There being on objection, Mary Matthews' confirmation advanced forward. CHAIRMAN GREEN said there is also the confirmation of Jeffrey M. Feldman, Esq., to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER made a motion to move the name Jeffrey M. Feldman, Esq., to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. There being no objection, Jeffrey Matthew's confirmation advanced forward. CSSB 304(RLS) - REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES & HWYS Number 1840 CHAIRMAN GREEN indicated the next order of business would be CSSB 304(RLS), "An Act relating to the bail or fine for an offense committed in a highway work zone; and providing for an effective date," sponsored by Senator Donley. JAMES ARMSTRONG, Legislative Assistant to Senator Dave Donley, Alaska State Legislature, came before the committee. He explained the effective date is April 30, 1999, to coincide with the start of the construction season. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES made a motion to move CSSB 304(RLS) out of committee with individual recommendations and with the attached zero fiscal note. There being no objection, CSSB 304(RLS) moved out of the House Judiciary Standing Committee. CHAIRMAN GREEN called for an at-ease at 2:00 p.m. He called the meeting back to order at 2:12 p.m. HB 196 - WILLS, TRUSTS, & OTHER TRANSFERS Number 1930 CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the next item on the agenda was HB 196, "An Act relating to wills, intestacy, nonprobate transfers, and trusts; and amending Rule 24, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure." He asked Dave Pree, Legislative Assistant to Representative Joe Ryan, to come before the committee to present HB 196. Number 1954 DAVE PREE, Legislative Assistant to Representative Joe Ryan, Alaska State Legislature, said there had been some changes made since the last committee hearing on HB 196. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER made a motion to adopt CSHB 196, Version H as the working draft. There being no objection, that version was before the committee. Number 1997 REPRESENTATIVE JOE RYAN, Sponsor of HB 196, said the concerns voiced by the Department of Law and Representative Porter at an earlier meeting have been addressed in the proposed committee substitute. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked for a brief explanation of the changes made in the proposed committee substitute. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER directed the committee's attention to page 9, line 27, and said the language had been reworded. He explained that in a situation of a trust with joint trustees, there are some activities of the trust that require unanimous trustees' sign off. If an individual trustee within the group is dissatisfied with a particular activity, this language allows that person to indicate in writing to the other trustees and the beneficiary - or the representative if the beneficiary is incompetent - that they do not wish to be held liable for this particular action. That being done, the trustee can sign for the activity because of the requirement for unanimous trustee consent. Number 2063 REPRESENTATIVE RYAN explained that Assistant Attorney General, Mary Ellen Beardsley of the Department of Law believed the statutory reference in Section 2 of the previous committee substitute was in error, so the correct statute is reflected in the proposed committee substitute. Additionally, she had suggested the term "uniform" be changed to "Alaska" in Section 11. He said one of the problems he's discovered is there actually is no Uniform (indisc.) Investor Act. There are seven drafts which have been made by the Uniform Law Commission and this is one of the drafts that has been used by seven other states. So, it's a uniform, nonuniform law. Lawyers seem to understand that, but the general public doesn't. So, to avoid confusion, it was changed to the Alaska Trust Act. Number 2130 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER clarified there had been concern that the members of this committee might have believed this was "the" Uniform Trust Act of the law commissioners. He said it isn't because there isn't one. There may be one next year. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER continued that on page 12 of the original bill, there was a provision that said, "Notwithstanding any other section of law, a trustee may lease, buy or sell, including a lease, purchase or a sale in the establishment of a trust service office, from or to the trust the trustee represents as a trustee if specifically authorized to make that in the trust instrument." He said basically, that is self-dealing and general common law in this area disallows self-dealing, so it was deleted. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked if it had been deleted in (h)? REPRESENTATIVE PORTER confirmed it had been deleted. He pointed out the next change on page 13, line 19, and said this section covers mingled funds and funds are not supposed to be mingled. This addresses a situation where funds have been mingled and a person is trying to straighten it out and the sequence of effect on the trust. Language was added on line 19, "Nothing in this section is intended to authorize the mingling of trust funds". Number 2313 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER directed the committee's attention to Section 13.36.180 on page 15 and said there had been a provision which attempted to hold a trustee not liable for a tort that was committed if it was committed incident to the kind of business activity in which the trustee was properly engaged. The language was deleted because it seemed to be an inconsistent statement. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said, "So, it had been you're not liable if it's the kind of business you're supposed to be doing, but you may be ..." REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ interjected, "You're not liable if you do something wrong that you weren't supposed to be doing, but thought you should have been able to." REPRESENTATIVE PORTER added, "Yes, but you were engaged in the business you were supposed to be engaged in. But if it was a tort, it was a wrong. I mean it doesn't make any difference whether you engage in the right business or the wrong business, a tort is a tort." REPRESENTATIVE RYAN interjected the tort would go against the trust versus the individual if it can be shown the individual wasn't guilty of personal fault. REPRESENTATIVE RYAN stated, "I would say that - the way I understand it - not being an estate planning attorney or a trustee - is that I would think that the action, the way I read this is, did I intentionally set out to commit this tort or was this inadvertent in the course of business. There is a liability that hangs out - now where do we hang the liability? Is it hung on the trust or is it hung on the individual who had a personal fault in committing the act? My understanding of this change makes it if it wasn't a personal fault, then you don't have a liability." Number 2435 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT noted that in both drafts, the language in that section begins, "A trustee who has incurred personal liability for a tort committed in the administration of the trust ...." which appeared to him to jump through all the hoops of trust law. There is some reason to attach personal liability for the tort, so .... TAPE 98-78, SIDE B Number 0001 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT ... "rather than say trust liability, as an entity. So, once you've gone through all those, it does seem to me that there should be only limited exoneration and I take it Representative Porter takes out that exoneration because they've already been found to be personally liable. To that extent, that change makes sense. And the new section does end, '... or if the trustee or officer was not guilty of personal fault in incurring the liability' - I don't know that's necessary given you already said 'has incurred personal liability for a tort', but it does clarify it." Number 0037 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER explained the next change is in Section (e), page 14, which again excluded the personal liability of the trustee, but he didn't think the previous language gave enough notice to the beneficiary (indisc.). He noted the language in the proposed committee substitute was not what he had requested. He added, "They had a two-tiered method of titling their signature; one as trustee and the other one not individually liable - oh, they just had and not individually. If they signed it as trustee, this was prima facie evidence to exclude the trustee from personal liability and if it was signed as trustee and not individually, that would constitute irrebuttable evidence on intent to exclude the trustee from personal liability. And I didn't think that gave enough notice, so I suggested that it be changed to 'and not individually liable' so that that anyone whose money it was recognized that that's what that signature meant. But they have added, unfortunately, the words that I took out in there, so I would move an amendment, if you're willing, on page 15, line 1, I would delete the first four words and the first ten words of line 2." He clarified the amendment would delete the last four words on line 1, and the first ten words of line 2 of page 15. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked if there was objection to the amendment? Number 0158 REPRESENTATIVE JAMES asked Representative Porter to clarify the reason for the amendment. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER explained that if a trustee is going to place him or herself in a position where there's irrefutable evidence they are not personally liable, they should communicate that to the benefactor and the settler. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said her concern, having operated as a trustee, she had to indicate "as trustee" after her signature to eliminate the chance of being liable. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER remarked he wants it perfectly clear "if there's refutable evidence." He said he would not have a problem if the committee wanted to add "as trustee" back in there, but make it back to the prima facie evidence. Number 0225 REPRESENTATIVE RYAN commented that under the Alaska Trust Act, it's a complete gifting and the settler is really no longer involved unless retaining a beneficial interest. Once it's settled and the gift tax is paid, it's a complete gifting and the settler has no control over it any longer. As a beneficial interest, the settler still has no control; it's discretionary on the part of the trustee's part whether to give them a distribution or not. So, really the only people this would apply to is the beneficiaries. Number 0263 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated he was uncomfortable with the "irrebuttable" nature of the language. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER said, "I wouldn't be opposed to going back to the way that Representative James described it was fine with me. (Indisc.) signing as trustee is prima facie evidence of no personal liability, which (indisc.) short of any evidence to the contrary." Number 0373 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER said, "I would move an amendment that on -- okay, it's this one -- line 1, page 15, all of the first line be deleted except the last word and on line 2, 'irrebuttable' be deleted and 'prima facie' be inserted. So, how it would read then is 'In a contract action under this section, the addition of the words' -- I'm sorry, we'll have to keep words -- the first word of that line we'll have to keep -- 'addition of the words as trustee after the signature of a trustee to a contract constitutes prima facie evidence of an intent to exclude the trustee from personal liability." Number 0466 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER noted this was a friendly amendment to his proposed amendment. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked if there was objection? Hearing none, Amendment 1 was adopted. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to lines 11 - 14 and asked why a person who commits a tort while managing a trust, could be reimbursed with respect to the extent of the increase in the value of whatever act committed. REPRESENTATIVE RYAN said he really didn't know. Number 0530 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to line 16 and asked why a charitable trust is treated differently. NOTE: Answer is indiscernible due to numerous individuals speaking at the same time. Number 0583 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked if someone could give him an example of "when someone commits a tort as a trustee, that increases the value of the trust property" as indicated on page 15, line 11. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER recalled the logic is that it was a tortuous act that got the money in there in the first place, so to the extent that whoever was harmed needs the money back, would sue the trustee and the trustee can take that money and give it back to the person that was harmed. The trustee shouldn't benefit from the illegal act. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said that makes sense, but it doesn't specifically say, "when sued by the wrong party and found liable, the trustee can take the increase from the trust and then give it back." There could be a potential situation where the trustee does a tort, isn't caught for it, and says, "I did a great tort for you and I want the money from it." REPRESENTATIVE PORTER interjected that it's the amount of gain as a result of the tort to the trust. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said, "Right. I could, as the tortfeasor trustee, I could -- there's no requirement here that I have to have been sued and owed the money for the wrongful gain yet." REPRESENTATIVE RYAN cited an example of an individual engaged in an inside trading deal and the trust benefitted from it. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated, "That may be the more logical example. So in that then, I as the trustee - inside trade - the trust gets the advantage and I say now, 'I want the increase in that stock value' and I get it." This just gets it back to the trustee, not back to the injured party. Number 0763 REPRESENTATIVE RYAN said, "The way I understand it, the trust basically increases in value, but as the trustee, if I have to be liable for that increase, that's not particularly fair because the money is in the trust - it could be recovered from the corpus of the trust to pay back, so why do you nail me?" REPRESENTATIVE CROFT suggested the language in (b) should be more strongly tied to the language in (a). There was further discussion regarding suggested language changes. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG pointed out the problem is the language doesn't address what the trustee does with the money. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said she thought it was purely and simply a measurement. She doesn't read this as the money going out of the trust. REPRESENTATIVE RYAN said, "Well, you delineate the rules under which the trustee operates - liability or not liability - it'd be up to the court to decide that particular action and affect to remedy would it not? REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said it reads "reimbursement to the trustee" though. Number 1000 REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said, "If I might. It does say reimbursement for the liability out of the trust funds if the trustee has paid the claim. Then (indisc.) back, but otherwise in (b) it says that if the trustee commits a tort, increases the dollar of the trust property, the trustee is entitled to exoneration or reimbursement with respect to the tort to the extent of the increase in value. She interprets that to mean the trustee is relieved of that much, but the money still stays in the trust, so she didn't understand the discussion of taking the money out of the trust to pay something when nothing is getting paid, but rather getting relieved of having to pay it because it's already there as a result of the tort. Number 1035 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT believed there was somewhat of a point in what Representative James' comment if it didn't say "or reimbursement". He added, "If it said entitled to exoneration, relief and that's the measure idea you're putting in, but it says 'or reimbursement', so I am entitled to reimbursement from the trust - it's not just a measure - it's an entitlement of payment." REPRESENTATIVE JAMES interjected, "Because you've incurred personal liability." REPRESENTATIVE CROFT replied, "Right, well, if I add that section that says that, but right now it just says if I committed a tort." Number 1067 CHAIRMAN GREEN asked the sponsor to explain the intent. REPRESENTATIVE RYAN said, "We're saying that he increases the value of the trust property, he's entitled to be exonerated or reimbursed with respect to the tort to the extent of the increase in value even though he otherwise wouldn't be entitled, but because there is a gain - the tort - he has a responsibility for his liability for the increase in value and so the increase in value is determined -- I want to phrase this right - I don't want to get the words wrong -- exoneration, reimbursement to the extent of the increase in value even though he otherwise wouldn't be entitled because if he hadn't increased the value, he would be personally responsible for whatever that value was. But since there was the increase in value and that can be recovered, then he doesn't have to bear it - the increase in value bears it - the trust bears it." CHAIRMAN GREEN said his concern was that somehow it's going through the trustee. Number 1140 STEVE NOEY, Title and Affiliation Unknown, said, "AS 13.36.180 - this is just a statement or a definition - provides that a trustee who has incurred a personal liability for a tort committed in the administration of a trust, is entitled to exoneration from the trust if the tort was a common incident of the kind of business the trust was engaged in or if the tort was not a common incident then the trustee was not personally liable. I think that the reason for this is, let's say that Wally Hickel had in his will that his hotel, the Captain Cook, would go into trust upon his death. It goes into trust upon his death and the trustee automatically becomes liable and the administrator of the hotel. There's a slip and fall on the property during the time that the trustee is taking possession of it and tried to put new management on the property or whatever's happening - it's a common incident type thing. But I think what they're saying is the trustee didn't cause this thing - it was a common incident like a slip and fall or a car accident if they had a delivery truck, and so in that the trustee would not be liable." REPRESENTATIVE PORTER said that wouldn't increase the value of the trust. CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested that may be true for a tort where the trustee didn't do something to actually enhance the value of the trust - this is just an operational sort of situation. MR. NOEY agreed that's an operational thing. Number 1266 MR. PREE said, "If the trustee, in the course of managing this trust, commits a tort, there may be a question of standing with respect to the trust and the person who committed the tort. The trustee who committed the tort would be -- increased the value of the trust -- held liable for such trust increase and because of the standing issue, they would be able to recover -- or he would be exonerated by the trust for whatever that increase was to address the standing question that whoever the tortfeasor was has against the trustee or the person who committed the tort." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he thought Mr. Noey had some notes on subsection (b). Number 1333 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: "He just says a simple example may illustrate the application of AS 13.36.180 if we assume that a person who operates a delivery service as a sole proprietor, dies and appoints a trustee who decides to continue the business on a temporary basis until it can be sold. While making a delivery, an employee of the business is negligent and injures a third party. The third party sues the trustee and not the trust. And since the employee was negligent, the trustee will be liable under the doctrine of respondent superior - don't ask me what that means - even though the trustee was not personally at fault. AS 13.36.180 would allow the trustee to be reimbursed by the trust in this instance because the delivery is a common incident, et cetera." REPRESENTATIVE PORTER noted that pertains to subsection (a). He continued, "And to (b), Mr. Chairman, let me just read it once what we've gotten - if there's any questions about it, before we move it. But what we've changed here is taking out 'commits a tort that' - the fourth, fifth, sixth and seven word and then adding the rest of it so it would read, 'If a trustee has incurred personal liability for a tort committed in the administration of the trust and that tort increases the value of the trust property, the trustee is entitled to exoneration or reimbursement with respect to the tort to the extent of the increase in value even though the trustee would not otherwise be entitled to exoneration or reimbursement.'" REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked, "Well, if there's a claim from a third party, would there not be an increase - it'd be offset?" REPRESENTATIVE PORTER remarked, "That's why we're saying, 'as incurred personal liability for a tort committed in the administration', so there is a bill against him personally. And in the situation where that act actually increased the value of the trust, that bill can be paid to the extent of that increase and anything over that would have to be paid by the .... Which puts the money that was unlawfully gained back." Number 1525 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER said, "I've only got one more and basically it's the same kind of a thing that we're dealing with in another section that cut out a whole bunch of middle ground and just said if you've got personal liability -- if you're not personally liable, you're not liable. That business activity stuff that we took out once before, we took out a second time in another section on page 16." He asked for a moment to find to locate the exact location. Number 1611 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said in reading ahead to the language on page 16, "if the trust is created by writing or by oral statement to the trustee at the time of the creation of trust that the trust is created orally" seems rather unusual. Number 1661 MR. JARDELL said his understanding is that some states allow oral wills and because these trusts are going to be nationwide, there could be a situation of a will that was orally created in one state that incorporated a trust in it and "if you could prove it up under the laws of that state, then it would be a valid (indisc.)." REPRESENTATIVE RYAN noted there are a lot of existing trusts that can be moved from the jurisdictions in which they were created to Alaska and would be administered under Alaskan law. He added, "And (indisc.) substantial trusts because of the advantages we have. That's why we're (indisc.-coughing) this business up here - from offshore jurisdictions and so forth, bringing back on shore. In fact, Senator Murkowski and Representative Young and Stevens are going to be talked to about creating an exemption trying to get some of this money back on shore by making an exemption in the law for -- you don't get penalized if you bring it back within a certain period of time. And then we hope to have that brought here into Alaska (indisc.) northern jurisdiction, so that's basically what this is. So, it covers any trust made in other jurisdictions and .... CHAIRMAN GREEN remarked that he was aware of oral wills because they're fairly immediate, but he had never heard of an oral trust which carries on and on. MR. JARDELL said, "My understanding would be that if you create an oral will and within that will, your will creates a trust." CHAIRMAN GREEN observed that he could have a written trust, but if it's orally given to another person, the whole thing is oral. MR. JARDELL replied, "My understanding would be that the whole thing is oral. If I'm out in the woods and I get shot and I turn to Representative Croft and say, 'This is my will - I have $5 million - take it, invest it, give my kids $100,000 when they turn 18 and until they die', in some states that may be a valid will and a valid trust arrangement ...." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said hopefully, the statutes provide that's not an allowable trust agreement in the state of Alaska. REPRESENTATIVE RYAN remarked that if they're imported to Alaska, they would fall under what was HB 101 last year. CHAIRMAN GREEN said, "Well, what I think you're trying to get at is that you could actually say that we could incorporate from out of state, but that we would not be able to able to create oral wills within the state." REPRESENTATIVE PORTER found the location he had been looking for and said, "The only other thing is that the changes that were made on page 15 on line -- well, the changes that I described that I made to 180 were also made to 185 that if evolved that tort for a business - 'tort of a common incident in the kind of business activity in which the trustee was properly engaged' - we took that that out because I don't know what that meant - it wasn't a tort if you were properly engaged in the business, but .... that was removed from 180 and 185. That's the rest of the changes." Number 1982 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to Section 13.36.170, Unenforceable oral trust created by deed, and said he wasn't sure why deeds of trust were included in this legislation. CHAIRMAN GREEN noted that HB 196 would be held in committee for further discussion. ADJOURNMENT Number 2051 CHAIRMAN GREEN adjourned the House Judiciary Standing Committee at 3:08 p.m.