



**House Resources**  
**HB 111**  
**February 24, 2017**

*Pat Galvin*  
*Chief Commercial Officer*  
*and General Counsel*

## HB 111 – WHAT ARE YOU TRYING TO ACHIEVE?

HAS IT ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED? – DOES IT HAVE SIDE-EFFECTS THAT OUT-WEIGH THE OBJECTIVE?

- "The State can't afford to keep paying these tax credits"
- Want to increase State revenue while still attracting new investment leading to production



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Are Tax Credit Payment  
Obligations Still “Out of Control”?


## Are Credits Still “Out of Control”?

MOST HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED OR EXPIRED IN THE PAST YEAR

How things looked last year...

### *History of Oil and Gas Production Tax Credits*

- Tremendous growth in non-North Slope (almost entirely Cook Inlet) refunded credits since FY10




Source: DOR Presentation 2/2/16

## Are Credits Still “Out of Control”?

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- **HB 147 eliminated Cook Inlet Credits.**
- **EIC's expired last year.**

**Most tax credit cash outflows are now gone.**

Source: DOR Presentation 2/2/16

# \$35M TAX CREDIT REFUND LIMIT WILL HAVE A LARGE IMPACT

STATE'S EXPOSURE TO LARGE CASH OUTLAYS HAS BEEN GREATLY REDUCED ALREADY

## *History of Oil and Gas Production Tax Credits*

**FY 2007 thru 2015, \$7.4 Billion in Credits**

### **North Slope**

- \$4.3 billion credits against tax liability
  - Major producers; mostly 20% capital credit in ACES and per-taxable-barrel credit in SB21
- \$2.1 billion refunded credits
  - New producers and explorers developing new fields

### **Non-North Slope (Cook Inlet & Middle Earth)**

- \$100 million credits against tax liability
  - Another \$500 to \$800 million Cook Inlet tax reductions (through 2013) due to the tax cap still tied to ELF
- \$900 million refunded credits (most since 2013)

**\$3.0 Billion total  
cash refunds over 9-  
years.**

SOURCE: DOR Presentation 2/2/16

# \$35M TAX CREDIT REFUND LIMIT WILL HAVE A LARGE IMPACT

STATE'S EXPOSURE TO LARGE CASH OUTLAYS HAS BEEN GREATLY REDUCED ALREADY

## *Bill Analysis: Section 9 (cash limits)*

### Notes on large annual credits

Over the 2007-2016 history of the tax credit program:

- There has only been **one** instance of a company who ever received **> \$200** million in a single year
- **Five** times ever when one company received between **\$100 - \$200** million in one year
- **11** times ever when one company received between **\$50 - \$100** million in one year

~ \$250M

~ \$500M - \$1B

~ \$550M - \$1.1B

Of the \$500 million existing unpurchased certificates:

- **Three** different companies are holding **\$100 million+**

~ **\$1.3B - \$2.3B**

Would have been spread  
over multiple years

SOURCE: DOR Presentation 2/17/17

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HAS IT ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED? – DOES IT HAVE SIDE-EFFECTS THAT OUT-WEIGH THE OBJECTIVE?

- "The State can't afford to keep paying these tax credits"
  - The most expensive tax credits have already been eliminated.
  - State's cash exposure has been largely mitigated already.
  - The remaining tax credit (NOL) is there to keep the playing field level between new entrants and incumbent producers.



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## KEEPING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

LONGSTANDING STATE DESIRE TO ATTRACT NEW PLAYERS/INVESTORS TO THE NORTH SLOPE

- Many of HB 111 provisions will be detrimental solely to new entrants.
- Following the changes incorporated in HB 147 last year, this will further tilt the economic advantages of the production tax system in favor of incumbents.
- Detrimental Provisions Include:
  - Lowering the NOL rate to 15%, below the effective tax rate of most incumbents.
  - Eliminating the refundability of NOL tax credits.
  - Not having a production threshold for the minimum tax floor means small producers who are also explorers will be negatively affected most often.



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## How Investments Are Treated – Incumbent vs. New Company

# IMMEDIATE TAX SAVINGS FOR INCUMBENT'S INVESTMENT

STATUS QUO & UNDER HB 111

- Assume an Incumbent with production tax obligations pursues a development requiring **\$1 billion** investment
- By reducing their Production Tax Value (PTV), the company **reduces their taxes** by the total expense multiplied by their effective tax rate:

$\$1,000 \text{ million} * (25\%*) \Rightarrow \text{worth } \$250\text{M}$

\*Effective tax rate will be different for different tax payers and at different oil prices. 25% is a reasonable placeholder as an example.

**\$1,000 Million Invested**

- **\$250 Million (Immediate Tax Savings)**

# REDUCED & DELAYED TAX BENEFIT FOR NEW ENTRANT'S INVESTMENT

UNDER HB 111

- Assume a new entrant with no current production tax obligations pursues an development project requiring **\$1 billion** in investment
- Company receives a 15% credit for its “tax loss” or “net operating loss (NOL)”, worth **\$150 million**
- *State does not refund*

**\$1,000 Million Invested**

- **\$150 Million (Tax Credit Certificate)**
- Can apply against tax bill once production starts (so long as it doesn't drop below minimum tax), likely to take years to use

# DELAYED TAX BENEFIT FOR NEW ENTRANT INVESTMENT

## STATUS QUO

- Assume a new entrant with no current production tax obligations pursues an development project requiring **\$1 billion** in investment
- Company receives a 35% credit for its “tax loss” or “net operating loss (NOL)”, worth **\$350 million**
- *State might pay this rebate to the Company at \$35M per year (subject to appropriation risk).*

**\$1,000 Million**

- **\$350 Million (Paid over time)**
  - Up to \$35 Million per year refunded
  - Can apply against tax bill once production starts, likely to take years to use

# AFFECT ON EVERY ONE'S BOTTOM LINE

DISPARATE TREATMENT FOR THE SAME INVESTMENT

For the next two slides, let's assume the following:

- Incumbent and New Co are 50/50 partners on a \$2B project, with each paying \$1B.
- Incumbent agrees to buy any New Co tax credit certificate at 90 cents on the dollar.
- Incumbent's effective tax rate is 25%.

# AFFECT ON EVERY ONE'S BOTTOM LINE

UNDER HB 111

Assume Incumbent &  
New Co partner on \$2B  
project 50/50

Incumbent gets immediate tax savings of \$250M, reducing State revenue by \$250M

New company earns a tax credit of \$150M.

New Co sells the credit to Incumbent for \$135M, then Incumbent reduces tax payment to the State by \$150M

Incumbent spends **\$735M**  
 $\$1B - \$250M - \$15M = \$735M$

New Co spends **\$865M**  
 $\$1B - \$135M = \$865M$

Poor  
Project  
Alignment



# AFFECT ON EVERY ONE'S BOTTOM LINE

UNDER A "BALANCED" APPROACH – NOL RATE EQUAL TO EFFECTIVE TAX RATE & STATE PAYS CASH FOR CREDITS

Assume Incumbent & New Co partner on \$2B project 50/50

Incumbent gets immediate tax savings of \$250M, reducing State revenue by \$250M

New company earns a tax credit of \$250M.

New Co refunds the credit with the State for an immediate cash rebate of \$250M

Incumbent spends **\$750M**  
 $\$1B - \$250M = \$750M$

New Co spends **\$750M**  
 $\$1B - \$250M = \$750M$

Good  
Project  
Alignment

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## The “Hard Floor” and Small Producers

# THE HARD FLOOR AS DISINCENTIVE FOR PRODUCTION

## MUST AVOID A “PRODUCTION PENALTY” STRUCTURE

- Need to ensure that a company with 1,000 bbls/day production is not worse off than if it had zero production.
- Recognize that small producers will be spending on exploration as well. Since there is no ring-fencing, a little production from one field shouldn't erase or de-value NOL's earned through exploration in a different field.
- Retaining production thresholds before a minimum tax would apply can avoid such inefficiencies.

## SMALL PRODUCER CREDIT

DESTROYING THE VALUE OF THIS LIMITED CREDIT IS MORE DAMAGING THAN IT'S WORTH

- Not allowing the small producer credit to pierce the minimum tax floor is a mistake.
- No additional companies can become eligible for this credit.
- It will expire for each eligible company at different points over the next 10 years, most sooner rather than later.
- The State's exposure will lessen each year until all eligibility is gone.
- It is not refundable and cannot be carried forward.
- The credit is a large portion of the small producer's return expectation when sanctioned the project.
- It is a small item for the State, but a critical life-line for many small companies.




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Don't lose track of the  
need for exploration

# NEAR-TERM PRODUCTION IS A GOOD GOAL, BUT IT'S NOT THE ONLY GOAL


THE STATE'S LONG-TERM INTERESTS DEPEND ON EXPLORATION



**A Strong Exploration And Production System Must Keep Feeding the System with New Exploration**

# BALANCING REVENUE WITH INVESTMENT CLIMATE

A LONGSTANDING AND CONTINUAL CHALLENGE FOR STATE POLICY MAKERS







1.SOURCE: Presentation to SEN JUD, Oct. 31, 2007, Revenue Comm. Pat Galvin



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A LONGSTANDING AND CONTINUAL CHALLENGE FOR STATE POLICY MAKERS



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# SUMMARY

NEED TO FIX HB 111

- HB 111 in its current form is fatally flawed.
- Don't try to fix a problem that is no longer present.
- Don't put new companies at a disadvantage compared to incumbents.
- Be ever mindful of the trade-off between revenue to the state and impact to investment.
- Don't make changes that barely move the needle for the state, but create a critical burden for small exploration and production companies.