Legislature(2021 - 2022)GRUENBERG 120

05/04/2022 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY

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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
-- Recessed to 5/6/22 at 10:30 am --
Heard & Held
-- Testimony <Invitation Only> --
Moved CSSB 161(JUD) Out of Committee
+ Bills Previously Heard/Scheduled TELECONFERENCED
             HB 5-SEXUAL ASSAULT; DEF. OF "CONSENT"                                                                         
1:09:08 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that the  first order of business would be                                                               
SPONSOR  SUBSTITUE FOR  HOUSE BILL  NO.  5, "An  Act relating  to                                                               
sexual abuse of a minor;  relating to sexual assault; relating to                                                               
the code  of military justice;  relating to consent;  relating to                                                               
the  testing of  sexual assault  examination kits;  and providing                                                               
for an  effective date."   [Before the committee, adopted  as the                                                               
work draft on 5/2/22, was  the proposed committee substitute (CS)                                                               
for SSHB 5, Version 32-LS0065\R, Radford, 5/2/22, "Version R."]                                                                 
1:09:41 PM                                                                                                                    
KIMBERLY  KESSLER   FERZAN,  Earle  Hepburn  Professor   of  Law,                                                               
University  of  Pennsylvania  Carey   Law  School,  informed  the                                                               
committee that  she had written  articles on sexual  assault, and                                                               
served  as an  advisor to  the American  Law Institute's  (ALI's)                                                               
Model Penal  Code (MPC) sexual  assault reform  project; however,                                                               
the views she expressed were her  own.  She offered the following                                                               
prepared remarks  [included in the committee  packet], which read                                                               
as follows [original punctuation provided]:                                                                                     
     Good afternoon.  My name  is Kimberly Kessler Ferzan. I                                                                    
     am  the   Earle  Hepburn  Professor   of  Law   at  the                                                                    
     University  of Pennsylvania.   I  have written  several                                                                    
     articles on sexual  assault, and I serve  as an Advisor                                                                    
     to  the  American  Law  Institute's  Model  Penal  Code                                                                    
     Sexual Assault  reform project.   My  views are  my own                                                                    
     and not those of the ALI.                                                                                                  
     I  wanted  to  speak  for   a  few  moments  about  the                                                                    
     complexities of criminalizing  sexual assault, and some                                                                    
     of the choices the April 28th draft makes.                                                                                 
     I want  to talk  about what consent  is, distinguishing                                                                    
     assent from  consent, and how factors  that may "defeat                                                                    
     consent" are understood in the draft.                                                                                      
     First,  what   is  consent?    Assuming   there  is  no                                                                    
     coercion,  deception, or  incapacity, something  I will                                                                    
     return to, what  does one person have to do  to make it                                                                    
     permissible to have sex with them?                                                                                         
     Could make it just words: Must get "yes"                                                                                   
     Could require a yes through "words and actions"                                                                            
     Could require  a yes through  "words and  actions", but                                                                    
     allow  inferences from  inaction  as well,  "If no  one                                                                    
     objects, these minutes are approved"                                                                                       
     Internal: just willingness                                                                                                 
     If  I see  my neighbor  crossing my  lawn and  I think,                                                                    
     that is okay with me, he  no longer is trespassing.  If                                                                    
     we  are  respecting  my autonomy,  then  I  can  change                                                                    
     others rights  and duties  simply by  what I  choose to                                                                    
     You have "willingness"                                                                                                     
     This can be understood as  the internal act view, where                                                                    
     how  someone behaves  gives evidence  of this  internal                                                                    
     choice.   Or  words  and action  that allow  inferences                                                                    
     from  silence (c)(2).   Is  silence  evidence that  the                                                                    
     person is  saying yes, or  is the person saying  yes by                                                                    
     silence? No practical difference                                                                                           
     Some  feminists  would  urge   a  "words  and  actions"                                                                    
     standard that requires more.   Let me explain that sort                                                                    
     of argument.   You have  defined sexual assault  in the                                                                    
     second  degree to  include  sexual penetration  without                                                                    
     consent.   Given Alaska's provision for  default mental                                                                    
     states under  11.81.610, this means that  the defendant                                                                    
     must be  reckless as to lack  of consent.  That  is, he                                                                    
     or  she must  consciously disregard  a substantial  and                                                                    
     unjustifiable risk  that the victim is  not consenting.                                                                    
     So,  let's say  that  the victim  does  not resist  and                                                                    
     allows  the D  to continue.    She later  says she  was                                                                    
     experiencing  frozen fright  and  he says  he took  her                                                                    
     acquiescence as  consent.  As  long as he  believes she                                                                    
     was consenting, he is not  guilty.  Even if you dropped                                                                    
     the mental state to negligence,  if a reasonable person                                                                    
     believed there  was consent  (b/c people  often consent                                                                    
     rather passively),  he is not  guilty.  So,  to protect                                                                    
     victims, and  change social  norms, some  states create                                                                    
     affirmative consent standards,  thereby requiring words                                                                    
     and action.                                                                                                                
     The biggest  problem with  doing this  is that  you are                                                                    
     trying to  shift behavior without really  giving anyone                                                                    
     notice of  it.  It becomes  a trap for the  unwary.  It                                                                    
     is easy to do this with  college kids whom you can make                                                                    
     go to  orientation, but shifting  social norms  is more                                                                    
     difficult.   Do you want  to punish people  with severe                                                                    
     felonies  to change  how people  consent to  sex?   And                                                                    
     remember, this applies not  just to inexperienced first                                                                    
     timers  but  to those  in  long  term relationships  as                                                                    
     A second concern  is that it is also  extremely hard to                                                                    
     articulate what  counts as a "yes"  and can potentially                                                                    
     invite  the very  kind of  dissection  of the  victim's                                                                    
     behavior  that affirmative  consent standards  may wish                                                                    
     to avoid.  Some scholars  have worried that in practice                                                                    
     this subjects victims to substantial scrutiny.                                                                             
     Finally,  with an  affirmative  consent standard,  more                                                                    
     onus  is put  on defendants.   If  you think  about how                                                                    
     affirmative  consent  would  be shown,  it  would  come                                                                    
     closer  to requiring  a defendant  to  convince a  jury                                                                    
     that  he had  consent than  to requiring  the state  to                                                                    
     prove its absence.  There  is then the question whether                                                                    
     it  is fair  to punish  someone  if the  state has  not                                                                    
     shown lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.                                                                           
     For  these reasons,  I would  leave your  "willingness"                                                                    
     formulation in place.   (If I had my  druthers, I might                                                                    
     go  with "decision,"  "choice" or  willed acquiescence"                                                                    
     to better  distinguish consent  from mere  desires, but                                                                    
     "willingness" is tracking the current MPC draft.)                                                                          
     Here is  a second  question about consent  that impacts                                                                    
     drafting.   Consent  is conceptually  confusing because                                                                    
     we use this one word to  mean two things.  Sometimes we                                                                    
     mean this  internal (or external) act  and sometimes we                                                                    
     mean  the internal  (or external)  act plus  sufficient                                                                    
     conditions   of  freedom,   knowledge,  and   capacity.                                                                    
     Sometimes, cases simply lack  that internal or external                                                                    
     act.    Having  sex  with  a  comatose  person  doesn't                                                                    
     involve either an  internal or external yes.   In other                                                                    
     cases,  though,  the  person  does  "say  yes"  but  it                                                                    
     doesn't count.   So,  a 12-year-old's  enthusiastic yes                                                                    
     to sexual contact doesn't count.   So, too, someone who                                                                    
     says yes at the point of  a gun doesn't count as making                                                                    
     the  action permissible.   Some  people would  say that                                                                    
     there isn't consent in these  cases, but we also in our                                                                    
     ordinary language  say, "she consented at  gunpoint" or                                                                    
     the teenager "consented."  This makes things tricky.                                                                       
     Because the MPC locked in  its definition of consent as                                                                    
     willingness,  it then  had to  use the  term "effective                                                                    
     consent" elsewhere.                                                                                                        
     You define  consent as willingness,  and then  say that                                                                    
     consent is  "ineffective" if induced by  fraud, duress,                                                                    
     or deception.   This means you are  making the decision                                                                    
     to   say  that   12-year-olds  do   consent,  but   not                                                                    
     effectively.    An alternative  would  be  to say  that                                                                    
     assent is  willingness.  And consent  is assent without                                                                    
     any of the undermining conditions.                                                                                         
     Why does this matter?   First, consider the double duty                                                                    
     in  your  use  of  force  provision  criminalizing  sex                                                                    
     "without consent of that person  by the use of force or                                                                    
     the express or implied threat.                                                                                             
     Notice  this will  cover  both the  person  who is  not                                                                    
     saying yes at all and  is compelled, and the person who                                                                    
     says  "yes"  but only  because  there  is  a gun.    It                                                                    
     arguably  equivocates  on  what you  mean  by  consent.                                                                    
     (Really a person who says  yes at gunpoint is willing.)                                                                    
     Although  courts  might  interpretively gloss  this  as                                                                    
     you'd  like, it  isn't  quite precise  of what  consent                                                                    
     The  Model   Penal  Code   draft  defines   consent  as                                                                    
     willingness and then needs to back out by saying:                                                                          
     the act  is without effective consent  because: (i) the                                                                    
     actor  uses or  explicitly or  implicitly threatens  to                                                                    
     use physical force or restraint against anyone;                                                                            
     Many of  us thought  this led to  clunky drafting.   If                                                                    
     the consent  is ineffective  when there is  force, then                                                                    
     you only  need to  discuss the  force, not  the consent                                                                    
     because consent  doesn't count anyway.   You  just want                                                                    
     that the person submits or is compelled by force                                                                           
     Now, consider  how you deal with  defeaters like force,                                                                    
     fraud, more generally.                                                                                                     
     First,  it  is not  clear  how  you want  the  specific                                                                    
     defeaters  that you  mention in  the statute  (sex when                                                                    
     the person is  subject to a threat of force  or is lied                                                                    
     to about  a medical procedure) and  your provision that                                                                    
     consent is ineffective if induced  by force, duress, or                                                                    
     deception.  MPC only has  that the very provisions that                                                                    
     it defines  in the  statute count  as force,  fraud, or                                                                    
     To see how this matters,  assume that Bob lies to Alice                                                                    
     and tells her  that he loves her, and she  has sex with                                                                    
     him  because   of  that.    Under   your  very  limited                                                                    
     statutory provisions, it seems  as though Alice was not                                                                    
     sexually  assaulted because  you have  not spelled  out                                                                    
     that  kind  of lie.    But  under your  provision  that                                                                    
     consent is ineffective if induced  by force, duress, or                                                                    
     deception, she  does not consent,  and so Bob  would be                                                                    
     guilty of  sexual assault in  the second degree.   That                                                                    
     is  your  provision  about ineffective  consent,  which                                                                    
     doesn't  specify  when  it   is  ineffective  could  be                                                                    
     construed  broadly.   Indeed, if  the way  deception is                                                                    
     defined elsewhere in your code  is used here, Bob would                                                                    
     be guilty of second-degree  sexual assault.  This would                                                                    
     make  Alaska  a significant  outlier  in  the kinds  of                                                                    
     cases  that jurisdictions  punish for  deception.   All                                                                    
     kinds of lies would  then count, including for example,                                                                    
     if a spouse lies and tells  her partner that she is not                                                                    
     sleeping with  other men, if it  is that representation                                                                    
     that leads to continued marital sex.                                                                                       
     I hope this is helpful and I await your questions.                                                                         
1:20:02 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR CLAMAN invited questions from committee members.                                                                          
1:20:29 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE  DRUMMOND requested  the  definition  of the  term                                                               
MS. KESSLER FERZAN  stated that a "defeater"  of consent referred                                                               
to a "yes"  that "doesn't count."  She provided  the example of a                                                               
"yes" that was  compelled by force; a "yes"  compelled by deceit;                                                               
and a "yes" given at gunpoint.                                                                                                  
1:22:06 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN said  he had heard of a  scenario in which                                                               
a college took  a "proactive approach" to  affirmative consent by                                                               
requiring affirmative  consent to every  physical act.   He asked                                                               
whether there was data to support that approach.                                                                                
MS. KESSLER  FERZAN shared her  understanding that  most colleges                                                               
have stronger  affirmative consent standards, which  she referred                                                               
to as "enthusiastic consent."                                                                                                   
REPRESENTATIVE  EASTMAN  asked  how  to  ascertain  where  Alaska                                                               
landed  on   the  spectrum  of  embracing   contemporary  consent                                                               
concepts.   He recalled that  Ms. Kessler Ferzan had  stated that                                                               
the Version R would make Alaska an outlier.                                                                                     
MS. KESSLER FERZAN  clarified that Alaska would be  an outlier in                                                               
terms  of  its  bold  stance on  how  deception  was  understood.                                                               
Because of the statutory  language, "extraordinarily" broad lies,                                                               
such as "I love you" could  be interpreted as sexual assault, she                                                               
said.  She added that  such an expansion would make jurisdictions                                                               
nervous, as  they do not want  to be in the  business of policing                                                               
which  kinds of  lies  would undermine  consent.   Regarding  the                                                               
definition of consent, she conveyed  that jurisdictions were "all                                                               
over the place" on affirmative  consent standards, adding that it                                                               
was an ever-changing landscape.                                                                                                 
CHAIR  CLAMAN  noted that  he  had  sent  Ms. Kessler  Ferzan  an                                                               
excerpt of  the definition  of consent  from AS  11.81.900(b), in                                                               
addition to the general definitions in the criminal code.                                                                       
1:28:59 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN inquired about  the harm that could result                                                               
from taking this "bold" approach [to the definition of consent].                                                                
MS.  KESSLER  FERZAN  said  it  was  a  matter  of  whether  [the                                                               
legislature]  wanted  every  single   lie  to  constitute  sexual                                                               
assault each time  it was material to the  victim.  Additionally,                                                               
whether [the  legislature] wanted the  courts in the  business of                                                               
policing the kind  of lies that were private and,  in some sense,                                                               
the defendant's  personal business.   Ultimately, she  said there                                                               
were questions about  what kind of false  impressions could count                                                               
as deception under this statute.                                                                                                
REPRESENTATIVE  EASTMAN asked  whether  failure  to disclose  the                                                               
presence  of  a  sexually  transmitted  disease  (STD)  would  be                                                               
counted as deception under Version R.                                                                                           
MS. KESSLER FERZAN said in  some jurisdictions, courts determined                                                               
whether a  person was deceived to  the nature and quality  of the                                                               
act.  For example, a medical  procedure that was actually "a body                                                               
part."   She explained  that the courts  attempted to  define the                                                               
act, such as disease-free sex, rather than just sex.                                                                            
1:33:50 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR  CLAMAN  asked  about  the   pros  and  cons  of  the  term                                                               
"willingness"  versus  "freely  given."   More  specifically,  he                                                               
asked  which term  tended to  be  more protective  of victims  in                                                               
terms of rape shield laws.                                                                                                      
MS. KESSLER FERZAN  said "freely given" was  generally thought by                                                               
feminists to be more protective  of victims; however, many people                                                               
wondered  whether,  in practice,  that  kind  of scrutiny  helped                                                               
victims as much as it was intended to.  She provided examples.                                                                  
CHAIR  CLAMAN   asked  whether  it   was  Ms.   Kessler  Ferzan's                                                               
perspective  that  the  committee  should  consider  removing  or                                                               
altering  the  language "consent  is  ineffective  if induced  by                                                               
force, duress, or deception" on page 4, line 17.                                                                                
MS. KESSLER FERZAN opined that  the language could be stricken or                                                               
changed to "consent  is ineffective if induced  by force, duress,                                                               
or  deception, as  defined  in" with  references  to the  earlier                                                               
provisions related  to force, deception,  and duress  that backed                                                               
undermined consent.                                                                                                             
1:43:22 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR  CLAMAN pointed  out that  an earlier  version of  the bill                                                               
made sexual  assault without consent first  degree sexual assault                                                               
whether  induced  by force  or  not.   Alternatively,  Version  R                                                               
graded  that classification  by  requiring the  use  of force  in                                                               
first degree  sexual assault and  not requiring the use  of force                                                               
in second degree sexual assault.   He asked how other states were                                                               
approaching the classification of sexual  assault with the use of                                                               
force  versus no  force and  whether the  general pattern  was to                                                               
distinguish the two in terms of severity.                                                                                       
MS. KESSLER FERZAN  said it was her general sense  that force was                                                               
graded more severely [in other  states], for which she advocated.                                                               
Additionally, she indicated that she  was in favor of more layers                                                               
of complexity rather than fewer.  She provided examples.                                                                        
1:46:21 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN  inquired about  the term  "implied threat                                                               
of force" and how other states captured that concept.                                                                           
CHAIR CLAMAN  noted, for  reference, that  Representative Eastman                                                               
was referring  to the language on  page 1 and page  2 of [Version                                                               
R] that  specifically discussed the  use of force or  the express                                                               
or implied threat of force.                                                                                                     
MS.  KESSLER FERZAN  confirmed  that the  current  MPC draft  was                                                               
using  the  implied use  of  force.    She posed  two  questions:                                                               
First, how  to prove  implied use  of force  after the  fact; and                                                               
second, whether  victims could  mistakenly perceive  something to                                                               
be  a  threat  of  force.   On  the  latter,  she  discussed  the                                                               
significance  of  the defendant's  mens  rea  ["the intention  or                                                               
knowledge of  wrongdoing that constitutes  part of a  crime"], or                                                               
"mental state,"  and provided  an example.   She  highlighted the                                                               
difficulty  of "unpacking"  an implied  threat of  force for  the                                                               
1:50:48 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE DRUMMOND asked whether  "freely given" consent was                                                               
more protective of victims than willingness.                                                                                    
MS. KESSLER FERZAN said the  question was empirical, as it varied                                                               
from case to  case and used a "words and  action standard," which                                                               
placed  a  "tremendous"  amount   of  scrutiny  on  the  victim's                                                               
behavior.  For that reason, she  believed that a words and action                                                               
standard was inherently dangerous for victims.                                                                                  
1:52:10 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR  CLAMAN sought  to  clarify whether  the  words and  action                                                               
standard was  associated with the  "freely given" version  of the                                                               
law or the "willingness" standard in the current version.                                                                       
MS. KESSLER FERZAN  clarified that the words  and action standard                                                               
was  the  definition  in  the older  standard.    She  referenced                                                               
Section 6 [of CSSSHB 5(STA)],  which defined "freely given" as an                                                               
agreement to cooperate  in the act that  was positively expressed                                                               
by word or action.                                                                                                              
1:52:56 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE  DRUMMON asked  Ms. Kessler  Ferzen to  repeat her                                                               
previous statement.                                                                                                             
MS.  KESSLER  FERZAN  restated  the  definition,  which  read  as                                                               
     (9)   "consent"  means   a  freely   given,  reversible                                                                    
     agreement  specific to  the conduct  at issue;  in this                                                                    
     paragraph, "freely given"  means agreement to cooperate                                                                    
     in the act was positively expressed by word or action.                                                                     
MS. KESSLER  FERZAN expounded on the  definition, explaining that                                                               
words  like "yes"  and "absolutely"  would count  as consent,  in                                                               
addition  to actions  that,  likewise,  count as  a  "yes."   She                                                               
provided an example.  She  reemphasized the potential downside of                                                               
implementing such a standard in that  a lot of judgement would be                                                               
placed  on the  victim's behavior  and whether  it constituted  a                                                               
yes.   The potential  upside, she added,  was that  silence would                                                               
not count as a "yes."  She provided an example.                                                                                 
1:57:05 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE DRUMMOND  asked how  to account  for a  victim who                                                               
froze in the act and could not respond.                                                                                         
MS. KESSLER FERZAN stated that  the "freely given" standard would                                                               
capture  frozen fright,  as it  would prohibit  sex with  another                                                               
person who  has not said "yes"  or engaged in behavior  that says                                                               
1:57:49 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE  asked whether coerced sex  was addressed in                                                               
the bill.   She provided an  example of a person  who was coerced                                                               
by  the threat  of revealing  something to  the public  and asked                                                               
whether that was classified as rape in the bill.                                                                                
MS. KESSLER  FERZAN believed  that was not  covered in  the bill.                                                               
She  said the  MPC dedicated  an entirely  different section  for                                                               
coercive conduct.                                                                                                               
REPRESENTATIVE VANCE  sought to  confirm that Ms.  Kessler Ferzan                                                               
was recommending the inclusion of  a separately graded section in                                                               
relation to coercion.                                                                                                           
MS. KESSLER  FERZAN suggested that an  additional provision could                                                               
outline  various types  of coercion,  either by  specifying clear                                                               
rules or including a general standard.                                                                                          
1:59:59 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN  considered a  scenario in which  a person                                                               
gave affirmative  consent to have  sex but  did not consent  to a                                                               
specific sexual act that followed.                                                                                              
MS. KESSLER FERZAN said that  would be tricky, given that consent                                                               
was defined  as a willingness to  engage in the conduct  at issue                                                               
[in CSSSHB 5(STA)].   She added that there would  always be "gray                                                               
area" questions that were hard to legislate.                                                                                    
2:03:31 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR CLAMAN sought further questions from committee members.                                                                   
2:03:45 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE  DRUMMOND asked  how  many states  were using  the                                                               
word "willingness"  and whether it  was impacting the  success of                                                               
MS.  KESSLER FERZAN  said she  did not  know.   The problem  with                                                               
impacting convictions, she said, was  that many hurtles exist for                                                               
victims  of  sexual   violence  before  one  even   gets  to  the                                                               
substantive   criminal   law,   which   prevents   victims   from                                                               
comfortably coming forward.                                                                                                     
2:05:16 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR CLAMAN compared  sexual assault in the  first versus second                                                               
degree.  He  shared his understanding that Ms.  Kesser Ferzan was                                                               
discussing some level  of conduct that may not be  covered in the                                                               
second degree  as penetration without  consent.  He asked  her to                                                               
expound on that statement in further detail.                                                                                    
MS.  KESSLER FERZAN  said she  was  unclear on  the statement  in                                                               
CHAIR   CLAMAN  provided   further  context,   adding  that   the                                                               
conversation revolved  around consent provided under  duress.  He                                                               
asked how  that fit  within the definition  of sexual  assault in                                                               
the  first degree,  which considers  consent through  the use  of                                                               
force, and in the second degree, which includes everything else.                                                                
MS. KESSLER  FERZAN provided several examples  and concluded that                                                               
it  was  a  question  of   whether  to  capture  specificity  for                                                               
scenarios  in which  a person  has not  said yes,  or whether  to                                                               
capture cases in  which a person said the word  "yes," but it was                                                               
made ineffective  by contextual  factors that were  not specified                                                               
in statute.                                                                                                                     
CHAIR CLAMAN  shared his understanding  that page 4, line  17, of                                                               
Version R could  be adding uncertainty and  complexity, which may                                                               
require  additional  definitions for  clarity  or  to be  removed                                                               
MS.  KESSLER   FERZAN  confirmed  that   Representative  Claman's                                                               
understanding was accurate.                                                                                                     
2:10:35 PM                                                                                                                    
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether  there was a recommended way                                                               
to  address,  in  statute, the  contradiction  between  the  rape                                                               
shield law, which conceals certain  information, and the "contact                                                               
at issue."   He questioned  how to  strike a balance  between the                                                               
"contact at  issue" and implied  circumstances and  asked whether                                                               
the  bill  adequately  addressed  the  tension  between  the  two                                                               
MS. KESSLER FERZAN  said she was not familiar  with Alaska's rape                                                               
shield  law;  however,  under  the  federal  rules  of  evidence,                                                               
evidence of  past conduct  was allowed to  be introduced  for the                                                               
particular defendant under the rape  shield statute, which helped                                                               
to  alleviate some  of the  tension referenced  by Representative                                                               
Eastman.  She provided an example.                                                                                              
2:14:39 PM                                                                                                                    
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that CSSSHB 5(JUD) was held over.                                                                        

Document Name Date/Time Subjects
Kimberly Ferzan CV February 2022.pdf HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
HB 5 Work Draft Committee Substitute v. R 5.2.2022.pdf HJUD 5/2/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/6/2022 10:30:00 AM
HB 5
HB 5 Sectional Analysis v. R (Distributed by the HJUD Committee) 5.2.2022.pdf HJUD 5/2/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/6/2022 10:30:00 AM
HB 5
HB 5 Summary of Changes v. W to v. R (Distributed by the HJUD Committee) 5.2.2022.pdf HJUD 5/2/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/6/2022 10:30:00 AM
HB 5
HB 5 Fiscal Note DPS-DET 5.2.2022.pdf HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/6/2022 10:30:00 AM
HB 5
HB 5 Fiscal Note DOC-IPO 5.3.2022.pdf HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/6/2022 10:30:00 AM
HB 5
SB 161 v. B 3.18.2022.PDF HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
SB 161
SB 161 Fiscal Note OOG-DOE 3.4.2022.pdf HJUD 4/27/2022 1:00:00 PM
HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
SB 161
SB 161 Amendment #1 HJUD (Withdrawn) 5.4.2022.pdf HJUD 5/4/2022 1:00:00 PM
SB 161