Legislature(2017 - 2018)BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
04/20/2018 01:30 PM Senate JUDICIARY
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB355 | |
| HB123 | |
| HB259 | |
| HB336 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | HB 355 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 208 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 123 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | HB 259 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | HB 336 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED |
HB 259-CONFINING VEHICLE LOADS
2:42:36 PM
CHAIR COGHILL reconvened the meeting and announced the
consideration of HB 259. He noted the proposed committee
substitute (CS) that corrects an issue that the sponsor and the
Department of Law identified.
2:43:37 PM
SENATOR COSTELLO moved to adopt the [Senate CS] for HB 259,
version G, as the working document.
CHAIR COGHILL objected for an explanation.
2:44:17 PM
JORDAN SHILLING, Staff, Senator John Coghill, Alaska State
Legislature, Juneau, Alaska, advised that the CS for HB 259
removes subsection (e) on page 2, line 24, of version S that
came to the committee. He deferred further explanation to Diane
Wendlandt with the Department of Law.
2:45:01 PM
DIANE WENDLANDT, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Office of Criminal Appeals, Department of Law, Anchorage,
Alaska, said the primary concern is burden shifting. Subsection
(e) relies on the proof of one fact (the prior conviction) to
prove another fact (criminal negligence). There isn't a close
connection between the prior violation and the proof of criminal
negligence because there are too many factual variables in
proving criminal negligence. She noted that other statutes are
illustrative. For example, if you're trying to prove the fact
that a defendant knew he had an obligation to register as a sex
offender, proof that he has a prior conviction is a very direct
and close connection to the fact you're trying to prove.
A prior conviction of what was found to be criminal negligence
may have turned on the type of load, the means of securing the
load, the vehicle, or the route traveled. The risk really
depends on very specific facts in each case. Trying to tie the
finding of criminal negligence in a prior case with a current
one doesn't require any similarity between the two cases. That
effectively shifts the burden of showing why the cases aren't
similar to the defendant, which is generally not allowed.
MS. WENDLANDT advised that not requiring similarity between the
past and current event means you're essentially defining
criminal negligence based strictly on propensity. The defendant
was careless in the past and therefore is presumed to be
careless in the current case. Evidence Rule 404(b) allows
evidence of prior acts to be presented to the extent that it
proves things such as the absence of mistake or knowledge. What
isn't allowed is to say a person is bad or careless and that's
enough to prove that they were careless of bad in the current
case.
CHAIR COGHILL found no questions and asked the sponsor to
present the bill.
2:49:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LOUISE STUTES, Alaska State Legislature, Juneau,
Alaska, sponsor of HB 259, stated that the bill addresses a
serious gap in the confined load statute that only allows a $300
traffic infraction, even if a person is seriously injured as a
result of someone's negligence in securing their load. The bill
also updates the statute to include all materials that escape a
vehicle, with a few specific exemptions. It requires maintaining
six inches of freeboard or tarping loads of sand, gravel, rock,
or similar materials. This is a responsible public safety
measure that will reduce fatalities, property damage, and
roadway litter.
CHAIR COGHILL asked Mr. Gruening to go through the sectional.
2:50:50 PM
MATT GRUENING, Staff Representative Louise Stutes, Alaska State
Legislature, Juneau, Alaska, presented the following sectional
analysis for HB 259.
Section 1 on Page 1, line 3 through Page 3, line 9: AS
28.35.251 is repealed and reenacted:
Subsection (a) on Page 1, lines 4 through 7:
This subsection states that a person is guilty of the
crime of failure to contain or confine a load in the
first degree if, with a mental state of criminal
negligence, they violate (c) and as result, cause
serious physical injury to another person. Criminal
negligence applies to the act of the securing the
load. Failure to contain or confine a load in the
first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Subsection (b) on Page 1, lines 8 through 10:
This subsection states that a person is guilty of the
crime of failure to contain or confine a load in the
second degree if, with criminal negligence, they
violate (c) and as result, cause property damage of
$5,000 or more to another person's property. Criminal
negligence applies to the act of the securing the
load. Failure to contain or confine a load in the
second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)(ii) and (B) on Page 1, line 11
through Page 2, line 7:
This subsection specifies that a person commits the
offense of failure to contain or confine a load in the
third degree if the person drives or moves a motor
vehicle loaded with any material on a highway unless
it is secured or situated in a way that prevents it
from escaping the vehicle or shifting to the extent
that the vehicle's maneuverability or stability is
adversely affected and the load is treated by methods
approved through regulation by the Department of
Public Safety that are designed to settle the load or
remove loose material before it is driven on a
highway. Failure to contain or confine a load in the
third degree is an infraction.
Subsection (c)(2) on Page 2, lines 9 through 12:
This subsection specifies that a person may drive or
move a motor vehicle loaded with sand, gravel, dirt,
rock, or similar materials if at least 6 inches of
freeboard is maintained around the perimeter of the
load or a cover is used and securely fastened.
Subsection (d)(1) on Page 2, lines 13 through 16:
This subsection is an exemption that specifies that
the provisions of this act do not apply to a vehicle
that deposits sand, liquids, or other materials for
the purpose of cleaning, maintaining, or improving
traction on the highway.
Subsection (d)(2) on Page 2, lines 17 through 18:
This subsection is an exemption that specifies that
the provisions of this act do not apply to commercial
motor vehicles that are subject to federal motor
carrier securement standards implemented through state
or federal law.
Subsection (d)(3) on Page 2, lines 19 through 20:
This subsection is an exemption that specifies that
the provisions of this act do not apply to the natural
accumulation of snow, ice, mud, dirt, or similar
materials.
Subsection (d)(4) on Page 2, line 21:
This subsection is an exemption that specifies that
the provisions of this act do not apply to a vehicle
that is removing snow or hauling snow after removal.
Subsection (d)(5) on Page 2, lines 22 through 23:
This subsection is an exemption that specifies that
the provisions of this act do not apply to random
litter escaping a vehicle. Litter is defined in this
section as plastic wrappers, empty plastic bags,
leaves, paper, or similar soft materials. "Random"
modifies "litter" to clarify that a load of litter is
not exempted.
Subsection (e)(1) on Page 2, lines 25 through 26:
This subsection specifies that failure to contain or
confine a load in the first degree is a class A
misdemeanor.
Subsection (e)(2) on Page 2, lines 27 through 28:
This subsection specifies that failure to contain or
confine a load in the second degree is a class B
misdemeanor.
Subsection (e)(3)(A), (B), (C), and (D) on Page 2,
line 29 through Page 3, line 6:
This subsection specifies that failure to contain or
confine a load in the third degree is an infraction
punishable by a fine of not more than $300 on the
first offense, $750 on the second offense, $1,500 on
the third offense, and $2,500 on the fourth offense.
The penalty for the first violation is consistent with
current statute.
Subsection (f) on Page 3, lines 7 through 8:
This subsection specifies that criminal negligence in
this section has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900.
Section 2 on Page 3, lines 9 through 10. AS 28.35.253
is amended by adding a new subsection:
This section is a conforming amendment to reflect the
repeal and reenactment of AS 28.35.251 in Section 1 of
the bill and the repeal of AS 28.35.255. AS 28.35.255
currently houses the penalties for violations of both
AS 28.35.251 and AS 28.35.253. Violating AS 28.35.253
is currently an infraction and there is no substantive
change.
Section 3 on Page 3, line 11:
This section repeals 28.35.255. This is a section that
requires people to have anti-spray devices such as mud
flaps and fenders on vehicles.
2:57:39 PM
CHAIR COGHILL held HB 259 in committee for further
consideration.