Legislature(2025 - 2026)ADAMS 519
04/29/2025 01:30 PM House FINANCE
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB78 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | HB 78 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| + | TELECONFERENCED |
HOUSE BILL NO. 78
"An Act relating to the Public Employees' Retirement
System of Alaska and the teachers' retirement system;
providing certain employees an opportunity to choose
between the defined benefit and defined contribution
plans of the Public Employees' Retirement System of
Alaska and the teachers' retirement system; and
providing for an effective date."
1:44:00 PM
DAVID KERSHNER, PRINCIPAL CONSULTING ACTUARY, GALLAGHER,
introduced the PowerPoint presentation "State of Alaska
Retirement Systems" dated April 29, 2025 (copy on file).
The presentation detailed the findings of the fiscal note
analysis related to HB 78. He explained that Buck had been
the plan actuary for the state's retirement system since
2006, and that he had personally been involved since 2015.
He stated that in 2023, Buck was acquired by Arthur J.
Gallagher and Company, which was a global risk management,
insurance, and consulting firm. He added that the Buck name
was officially retired in July of 2024 and the firm was now
known as Gallagher.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 2 and explained that he
would provide an overview of how the Public Employees'
Retirement System (PERS) and the Teachers' Retirement
System (TERS) were funded under Alaska statute. He noted
that the subtleties were sometimes lost when trying to
understand why costs were projected to increase. He relayed
that he would then describe how the assumptions were set
for the annual evaluations adopted by the Alaska Retirement
Management Board (ARMB) for the contribution rates. He
would then discuss the assumptions specific to HB 78 and
how the assumptions related to the ongoing assumptions for
the valuations. He stated that he would touch briefly on
the risk-sharing provisions within HB 78 and other economic
considerations. He would continue to summarize key
information from the March 24, 2025, fiscal note letter
(copy on file), which provided specific numbers related to
HB 78. If time allowed, he would present an example
beginning on slide 31 that would help illustrate why costs
were projected to increase.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 4 and explained that PERS
and TRS were funded though mandates in Alaska statutes. He
stated that there were two main sources of funding for the
retirement systems. The first source was investment income
on the invested assets, and the second source was
contributions. He clarified that there were three types of
contributions: employer contributions, member
contributions, and state contributions.
Mr. Kershner described the employer contributions under
PERS. He explained that non-state employers contributed 22
percent of total payroll, which included both defined
benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) retirement
members. He noted that under PERS, the state as an employer
contributed not only the 22 percent, but the full actuarial
rate based on the total payroll of its employees, which was
just under 50 percent of the total PERS payroll. He relayed
that under TRS, employers contributed 12.56 percent of the
total payroll.
Mr. Kershner reviewed the member contributions. He
explained that under PERS, peace officers and firefighters
contributed 7.5 percent of pay, while all other PERS
members contributed 6.75 percent of pay. He added that TRS
members contributed 8.65 percent of pay. He explained that
the actuarially determined contribution for the DB plan
consisted of two components. The first was the normal cost,
which was the actuarial cost of benefits expected to accrue
in the upcoming year as active members earned one more year
of service. He stated that the second component was the
past service cost, which represented paying down the
unfunded liability over a 25-year period as defined in
statute. He emphasized that the two components were
calculated separately for the pension trust and the health
care trust before being combined, which would be shown
later in the presentation.
1:49:11 PM
Mr. Kershner continued on slide 5 and shared that the
normal costs for the DB plan were covered by member
contributions and employer contributions. He explained that
employers also contributed the costs for the DC retirement
plan, which included four benefits: occupational death and
disability benefits, health care benefits, employer defined
contribution amounts of 5 percent for PERS members and 7
percent for TRS members, and 3 percent health reimbursement
account contributions.
Mr. Kershner stated that a portion of the employer
contribution also went toward the DB past service cost,
which paid down the unfunded liability. He explained that
the employer contribution portion was calculated as the
total employer contribution minus the amount paid toward
the normal cost and minus the DC retirement plan costs. He
noted that the employer contribution portion was important
because it determined how much the state would have to pay
to make up the difference.
Mr. Kershner explained that the portion of the DB past
service cost not paid by employers was paid by the state
through additional state contributions. He added that
additional state contributions could increase for two
reasons: if the cost of the underlying benefits changed, or
if there were changes in the distribution of employer
contributions. He noted that the second reason was a more
subtle factor that was sometimes not fully understood and
could have a significant impact on projected state
contributions.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 6 and stated that the past
service cost paid down the unfunded liability. He explained
that the unfunded liability was the difference between the
actuarial accrued liability and the actuarial value of
assets. The actuarial accrued liability was the present
value of future benefits expected to be paid for current
members, both active and inactive, that was attributable to
service as of the date of calculation. The actuarial value
of assets was a smoothed, market-related value. He noted
that the market value could fluctuate significantly, as had
been seen over the last few weeks. If the market value of
assets were used to determine contributions, then as the
market value moved up and down, contributions would also
rise and fall. He explained that an actuarial value of
assets was used to mitigate volatility. He reiterated that
the actuarial value of assets was a smoothed market value
in which gains and losses were recognized over a five-year
period. Each year that there was a market gain or loss, 20
percent of it was recognized in the smoothed value, and the
remaining 80 percent was recognized over the subsequent
four years.
Mr. Kershner explained that annual valuations always
resulted in unexpected changes in the unfunded liability,
which could arise from five sources. The first was asset
returns for the year and how the returns compared to the
expected return, which was currently 7.25 percent. The
second was changes in the data that drove the liabilities.
Each year, updated data was received and compared against
prior assumptions, which produced the liability experience.
A third source was contributions that were greater or less
than the actuarially determined contribution. For example,
the state contributed $3 billion to PERS and $2 billion to
TRS in 2015. Since the contributions exceeded the
actuarially determined contribution, the contributions
produced a contribution gain, which reduced the unfunded
liability for the year.
Mr. Kershner stated that actuarial assumptions also
affected the unfunded liability and any change in
assumptions impacted the accrued liability, either
positively or negatively. Plan provisions could also affect
the unfunded liability. Although most changes were
prospective, such as creating a new tier of benefits, some
changes that affected service prior to the date of change
also altered the unfunded liability.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 7 and explained that the
current funding methodology for PERS and TRS had been
established in statute in 2014. One key element was that
the amortization method for the unfunded liability changed
from a level dollar approach to a level percentage of pay
approach. The level dollar approach was similar to a home
mortgage, where the outstanding principal was paid down in
equal amounts over 15 or 30 years. Under level percentage
of pay, amortization amounts were assumed to increase as
payroll was projected to increase. He explained that when
compared, level percentage of pay amounts were lower in the
early years, crossed over after about ten years, and then
became greater than the level dollar amounts. On a present
value basis, both methods equaled the unfunded liability,
but the patterns differed.
Mr. Kershner explained that in 2014, the amortization
period was reset to 25 years, meaning that the PERS and TRS
trusts were expected to be fully funded by 2039. He noted
that another change was that contribution rates were no
longer set using the most recent valuation but instead were
based on a two-year lag. For example, the FY 26
contributions that were going into effect in July of 2025
were set based on the 2023 valuations, which had been
adopted in September of 2024. He added that the actuarial
value of assets was reset to market value in 2014, with the
five-year smoothing method implemented on a prospective
basis. He noted that the 20 percent market value corridor
was eliminated.
1:56:38 PM
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 8 and shared that in 2018,
ARMB changed the amortization method and layered
amortization, which meant that every year's change in the
unfunded liability was amortized over a separate 25-year
period. Each unexpected change in the unfunded liability
created a new layer that was then amortized over 25 years.
He emphasized that the only reason for making the change
was to help control volatility of the state's contributions
because the original 25-year period would have become
shorter over time.
Mr. Kershner reported that the effect of introducing
layered amortization was that the original date of 2039,
which was when the plans had been expected to be fully
funded, was extended further into the future. He indicated
that because every new layer restarted the 25-year clock,
the most recent valuations projected that the pension
trusts for both PERS and TRS would be 100 percent funded by
2048. He added that the health care trusts for both PERS
and TRS were already over 100 percent funded and were
expected to remain at a similar funding level going
forward.
Mr. Kershner noted that the next two slides were not
related to HB 78 and were provided for informational
purposes. He remarked that in recent House Finance
Committee and Senate Finance Committee meetings, there had
been many questions as to why the unfunded liabilities had
continued to grow since the $3 billion contribution. He
explained that the team at Gallagher had prepared charts to
present to ARMB and believed the charts would be helpful
for the committee as well.
Mr. Kershner moved to slide 9, which showed the changes in
the unfunded liability for the PERS pension since 2014. He
noted that slide 10 showed the same information for TRS. He
explained that the first column [column A] reflected the
gains and losses on the market value of assets. For
example, if the assumed return was 7.25 percent and the
plan market return was 10 percent, there had been a gain
because the plan earned more than expected.
Mr. Kershner elaborated that column B showed the associated
smoothed actuarial value gains and losses, based on the
market gains and losses from column A. He noted that the
year ending June 30, 2021, was exceptional as the plans
achieved returns above 30 percent, which was highly
unusual. However, there was a $1.6 billion loss in 2022,
which eliminated nearly all of the prior year's gains. He
explained that the change illustrated how volatile market
value gains and losses could be from year to year.
Mr. Kershner stated that column C showed the gains and
losses on the liabilities due to unexpected changes in
participant data from one year to the next. He noted that
column D reflected the gains and losses due to
contributions that were either greater or less than the
actuarially determined contributions. For example, PERS had
an $835 million contribution gain in 2015 due to the $1
billion contribution.
Mr. Kershner added that column E showed the impact of
assumption changes. He noted that an experience study was
conducted every four years and the assumptions were
potentially updated in response to the study's findings. He
clarified that the impact on the unfunded liability from
the assumption changes appeared in column E. He explained
that the final column showed the net increase or decrease
in the unfunded liability based on the results from columns
B through E. The PERS pension unfunded liability had
increased by $325 million over ten years, which was more
than expected. He reported that a large portion of the
increase was due to the assumption changes in column E in
which over $750 million in liability had been added,
primarily because of the lowering of the expected return
assumption. In 2014, the assumption had been 8 percent, in
2018 it had been lowered to 7.38 percent, and in 2022 it
had been further reduced to 7.25 percent. He explained that
when the assumed return was lowered, liabilities increased
because lower earnings on invested assets were expected.
Mr. Kershner continued on slide 10, which contained similar
information for TRS. He noted that in 2015, column D showed
a $1.5 billion contribution gain. He explained that $1.7
billion of the $2 billion contributed in 2015 to TRS had
gone to the pension trust and about $300 million had gone
to the health care trust. He explained that the $1.5
billion gain was the difference between the $1.7 billion
contributed and the amount required based on the actuarial
calculations.
2:03:01 PM
Representative Stapp asked if Mr. Kershner could describe
the process of layered amortization compounding multiple
times. He explained that he understood the math in theory.
He relayed his understanding that layered amortization
began in 2015 and the 25-year clock began, but a new layer
of amortization had been added when the assumptions
changed, which pushed the liability to being fully funded
by 2048. He expressed concern that the number could not
simply be pushed to 2095 since participants would not live
that long.
Mr. Kershner replied that the analogy he considered most
useful was to think of the unfunded liability like a first
mortgage on a home. The initial unfunded liability had been
created in 2014 and was being amortized over 25 years. He
remarked that each subsequent assumption change was like
taking out a new home equity line of credit, with each new
line funded over a separate 25-year period. He explained
that each new line of credit created a new layer of
amortization. He relayed that there was a substantial
discussion when ARMB considered adopting layered
amortization about whether the amortization period should
be shorter than 25 years, particularly because DB PERS and
TRS plans were closed to new entrants. The legal opinion
had been that because the statutes specifically required
unfunded liabilities to be amortized over 25 years using
level percentage of pay amortization, the board should
avoid conflict with the statutes by keeping the 25-year
period.
Mr. Kershner relayed that the next experience study would
be conducted the following year, and discussions had
already occurred at board meetings about possibly
shortening the amortization period. He reiterated that the
25-year period helped reduce volatility. For example, if
layered amortization was not adopted and the system faced a
$1 billion loss in 2038, the loss would need to be funded
immediately because only one year would have remained in
the amortization period. He stressed that layered
amortization was introduced to help mitigate contribution
volatility to the state.
Representative Stapp commented that it made sense to him
why the layer amortization method would be used. He
explained that his concern stemmed from the fact that the
plan was closed, meaning that there were participants at
the end receiving cash outflows, which meant that the state
had liabilities. He was unsure about extending an
assumption change out to 2070 because the participants
would not be alive to receive the cash outflows by 2080. He
argued that since the plan was closed, the amortization
period should be shorter. Otherwise, he felt it would be as
though a liability was being carried into years when no
payments would exist. He acknowledged that the analogy of a
house made sense, but a house could exist indefinitely
while individuals had finite lifespans.
Mr. Kershner responded that discussions about shortening
the amortization period had already taken place at ARMB
meetings. He anticipated that if the DB plans remained
closed at the next experience study, the most likely
outcome was that the amortization period would be reduced
to 15 years. He explained that the majority of the unfunded
liability would already be fully funded by 2039, because
the 25-year period introduced in 2014 had not been changed
by the layered amortization. He noted that 21 years
remained in the 25-year schedule in 2018 and the schedule
would be fully funded by 2039. He clarified that it was the
successive layers added after 2018 that each carried their
own 25-year period.
2:08:59 PM
Representative Stapp remarked that the explanation made
sense. He compared the layering to a pyramid where each new
layer became smaller as it was added on top. He understood
that the formula was the total employer contribution minus
the employer portion of the DB normal cost. He asked how
payroll growth was modeled in the actuarial work. He
remarked that payroll growth seemed to be a significant
factor in the formula considering that it was based on
employer contributions minus normal costs.
Mr. Kershner responded that the payroll growth assumption
historically had been set at the inflation rate plus a
margin. He noted that prior to 2018, the margin had been 50
basis points. For example, when inflation was 3.12 percent
in 2014, the payroll growth assumption had been 3.62
percent. He added that the margin had been reduced to 25
basis points in 2018. With the current inflation assumption
of 2.5 percent, the payroll growth assumption was 2.75
percent. He noted that the board was considering changes to
the current inflation assumption. He explained that
projections were currently being prepared for the June 2025
meeting to evaluate the impact of lowering payroll growth
on future state contributions. He observed that actual
payroll growth during the past decade had been much lower
than the assumption. He reported that PERS payroll had
grown by about 2 percent per year, while TRS payroll had
grown by about 1 percent per year. He reiterated that the
board was considering lowering the assumption, which would
accelerate funding into earlier years. The lowest payroll
growth assumption available was 0 percent, which would
essentially create a level dollar approach. He noted that
if the assumption were reduced to 1 percent instead of 2.75
percent, some of the contributions would shift from future
years into earlier years and result in a less steep
increase in future contributions.
Representative Stapp explained that the reason he asked was
because the committee had just received information about a
salary study [Salary Study (2025) conducted by the Segal
Company]. He remarked that the study made it clear that
state employees had not been appropriately compensated over
the past decade. He expressed concern that the liability
would only be shifted if the committee considered
increasing salaries for employees while ARMB lowered
projections.
Mr. Kershner responded that the salary increase assumption
was separate because retirement benefits under the plans
were based on the average pay at the time of retirement. He
clarified that the benefit projections were based on the
salary increase assumption, which was expected to increase
in the future. He emphasized that an increase in the salary
increase assumption would raise projected benefits and
therefore also raise projected liabilities. He continued
that the speed at which the unfunded liability was paid
down was tied to the payroll growth assumption. He noted
that the payroll growth assumption was generally
independent of the salary increase assumption because
payroll growth considered the total payroll, which included
current members as well as new entrants replacing retiring
members. He stressed that liabilities were tied to the
salary increase assumption, while the rate of paying down
the unfunded liability was tied to the payroll growth
assumption.
Representative Stapp recalled that Mr. Kershner had stated
that the change in participant data demonstrated in column
C on slide 9 led to the losses, and he asked what the
assertion meant. He asked if the change was due to a higher
inflation rate that increased the cost of living adjustment
(COLA) payments or if it was related to investment returns.
Mr. Kershner responded that it was "all of the above" other
than the expected return on assets that was reflected in
columns A and B. He clarified that changes in the data
referred to the information received each year on actively
employed individuals. He explained that some employees were
terminated, some retired, and others remained active. He
noted that peace officers and firefighters could retire
with an unreduced benefit after 20 years of service, which
was factored into assumptions. He explained that the
inflation component affected post-retirement pension
adjustments, which were linked to the Anchorage consumer
price index (CPI).
Mr. Kershner emphasized that each year, new data revealed
whether more people retired, died, or terminated employment
than had been assumed. He explained that comparing the
actual data with the expected assumptions created liability
gains or losses. He clarified that more early retirements
than expected resulted in a loss because benefits were then
paid earlier and for longer periods of time. The opposite
effect occurred if participants who were already in pay
status died sooner than expected under the mortality
assumption. He suggested that while it was a loss for the
individual, it was a gain to the plan because benefits were
no longer being paid unless a survivor benefit applied. He
summarized that liability gains or losses were the result
of all such potential changes.
Representative Stapp remarked that although it was somewhat
morbid, he understood.
2:16:52 PM
Representative Bynum directed attention back to slide 4. He
understood that the slide illustrated "who paid and how
much." He remarked that non-state employers contributed 22
percent of the total payroll. He asked if the state would
assume the additional portion for non-state employers if
the actual cost exceeded 22 percent.
Mr. Kershner responded in the affirmative. He explained
that the fourth bullet on slide 5 indicated that the past
service cost not paid by employers was covered by
additional state contributions. He added that the State of
Alaska as an employer paid the full rate beginning in FY
22. He clarified that the state previously contributed at
the 22 percent level, but it now paid the full rate.
Representative Bynum recalled that there had been
discussion about potentially shortening the 25-year
amortization period, even though statute required that it
be 25 years. He asked what the overall financial impact
would be if the amortization period were reduced.
Mr. Kershner replied that shortening the amortization
period increased annual payments. He compared the reduction
to the difference between a 15-year and a 30-year mortgage,
where the shorter term required larger payments but
resulted in lower total costs because less interest
accrued. He emphasized that the same concept applied to
amortizing unfunded liability.
Representative Bynum remarked that any increased cost would
ultimately shift to the state because of the 22 percent cap
for non-state employers.
Mr. Kershner confirmed that Representative Bynum's
understanding was correct.
Representative Bynum understood that the investment return
assumption had decreased from 8 percent in 2014 to 7.25
percent in 2022. He asked what the interim year and amount
had been.
Mr. Kershner responded that the assumption had been lowered
from 8 percent to 7.38 percent in 2018, and in 2022 it had
been reduced further to 7.25 percent. He added that when
the return assumption was 8 percent in 2014, the inflation
rate was 3.12 percent. In 2018, the inflation rate was
lowered to 2.5 percent, which was where it remained. He
explained that several other assumptions were updated in
2018, including mortality, salary increase rates, and
retirement rates. He noted that while the numbers presented
on slides 9 and 10 reflected combined impacts, the single
assumption with the largest effect on liabilities was
always the expected return assumption.
2:21:18 PM
Representative Hannan stated that she had a question
related to slide 6 and the data on liabilities. She
wondered what pieces of data were included, but she had
realized that it referred to payroll increases, which
projected how much a future retiree would earn and would
change over time. She turned to slide 9 and asked if a gain
for liabilities was considered unfavorable and a loss was
favorable, since a loss brought the plan closer to
stability.
Mr. Kershner responded that a gain on liabilities was the
goal. He explained that a gain or loss was the difference
between what was expected to occur and what actually
occurred. He clarified that when the result was favorable
to the plan, it was recorded as a gain, and when it was
unfavorable, it was a loss. For example, if the plan
assumed a 7.25 percent return but earned 10 percent, it was
considered an asset gain. Conversely, if the plan earned
only 5 percent, it was an asset loss.
Representative Hannan noted that she was interested in the
liabilities.
Mr. Kershner explained that a 2.5 percent inflation rate
was assumed but if actual inflation was higher, the post-
retirement pension adjustments granted based on CPI changes
would be above the assumption. For example, there were
significant liability losses in 2022 and 2023 because
inflation was high and the benefits that were paid out were
higher than expected. He added that liability changes also
came from demographic differences such as more or fewer
retirements, deaths, or terminations than anticipated. All
of the changes combined were reflected in column C.
Representative Hannan referenced the liability results for
2018 through 2020. She noted that 2018 showed a large
triple-digit gain, 2019 dropped to a third of that amount,
and 2020 stayed at the lower level before increasing again
in subsequent years. She asked if there had been an
analysis of the data to explain what happened to the
liabilities in 2019 and 2020. She wondered if more people
had died or fewer people had retired.
Mr. Kershner replied that the calculation was comprehensive
and involved many factors. He explained that the executive
summary section of the Fiscal Note Analysis conducted by
Gallagher (copy on file) contained tables outlining the
sources of liability gains and losses. The sources usually
included 10 to 12 categories such as demographic
experience, retirements and terminations, post-retirement
pension adjustments due to inflation, and salary increases
above or below expectations. He noted that in any given
year, some of the factors could produce gains while others
produced losses, which were combined in aggregate to
produce the reported totals. He added that in 2022 and
2023, unusually high inflation increased pension
adjustments, but lower than expected salary increases
created an offsetting gain.
Representative Hannan remarked that the numbers generally
made sense to her, but the wages did not. She asked how the
reports accounted for the fact that no new members were
entering the DB system. She understood that liabilities
were based on wages from current employees, but many
individuals whose benefits were being paid were no longer
contributing to the system. She suggested that perhaps it
was not an element that could be captured in the reports
and that she should trust Gallagher to make accurate
predictions.
Mr. Kershner responded that there were two factors that
could cause a gain or a loss in liabilities for people who
were already retired. The first factor was whether the
retiree received a post-retirement pension adjustment that
was either greater or less than anticipated. The second
factor was mortality. He explained that if there were
10,000 retirees and it was assumed that 1,000 of them would
die in a year, but the data showed that only 500 had died,
then the plan would have 9,500 retirees instead of 9,000.
That outcome would be considered a loss. Conversely, if
more retirees died than expected, it would be a gain from
the plan's perspective because there would be fewer
beneficiaries receiving payments. He clarified that salary
increases had no impact on people who had already retired
because their benefits were fixed and already known. The
only factors that affected retirees were inflation and
mortality.
2:28:06 PM
Representative Bynum remarked that the health care trust
was currently funded at more than 100 percent, but the
presentation did not indicate the current funding rate for
the pension. He asked why the health care trust was
overfunded while the retirement portion of the plan was
significantly underfunded.
Mr. Kershner replied that more details would be provided
later in the presentation. He offered reassurance that he
would discuss the FY 26 pension and health care
contribution rates. He relayed that there were three key
reasons for the health care trust's overfunding. The first
reason was that the Department of Revenue's (DOR) Division
of Retirement and Benefits (DRB) had implemented the
Employer Group Waiver Program (EGWP), a federal subsidy
received by the plan based on retiree benefits. He
explained that the subsidy functioned as an additional
contribution to the trust and reduced liabilities. In 2018,
the introduction of EGWP reduced the overall health care
liabilities for PERS and TRS by nearly $1 billion.
Mr. Kershner continued that the second reason was a change
in plan administration in 2019. The new administrator's
efficiency in processing claims resulted in lower claim
payments than had been observed in previous years. The
third reason was that for several years, actual claims paid
out to retirees and beneficiaries had been lower than
projected, creating health care gains. In 2024, the trend
had reversed and actual claims exceeded expectations,
creating a health care loss. However, the trusts remained
overfunded, primarily due to the implementation of EGWP in
2018.
Representative Bynum asked whether the EGWP subsidy was
ongoing or had been a one-time injection into the plan.
Mr. Kershner responded that the EGWP subsidy was likely
ongoing. He explained that it would eventually end at some
point in the future, but all indications suggested that it
would continue for the foreseeable future. He added that
the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 had made changes
to the EGWP subsidies, which had already been reflected in
the liability calculations. He emphasized that the program
was being monitored but was considered to be an ongoing
subsidy that reduced future health care liabilities for the
plan.
Representative Bynum remarked that the reason he raised the
issue was because health insurance had been one of the
largest drivers of costs for state government as well as
for municipal governments that funded schools. He observed
that health care costs seemed to be out of control across
the board. He thought it was unusual that the health care
portion of the retirement program remained overfunded and
was projected to continue being overfunded. He asked what
percent of the plan was currently funded.
Mr. Kershner responded that he could follow up with the
information.
Representative Bynum was amenable to receiving the
information later.
Mr. Kershner explained that he found the information and
as of June 30, 2024, the PERS health care trust was funded
at approximately 132 percent, and the TRS health care trust
was funded at approximately 139 percent. He clarified that
the figures meant the assets exceeded the liabilities. He
relayed that the numbers represented a snapshot in time
that was subject to change each year.
Representative Bynum asked what the funded percentages for
the retirement portion of the PERS and TRS plans were.
Mr. Kershner replied that as of June 30, 2024, the PERS
pension funded ratio was 68 percent, while the TRS pension
funded ratio was just under 78 percent.
2:34:41 PM
Mr. Kershner continued on slide 12 and explained that the
FY 26 contribution rates had been adopted by ARMB in
September of 2024 and would take effect on July 1, 2025. He
stated that he would describe the mechanics of how the
rates were calculated and noted that the same process was
used to evaluate the costs of HB 78. He explained that the
slide contained the contribution rates for the DB plans.
The first three columns on the slide represented PERS,
while the next three columns represented TRS. He emphasized
that pension and health care were calculated separately
before being aggregated. He noted that the statutes set
contribution rates at 22 percent for PERS non-state
employers and 12.56 percent for TRS. All the percentages
shown on the slide were calculated as percentages of total
pay for both DB and DC members. He explained that over
time, the DC payroll represented the majority of total pay
because the number of active DB members continued to
decline. He directed attention to line 1 on the slide,
which showed the normal cost rate. He explained that the
normal cost rate reflected the cost of benefits expected to
accrue in the upcoming year.
Mr. Kershner noted that line 1a represented the total rate,
from which the member rate was subtracted. For PERS, the
member rate reflected the contribution rates of peace
officers and firefighters, along with all other
contribution rates, multiplied by their pay and divided by
total pay. The calculation averaged out to 1.71 percent. As
a result, the employer was responsible for paying 2.14
percent of pay toward the normal cost in FY 26. For pension
and health care combined, the employer contribution was
1.97 percent. He noted that there were no member
contributions for health care benefits, which explained why
line 1b was zero for health care. He relayed that the past
service cost rate represented the sum of all amortization
layer payments divided by total pay. The rate for the PERS
pension was 18.63 percent and 21.12 percent for the TRS
pension. The rate for both health care trusts was zero
because the trusts were overfunded.
Mr. Kershner explained that adding the employer rate from
line 1c to the past service rate produced the actuarially
determined contribution rate. Including both pension and
health care, the PERS contribution rate was 22.74 percent
of pay, and the TRS contribution rate was 25.48 percent. He
stated that line 4 showed the adopted contribution rates.
He shared that ARMB had elected not to contribute the
health care normal cost for the past three years because it
would only increase the existing surplus in the overfunded
health care trusts. By foregoing the contribution, the
employer portion could instead be dedicated more heavily to
the pension trust. He noted that ARMB had recently chosen
to apply the original 25-year amortization schedule that
was established in 2014, which accelerated contributions
into the earlier years. For example, the board's adopted
rate for the PERS pension was 21.43 percent, compared to
the actuarially determined 20.77 percent, while the health
care contribution rate was set at zero.
Mr. Kershner noted that the next two slides provided the
same information for the DC retirement plans, which covered
employees hired on or after June 2006. He moved to slide 13
and explained that the DC plans included four components:
occupational death and disability, retiree medical or
health care, the DC employer rate, which was 5 percent for
PERS and 7 percent for TRS, and a 3 percent health
reimbursement account contribution. He stated that the
actuarially determined past service cost rate for
occupational death and disability and retiree medical was
zero because the trusts were overfunded. He noted that
there were no past service costs for the DC and health
reimbursement accounts because the percentages were fixed.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 14 and explained that line
3 of the DC retirement plan tables combined the two
relevant components that were then divided by pay for DC
retirement plan members. He explained that a projection was
made and the DC retirement plan rates on line 7 were
converted to percentages of total pay, which were
consistent with how the DB rates were expressed. He pointed
out that the total employer contribution rate for PERS DC
plan members was 6.9 percent of total pay, while the total
rate for TRS DC plan members was 7.65 percent.
Mr. Kershner moved to slide 15 and indicated that the
figures were consolidated for PERS and TRS. He noted that
line 1 reflected the DB rates, carried forward from slide
12. Line 2 showed the DC plan rates from slides 13 and 14.
The rates were then added together to produce the total
rate on line 3, which was 28.33 percent for PERS and 31.33
percent for TRS. He relayed that the totals were then
compared to the statutory employer contribution rates,
which were 22 percent for PERS non-state employers and
12.56 percent for TRS. The excess rate was paid by the
state and shown on line 5a as the difference between the
total rate from line 3 and the statutory rate on line 4.
Mr. Kershner noted that line 5b made an adjustment for
interest because employer and member contributions were
paid throughout the year with each payroll, while
additional state contributions were generally paid at the
beginning of the fiscal year. The timing difference meant
an extra half-year of interest was earned on the state
contributions, and line 5b accounted for the adjustment.
Multiplying by the projected pay on line 6 produced the
dollar amount of additional state contributions. He
reported that that the PERS additional state contribution
for non-state employers was $79.8 million beginning July 1,
2025, while the TRS contribution was just under $139
million.
2:42:48 PM
Representative Galvin noted that the adopted contribution
rate on slide 12 was 21.43 percent. She asked how long
Gallagher projected it would take for the pension to be
fully funded for PERS and TRS at the 21.43 percent rate.
She recalled that it was previously projected to be fully
funded by 2039.
Mr. Kershner responded that the 21.43 percent rate adopted
by the board reflected the original 25-year amortization
period that ended in 2039. He relayed that the 22.74
percent rate on line 3 on slide 12 was based on the layered
amortization approach and it projected full funding by
2048. He clarified that the 22.74 percent rate reflected
the layered amortization method, while the 21.43 percent
was tied to the fixed 25-year schedule. The pension trust
would be fully funded by 2039 if the board continued
adopting rates consistent with line 4.
Representative Stapp expressed confusion about why the
layered amortization approach had not been adopted. He
thought that ignoring layered amortization seemed like it
would push liability payments further into the future and
increase long-term costs. He asked Mr. Kershner to explain
the reasoning.
Mr. Kershner responded that Representative Stapp had the
information opposite. He explained that layered
amortization extended the timeframe for full funding, since
each year's unfunded liability was amortized over 25 years.
For example, the unfunded liability created in 2024 would
be paid down through 2048, and the new 2025 layer would
extend to 2049. By contrast, the rate adopted by ARMB on
line 4 assumed that layered amortization had never been
implemented, and instead continued the fixed amortization
schedule ending in 2039. The approach accelerated
contributions in the near term and reduced the burden
later, because funding was concentrated within the
remaining 14 to 15 years of the original schedule.
Representative Stapp asked if the losses from the plan were
being incorporated into the state contribution, and whether
that was why state contributions were increasing. He
clarified that he understood that ARMB was absorbing the
plan's projected losses through additional state
contributions to ensure the liability was paid off by 2039.
He asked if the additional costs and changes in assumptions
were driving the increased state contribution.
Mr. Kershner reiterated that the process was similar to
making extra mortgage payments on a 30-year mortgage.
Instead of using layered amortization, which would extend
to 2048, the board assumed that the plan would be funded as
if the schedule would end in 2039. He explained that it
would be similar to paying an extra mortgage payment each
year and paying down the mortgage faster.
Representative Stapp asked for more information about the
disparity between total employer contributions for pensions
and the contributions provided to current employees under
the DC plan. He asked whether such a disparity was
standard. He noted that many state workers were in Tier IV
and often talked about how the current system with a 6.9
percent contribution rate was inadequate. He suggested that
it would be hard to disagree with the Tier IV workers.
Mr. Kershner responded that the difference depended on the
nature of the benefits. He explained that if HB 78 were to
pass, members would receive a lifetime pension with post-
retirement adjustments, which were more valuable benefits
than those under the current DC plan. Consequently, the
costs for DB members were higher than for DC members due to
the greater value of the benefits.
2:48:52 PM
Representative Stapp acknowledged that higher benefits
naturally entailed higher costs. He asked for clarification
that the Supplemental Benefit System (SBS) was not included
in the calculations on slides 13 and 14.
Mr. Kershner confirmed that SBS was entirely outside of the
calculations.
Representative Tomaszewski asked how it was justified that
DB plans were superior to DC plans. He pointed out that in
a DC plan, members retained their principal and could pass
it on to their children. He asked for clarification on why
the DB plan was considered the better system.
Mr. Kershner responded that that the investment risk was
taken on by individual members under a DC plan, which meant
that actual benefits could exceed projections if investment
returns surpassed the assumed 7.25 percent. However, market
losses could also reduce benefits. In contrast, a DB plan
provided a fixed, guaranteed lifetime benefit based on
years of service and final average pay, often including
survivor benefits. The DB plan ensured predictable
retirement income regardless of investment performance and
also included survivor benefits that allowed members to
pass their benefits to a beneficiary upon their death.
Mr. Kershner continued that DB members also received post-
retirement pension adjustments, which were valuable and
costly because the adjustments provided an automatic
inflation-adjusted benefit, which was particularly
significant in periods of high inflation. He emphasized
that based on the level of benefits in the plan, the DB
plan was more valuable and more costly than the DC plan. He
added that if employer contributions to the DC plan were
increased from 5 percent to 10 percent, the comparison
would differ. However, the DB plan carried higher costs
under current assumptions and benefit levels.
Representative Tomaszewski commented that investment
outcomes could influence the value, but he appreciated the
explanation. He asked whether the benefits under HB 78
would be discussed, including survivor benefits.
Mr. Kershner confirmed that the topic would be covered in
the upcoming slides.
2:52:55 PM
Representative Bynum noted that Mr. Kershner had described
the DB plan as more valuable and more costly. He asked if
the characterization was based on the fact that the
comparison was not "apples to apples" and if the higher
cost reflected the value of the benefits rather than equal
contributions.
Mr. Kershner responded that projected costs were determined
based on a series of assumptions. He explained that if HB
78 were to pass, members in the DB plan would receive
benefits that cost more than members' current contributions
under the DC plan. He noted that the comparison was
illustrated on slides 13 and 14.
Representative Bynum commented that market volatility
affected the DC plan depending on when members withdrew
funds and how the investments performed. He understood that
previously, the employee was not impacted and only the
plan's liability was affected. He asked whether market
volatility could negatively impact employees, retirees, and
employers if HB 78 were to pass.
Mr. Kershner explained that investment risk was borne
entirely by the plan sponsor in a DB plan. He noted that if
the statutory contribution limits did not exist, employers
would pay more if investment earnings fell short of
expectations. Conversely, if earnings exceeded assumptions,
contribution rates would decrease. He emphasized that plan
members were unaffected by investment risk in a DB plan,
while investment risk was entirely borne by the members
under a DC plan.
Representative Bynum noted that under the current PERS
model, retirees were not impacted by market volatility. He
understood that HB 78 implemented a shared risk model,
which meant that the employee and employer shared in the
risk. He observed that the 22 percent statutory
contribution cap still existed under the current
assumptions and the liability shifted to the state when the
percentage was exceeded. He asked if employees shared in
the risk under HB 78.
Mr. Kershner responded in the affirmative. He explained
that Gallagher's projections assumed that all future
experience matched the current assumptions and that none of
the risk-sharing provisions would be triggered. He added
that HB 78 included two risk-sharing provisions: ARMB could
reduce post-retirement pension adjustments for HB 78
members, and the board could increase the member
contribution rate from 8 percent up to 12 percent if fund
levels fell below certain thresholds. He noted that based
on the projections, the fund was not expected to dip below
the threshold, but the built-in provisions would activate
if adverse experience affected unfunded liabilities.
Representative Bynum asserted that that the term "shared
risk" suggested equal distribution of potential risk. He
asked for clarification that the risk under HB 78 was
tiered. He understood that the first layer of risk fell on
the state due to the 22 percent cap, the second layer of
risk could fall on retirees depending on the board's
decisions, and a third layer of risk could potentially fall
on employees. He asked if risk sharing was based on
"trigger points."
Mr. Kershner responded in the affirmative. He explained
that the trigger was a 90 percent funded level. If HB 78
were to pass and the funded levels of the trust fell below
90 percent, the triggers would activate and allow the board
to adjust member contributions and reduce post-retirement
pension adjustments. He added that if the funded status
decreased from 100 percent to 95 percent, the resulting
risk would be borne entirely by the employers because the
triggers would not activate.
Representative Bynum highlighted that market volatility
posed a risk depending on whether a member was in a legacy
PERS plan or a plan established after the potential passage
of HB 78. He clarified that the risk could be shared under
HB 78 but the risk would be taken on by the employee under
the current DC plans.
Co-Chair Foster asked if committee members were prepared to
stay late to hear the remainder of the presentation. He
added that Mr. Kershner had a flight to catch in the
evening.
Representative Hannan noted that she had two constituent
appointments scheduled, but she would return to the
committee meeting afterwards.
Co-Chair Foster received confirmation from committee
members that they were willing to stay.
3:02:34 PM
Representative Allard asked for more information about
retirement benefits that might extend to a spouse or to a
child who is disabled and under state care. She asked what
the average retirement age of Alaska state employees was.
Mr. Kershner responded that the average retirement age
differed by benefit level and employee group. He explained
that the earliest retirements tended to occur among peace
officers and firefighters within PERS, due to more
subsidized early retirement benefits. For example, a peace
officer or firefighter could retire at any age with at
least 20 years of service, whereas non-peace officer PERS
members could only retire after 30 years of service. He
noted that teachers tended to retire later, with many
continuing to work into their 70s.
Representative Allard asked what the average life
expectancy of an Alaskan was. She asked how long the state
might be paying benefits for peace officers that retired
between the ages of 40 and 45 if the officer began working
at around age 21.
Mr. Kershner responded that retirements at such a young age
were rare. For example, a peace officer or firefighter
retiring at age 50 might live approximately 30 more years,
reaching age 80.
Representative Allard suggested that the average life
expectancy was 74 or 75 years old.
Mr. Kershner clarified that average life expectancy at
birth was around 74 to 75 years, but once an individual
reached age 50, their life expectancy was longer. He added
that a 65-year-old male had a life expectancy of roughly 17
to 18 more years and a 65-year-old female had a life
expectancy of approximately 19 to 20 more years.
Representative Allard asked if the benefits would go to a
deceased member's surviving spouse and whether a form must
be completed to ensure that the benefits were passed on.
Mr. Kershner responded that it depended on the individual's
situation. When a member retired in the DB plan, the member
had the option of selecting from a variety of types of
benefits. The standard benefit was a single life annuity
paid for the member's lifetime, after which no further
payments were made. Alternatively, the member could elect a
joint and survivor benefit, which meant that a percentage
would be paid to a designated beneficiary after the
member's death. The selection of a survivor benefit was at
the discretion of the retiree.
Representative Allard asked if a DB member could designate
whoever they wanted to receive a portion of their benefits
if their spouse was deceased, such as their children.
Mr. Kershner deferred the question to DRB.
3:08:07 PM
KATHY LEA, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT AND BENEFITS,
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, responded that under DB
plans, a child could only be designated as the survivor if
the child was totally incapacitated. If the spouse was
still alive, the spouse would need to waive their rights to
the benefits. If a retiree had chosen the joint and
survivor option and the spouse was deceased, the only
payment to beneficiaries would be the last paycheck or any
remaining balance in the contribution account.
Representative Allard asked for clarification that only
fully incapacitated children could receive benefits.
Ms. Lea confirmed that the child had to be completely
incapacitated and unable to support themselves to receive
benefits.
Representative Allard shared that she had a conversation
with a state worker who had thanked her for asking certain
questions. She relayed that the worker had received nothing
upon their parent's death and all of the benefits returned
to the state. She asked for confirmation that the if the
deceased person did not receive the money, the money would
return to the state.
Ms. Lea assumed the parent in the example had not retired.
Representative Allard clarified that the parent had
retired.
Ms. Lea explained that for a retired member, benefits were
first paid from their contribution account. Once the
contributions were exhausted after about two years,
remaining payments came from employer contributions and
fund earnings. If the retiree had exhausted their
contributions and passed away, only the final paycheck was
paid to beneficiaries, and the remainder reverted to the
state.
Representative Allard asked if a DB member passed away
within two years of retiring and had, for example, $900,000
in their account, would the remaining funds revert to the
state upon the member's death.
Ms. Lea responded that it would be highly unusual for a
PERS member to have $900,000 in their account if they had
been retired for at least two years. She relayed that
$900,000 exceeded the average participant account balance.
She noted that the worker with whom Representative Allard
had a conversation might have been referring to a different
plan, possibly the SBS plan. She clarified that once a
participant died, the remaining assets in their plan were
paid to either their survivor or the beneficiaries. The
only circumstance in which no one received the funds was if
there was no beneficiary designation on file, in which case
the matter would have to go to court.
Representative Allard asked what would happen to the
retirement money if a DB retiree passed away and had no
spouse and no incapacitated children. She stressed that she
wanted to know what would happen to the money if there was
no one to inherit it.
Ms. Lee responded that it would return to the trust.
Representative Allard understood that the money would
return to the trust, which was owned by the state.
Ms. Lea responded that the state did not own the trust, but
the members of the trust owned the trust. She explained
that if a DB retiree had no survivor and no beneficiaries,
the remaining assets reverted to the PERS or TRS trust and
did not go back to the state. She emphasized that the state
could not access the money.
3:14:07 PM
Representative Allard asked for clarification regarding DC
accounts. She asked if children could inherit a deceased DC
member's account if the spouse was deceased.
Ms. Lea responded that a DC member could leave their money
to any designated beneficiary. If no beneficiary
designation existed, the account was distributed first to
the spouse, then to children, and then to the parents,
continuing in that order until the account was exhausted.
Co-Chair Foster asked if Ms. Lea was available to stay
late. He suggested that she could return to the committee
at a later date if necessary.
Representative Allard pointed out that under DB plans, if a
member had no surviving spouse or incapacitated children,
the money reverted to the trust and was not available to
the family. Under DC plans, the money could be inherited by
children if the spouse was deceased. She questioned why DB
plans were considered better for the individual when DC
plans allowed funds to remain with family members. She
noted that while DB plans might reduce state costs, the
benefits did not necessarily extend to the member's family
and might result in payments continuing for decades after
retirement without providing long-term family security.
Co-Chair Foster asked if Ms. Lea was available to return
the following afternoon.
Representative Allard suggested that she could provide Ms.
Lea with her questions ahead of time.
Co-Chair Foster recommended that Ms. Lea return to the
committee the following day if possible.
3:17:19 PM
Co-Chair Foster asked if Representative Galvin had a
question.
Representative Galvin commented that she would hold her
questions until the presentation reached slide 28.
Co-Chair Josephson recalled that approximately 15 minutes
earlier, Mr. Kershner had noted that the risk in HB 78 was
borne by the state. He noted that Representative Bynum had
asked whether the plan was actually a shared risk, and Mr.
Kershner had responded that it was. However, Mr. Kershner
had also stated that it was unlikely that the risk would be
shared because the funds would not dip beneath the 90
percent solvency level. He found the observation vitally
important and he thought it was arguably the key to the
bill. He asked if Mr. Kershner was indicating that the bill
had been written to ensure that the triggers would likely
not be needed.
Mr. Kershner responded that all of Gallagher's projections
assumed that future experience would match the assumptions.
He noted that Gallagher was not projecting the 90 percent
threshold to be reached based on current assumptions. He
clarified that the trust would begin at 100 percent funded
and was projected to remain well above 90 percent funded.
He acknowledged that it was possible that events could
occur that would trigger the 90 percent threshold, such as
a terrible year in the markets that caused asset values to
decline by a significant percentage, but it was not likely.
Mr. Kershner suggested that Gallagher could conduct an
example sensitivity analysis for the committee and could
analyze the impact of three successive years of poor asset
returns followed by recovery to 7.25 percent. He noted that
such a scenario could have a significant impact on the DB
plans and potentially the state. If a similar scenario
caused the funding levels of the HB 78 trust to fall below
90 percent, then not all of the risk would fall directly to
the state. He explained that some of the risk would be
borne by the trust members because the board had the
authority under HB 78 to increase member contributions from
8 percent to as high as 12 percent. He explained that such
an increase might not eliminate the entire adverse effect
and the state could still be impacted. When the DB plans
were closed in 2006, the state was essentially mitigating
some of its future risks. He clarified that placing the
post-2006 members in a DC environment shifted the risk to
the member. If the members were to be placed back into a DB
environment, some of the risk would be reversed as well.
Some of the risk was controlled by the risk-sharing
provisions, but it was not completely eliminated.
Co-Chair Josephson asked if the cost to the state under HB
78 related to its effectiveness. He noted that Gallagher
had anticipated the bill would be effective. For example,
the state was not effective at hiring eligibility
technicians for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), which resulted in a $12 million penalty to
the state by the federal government. He questioned if
Gallagher was projecting that it would be easier to hire
people under Tier V because retirement benefits were more
attractive than in Tier IV.
Mr. Kershner responded that the expectation was that if HB
78 were to pass and employees were able to join DB plans,
future retention would be improved. He explained that the
bill was expected to lower turnover because employees would
be incentivized to stay employed in order to receive
retirement benefits. He continued that more people were
expected to remain employed if HB 78 were to pass than if
the current DC plan remained in place. He relayed that more
members in the future meant more benefits, more
liabilities, and therefore more contributions. He affirmed
that higher retention would likely lead to higher costs. He
clarified that the analysis was strictly focused on the
actuarial impact to the state contributions and the
analysis did not include potential economic benefits such
as reduced training and recruiting costs. He stressed that
other factors needed to be considered alongside the
actuarial findings to determine the total economic benefit
to the state. He emphasized that Gallagher's analysis was
restricted to the actuarial impact on future contributions
to PERS and TRS.
3:24:45 PM
Co-Chair Foster remarked that the most critical portion of
the presentation appeared to be slides 26 through 36. He
requested that questions be held until the end and
suggested that Mr. Kershner could be brought back for
follow-up questions via teleconference if needed.
Mr. Kershner stated that the next slides covered actuarial
assumptions, many of which had already been addressed
through questions from committee members. He moved to slide
17 and explained that Alaska statutes required an analysis
of plan experience at least every four years through an
experience study. He clarified that assumptions had last
been set in 2022 and the next study would be conducted in
2026. He stated that an experience study involved reviewing
the previous four years, comparing actual outcomes with
assumptions, and determining whether adjustments were
needed.
Mr. Kershner cautioned that recent experience had to be
interpreted somewhat subjectively. During the COVID-19
pandemic, termination rates had been unusually low and
salary increases were somewhat lower than expected. He
explained that it would not be appropriate to assume that
the patterns would persist indefinitely. He likened the
process to driving a car, noting that while one glanced in
the rearview mirror, the focus remained on the road ahead.
He emphasized that while past experience informed the
process, the primary focus was on long-term trends.
Mr. Kershner noted that statute required that there be an
annual review of health care assumptions. He explained that
the health actuary evaluated health care costs on a per
capita basis and reviewed trend rates, which reflected
assumed future increases in the costs. He remarked that
actuaries were guided by standards of practice, which
required the use of assumptions representing the best
estimate of long-term outcomes. He relayed that debate had
occurred regarding what termination rates should be applied
to members if HB 78 were to pass. He stated because there
was an expectation of higher retention under a DB plan, it
would be inappropriate to assume DB members would
experience the same high termination rates as DC members.
He explained that lower termination rates were consistent
with higher retention and that the expectations were
incorporated into the assumptions.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 18 and emphasized that no
single correct answer existed for assumptions. He explained
that assumptions could fall within a reasonable range. For
example, while a return assumption of 12 percent would be
unreasonable, both 7.25 percent and slightly lower
alternatives such as 7 percent or 6.75 percent could be
considered reasonable. He added that the current
assumptions had been established using Alaska-specific data
for turnover, retirement patterns, and mortality, based on
the four years of experience through 2021. He confirmed
that Alaska member experience was incorporated to the
extent that the data was statistically credible. He stated
that mortality assumptions were based on standardized
national tables encompassing hundreds of thousands of lives
and deaths, since individual plan data might not always be
sufficient on its own.
3:30:02 PM
Mr. Kershner moved to slide 20 and explained that the
current assumptions used in the actuarial evaluations had
been applied. He clarified that the model assumed 75
percent of the DC retirement rates and 25 percent of the DB
retirement rates. He stated that the approach was
consistent with Sections 4 and 60 of HB 78, which relied on
the most recent assumptions with the exception of
retirement rates. He stated that the previously mentioned
fiscal note letter prepared by Gallagher had acknowledged
that there was uncertainty about the future termination
experience of members if HB 78 were to pass. He relayed
that it was projected that the experience of members after
the potential passage of HB 78 would more closely resemble
that of DB members.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 21 and noted that some
termination rates had been set many years earlier, when the
DB plan had a larger active membership base. If HB 78
passed, Gallagher would be able to analyze over time the
actual turnover experience of members. He explained that
assumptions specific to the members under HB 78 would be
developed once credible experience was available.
Mr. Kershner advanced to slide 23 and noted that some of
the bill's risk-sharing provisions depended on the funded
status of the trust. He reiterated that the triggers would
not be activated based on the assumption that future
experience would match existing assumptions. He remarked
that if HB 78 were to pass and assumptions reflected
adverse experience that reduced funding below 90 percent,
there would be a potential increase in the member
contribution rate or a possible reduction in post-
retirement pension adjustments. He continued to slide 24
and emphasized that the potential economic benefit to the
state outside of funding PERS and TRS also had to be
considered when reviewing cost projections to evaluate the
total economic impact to the state if HB 78 were to pass.
Representative Bynum asked if it would have been more
conservative to use a blend of more modern termination
rates rather than relying on the older DB rates. He asked
if using modern rates would have provided a more
conservative evaluation given that HB 78 involved a
different plan with different benefits.
Mr. Kershner responded that such an approach could have
been taken. He explained that if more moderate termination
rates had been applied, the cost estimates would have been
lower than the rates that were projected. He confirmed that
using a different set of assumptions would indeed have
produced different results.
3:35:53 PM
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 26 and detailed the fiscal
analysis. He explained that the remaining slides came
directly from the March 24, 2025, fiscal note letter. He
reported that slides 26 and 27 summarized the potential
impact to state contributions. He noted that slide 26
showed the additional state contributions, and slide 27
showed the state as an employer contributions under PERS.
Mr. Kershner clarified that the calculations assumed that
100 percent of active members in the DC plan would elect to
transfer to the DB plan if the bill were to pass. He
acknowledged that if some active members chose to remain in
the DC plan, the cost estimates would be lower. He stated
that the model did not necessarily reflect the worst-case
scenario because higher costs were possible, but it
represented a conservative scenario by assuming all non-
retired DC members would transfer to DB.
Mr. Kershner relayed that the first three columns on the
chart on slide 26 displayed the additional state
contributions for the non-state employers under PERS
through FY 2039. He noted that the first year shown was FY
27 because the contribution rates for FY 26 had already
been adopted by ARMB. He summarized that the figures
reflected the current baseline projections of additional
state contributions for PERS, followed by the projections
if HB 78 were implemented and all members elected to
transfer. He relayed that the figures in the 2030 row would
be explained in detail in a few slides. He added that the
next columns contained the same information for TRS, and
the final columns presented the combination of the PERS and
TRS additional state contributions. The chart was
essentially projecting the potential impact of HB 78 based
on the stated assumptions. He indicated that additional
state contributions could increase by as much as $467
million through FY 39.
Mr. Kershner advanced to slide 27, which displayed
essentially the same information, but for the contributions
by the state as an employer under PERS. He clarified that
the state paid the full rate. The slide showed the state
contributions for the DB plan and what the contributions
would be under HB 78. He explained that the middle columns
reflected the projected contributions for the current DC
retirement plan and the HB 78 column represented the
projected contribution rate.
Mr. Kershner noted that a handful of people had already
retired under the DC plan and the retirees would continue
to receive their DC benefits. He elaborated that because
the DC trusts were overfunded, the actual rate for DC
retirees would be zero in the projections. He added that
the DC costs under the HB 78 column represented the health
reimbursement account contributions, which equaled 4
percent for PERS peace officers and firefighters and 3
percent for all others. He pointed out that the state would
actually see a decrease in DC contributions. When the
increase for the DB plan was combined with the decrease in
the DC contributions, the result was reflected in the last
column on the right. He reported that the state as an
employer could potentially contribute an additional $687
million through FY 39.
Mr. Kershner advanced to slide 28 and explained that there
were two reasons why state contributions were projected to
increase. The first reason was that the underlying benefits
that HB 78 members would receive were more valuable from an
actuarial perspective. He observed that some individuals
might prefer DC benefits; however, the DB provisions that
HB 78 members would be entitled to receive would cost more
than the current DC benefits. He reported that members of
the DC plan received occupational death and disability
benefits, health care benefits, an employer contribution to
the DC account of 5 percent of pay for PERS members and 7
percent of pay for TRS members, and an additional 3 percent
of pay contribution to the health reimbursement accounts.
Mr. Kershner explained that if the bill were to pass,
members of the DB plan would receive a lifetime pension
unless they elected a survivor benefit at retirement. He
added that the normal benefit was a lifetime pension. He
specified that members would remain eligible to receive the
same health care benefits as current DC members. The new DB
members would also be entitled to death and disability
benefits that were more valuable than those available under
the DC plan. He continued that members would also be
eligible for post-retirement pension adjustments linked to
annual changes in the Anchorage CPI. Additionally, members
would continue to receive employer contributions to the
health reimbursement accounts, which equaled 4 percent of
pay for PERS peace officer and firefighter members and 3
percent of pay for all others.
3:41:31 PM
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 29 and explained that the
underlying health care benefits that members would receive
under 78 were the same as the benefits that members
currently received. He clarified that more individuals were
expected to remain employed and receive health care
benefits because future retention was projected to improve
under HB 78. He emphasized that there would be higher
actuarial costs for the same benefits when members
participated in the DB plan compared to the DC retirement
plan. The table on the bottom of the slide showed the
projected costs for FY 30 as a percentage of pay for each
group. He relayed that the FY 26 DC costs had been
converted to a total pay basis. He noted that the costs
presented on the slide were projected as a percentage of DC
members' pay only. He stated that for PERS DC members, the
current employer cost as a percentage of the PERS DC pay
was 9.17 percent. The figure included less than 1 percent
for occupational death, disability, and health care, 5
percent for defined contribution, and 3 percent for health
reimbursement accounts.
Mr. Kershner continued that for TRS members, the total was
employer cost was 10.74 percent. He explained that the next
section on the right side of the slide illustrated the
projected costs for the same members as participants in the
DB plan under HB 78. He relayed that the pension costs, net
of the 8 percent member contributions, were about 6.5
percent of pay. He added that the health care costs were
shown as about 2 percent of pay. He underscored that the
amounts were higher than current levels because more people
were projected to remain employed and receive benefits. He
reiterated that more participants led to more benefits
paid, which created higher liabilities and, therefore,
higher costs. The health reimbursement account cost of 3.16
percent represented a blended rate of 4 percent for peace
officers and firefighters and 3 percent for all others. He
explained that the total column in both sections clearly
showed that the HB 78 costs were higher. He stressed that
more valuable benefits resulted in higher costs.
Mr. Kershner moved to slide 30 and relayed that the second
reason for the higher costs was that the additional costs
under HB 78 would shift directly to the state and lead to
higher state contributions. He explained that because
employer contributions were fixed at 22 percent for non-
state PERS employers and 12.56 percent for TRS, the
actuarially determined contribution left the excess costs
to be covered by additional state contributions. He
stressed that any increase to the actuarial rate would also
fall to the state. He noted that the impact would be
demonstrated through an example on the next slide.
3:44:56 PM
Mr. Kershner advanced to slide 31 and stated that the
example applied to PERS, although TRS would be similar. He
explained that the chart on the left expressed the current
cost as a percentage of total payroll. He noted that the
blue segment represented the DB cost for current DB
members, while the green segment showed the cost for DC
members. He clarified that the costs for the DC members
matched the values presented on the previous slide, but
were converted to a total pay basis. He reminded the
committee that slide 29 had shown a percentage of 9.17,
while slide 31 reflected 7.67 percent, because 7.67 percent
represented a percentage of all pay rather than just DC
pay. The total current cost for DB and DC combined was
29.16 percent of total pay. The chart on the right
illustrated the change in costs, and the cost for the DB
plan decreased. He pointed out that the green section
representing the cost for DC was eliminated, leaving a
value of zero, and the yellow section showed the cost for
members under HB 78. He reiterated that slide 29 showed
that the cost for the PERS members under HB 78 was 11.78
percent of pay. He explained that when that 11.78 percent
was converted to total pay, it became 10.09 percent. He
summarized that when the 20.13 percent for DB was combined
with zero for DC and 10.09 percent for HB 78, the total
cost increased to 30.22 percent.
Mr. Kershner continued to slide 32 and explained that all
contribution rates were expressed as a percentage of total
pay. The projected payroll for PERS DC members in FY 30 was
expected to increase due to anticipated higher retention
and fewer terminations, which meant that more of the
current group of employees would remain in FY 30 as opposed
to new hires entering at lower pay. He emphasized that
although the underlying cost for the DB members did not
change, the percentage went down because the cost was
divided by a higher payroll figure. He clarified that if
the total cost was divided by $2,853,980,000 versus the
current cost divided by $3,008,228,000, the percentage
decreased because the denominator was higher. He reiterated
that the state as an employer contributed the full
actuarial rate.
Mr. Kershner explained that the total projected FY 30 rate
was calculated by multiplying the combined DB and DC
current cost of 29.16 percent of total pay by the projected
payroll of $2,853,980,000, then multiplying it by the
percentage of the total payroll attributable to the PERS
state employees, which was just under 50 percent. He stated
that the result was $414,945,000. He explained that under
HB 78, the DB total rate was 30.22 percent multiplied by
the higher payroll and by the same percentage, which
equaled $453,271,000. He noted that the same figures
appeared for FY 30 in the tables of numbers through FY 39
that had been included in previous slides.
Mr. Kershner explained that the portion of the FY 30 DB
contribution rate paid by non-state employers for both PERS
and TRS was projected to decrease from 14.33 percent to
11.91 percent. He clarified that the 14.33 percent
represented the 22 percent statutory rate minus the rate
that employers paid for DC members, which was 7.67 percent.
He explained that under HB 78, employers would pay the 22
percent statutory rate minus the DC rate, which was zero,
minus the HB 78 rate of 10.09 percent. He shared that the
total equaled 11.91 percent. If the bill were to pass,
employers would continue to pay 22 percent but would
contribute less toward the unfunded liability, and the
state would be required to make up the difference.
Mr. Kershner advanced to slide 33 and explained that the FY
30 additional state contribution rate was the total DB rate
of 21.49 percent minus the portion paid by non-state
employers of 14.33 percent, plus the half-year interest
adjustment, which equaled 6.91 percent. He added that under
HB 78, the FY 30 additional state contribution rate was the
DB rate of 20.13 percent minus the portion paid by non-
state employers of 11.91 percent, which equaled 7.94
percent.
Mr. Kershner explained that the final bullet on slide 33
multiplied the percentages from the previous bullet [6.91
percent and 7.94 percent] by the total payroll and by the
portion of pay attributable to non-state employers. He
stated that the additional state contribution for FY 30 was
projected to increase from just under $99 million to just
under $120 million. He emphasized that there were many
moving parts in the calculations, such as the underlying
costs themselves and the amount of the unfunded liability
that was paid by the employers. As the unfunded liability
decreased, the state covered the shortfall through
additional contributions. He added that the same three
slides could be presented for TRS, which followed a similar
structure. He remarked that was moving quickly due to time
constraints.
3:52:13 PM
Representative Galvin thanked Mr. Kershner for his
presentation. She relayed that she had calculated the
numbers on slide 32 on her own and her calculations totaled
$38.3 million, possibly more, in FY 30 for the state as the
employer contributions. She added that she calculated $20.8
million for the FY 30 PERS amount. She noted that slide 28
had clarified the role of post-retirement pension
adjustments and she understood that adjustments could be
made if circumstances shifted. She asked Mr. Kershner to
further explain the adjustment feature. She noted that she
also had questions about the multiplier effect.
Mr. Kershner responded that post-retirement pension
adjustments were often referred to as cost-of-living
adjustments [COLA], which were offered in most other
states. He stated that the purpose was to provide
purchasing power protection to retirees. For example, if a
retiree received a $1,000 monthly benefit, the total would
remain fixed for life if there was no adjustment, despite
inflation diminishing its value. He explained that COLAs
were intended to preserve purchasing power and were linked
to the Anchorage CPI changes each year. He stated that
under age 65, members received 50 percent of the CPI
increase, and over age 65, members received 75 percent.
Mr. Kershner explained that members of the DB plan who were
current residents of Alaska also received a separate 10
percent COLA, which was a flat 10 percent of the benefit
and not linked to inflation. He clarified that under HB 78,
members would not be eligible for the 10 percent COLA, and
COLA costs were not included in the HB 78 analysis. He
noted that current DB members hired prior to 2006 would
continue to receive the benefit.
Representative Galvin commented that the HB 78 plan seemed
to be an entirely new product. She understood that the
presentation had not covered other benefits that would be
valuable to the state as a result of the bill, such as the
lower employee training costs. She relayed that she had
started writing a list of the other benefits and asked if
any assessment had been completed to discover other
potential advantages. Some of the benefits on her list were
lower training costs, retention costs, hiring bonus costs,
lowering overtime costs, and lowering contractual costs
when positions could not be filled.
Representative Galvin continued that another cost to the
state involved education. She observed that when teachers
remained in their positions for longer periods, higher
academic results were achieved, which reduced the need for
costly academic interventions. She asserted that consistent
hiring and retention of Alaska's public service workers
saved the state money in multiple ways. She emphasized that
the benefit of education was important. She explained that
she wanted to better understand the overall value.
3:58:14 PM
Mr. Kershner responded that the points Representative
Galvin raised were important. He referred to slide 24,
which indicated that additional economic factors must be
considered. He clarified that as actuaries for the
retirement systems, Gallagher's qualifications extended
only to projecting potential cost impacts to the retirement
plans' funding. He explained that an economist or other
professional would need to evaluate the types of issues
Representative Galvin mentioned. He stated that once cost
estimates or savings were determined, the figures should be
combined with the actuaries' cost projections to assess the
overall economic benefit to the state. He emphasized
Gallagher was not qualified to provide the analysis.
Representative Galvin asked if Mr. Kershner could provide
any general statements regarding the effect of not offering
DB plans, based on his experience in reviewing DB plans in
other states and his awareness of the plans' overall
impact.
Mr. Kershner suggested that he could share his personal
opinion. He believed that DB plans were beneficial to both
individuals and employers. He noted that the plans also
provided job security for actuaries because actuaries were
not needed for DC plans. He commented that DB plans were
generally considered preferable to DC plans. However, more
valuable benefits usually came at a higher cost, which had
been presented in the analysis. He relayed that DB plans
offered many positive outcomes and benefits to both the
state and individuals, but the plans also involved
potential risks and costs, which the presentation had
sought to illustrate.
Representative Galvin asked about slide 4 of the
presentation, which compared PERS and TRS employee
contributions. She relayed that she was confused as to why
PERS contributions were set at a higher percentage than TRS
contributions. She commented that the difference seemed
significant and asked if Mr. Kershner could help her better
understand the distinction. She remarked that it seemed
related to peace officers, firefighters, and similar roles.
Mr. Kershner responded that, unfortunately, he did not know
the history. He explained that he was aware that the
statutory rates were set in 2008 but he was not involved at
that time and did not know the reasoning for why PERS was
22 percent and TRS was 12.56 percent.
Representative Galvin asked whether there was any general
understanding about how other states handle the rates, or
if it was just the way the rates had been negotiated.
4:02:09 PM
Mr. Kershner replied that the total DB contribution rates
were shown on slide 12 and was 22.74 percent for PERS and
25.48 percent for TRS, before any employer contribution. He
noted that the total rates were in the same vicinity, but
the way the costs were shared among employers in Alaska was
unique. He reiterated that he did not know how the
statutory split had been decided many years ago.
Representative Galvin remarked that she understood that Dr.
Teresa Ghilarducci had conducted an economic analysis for
the Alaska State Senate, which suggested that there could
be potential savings of approximately $76 million due to
retention and recruitment effects.
Representative Stapp commented that the disparity between
TRS and PERS was likely because TRS employees did not have
SBS, which resulted in a lower employer contribution. He
asked why the state would assume additional liability given
the projected reduction in the non-state employer
contribution rate, instead of maintaining the non-state
employer contribution at 22 percent until the existing
unfunded liability was cleared.
Mr. Kershner responded that under HB 78, non-state
employers would continue to contribute 22 percent. He
explained that because the actuarial rate would increase,
any amount above the capped employer contribution would
fall to the state as additional state contributions.
Representative Stapp understood that when the 22 percent
rate was originally applied to municipal employees, the
expectation had been that once the unfunded liability was
paid off, municipalities would not continue at 22 percent.
He asked whether the current expectation was for the 22
percent rate to remain fixed indefinitely. He asked whether
the state would ever incur an unfunded liability under HB
78 if all Gallagher's assumptions were met.
Mr. Kershner responded that Gallagher's projection was that
the state would not incur an unfunded liability. However,
he clarified that a small unfunded liability existed
because the FY 26 contribution rates had already been
adopted and HB 78 would initially be unfunded. The
contributions in the first year would not be enough to
cover the cost of the HB 78 benefits, but it would not fall
below the 90 percent threshold.
Mr. Kershner added that after FY 39, the projected
contribution rate dropped precipitously because the large
unfunded liability would have been fully paid. For example,
the PERS DB rate dropped from approximately 20 percent down
to around 2 or 3 percent. He added that employers would not
be expected to continue contributing 22 percent for current
PERS participants because the total rate would be less than
22 percent after FY 39, regardless of whether the bill
passed.
Representative Stapp thought that if an unfunded liability
occurred and the rate remained at the 22 percent level, the
state could revert unfunded liability to the employers if
HB 78 were to pass. He added that slide 9 indicated that
since 2000, more liability to the state occurred than was
projected. He noted that each time projections were revised
since 2000, the plans had performed worse than expected,
requiring downward adjustments of the assumed rate of
return. He recalled that the initial thought during the
bill's crafting was to stress test the projections at 6.75
percent, and that Dr. Ghilarducci had recommended testing
at 6.25 percent or 7.5 percent. He observed that the
current assumption remained 7.25 percent. He wondered if
Mr. Kershner would reimburse the state in the event the
projections were off by $555 million. He argued that if the
projections were favorable, the state would return funds to
the system.
Mr. Kershner replied that he would not reimburse the state.
He noted that in 2021, asset returns were strong and the
unfunded liability decreased by $579 million. He explained
that projections in 2021 had been more favorable compared
with the prior year's projections and he emphasized that
outcomes depended on actual plan experience. He clarified
that he did not control asset performance and expected
returns had been higher in prior years. He added that all
public sector plans had reduced assumed investment returns
because future expected returns on equities and other
investments were lower than the returns were 10 to 20 years
ago.
Mr. Kershner continued that assumptions had to reflect best
estimates of future experience. He stated that using an
unrealistic assumption such as an 8.5 percent investment
return would lower projected contribution needs
artificially and would not reflect current realities. He
explained that 20 years ago, such an assumption may have
been reasonable, but it was no longer plausible given the
current asset structure and investment allocations. He
reiterated that assumptions were updated regularly through
experience studies every four years to keep projections
current and prevent outdated assumptions from skewing
results.
4:11:15 PM
Representative Stapp remarked that he had learned that if
all historical public sector DB plans were aggregated, the
average rate of return was 6.85 percent. He questioned why
a number that was likely to be revised downward again would
be used to make projections. He expressed confusion about
why the comparison would not be made to at least the
average rate of return throughout the lifetime of DB plans.
Representative Stapp continued that he expected that in
another five to seven years, regardless of the plan in
place, the assumed rate of return would decline from 7.25
percent to 7 percent, or from 7 percent down to 6.85
percent. He asserted that when the inevitable decline
occurred, the cost to the state would increase because the
plans would not be earning the same amount. He asked
whether it would be challenging to show what the outcome
would look like if the plan only returned 6.85 percent, or
an approximately 50 basis point difference from the current
projection.
Mr. Kershner responded that it would not be difficult to
run such an analysis. He explained that if the analysis
were calculated at 6.75 percent instead of 7.25 percent,
the current projections would all increase because the
assumption would be for less investment income. He
clarified that contributions would therefore need to
increase to make up the difference. He added that both the
current baseline numbers and the HB 78 numbers would
increase, but the difference would remain similar to what
was currently projected. He noted that while the totals
would all be higher, the delta between the current plan and
the plan under HB 78 would remain in roughly the same
range. He confirmed that it was possible to run all the
projections at a different rate, but the net changes would
likely remain of the same magnitude. He repeated that if
the analysis were run at 6.75 percent, all of the numbers
would increase, but the difference between the two would
likely remain about the same.
4:14:12 PM
Representative Tomaszewski directed attention to slide 23
regarding risk sharing provisions. He observed that the
slide indicated that the board could reduce post-retirement
pension adjustments and increase member contributions from
8 percent to 12 percent. He asked whether the provision was
unique to the bill or whether other states or plans
included similar provisions.
Mr. Kershner replied that some other states had risk
sharing provisions in which the funded status of the plans
was stronger because the risk was shared, which meant less
exposure for both the state and the plan sponsor. He
emphasized that including risk sharing provisions was not
unique to HB 78. He added that the approach was becoming
more common in the public sector, though not yet widespread
among all states. He noted that a number of states had
either a hybrid DB and DC arrangement or some type of risk
sharing where employees shared more of the risk compared to
a fixed rate.
Representative Tomaszewski asked if other state boards were
required to take action if funding for the trust declined
or if action was optional in other states. He inquired if
there were states where the contribution rate would be
automatically increased if a trust fund declined to the 90
percent threshold. He asked whether any of the other state
plans included automatic increases or limitations.
Mr. Kershner responded that he could not provide all of the
details off the top of his head, but he was aware that some
plans were not subjective and did not involve active
decision making by the governing board, as occurred in
Alaska. He explained that in some plans, adjustments could
be triggered not necessarily by the funded status of the
plan, but if the rate of return for a particular year fell
below a certain level. He added that each state with risk
sharing provisions had different mechanisms, and some of
the mechanisms were automatic rather than discretionary,
unlike in Alaska where ARMB had the ultimate authority.
Representative Tomaszewski asked whether it would be more
reasonable to make the plan more fluid by having automatic
adjustments to keep the plan afloat, rather than subjecting
changes to the discretion of the board. He asked whether
automatic triggers that could maintain the fund at 100
percent funded would improve the plan.
Mr. Kershner responded that he believed that automatic
adjustments would provide additional protection. For
example, if the trust fund fell below 90 percent, the board
could currently increase the HB 78 member contribution
rate. However, if there were an automatic trigger that
mandated the rate increase to a defined level rather than
leaving the decision to the board, the automatic adjustment
would remove other discretionary factors. He clarified that
the intent of risk sharing provisions was to provide
protection. An automatic adjustment would ensure that the
provisions activated without reliance on the board's
judgment, which could be influenced by political or other
pressures.
4:18:32 PM
Co-Chair Foster relayed that he would have his staff reach
out to representatives who were not present during the
entire meeting to determine if they had questions or
desired a follow-up with Mr. Kershner.
HB 78 was HEARD and HELD in committee for further
consideration.
Co-Chair Foster reviewed the meeting agenda for the
following day.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| HB 78 Gallagher - Fiscal Note FY27-FY39 (UPDATED).pdf |
HFIN 4/29/2025 1:30:00 PM |
HB 78 |
| HB 78 Gallagher Presentation to HFIN 4.29.25.pdf |
HFIN 4/29/2025 1:30:00 PM |
HB 78 |
| HB 78 CS FIN WorkDraft 042925 v.N.pdf |
HFIN 4/29/2025 1:30:00 PM |
HB 78 |