Legislature(2025 - 2026)BUTROVICH 205
04/07/2025 01:30 PM Senate JUDICIARY
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| SCR1 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | SCR 1 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | SB 78 | TELECONFERENCED | |
SCR 1-ART. II, SEC. 16, CONST: VETO RECON
2:00:56 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN announced the consideration of SENATE CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION NO. 1 Relating to the procedure that the Thirty-
Fourth Alaska State Legislature will use to reconsider bills and
items vetoed by the governor.
CHAIR CLAMAN said this is the second hearing of SCR 1 in the
Senate Judiciary Standing Committee.
2:01:32 PM
MEGAN WALLACE, Chief Counsel, Legislative Legal Services,
Legislative Affairs Agency, Juneau, Alaska, answered questions
during the discussion of SCR 1.
2:01:45 PM
SENATOR STEVENS asked whether the adoption of SCR 1 would make
the process more difficult for the legislature than the system
currently used. He asked whether it would require the
legislature to meet more often. He said he understood that she
had given this some thought and asked for her comments.
MS. WALLACE replied that she reviewed SCR 1 and the legal
opinion that [outside legal counsel, Ms. Orlansky] presented to
the committee on April 4, 2025. She opined that the resolution
has the potential to provide the legislature less flexibility in
considering the governor's vetoes. She explained that the
longstanding practice has been that if the governor vetoes a
bill or an item in an appropriation bill, the legislature
decides whether to convene in joint session to reconsider that
veto. She noted that this has been a discretionary process over
the last few decades. SCR 1 commits the legislature to meeting
to consider every veto, regardless of the legislature's will to
attempt an override, which differs from historical practice. She
said nothing in the current rules or process prevents the
legislature from reconsidering every veto, but the resolution
would provide less flexibility in making that decision.
2:04:06 PM
SENATOR STEVENS expressed appreciation for the comments and said
it causes concern, given how difficult it is to bring the
legislature together. He asked whether SCR 1 would require the
legislature to meet on every issue and whether it could result
in multiple meetings during an interim.
MS. WALLACE replied that the resolution is an agreement of the
34th Legislature. If a bill or an item in an appropriation bill
th
is vetoed during the regular session of the 34 Legislature, it
will meet immediately in joint session to consider that veto.
She said that if a bill or item is vetoed after adjournment, the
legislature will consider those vetoes within the first five
days of the next regular session or during a special session if
one is called.
2:05:42 PM
SENATOR STEVENS asked whether there is anything wrong with the
current process and leaving it the way it is.
MS. WALLACE replied that the question is difficult to answer.
She said that from a legal perspective, there are differing
viewpoints on the issue. She noted that litigation was filed in
2024 shortly after the legislature convened, raising the
question of whether the legislature is required to meet in joint
session or whether it is discretionary. She stated that the
issue became moot because the legislature chose to meet in joint
session, but a lawsuit, Landfield v. Tilton, was filed against
the Speaker of the House. She explained that the case never
reached the merits of the case on procedural grounds. She opined
that doing anything other than the legislature's longstanding
practicemeeting at its discretion to determine whether to
consider overriding the governor's vetoesis that someone could
file a lawsuit similar to the one initiated in 2024.
2:07:52 PM
SENATOR MYERS sought confirmation that SCR 1 does not require
the legislature to call an immediate special session to
reconsider a veto if it is already adjourned. Instead, the
resolution would require the legislature to act on the veto
quickly the next time it was in session. He asked if that
interpretation was accurate.
MS. WALLACE replied yes, that is how she reads SCR 1.
2:08:36 PM
SENATOR MYERS asked for further clarity regarding the potential
risks if a lawsuit were filed. He noted that the Supreme Court
has indicated limits on how far it will go in directing the
legislature's actions, but pointed out this matter involves
constitutional requirements. He asked what risks might arise if
a suit were filed and advanced to trial.
MS. WALLACE explained that the case touches on the veto override
provision, which has constitutional, procedural, and rules-based
components. She said differing opinions were presented to this
committee. She stated that when outside counsel filed the
dispositive motion in the Landfield case, the arguments in the
lawsuit were that:
• The court would likely defer to the legislature's
constitutional authority to adopt its own rules and procedure.
• The court should not intervene in how the legislature gets
together to consider veto overrides.
• Article II, sec. 16 of the Alaska State Constitution (ASC),
places parameters on the timeframe for reconsidering vetoes.
• This language is not mandatory in requiring the legislature to
meet after every veto.
• If the legislature chooses to meet, it must do so within the
constitutionally prescribed timeframe.
2:11:10 PM
MS. WALLACE noted that for vetoes occurring while the
legislature is in session, the term "immediately" may leave room
for interpretation, but for vetoes issued after adjournment, the
five-day timeframe is straightforward and arguably means that if
the legislature does not act within those five days, it loses
the opportunity to do so.
MS. WALLACE said that if the court rejects those arguments, the
likely alternative is that the court would hold in a manner
consistent with SCR 1. She explained that such a ruling would
find the legislature's current practice inconsistent with the
Constitution and require the legislature to convene in joint
session for every bill vetoed rather than exercise discretion.
She stated that the disagreement among attorneys is which of
these outcomes is more likely.
2:12:52 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN interjected, stating that she was presenting the
argument made by the Speaker's attorneys that "shall" does not
necessarily mean "shall." He said the plaintiff's position, by
contrast, was that "shall" means "shall" and that the
legislature must meet with no discretion about whether to
convene a joint session. He asked whether the essence of the
dispute between the plaintiff and the defense was that the
plaintiff asserted "shall means shall," whereas the Speaker's
attorneys argued that "shall" does not strictly require
convening a joint session.
MS. WALLACE sought clarification about the juxtaposition he was
describing. She expressed her understanding that the argument is
consistent with some of the legal advice that has come from
Legislative Legal Services.
2:14:03 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that he is specifically starting with the
plaintiff's position, not the legislature's position. He asked
what the plaintiff's argument was.
MS. WALLACE said she had misunderstood the question. She replied
that the plaintiff's position was that the "shall immediately"
language in ASC art. II, sec. 16 is mandatory rather than
discretionary. She said the plaintiff argued that the
Constitution requires the legislature to convene in a joint
session to consider the governor's veto.
2:14:46 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN sought confirmation that the legislature's position
is that even though the Constitution says "shall," in this
argument the word "shall" does not really, quite mean "shall."
MS. WALLACE answered in the affirmative, clarifying that in
terms of the arguments presented, the matter never advanced to
briefing on the plaintiffs substantive claims due to service-
of-process issues. She said the parties ultimately dismissed the
case on a pending motion to dismiss. She referenced the preview
offered in outside counsel's briefing, which she believed
indicated that the word "shall" in ASC art. II, sec. 16 was tied
to timing. She said this meant that if the legislature chose to
act, the Constitution dictated when it had to act, not whether
it must act.
2:16:03 PM
SENATOR KIEHL said he was having trouble understanding how the
Constitution uses "shall" and "may" when it comes to the
potential enactment of a disputed piece of legislation. He
referred to ASC art. II, sec. 15, which states, "The governor
may veto bills passed by the legislature. He may, by veto,
strike or reduce items in appropriation bills. He shall return
any vetoed bill, with a statement of his objections, to the
house of origin." He said that language appears to draw a clear
distinction between what is discretionary and what is mandatory.
He asked her to explain whether "shall" binds the governor in
that quote. He said the reason for his question is that in the
"Action Upon Veto" section of ASC art. II, sec. 16, the first
words are "Upon receipt of a veto message." He asked, if "shall"
does not mean "shall," whether a governor could avoid the
possibility of being overridden by simply not returning a vetoed
item to the legislature on the theory that returning it is
discretionary.
MS. WALLACE replied no, she did not believe that was the case.
She said that while she articulated one of the potential
argumentsand one that was presented to the court even though
the issue was never reached substantivelyshe acknowledged that
there is an opposing argument. She said there is an argument
that, based on the language in the first sentence of ASC
art. II, sec. 16, the legislature would be required to meet for
every item or bill that is vetoed.
2:18:14 PM
SENATOR KIEHL expressed appreciation for the response and said
he did not intend to imply that she dismissed the argument. He
said he was trying to identify the legal or constitutional
principle that makes "shall" discretionary for the legislature
but makes "shall" mandatory for the governor in the adjacent
section. He asked her to help him understand that distinction.
MS. WALLACE replied that the analysis requires reading the first
sentence of ASC art. II, sec. 16 in the context of the entire
section, not in isolation. She stated that when the language is
consideredincluding the differences between messages received
during session and messages received after adjournmentand when
that is coupled with the limited constitutional convention
dialogue on the subject, that conclusion is reached.
2:19:27 PM
SENATOR KIEHL said that when he reads ASC art. II, sec. 16 in
its entirety, it appears to say that any time a special session
is not absolutely required, the same legislature must reconsider
passage of the vetoed bill or item. He stated that when the
whole provision is read together, there is only one circumstance
in which the Constitution does not use the word "shall," and
that relates directly to special sessions. He emphasized that
the Constitution does not mandate convening a special session
for this purpose. However, in every situation where a special
session is not required, the Constitution uses "shall."
SENATOR KIEHL contended that, at the risk of grossly
oversimplifying, the Alaska Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
generally been to avoid interpretations that "get cute with the
words." He said that, given that pattern, he was struggling with
an interpretation under which "shall" means "shall" for the
governor but "shall" means "may" for the legislature.
2:20:47 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN referred to Mr. Gardner's memo and Ms. Orlansky's
memo, which contain discussion of and reference to minutes
relating to ASC art. II, sec. 16. He asked the chief counsel
whether she could identify any minutes relating to the
Constitution that support the notion that "shall" does not mean
"shall" for purposes of ASC art. II, sec. 16.
MS. WALLACE replied that, in her opinion, there are no
constitutional convention minutes suggesting that the word
"shall" in ASC art. II, sec. 16 should be interpreted as
anything other than mandatory. She said that some of the minutes
referenced in the other legal opinion include discussion
indicating that, once the legislature is in joint session, a
matter comes before the body only if it is taken up by the
President of the Senate, who presides over the joint session.
She said that discussion reflects the idea that a vetoed matter
would come before the legislature only if the President brings
it forward. She posited that if the topics taken up during a
joint session are discretionary, then a question arises as to
why the legislature could not also exercise discretion over
whether a joint session is necessary in the first place. She
posed a hypothetical question asking why the legislature would
be required to convene a joint session solely to sustain the
governor's veto if there is no will to override a veto.
2:23:35 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN declined to answer and returned to his original
question. He said it appears that when the chief counsel
reviewed the minutes relating to the Constitution, the overall
tenor of the discussion supports the view that "shall meet"
means the legislature is required to meet in joint session. He
said the question of what happens during that meeting is
separate from the question of whether the legislature must meet.
He asked whether he had characterized that correctly.
MS. WALLACE replied yes, stating that she believed that was a
fair assessment of the minutes.
2:24:20 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN said that, in reviewing the Gardner and Orlansky
memos, he saw a difference in how each addresses what must occur
once the legislature meets in joint session. He said the
Orlansky memo appears to view a joint session as requiring a
vote, in some form, on every vetoed item. He said that, in
contrast, the Gardner memo appears to take the view that the
Constitution requires the legislature to convene in joint
session, but that the legislature retains discretion over what
occurs once convened. He asked whether she agrees that Orlansky
and Gardner take different perspectives on what is required of
the legislature once convened in joint session.
MS. WALLACE replied that she did not feel qualified to comment
on the perspectives expressed in memos authored by other
attorneys.
2:25:32 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN said that, setting the two memos aside, he wanted
her perspective. He asked her to assume that "shall" means
"shall,and the legislature is convened in joint session with
10 vetoes. He said, based on that assumption, what is her
perspective on whether ASC art. II, sec. 16:
• requires the legislature to vote on all 10 of the vetoed
items; or
• gives the legislature the discretion to vote on two of the
vetoes, then move to adjourn out from under the remaining
vetoes, thereby effectively indicating that it does not have
the votes to override those items.
MS. WALLACE replied that her perspective is that ASC art. II,
sec. 12 gives the legislature the authority to adopt its own
uniform rules, and that the courts are generally reluctant to
intervene in the legislature's internal procedures. She said
that if a joint session were convened and a motion to adjourn
were made and adopted before a vote was taken, it is unlikely
the court would intervene and require the legislature to
reconvene and continue in joint session. She said that, in her
view, once the legislature is in joint session, the legislature
has the purview to decide what matters it votes on.
2:27:26 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN reframed his question, offering another
hypothetical scenario. He stated that the legislature is in
possession of 10 vetoed items. It convenes a joint session,
gavels in, immediately makes an adjournment motion, and with a
majority vote, it adjourns the joint session without voting any
vetoed item. He asked whether she believed the legislature met
the constitutional requirement to meet in joint session even
though it voted on nothing other than the motion to adjourn.
MS. WALLACE replied that, in her opinion, yes. She said that
assuming the Constitution requires the legislature to meet in
joint session, then in that hypothetical scenario, she believes
the legislature met the requirement. She stated that even under
a conservative reading of the provision, the legislature would
have fulfilled its constitutional obligation in that scenario.
2:28:28 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN offered another hypothetical scenario. He
hypothesized that the legislature received a veto during the
interim and, within the first five days of convening the second
session in 2026, the legislature meets in joint session. He
stated that the first action taken is a motion to adjourn, and
with no objection, the motion carries, the joint session
adjourns, and nothing was voted on. He said a party files a
lawsuit claiming the legislature failed to satisfy its
constitutional duty, because even though it met in joint
session, the body did not vote on anything. He asked whether she
believed the legislature would have a strong defense that the
legislature satisfied the constitutional requirement simply by
meeting in joint session.
MS. WALLACE answered in the affirmative.
CHAIR CLAMAN said he would give her the opportunity to close the
loop on her testimony.
MS. WALLACE said she wished to offer another comment regarding
the constitutional convention minutes, which the committee
discussed in this debate. She said another potential
interpretation is that concerns about delaying a veto override
influenced the inclusion of timeframes. She explained that
without a time limit, either body could hold the vetoed bill,
wait, or never act, keeping the bill "in play," which would make
it easier to "run out the clock." She noted that under those
circumstances, a vetoed bill could be held from the floor in an
attempt to prevent a veto override, and that holding the bill in
play long enough could leave too little time for members to
introduce and advance a revised bill before adjournment.
MS. WALLACE stated that this concern is mitigated under the
procedure historically used. She explained that if no joint
session is called within the first five days of session, that
functions as a signal to members that the veto has implicitly
been sustained. She said that in that circumstance, if there is
a will to introduce a revised measure, there remains time to do
so before the end of session.
2:31:30 PM
SENATOR MYERS said he heard a statement that raised concern. He
said that when discussing lawsuits and what the Supreme Court
may or may not rule, he became concerned about the direction the
chief counsel was going with her comments. It sounded like an
implication that the Supreme Court, in a sense, cannot tell the
legislature what to do. In other words, the legislature can kind
of follow its own rules and procedures, even if they are not
necessarily written down. He said it sounded like a version of
"we can do what we want, and it doesn't matter, unless somebody
sues us." As opposed to, the legislature should do its level-
headed best to follow the Constitution. He sought clarification
about the direction the chief counsel was headed with her
comments.
MS. WALLACE replied that she did not believe that was what she
intended to convey. She said the Court has consistently held
that, unless a constitutional issue is raised, it will not,
based on separation of powers, issue opinions on the procedures
the legislature uses to conduct its business. She said the Court
has applied that principle in a variety of circumstances. She
explained that the issue before the committee involves a
procedural component alongside the legislature's constitutional
authority to override the governor's vetoes. She affirmed a
constitutional provision is directly at play; therefore, she was
not suggesting that the legislature would not take up the
matter. However, there are significant procedural considerations
regarding what discretion the legislature does and does not
have. She stated that, in light of those considerations, there
is a chance the Court would give deference to the procedure the
legislature has adopted.
2:34:22 PM
SENATOR MYERS revisited the discussion on the word "shall,
stating if "shall" means "shall" in the context of the phrase
"shall meet immediately" should it not also have the same
meaning when applied to "reconsider passage in ASC art. II,
sec. 16. He reasoned that if "shall" applies to meeting, then it
ought to apply equally to reconsideration, meaning the
legislature would be required to take a vote on the vetoed bill.
He said that historically votes were taken on the vetoes
themselves, not simply on a motion to adjourn. He said that
otherwise, the concern raised by Delegate Taylor reemerges, in
that a bodyor potentially a presiding officercould sit on a
vetoed bill and prevent a vote from occurring. He noted that, in
the debates over inserting the word "immediately," the explicit
purpose was to prevent a body or a person from withholding a
bill to prevent a vote from being taken. He said that, in his
view, if "shall" is mandatory with respect to meeting, it should
also be mandatory with respect to reconsidering passage, which
would require a vote to be taken.
2:36:07 PM
MS. WALLACE replied that she agreed that, if the issue were
presented as a lawsuit, the court could interpret the word
"shall" to mean that the legislature must convene in joint
session and must reconsider every bill or vetoed item. She said,
however, that what is unclear is how a court would reach such a
decision without intervening in the procedures by which the
legislature conducts its business. She said that if the
legislature convenes a joint session and immediately votes to
adjourn, which requires a majority of those present, it is
uncertain what would come next. She asked whether that would
require the legislature to reconvene the same day, the next day,
or to continue meeting until the legislature considers every
item eligible for an override. She stated that the court would
have to answer these questions due to the procedural
complexities involved. She opined that a court would defer to
the legislature's procedure and likely not hold that it must
consider every item.
2:38:33 PM
SENATOR KIEHL agreed that is a more difficult question. He
stated that the primary thrust of SCR 1 is that it says the
legislature "shall meet." He raised the point that the chief
counsel was unsure which principles a court might use, noting
that outside counsel invited to opine on the issue said that it
is well accepted in law that a more specific rule controls over
a general one. He stated that the chief counsel referenced ASC
art. II, sec. 12, which provides that "the houses of each
legislature shall adopt uniform rules of procedure." He said
this section requires the legislature to set its own rules, but
it also requires the legislature to keep a journal of its
proceedings. He stated that if the legislature adopted uniform
rules that said, "never mind with the journal," he believed a
court, if faced with a challenge, would point to the specific
constitutional requirement. He asked whether he was
misunderstanding the principle that specific provisions govern
over general structures.
MS. WALLACE replied that he was not misunderstanding the
principle. She stated that she was trying to articulate the
other side of the argument. She said she was not attempting to
advance any argument that "shall" does not mean "shall;" that is
not the argument that could potentially be advanced. She
explained that the argument that could be raised is that the
word "shall" modifies the time period, meaning "shall
immediately" or "shall no later than the fifth day of the next
legislature." She stated that this language establishes the
deadline for acting in joint session and the consequence of not
acting. If the legislature does not meet that deadline, the
option to reconsider passage of the vetoed bill or item is no
longer available. She said she was not suggesting that "shall"
does not mean "shall," rather, it could be argued that the
language, if litigated, affects the time within which the
legislature must meet.
2:41:13 PM
SENATOR KIEHL pointed out that there is an "and" in the first
sentence of ASC art. II, sec. 16, citing "shall meet immediately
in joint session and reconsider." He asked whether the
conjunction means that the requirement applies to both actions.
He stated that it does not appear to establish two separate
conditions; rather, the "and" links them together.
MS. WALLACE replied that he is correct that the conjunction
suggests that meaning. She asked whether a court would stop
there or whether it would look at the whole section together,
even if the court was not considering a veto that occurred after
adjournment. She noted that the same conjunction does not appear
in the provision governing reconsideration of a veto after
adjournment. She cited the language stating that a bill vetoed
after adjournment of the first regular session "shall be
reconsidered by the legislature sitting as one body no later
than the fifth day." She said that raises the question of
whether the mandatory language is "shall be reconsidered" or
whether the mandatory language relates to "shall no later than
the fifth day." She stated that arguments on both
interpretations would likely be presented in litigation of this
nature.
2:43:04 PM
SENATOR MYERS stated that he was surprised to hear that the
point of "shall" is to interact with the word "immediately,"
partly because it does not make grammatical sense to him. But,
mostly because, based on the constitutional convention minutes,
"shall meet" was already in the text, and "immediately" was
later inserted as a modifier. He further observed that the rest
of the section was amended later, in 1976, to add the five-day
window. He expressed his belief that, for these reasons, it made
sense to interpret "shall" as indicating an action rather than a
timeframe. He asked her to respond to that point.
MS. WALLACE replied that she did not necessarily disagree with
anything he had just said regarding the insertion of the term
"immediately." She reiterated possible interpretations. One
interpretation is that the term establishes a deadline and
creates a restriction on the legislature for failing to meet
immediately or within the five-day timeframe.
MS. WALLACE said another interpretation is that the legislature
is plainly just required to meet immediately in joint session
and reconsider vetoes. She said it is hard to reconcile this
interpretation. She explained that she does not know of, at
least did not recollect, any legal opinion indicating that once
the legislature convenes in joint session, it must reconsider
everything. She stated that this juxtaposition makes it
challenging to reconcile these two ideas.
2:45:55 PM
SENATOR STEVENS stated that the possibility of change worried
him because it could cause more difficulties than intended. He
said he is concerned about the institution. He said based on the
chief counsel's comments, the change could tie the legislature's
hands in ways it might later regret and make matters more
difficult. He noted that the current approach has worked for at
least 50 years or longer. He said that when the attorney
mentioned "less flexibility," it raised concern. He asked what
was meant by "less flexibility," how it would affect the
legislature, and requested that she expand on those points.
MS. WALLACE provided context for her statement that the
legislature might have less flexibility. She explained that she
was referring to the historical practice in which the
legislature decided for itself whether to meet to consider the
governor's vetoes. She said this discretion allowed the
legislature to consider what else was before it, the will of the
legislature, scheduling issues, and other priorities. She stated
that the matter before the committee was a policy decision for
the legislature regarding how it intended to proceed when it
received a veto message from the governor. She explained that
less flexibility meant that if the legislature adopted the
position outlined in SCR 1, it would, regardless of other
business or the will of the legislature, convene to take up the
governor's vetoes.
2:48:27 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN thanked the chief counsel for joining the committee
and acknowledged that she had received a number of challenging
questions. He remarked that she may have expected a standard
committee hearing but instead found herself in something
resembling a moral argument before a court. He expressed
appreciation for her responses.
CHAIR CLAMAN offered remarks on the discussion. He observed that
part of the challenge with SCR 1 is the language of the
Constitution and historical procedural precedent, which the
legislature has followed. He said that the Legislative Legal
Services Division has, for the better part of 50 years, given
advice that appears to ignore the Constitution's plain language.
He stated that, to some extent, chief counsel is trying to
defend a historically followed practice. It is only in recent
years that individuals have begun to question whether the
Constitution says something different.
CHAIR CLAMAN said there may be good reasons for Legislative
Legal Services to want to provide background and support for a
long-standing practice. However, there are times when courts
both the Alaska Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Courtare asked to determine whether a precedent should continue
to be followed, even after closer examination reveals it may no
longer make sense. He reiterated that his remarks were an
observation and not a question.
2:50:03 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN solicited a motion for amendments.
2:50:12 PM
SENATOR MYERS moved to adopt Amendment 1, work order 34-
LS0177\A.1.
34-LS0177\A.1
Wallace
4/7/25
A M E N D M E N T 1
OFFERED IN THE SENATE BY SENATOR MYERS
TO: SCR 1
Page 2, lines 19 - 22:
Delete "the legislature met in joint session on
January 18, 2024, the third legislative day of the
Second Regular Session of the Thirty-Third Alaska
State Legislature, and reconsidered items from House
Bill No. 39, enacted as ch. 1, FSSLA 2023, that were
vetoed by the governor during the interim, and,"
2:50:12 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN objected for purposes of discussion.
2:50:20 PM
SENATOR MYERS said the point of Amendment 1 was to lay out a
cleaner precedent for the legislature to follow. He explained
that Amendment 1 deleted reference to the January 18, 2024 joint
session because it created a murky precedent. He said that not
all of the governor's line item vetoes were reconsidered during
that joint session, and it adjourned with those items left on
the table. He said the reference was removed to eliminate
ambiguity in establishing precedent for reconsideration of the
governor's vetoes.
CHAIR CLAMAN removed his objection. He found no further
objection and Amendment 1 was adopted.
2:52:05 PM
SENATOR MYERS moved to adopt Amendment 2, work order 34-
LS0177\A.2.
34-LS0177\A.2
Wallace
4/7/25
A M E N D M E N T 2
OFFERED IN THE SENATE BY SENATOR MYERS
TO: SCR 1
Page 3, following line 13:
Insert new material to read:
"FURTHER RESOLVED that the Thirty-Fourth Alaska
State Legislature interprets the phrase "the
legislature shall reconsider passage of the vetoed
bill or item" in art. II, sec. 16, Constitution of the
State of Alaska, as meaning that a vote must be taken
on all vetoed bills and items and all vetoed bills and
items will be voted on either individually or as part
of a group; and be it"
2:52:06 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN objected for purposes of discussion.
2:52:12 PM
SENATOR MYERS explained that Amendment 2 inserted an extra
resolve clause that addressed the discussion with the chief
counsel about the requirement to vote. He said he drafted the
amendment to allow flexibility, noting that the legislature
would not need to vote on each item individually so long as
every item was covered by a vote. He stated that items could be
voted on either individually or as a group. He acknowledged a
concern that a governor could theoretically weaponize the
process by issuing numerous small vetoes, and he said grouped
voting could address that issue.
SENATOR MYERS expressed his belief that the legislature had used
grouped votes in the past. He cited 2019, when some vetoes were
voted on as a unit, and the beginning of the 2020 session, when
two items were again taken up together after a motion to divide
the question failed. He stated that he believed the
Constitution's requirement to "shall reconsider" means a vote
must be taken that covers each bill or item in some form. He
said that was the purpose of Amendment 2.
2:54:45 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN maintained his objection and asked for a roll call
vote.
A roll call vote was taken. Senator Myers voted in favor of
Amendment 2 and Senators Kiehl, Stevens, and Claman voted
against it. Senator Tobin was absent. The vote was 1:3.
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that Amendment 2 failed on a vote of
1 yea and 3 nays.
2:55:20 PM
At ease.
2:55:29 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN reconvened the meeting and said it is his intention
to look to the will of the committee on SCR 1.
2:55:45 PM
SENATOR MYERS spoke to the concern about the legislature's hands
being tied. He said he understood the point and believes that
the Constitution gives the legislature latitude in electing its
officers, selecting its rules, and other matters mentioned in
ASC art. II, sec. 12. He stated that it seems to him that the
purpose of a constitution is, to some extent, to tie the hands
of a legislative body. He said that is why constitutions are
written, so legislators cannot simply come to Juneau and do
whatever they want. He referenced current national discussions
about the extent to which a government's actions are constrained
by a constitution. He stated that while he generally believes in
efficiency, he does not believe efficiency is necessarily the
best guide when interpreting constitutional provisions. He said
he appreciated the chair bringing forward SCR 1 and planned to
support it.
2:56:53 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN solicited the will of the committee.
2:56:58 PM
SENATOR KIEHL moved SCR 1, work order 34-LS0177\A, as amended,
be reported from committee with individual recommendations and
attached zero fiscal note(s).
2:57:18 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN found no objection and CSSCR 1(JUD) was reported
from the Senate Judiciary Standing Committee.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| SCR 1 Amendment #1 4.7.25.pdf |
SJUD 4/7/2025 1:30:00 PM |
SCR 1 |
| SCR 1 Amendment #2 4.7.25.pdf |
SJUD 4/7/2025 1:30:00 PM |
SCR 1 |