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The Honorable Dan Saddler, Co-Chair
The Honorable Steve Thompson, Co-Chair
House Military and Veterans' Affairs Special Committee
Alaska State House of Representatives
State Capitol
Juneau, AK 99801

Via email: Representative_Dan_Saddler@legis.state.ak.us
Representative_Steve_Thompson@legis.state.ak.us

Re: HB 234: Funeral Picketing and Protests
ACLU Review of Constitutional Issues

Dear Co-Chairs Saddler & Thompson:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide written testimony with respect to House Bill 234.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Alaska represents thousands of members and activists throughout Alaska who seek to preserve and expand the individual freedoms and civil liberties guaranteed by the United States and Alaska Constitutions. From that perspective, we wish to advise the Committee of our concern that the proposed bill, if enacted, would violate the rights of free speech and free assembly under the Alaska Constitution and the United States Constitution.

Bill Overview

The current draft of HB 234 proposes to amend the existing disorderly conduct statute, to criminalize the act of "knowingly engag[ing] in picketing with reckless disregard" that the picketing occurs within 150 feet of the boundaries of a "cemetery, mortuary, church, or other facility" and either during a funeral at that location or within an hour of the start or end of the funeral.

The bill goes on to define the term “funeral,” excluding a funeral procession from that definition. The bill also defines “picketing” as “protest activities . . . that disrupt or are undertaken to disturb a funeral.”

Freedom of Speech

Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, people have the freedom to speak without government interference. The freedom of speech is not absolute, *but government regulation of speech imposes a heavy burden on the government to justify the nature of its regulation and to show that alternative means of vindicating the government interests were inadequate.*

A. The Bill Would Regulate Speech on Sidewalks, a Traditional Public Forum

The present bill directly regulates speech on its face. “[P]rotest activities” are expressive activity, by the very basic meaning of the word “protest.” “Picketing” has long been recognized as expressive activity. *See, e.g., Carey v. Brown*, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).

Based on the broad scope of the bill and the real world context of the activities regulated, the bill would criminalize certain expressive activity both on one’s own private property – assuming the private property lay within 150 feet of a cemetery or church – as well as on a sidewalk or public park, which are recognized as “traditional public forums” for public speech. *Hill v. Colorado*, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000).

Given that the bill directly regulates speech **on one’s own property and in traditional public forums**, the bill will be subject to the most careful scrutiny by a court, demanding that the restriction be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” *Frisby v. Schultz*, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (citation omitted).

B. The Bill is Not Content-Neutral, But Only Regulates Protest Activities

“The right to free speech . . . may not be curtailed simply because the speaker's message may be offensive to his audience.” *Hill*, 530 U.S. at 716. For that reason, most restrictions on speech must be content-neutral, meaning that the regulation of speech may not refer to the content of the speech. *Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.*, 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994). By contrast, content-neutral restrictions on speech in a public forum describe the time, place, and manner in which speech may be made, and must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). Examples of a content-neutral regulation would include an ordinance against using a loudspeaker over a particular volume or after a certain hour.

In the recent funeral picketing case, the United States Supreme Court did admit that some state laws establishing a buffer zone would be analyzed differently (which does not necessarily mean that they would be *constitutional*), but only to “the extent [such state] laws are content neutral.” *Snyder v. Phelps*, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011).

HB 234 appears to refer to the content of speech, and is thus not content-neutral. The term “protest activities” suggests that only the speech of those presenting a negative viewpoint would be affected by the regulation. Under the bill, a person loudly stating that the US military is contributing to the decline of moral values would presumably be engaged in “protest activities,” while a person loudly stating that we must honor our veterans would not be engaged in “protest activities.”¹ *Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 482. Therefore, the conduct prohibited is not merely traditional picketing, but protesting, oppositional speech. *Snyder*, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (noting that the claims of the offended plaintiffs “turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself”).

Heightening the inference that the bill is intended to discriminate between those presenting supporting views and those presenting opposing views at a funeral, the bill also prohibits activities that “disrupt or are undertaken to disturb a funeral.” But in the context of the bill’s language, activities that “disrupt” or “disturb” would likely be viewed in light of their content, rather than a neutral standard. “Disrupting” or “disturbing” entails that the activities run contrary to the purpose or plan of the funeral. Loud noises, such as amplified speech or, as has become more common at funerals, the loud revving of motorcycle engines may be viewed as non-disruptive when the expressive conduct accords with the purpose of the funeral, but disruptive when it is not. **Favoring certain expressive activity over another in regulating picketing violates the First Amendment.** *Carey*, 447 U.S. at 470. Notably, in one of the only cases upholding such a law, the parties *stipulated* that the law was content-neutral, rather than contesting the law’s neutrality. *Phelps-Roper v. Strickland*, 539 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2008).

C. The Legislative History Suggests Lack of Content-Neutrality

Finally, the legislative history suggests that the bill was not intended to be content-neutral. The Sponsor Statement indicates that the bill “asks anyone within the area of a funeral service to conduct themselves in a respectful manner.” Sponsor Statement, HB 234. While most – if not indeed nearly all – of us, can agree that permitting funerals to proceed in a peaceful, quiet environment is a laudable goal, nonetheless the state may not legislate “respectful” behavior on the streets and sidewalks of Alaska, nor in the front yards of its citizens. *Olmer v. City of Lincoln*, 192 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting sign-holding outside churches was unconstitutional because it went “beyond the church building and

1. A protest is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as an “act of objecting or a gesture of disapproval.” By contrast, the general definition of “picketing” is merely “posting at a particular place.”

church property, and seeks to forbid peaceful communication on property belonging to the public, even though the communication may be completely truthful, and even though there is absolutely no physical interference with access to the church"). If "protest activities" that "disrupt" or "disturb" are any activities that are "disrespectful," the law clearly discriminates based on the content of the speech and cannot stand.

D. No Compelling Governmental Interest in Restricting Speech at Funerals

Given that the bill is not content-neutral, the question is then whether "protecting families at funerals during their time of grief" is a compelling state interest justifying a restriction on free speech. **The Constitution requires that "to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."** *Snyder*, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (emphasis added). The only cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld such laws have been content-neutral laws relating to the privacy of one's home. *Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 487-88 (upholding content-neutral ordinance banning picketing of a single home which made the resident a "prisoner" in his own home); *Rowan v. Post Office Dept.*, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (upholding statute permitting mail recipient to halt offensive mailings to his residence).

We emphasize that a funeral is a solemn occasion and that families in grief should be accorded the respect that such an occasion deserves. However, funerals are also traditionally public events, frequently held in places of worship or funeral homes that are open to the public. In Anchorage, for instance, numerous cathedrals and churches occupy the downtown area, as does a large cemetery. In Juneau, a Catholic cathedral and a Russian Orthodox church sit three blocks from the State Capitol. Expecting that one will neither see nor hear anything offensive in a heavily-trafficked public space is not reasonably comparable to an expectation that one can retire to one's private home without running a gauntlet of protestors.

While the members of the Westboro Baptist Church espouse an abhorrent ideology and express it in the most repulsive terms, this bill would affect all funerals and all protestors. Protesting a funeral, especially that of a public figure, may express an important view opposing an ideology or history of bad acts committed by the person being buried. Funerals are frequently centered around a eulogy, an opportunity to say complimentary things about the deceased. A protest outside a funeral may be an opportunity to present an alternative viewpoint about the deceased and to communicate it to passers-by.

Alternatively, when the death of an individual occurs under circumstances giving rise to matters of public concern, the funeral may be the locus of public debate. Famously, the lynching death of Emmett Till resulted in a dramatic funeral in Chicago which thousands of people attended; a dramatic moment that galvanized the civil rights movement. **A municipality could use the bill, for instance, to characterize angry or upset attendees at a funeral for a victim of a police shooting as "protestors" and arrest the attendees for disorderly conduct. A bill that restricts the freedom of speech on the basis of content is available for all kinds of mischief.**

E. The Bill Is Not Narrowly Tailored and Does Not Leave Adequate Avenues for Expression

Because the bill extends to 150 feet in every direction from a church, mortuary, funeral home, or cemetery where a funeral may take place, and extends from an hour before to an hour after a funeral, HB 234 unconstitutionally restricts speech in that it is neither narrowly tailored nor does it leave adequate avenues for expression. The only recognized constitutional interest at stake is the right of a listener in a private place to avoid being a captive audience to a message the listener has no desire to hear. *Phelps-Roper v. Strickland*, 539 F.3d at 364.

Funeral attendees are not a captive audience to a quiet protest, provided the protest does not enter the church or block the entrance to the church. *Olmer*, 192 F.3d at 1180-81. Funeral attendees may have to walk or drive past protestors holding signs that offend them, and might wish to avert their eyes for the period they would otherwise be exposed to the offensive messages. Clearly, protestors can be excluded from the funeral home, mortuary, cemetery, or church where the service takes place. **Thus, the statute is not narrowly tailored to the government interest in avoiding making funeral attendees a captive audience to the protest.**

Further, a primary function of a mortuary or funeral home is to serve as a space for funeral services. *Some funeral homes may hold more than one funeral in a day.* Given the length of services and the one hour window before and after the service when a protest may not take place, **HB 234 – as currently drafted – could prohibit even unrelated protests near a funeral home, for potentially many hours out of any given day.**

Since some important public buildings – likely sites for protests – are close to funeral homes, this would impose a serious burden. For instance, there is a funeral home across the street from the Atwood Building in Anchorage. An Episcopal church lies across the street from the Dena'ina Convention Center. A labor demonstration against a particular employer lacks the same efficacy if performed offsite. Employees at a business located next door to church, mortuary, funeral home, or cemetery would be unable to mount an effective protest about labor conditions if their protests had to start and stop every time a funeral was taking place. As an example, the Sheraton Hotel in Anchorage lies across the street from the municipal cemetery in the middle of downtown. Employees at similarly situated businesses could be seriously chilled from engaging in meaningful protests and could conduct regular, continuing protests only at the risk that someone would define their protests as “disrupt[ing]” the funeral service.

Last, the bill leaves open little alternative for those who actually wish to protest the church, funeral home, or cemetery in question, by mandating that the protestors stay at least 150 feet away from the property within an hour before or after funerals. Someone may seek to picket a church, such as to bring attention to victims of sexual assault. Someone may seek to picket a funeral home or a cemetery, such as in a labor dispute or a dispute about the policies of the business. While such protests may incidentally impact funeral attendees, the alternative would thwart the free expression of employees or those with legitimate concerns about the church, funeral home, or cemetery. Taken as a whole, the law would leave few alternatives open to those

who seek to protest outside public or private buildings that happen to be located near a church, funeral home, or cemetery, as well as those who seek to picket the church, funeral home, or cemetery itself.

The bill is not narrowly tailored to the legitimate state interests because the protestor must engage in picketing with "reckless disregard," rather than knowledge, that the picketing takes place within 150 feet of the site of a funeral and within one hour before or one hour after the funeral. "Recklessness" refers to a criminal law standard that a person consciously disregards a substantial risk of a certain condition being present. AS 11.81.900(a)(3). Presumably, there is a substantial "risk" that a funeral will take place at a church, funeral home, mortuary, or cemetery at any time. This standard unreasonably imposes on a protestor the duty of discovering whether or not a funeral is ongoing, recently took place, or will take place within an hour of a protest. Employees protesting labor conditions at the Sheraton will thus be required to find out if any funerals are taking place in the municipal cemetery on a day when they decide to protest. **Protesters should not be burdened with such a duty to discover whether a funeral is taking place at any given time.** Imposing the burden on protesters to discover when and whether a nearby church, cemetery, or funeral home is conducting a funeral leaves the law unreasonably ill-tailored to legitimate state interests and imposes an unconstitutional "protest at your own risk" policy.

Drafting Considerations

We suggest the Committee may wish to consider:

The protests staged by the Westboro Baptist Church express abhorrent views, for which the ACLU has no sympathy. Further, the manner in which they protest is deeply offensive. **The great maxim of free speech is that for all evil speech, "the remedy to be applied is *more speech*, not enforced silence."** *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927).

Rather than seeking to prohibit fools from saying foolish and hurtful words, we as a community should come together to show our appreciation for our service members and others in our community whose funerals may be subject to these protests. If the protests of a handful of people inspire a thousand people to come out to show their support and respect at a funeral, does that tribute not outweigh the ill words of a few? The true voice of Alaska should come out when a misguided minority threatens their protests, so we may show why their words are folly.

Second, the members of the Westboro Baptist Church thrive on the controversy and attention generated by their activity. They also thrive on the attorneys' fees generated when legislatures and municipal assemblies act hastily to prevent them from protesting. As truly painful as it is to watch such a protest unfold, it will surely be more galling to pay from the state treasury to facilitate more protests and more litigation by a tiny group of hateful individuals whose message has already received too much attention.

Conclusion

We hope that the Military and Veterans' Affairs Special Committee will recognize that these are just some of the constitutional infirmities in House Bill 234.

Thank you again for letting us share our concerns. Please feel free to contact the undersigned if you have any questions or wish additional information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. A. Mittman", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Jeffrey Mittman
Executive Director
ACLU of Alaska

cc: The Honorable Carl Gatto, Vice Chair, Representative_Carl_Gatto@legis.state.ak.us
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