







CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

Representative Andy Josephson

32nd Legislature

SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

- Sec 1. Contribution limits on individuals



		\$700	House of Representatives*
		\$1,000	Senator
		\$1,500	Governor
		\$1,000	Groups*
		\$5,000	Political parties

*Applies to municipal races, judges seeking retention, and delegates to a constitutional convention

*Groups or PACs that give directly to candidates

SECTIONAL

- Sec. 2* Limits on groups that are not political parties



Double the limits
of an individual

Candidates

Other groups

Political parties

*Section 3 duplicates the language for nongroup entities.


SECTIONAL

- Sec. 4 Joint campaigns for governor and lieutenant governor



\$3,000

Joint campaign for governor and lieutenant governor.



\$6,000

SECTIONAL

- Sec. 5 Indexing for inflation.
- Sec. 6 Limiting nonresident contributions to 50% of a candidate's total contributions during the campaign.


BILL PROPOSAL AND GOAL

Maintain the spirit of previous law and Alaskans' preferences as closely as possible while staying in the confines of the Constitution. Combat corruption and the appearance of corruption in our elections.

HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS IN ALASKA

- 1974: AK Leg passes \$1,000 contribution limit.
- 1996: Legislature lowers the limit to \$500 to pre-empt a ballot initiative.
- 2003: Legislature raises the limit back to \$1,000.
- 2006: Ballot initiative passes with 73% support for limit to be lowered back to \$500.
- 2021: *Thompson v. Hebdon* 9th Circuit finds Alaska's \$500 limit unconstitutional and APOC reverts to \$1,000 + inflation = \$1,500.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY




HISTORICAL LIMITS IN TODAY'S DOLLARS


Year	Historical Value	Value in Today's Dollars (10/2021)
1974	\$1,000* (Legislative)	\$5,900 ¹
1996	\$500 (Ballot pre-empting)	\$895
2003	\$1,000 (Legislative)	\$1,522 ²
2006	\$500 (Ballot)	\$697 ³

1. The legislature also limited campaign expenses severely to 40% of the equivalent of the state's population. This lowered the impact of the high contribution limit.
2. This is where APOC derived the source of their \$1,500 estimate.
3. This is where this bill derives its starting point for House races.


House contribution limits over a calendar year



Senate contribution limits over a calendar year



Governor contribution limits over a calendar year



STATE BY STATE COMPARISON

	House	Senate	Governor	
Colorado	\$200	\$200	\$625	per election
<i>Adjusted to calendar year</i>	\$400	\$400	\$1,250	
Connecticut	\$250	\$1,000	\$3,500	per election
<i>Adjusted to calendar year</i>	\$500	\$2,000	\$7,000	
Delaware	\$600	\$600	\$1,200	per cycle
<i>Adjusted to calendar year</i>	\$600	\$600	\$1,200	
Maine	\$425	\$425	\$1,725	per election
<i>Adjusted to calendar year</i>	\$850	\$850	\$3,550	
Michigan	\$1,050	\$2,100	\$7,150	per cycle
<i>Adjusted to calendar year</i>	\$525	\$525	\$1,787	
Montana	\$180	\$360	\$710	per election
<i>Adjusted to calendar year</i>	\$360	\$720	\$1,420	
Vermont	\$1,050	\$1,580	\$4,210	per two-years
<i>Adjusted to calendar year</i>	\$525	\$790	\$2,105	


ALASKANS PREFER LOW LIMITS

- There have been two ballot initiatives to lower limits and reduce nonresident influence over Alaskan elections.
- The 1995 initiative quickly gained 32,000 signatures and put pressure on the legislature to pass a similar bill.
 - The Anchorage Daily News published this quote at the time:
 - “VECO's Pete Leathard said he fears the initiative might diminish the industry's influence.”
- The 2006 Ballot Initiative went to the ballot and passed with 73% of voters approving the measure.

April 28th, 1996 “Initiative targets politics as usual, overhaul makes a lot of changes, but how much difference isn’t clear.”

[Anchorage Daily News](#)

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES FOR GOVERNOR THROUGH INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES 2018



CONSTITUTIONALITY

- HB 245 passes contribution limit tests laid out in *Randall v. Sorrell*.
- The previous \$3,000 aggregate nonresident limit was found unconstitutional. The judge's opinion in the case also noted "while we do not foreclose the possibility that a state could limit out-of-state contributions in furtherance of an anti-corruption interest, Alaska's aggregate limit on what a candidate may receive is a poor fit." (*Thompson v. Hebdon*)

9TH CIRCUIT *THOMPSON V. HEBDON*

- The court considered five primary factors for the contribution limit:
 1. Does the limit “significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns?” **Yes**
 2. Are political parties subject to the same low limits as individuals? **No**
 3. Are volunteer services counted toward contribution limits? **No**
 4. Are the limits indexed for inflation? **No**
 5. Is there a “special justification” for a uniquely low limit? **No**

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THIS BILL: LIMITS ON INDIVIDUALS

- 1. Does the limit “significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns?” **This factor is improved**
- 2. Are political parties subject to the same low limits as individuals? **This factor was already satisfactory**
- 3. Are volunteer services counted toward contribution limits? **This factor was already satisfactory**
- 4. The limits are now indexed for inflation. **This factor is improved**
- 5. The limit is no longer uniquely low. **This factor is improved**

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

- Empirical studies have found links between large contributions and public trust in government.
- One study found that “a large majority of Americans believe that the campaign finance system contributes to corruption in government.”
 - *Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law*, 153 U. Pa. Law Review 119, 120 (2004)
- Another found that “members’ dependency on outside contributions draws them in a more extremely liberal or extremely conservative ideological direction that is counter to the ideological preferences of the districts they represent.”
 - *Getting Short-Changed? The Impact of Outside Money on District Representation*, [97 Social Science Quarterly](#)