

# State of Alaska Office of Management and Budget

## Senate Joint Resolution 6 *Alaska Spending History & Appropriation Limits*



THE STATE  
of **ALASKA**  
GOVERNOR MICHAEL J. DUNLEAVY


## Current Constitutional Spending Limit (Article 9, Section 16)

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
- Limit set at \$2.5 billion, plus inflation and population growth since 1982
  - Calculation for FY20 would be about \$10.5 billion
- Spending subject to cap includes all UGF operating and capital expenditures, most statewide items, plus some DGF items
- Excludes PFDs, bond proceeds, debt service payments, non-State sources of revenue, public corporation revenues, and disaster declarations
- At least 1/3 of limit reserved for capital projects and loans
  - Can break the limit for capital projects, if approved by the voters.

# Current Limit Concerns

# Inflation and Population Adjusted UGF Spending



# UGF Spending History and Different Limits



## Considerations

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
- Not all government spending needs to grow with population
  - Teachers and troopers, maybe
  - Regulators and auditors, maybe not
- For 20 years, the State did not need inflation adjustments, even when they were allowed
- A high allowed rate of growth from a record high spending level leads to an ineffective limit



# Why Amending the Limit is Necessary


# Where Does the Current Path Lead?

No PFD, No Savings, and No Good Options for Future Alaskans






# UGF Spending History




Source: Legislative Finance Division

# UGF Spending History




# What if the Proposed Spending Cap Passed before Oil Prices Spiked?



\*Assumes oil tax credits would have reduced revenue rather than become budget items, and that contributions to unfunded pension obligations would be excluded from the cap


# Size of Permanent Fund if Proposed Spending Limit was in Place before Oil Prices Spiked?

## With Proposed Spending Limit




Note: Roughly half of the additional balance comes from money not allowed to be spent, the rest comes from compounding interest on those savings

## Current Situation



Source: APFC, Treasury Division, and ERG calculations

# What Actually Happened



# The Governor's Plan




## Governor's Constitutional Amendments

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Three constitutional amendments were introduced to provide sustainability, predictability, and affordability for Alaska:

- **SJR 6: Set an annual spending and savings rule to stabilize spending and grow the Permanent Fund.**
- SJR 5: Changes to the current PFD formula would require a vote of the people– Alaska is an owner state.
- SJR 4: Require a vote of the people before the implementation or increase of any tax.

# Where Does Governor Dunleavy's Plan Lead?



# Comparing the Current Limit to the Proposed Limit

# Appropriation Limit (SJR 6/HJR 7)


Big picture:

- Current appropriation limit is so high that the limit is never met
- Constitutional Amendment changes the current appropriation limit to be more meaningful and impactful over time
- Deposits excess revenues annually into savings
- Changes the Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund to the Savings Reserve Fund and limits spending and fund size

# Appropriation Limit: Section 1(a)

- Appropriation Limit – “Appropriations made for a fiscal year **shall not exceed** the average of the appropriations made in the previous three fiscal years by more than **fifty percent of the cumulative change in population and inflation since January 1 of the previous calendar year**, derived from federal indices as prescribed by law, **or two percent, whichever is less.**”
  - Provides a **list of exceptions** for spending that falls outside the appropriation limit cap
  - Examples: permanent fund dividends and money placed in the fund; money for disasters; obligations and proceeds from G.O. bonds and revenue bonds
  - Most substantial change from existing exceptions--**capital spending is not an exception** and falls within the appropriation limit cap

# Illustration of Total Budget and Appropriation Limit





## Calculation of Appropriation Limit

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The lesser of:

$$(\text{Year}_{-3} + \text{Year}_{-2} + \text{Year}_{-1})/3 \times (1 + (\text{Inf} + \text{Pop})/2)$$

OR

$$(\text{Year}_{-3} + \text{Year}_{-2} + \text{Year}_{-1})/3 \times (1.02)$$

$$\text{Year}_{-3} = \$5.4$$

$$\text{Year}_{-2} = \$5.5$$

$$\text{Year}_{-1} = \$5.6$$

$$\text{Inflation} = 2.25\%$$

$$\text{Population Growth} = 1\%$$

Then:


$$(5.4 + 5.5 + 5.6)/3 \times (1 + (.0225 + .01)/2) = \text{limit}$$

$$16.5/3 \times (1 + (.0325/2)) = \text{limit}$$

$$5.5 \times 1.01625 = \text{limit}$$

$$5.6 = \text{limit}$$

# Comparison of Current Limit to Proposed Limit



# Appropriation Limit: Section 1(b) and (c)

- Excess revenues would automatically be deposited into savings accounts in priority order

**Total amount in general fund that is “unexpended, unobligated, and unappropriated” (i.e., excess revenues)**


**Priority #1:** Pay back the permanent fund principal 50% of the income that was deposited into the ERA that fiscal year

**Priority #2:** *[if money remains after priority #1]* Get savings reserve fund balance up to appropriation limit (formerly the CBR)


**Priority #3:** *[if money remains after priority #2]* Put money into permanent fund principal to continue growing the fund

# Appropriation Limit: Sections 2, 3, and 5

## Existing Budget Reserve Fund



## New Savings Reserve Fund



## Conclusion

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- The current spending limit is ineffective
- Without an effective limit, government spending will continue to grow
- Without an effective savings rule, future generations will have less than we have today.
- Growth in government will lead to a depletion in savings, the erosion of the PFD program, or the introduction of broad-based taxes
  - Given time, it will require all three

# Questions?