Legislature(2021 - 2022)GRUENBERG 120
04/26/2022 03:00 PM House STATE AFFAIRS
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB66 | |
| HB142 | |
| HB271 | |
| HB396 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | HB 66 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 316 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 142 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 271 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 309 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 396 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
HB 66-ELECTIONS, VOTING, BALLOTS
[Contains discussion of SB 39.]
4:56:44 PM
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS announced that the first order of business
would be HOUSE BILL NO. 66, "An Act relating to voting, voter
qualifications, and voter registration; relating to poll
watchers; relating to absentee ballots and questioned ballots;
relating to election worker compensation; and providing for an
effective date." [Before the committee, adopted as the working
draft on 4/12/22, was the proposed CS, Version 32-LS0322\O,
Klein, 3/30/22, "Version O."]
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS welcomed invited testimony.
4:58:24 PM
MATT ROE, Voting Works, explained that Voting Works was a non-
partisan non-profit organization that built election software.
He stated that the goal of his testimony was to briefly describe
what open-source software was and how it applied to election
administration. He stated that he would be speaking from his
experience implementing open-source software but would not be
speaking to the specifics of Voting Works products. He
explained that the "source" in open source referred to source
code, which was the set of instructions written by programmers
that a computer follows to achieve the desired software
behavior. He used an example of source code, which he described
as "a complicated recipe for baking a cake," but qualified that
for most software the source code was kept secret and available
only to the original programmers. By contrast, open-source
software had source code that was always available to anyone who
wished to see it. Mr. Roe continued his remarks by asserting
that much of the software used today (including all major web
browsers and much of software that powered the Internet) was
open source. He emphasized that the key benefit of open-source
technology was transparency. He cited that open-source software
was used in almost every industry, including scientific
research, financial services, and cybersecurity. He asserted
that in the world of election administration, especially when
the country was particularly polarized, open-source transparency
provided a common ground of facts that could be trusted and
verified. He described malicious code that changed votes as an
example of a problem that could be dispelled by a technical
review of the open-source code. He emphasized the importance of
proper security procedures, which should be transparent. He
mentioned the public accountability of election officials.
5:02:37 PM
MR. ROE wanted to discuss how open-source voting systems were
used in practice. He asserted that open-source voting systems
were used just like any other voting system with well-
established practices for certifying, testing, and operating
voting equipment. He stated that the only change introduced to
the election process by open-source software would be increased
transparency and public confidence in the election outcome. He
opined that SB 39 represented a non-partisan commitment to
increasing the transparency and security of Alaskan elections
throughout the entire cycle of the election.
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS asked whether Mr. Roe was familiar with the
language relating to open-source voting systems in Version O.
MR. ROE answered yes.
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS invited him to comment on the provisions in
Version O.
5:06:22 PM
MR. ROE clarified that he was familiar with the original version
of HB 66. He offered to read a section of an amendment [to SB
39, the companion bill to HB 66,] that was offered in the Senate
Judiciary Standing Committee (SJUD). He indicated his support
for the language in Amendment 41 to CSSB 39(JUD), [labeled 32-
LS0204\D.59, Klein, 4/20/22], which read:
Sec. 15.20.910. Standards for voting machines and vote
tally systems. The director may approve a voting
machine or vote tally system for use in an election in
the state upon consideration of factors relevant to
the administration of state elections. A voting
machine or vote tally system must meet the United
States Election Assistance Commission's voluntary
voting system guidelines and be certified by the
commission, use only open-source software technology
or commercial off-the-shelf software and firmware, and
satisfy the requirements of AS 15.15.032(c).
MR. ROE explained that Amendment 41 continued by defining both
"commercial off-the-shelf" and "open-source software
technology." He shared his understanding that Amendment 41 was
adopted by SJUD.
5:08:24 PM
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE sought to clarify how open-source software
would help improve Alaska's voting system.
MR. ROE clarified that transparency was the key benefit of open-
source technology, as it allowed anyone to review the source
code of the voting equipment. As a result, he said, the
increase in understanding and transparency would increase public
confidence in the election outcome, especially in the context of
heavy polarization or distrust in the existing voting equipment.
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE asked Mr. Roe to describe, in layman's
terms, how the public would access the source code.
MR. ROE said the specific implementation was ultimately up to
the Division of Elections (DOE), Office of the Lieutenant
Governor. He provided several examples of how other states were
providing source code to the public, including GitHub, a website
for software development that allowed users to store, manage and
view code, as well as track the changes made to that code.
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE asked whether the general public would be
able to understand the source code. More specifically, she
questioned whether source code was displayed in layman's terms,
such as, "There were 350 votes in precinct 1, and 642 votes in
precinct 2, and there were 5 question ballots ? [that had to be]
recounted."
MR. ROE made a distinction between open-source software and
different aspects of a transparent voting system. He explained
that a transparent voting system and its implementation should
include the ballot count via reports and auditing evidence,
which was one layer of transparency. He clarified that sharing
the code for public inspection was an additional layer of
transparency.
5:14:38 PM
REPRESENTATIVE STORY asked [which states] were using the open-
source technology and what voting equipment was compatible with
it.
MR. ROE reported that the Voting Works open-source voting system
was being used in five counties in Mississippi. Additionally,
Voting Works developed an open-source, post-election auditing
tool, named Arlo, which was used in 12 states. In 2016, he
said, New Hampshire successfully implemented open-source ballot
marking devices statewide. Los Angeles County, he continued,
built a voting system, referred to as Voting System for All
People, that they planned to open source. Additionally,
California allowed counties to pilot open-source voting systems
with a certification process. He added that several state
legislatures, including New Jersey and Tennessee, had introduced
legislation that would require open-source voting technology.
REPRESENTATIVE STORY asked how much the voting machines cost.
MR. ROE reported that the Voting Works open-source voting system
was 50 percent of the total cost of ownership relative to a
closed-source voting system.
5:17:45 PM
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS inquired about the specific cost of a
Voting Works voting machine.
MR. ROE stated that the price of the Voting Works voting machine
was posted on the Voting Works website. He reported that a
variety of reports had analyzed the cost of voting equipment in
given jurisdictions and found that the price was between $5,000
and $10,000.
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS asked whether open-source election
equipment was on track for federal certification by 2024.
MR. ROE shared that Voting Works planned to federally certify by
2023.
5:20:10 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the unanswered questions
from the previous hearing on Version O had been answered, such
as the rationale for the statutory retention requirements
[pertaining to election material].
5:20:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CHRIS TUCK, Alaska State Legislature, prime
sponsor of HB 66, sought to clarify whether Representative
Eastman was referring to the retention of ballots.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN clarified that he was referring to the
retention of all documents, including ballots.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK explained that the retention requirements
were included in the bill to preserve integrity and ensure that
nothing was destroyed until after the election was certified in
case questions arose.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN shared his understanding that the current
language in Version O reduced the length of retention. He asked
whether the bill sponsor would be amiable to an amendment that
increased or maintained the current statutory retention
requirements.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK indicated that Version O required election
material to be retained for 22 months. He asked whether
Representative Eastman was hoping to extend that amount of time.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN pointed out that under current law, the
current retention requirement was four years.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK conveyed that it was a policy call for the
committee to make.
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS asked whether DOE had any perspective on
the length of document retention or the merits of two years
versus four years.
5:23:25 PM
GAIL FENUMIAI, Director, Division of Elections, Office of the
Lieutenant Governor, explained that the division retained
records according to the state's record retention schedule. She
declined to opine on 22 months versus four years.
5:24:00 PM
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE directed attention to Section 44,
Subsection (c), and inquired about the definition of "forensic
examination."
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK acknowledged that there was no statutory
definition of forensic examination. He suggested replacing the
term with "Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA)."
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE pointed out that Section 43, paragraph (5),
made reference to a party primary. She asked whether that term
was still applicable.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK confirmed that the language needed to be
changed due to the passage of Alaska Ballot Measure 2 [Top-Four
Ranked-Choice Voting and Campaign Finance Laws Initiative
(2020)]. He shared that Representative Claman was drafting a
forthcoming amendment to address the language in question.
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE directed attention to page 19, lines 3-4,
and asked why an election official would need access to the
political affiliations of all persons.
5:27:12 PM
MIKE MASON, Staff, Representative Chris Tuck, Alaska State
Legislature, on behalf of Representative Tuck, prime sponsor,
shared his understanding that the language in question was the
subject of an amendment to the companion bill in the Senate [SB
39]. Further, he shared his belief that it would be challenging
to exclude a person's political affiliation from the voter
records.
5:27:53 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN turned attention to Section 44,
Subsection (d), and asked why a precinct tabulator needs to
connect to the Internet 24 hours before the polls open on
election day. He suggested prohibiting Internet connectivity
entirely.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK explained that precinct tabulators require
internet connection to be tested and checked prior to the
election to confirm their ability to function properly.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether it was necessary to access
the tabulators remotely ahead of time to test them.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK answered yes, to ensure that they work
properly. He directed the question to Ms. Fenumiai.
MS. FENUMIAI asserted that Representative Eastman was referring
to the logic and accuracy testing, which was performed in the
division's regional offices prior to field deployment. She
clarified that they are not connected to the Internet when
voting occurs.
5:30:41 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked why the tabulators needed the
capability of connecting to the Internet.
MS. FENUMIAI stated that the Internet connection allowed the
tabulators to transmit the election results in a timely manner.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN pointed out that per Section 44,
Subsection (d), the tabulators could not be connected to the
Internet from 24 hours before the polls open on election day
until 14 days after the polls close. He asked whether there was
another rationale for connecting the tabulators to the Internet
or a cellular network.
MS. FENUMIAI described how the tabulators were briefly connected
to the Internet to transmit the election results following poll
closure. She added that, should the bill pass in its current
form, the division would need to find a different method to
collect the results from the majority of the precincts that
relied on an analogue or cellular network to transmit results.
MR. MASON pointed out that the language in question was not
included in the original version of the bill. He explained that
it was added in an effort to compromise with the Senate version
of the bill. He directed attention to the following sentence in
Subsection (d), which specified that "all tabulator data shall
be loaded from the tabulator onto a separate storage device and
transmitted from a computer that is not connected to the
tabulator."
5:33:22 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN suggested removing the ability to connect
to the Internet entirely, as the connection would not be used to
transmit results.
MR. MASON pointed out that removing the connectivity entirely
would preclude the ability to update or fix the open-source
software on the tabulator.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the software could be
updated with CD-Rom or USB.
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS suggested that Representative Eastman draft
an amendment to address his concerns.
5:35:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE STORY questioned whether two days post-election
was sufficient time for the director to send notifications of
deficient ballots for the curing process. She shared her
understanding that [SB 39] was amended to include a five-day
deadline and inquired about the rationale for the expanded
timeline [in the Senate].
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK expressed his support for the ballot curing
process. He deferred to Ms. Fenumiai.
MS. FENUMIAI was unsure why the Senate made that change. She
opined that any curing process put into statute should allow for
the maximum amount of time possible.
5:37:43 PM
REPRESENTATIVE STORY asked whether the division was amenable to
five days post-election, as opposed to two days. She opined
that dive days seemed more reasonable.
MS. FENUMIAI agreed that more time would be favorable.
5:39:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR expressed her concern about the language,
"the director shall immediately make a reasonable effort to
contact the voter", on page 19, lines 17-18. She suggested that
"reasonable effort" needed further clarification.
MR. MASON highlighted that the ballot curing sections [Section
41 and Section 42] mirrored provisions in Governor Dunleavy's
election bill. He explained that the original version of HB 66
included a more lenient [ballot curing] system that utilized an
affidavit.
REPRESENTATIVE TARR, in response to a follow-up question from
Representative Tuck, opined that "reasonable effort" was
ambiguous and could be challenged. Additionally, she agreed
with Representative Story's suggestion of increasing the two-day
time period. She went on to address the minimum pay for
election workers. She expressed her support for raising their
pay to $15.50; however, she wondered whether the
prescriptiveness of the language would prevent election workers
from being paid more than $15.50
MR. MASON recalled the drafting process of the original version
of HB 66, indicating that the intent was to reflect DOE's
processes during the 2020 election. He opined that the language
would not restrict election workers from being paid more than
the minimum amount. Further, he suggested tying the pay scale
to a step above minimum wage, to ensure that their wages would
be adjusted annually for inflation.
5:45:06 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR asked the director to weigh in on the pay
scale and the difficulty of attracting employees.
MS. FENUMIAI understood the language [in Section 53] to mean
that the division shall pay not less than $15.50. Nonetheless,
she acknowledged that by cementing an arbitrary number in
statute, the division would have less flexibility to make pay
increases. She believed that it would be easier to keep rates
of pay in regulation, as opposed to statute, and adjust them
accordingly with the budget increases provided by the
legislature. She noted that DOE had submitted a budget request
to increase election worker compensation to $20 per hour for
precinct workers, which would require amending the regulations
to accommodate the new rates of pay if passed.
REPRESENTATIVE TARR pointed out that the statutory language in
Version O, should it pass, would supersede the regulatory pay
increase; therefore, the division's plan for the upcoming
election would be impacted.
MS. FENUMIAI confirmed. She maintained her belief that keeping
the pay scale in regulation would provide the division with more
flexibility to increase pay, which was much needed, she opined.
REPRESENTATIVE TARR asked whether Ms. Fenumiai would prefer that
the minimum compensation for election workers exist in statute,
as written in Version O, or that the pay scale remain a
regulatory item.
MS. FENUMIAI suggested that the word "minimum" could lead to
speculation about pay increases. Additionally, she asserted
that pay increases were a budgetary concern, as raising the
minimum pay from $12.50 an hour to [$15.50] was a substantial
increase for the division.
5:48:49 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN returned attention to Section 44 and
asked how a person would identify whether a precinct tabulator
was connected to a cellular network.
MS. FENUMIAI explained that the current precinct tabulators were
not equipped with an internal mechanism to connect to the
Internet, adding that they used an external modem to connect.
She said if the bill were to pass, the precincts would not be
provided with the external modems to attach to the tabulators.
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN pondered strengthening the language to
clarify that modem connections were not permissible. He asked
whether that would create a hardship for the division.
MS. FENUMIAI offered to follow up with the requested
information.
5:50:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN directed attention to Section 44,
subsections (d) and (e), and asked whether there were safeguards
against someone accessing the computer [that the storage device
connects to].
MS. FENUMIAI conveyed that Alaska remained a paper-based ballot
system, which in itself was a safeguard. She emphasized that
the machines underwent logic and accuracy testing conducted by
bipartisan boards before each election. Additionally, the
machines were sealed with security seals, which were not broken
for any reason.
5:52:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE asked whether myAlaska had the capacity to
[send notifications to voters]. She suggested implementing a
notification system that could be used for tracking and curing
ballots.
MS. FENUMIAI said she was unfamiliar with innerworkings of
myAlaska. She added that currently, DOE did not use the website
for anything. She conveyed that Ballot Trax would be used for
the upcoming special election, which had the ability to notify
voters who had opted in of the need for a cure.
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE requested additional information on Ballot
Trax.
MS. FENUMIAI offered to follow up with the requested
information.
5:56:03 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN sought to confirm that voters were purged
from the voter roll after failing to vote for four consecutive
years.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK deferred to Ms. Fenumiai.
MS. FENUMIAI remarked that the list maintenance procedure
involved a "lookback" of two years. She stated that a voter
remained on the roll for two federal general election cycles, or
four years, past the point of inactivity.
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN asked Ms. Fenumiai to opine on [Risk-
Limiting Audits (RLAs)] and whether they offered a valid method
for verifying the accuracy of the system.
MS. FENUMIAI declined to comment at this time.
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN asked whether she would feel comfortable
sharing her opinion on that subject in the future.
MS. FENUMIAI believed that it was a policy call for the
legislature. She added that the division would carry out the
statute as directed.
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN asked whether the director would advise
the legislature upon the discovery of any gaps or flaws in the
auditing system.
MS. FENUMIAI remarked that it was not the director's role to
advise the legislature on those decisions. She reiterated that
she had not read through the proposed auditing provisions in
great detail; nonetheless, she acquiesced that if directed to do
so, the division would comply.
5:59:06 PM
MR. MASON noted that Mr. Roe was available to speak to RLAs.
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN asked whether RLAs could be trusted and
whether they were "the best way to go" in regard to the auditing
process.
MR. ROE stated that all post-election audits, including RLAs,
were important tools in addition to open-source voting
equipment. Ultimately, he said, building secure systems
included multiple layers of protection.
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN asked whether Version O required the
renewal of absentee ballot requests each election cycle.
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK explained that after requesting an absentee
ballot, the voter could continue to vote absentee until he/she
missed two election cycles, in which case the voter would need
to reapply. He emphasized that permanent absentee voting was
optional.
REPRESENTATIVE KAUFMAN shared his belief the requiring voters to
request an absentee ballot annually would act as a "failsafe"
against unused ballots being sent out into "the ether."
REPRESENTATIVE TUCK said permanent absentee voting was a policy
call. Nonetheless, he pointed out that absentee voting made it
more convenient for senior citizens, disabled people, and those
living in rural Alaska. He conveyed that the idea was to
capitalize on the success of the [2020] election, which saw over
60 percent statewide participation due to the the convenience of
by-mail voting. He added that he opposed the idea of requiring
voters to reapply for absentee ballots on an annual basis.
6:04:35 PM
CHAIR KREISS-TOMKINS announced that the proposed CS for HB 66,
Version O, was held over.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| HB 66 Testimony League of Women Voters Alaska 04.21.2022.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 66 |
| HB 66 Additional Info - Little Hoover Commission April 2021.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 66 |
| HB 271 Amendment I.1 - Kreiss-Tomkins.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 271 |
| HB 271 Letter of Support - Susitna River Coalition 04.21.22.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 271 |
| HB 142 Amendment W.16 - Eastman.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 142 |
| HB 396 Fiscal Note DOR-TRS-04-22-22.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 396 |
| HB 396 Amendment I.1 -- Kreiss-Tomkins.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 396 |
| HB 142 Amendment Packet with Votes HSTA 04.26.22.pdf |
HSTA 4/26/2022 3:00:00 PM |
HB 142 |