Legislature(2019 - 2020)BUTROVICH 205
02/07/2019 01:30 PM Senate TRANSPORTATION
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| Audio | Topic |
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| Start | |
| Presentation(s): Impact of Earthquake on Transportation | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
SENATE TRANSPORTATION STANDING COMMITTEE
February 7, 2019
1:31 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Senator Shelley Hughes, Chair
Senator Peter Micciche
Senator Jesse Kiehl
MEMBERS ABSENT
Senator Mike Shower, Vice Chair
Senator David Wilson
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
PRESENTATION(S): IMPACT OF EARTHQUAKE ON TRANSPORTATION
- HEARD
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
No previous action to record
WITNESS REGISTER
DR. MICHAEL WEST, State Seismologist and Research Professor
University of Alaska Fairbanks
Fairbanks, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Participated in the presentation, "Impact of
Earthquake on Transportation."
DAVE KEMP, Central Regional Director
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Participated in the presentation, "Impact of
Earthquake on Transportation."
CHRIS HODGIN, Facilities Services Project Manager
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Participated in the presentation, "Impact of
Earthquake on Transportation."
RICH PRATT, Chief Bridge Engineer
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions related to the
presentation, "Impact of Earthquake on Transportation."
MARK DAVIS, Director
Division of Facilities Services
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions related to the
presentation, "Impact of Earthquake on Transportation."
ACTION NARRATIVE
1:31:48 PM
CHAIR SHELLEY HUGHES called the Senate Transportation Standing
Committee meeting to order at 1:31 p.m. Present at the call to
order were Senators Kiehl, and Chair Hughes. Senator Micciche
arrived soon thereafter.
^PRESENTATION(S): Impact of Earthquake on Transportation
PRESENTATION(S): Impact of Earthquake on Transportation
1:32:19 PM
CHAIR HUGHES stated that the only order of business would be a
presentation on the November 30 earthquake, how it happened, how
it was monitored, and how it impacted roads and public
facilities. She invited Dr. West to begin his presentation.
1:33:01 PM
DR. MICHAEL WEST, State Seismologist and Research Professor,
University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, said he directs the
Alaska Earthquake Center (AEC) that is most known for its rapid
assessment of earthquakes and the basic parameters such as where
they occur, how large it was, and the extent of the ground
shaking. Anyone who has visited coastal communities has likely
seen evacuation signs or signs that map the hazard zone for
tsunamis. Those are installed on safe zones determined through
research and products also put out by the Alaska Earthquake
Center.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if the Alaska Earthquake Center puts out both
the initial and the subsequent, more finely tuned, report
following an earthquake that is available through a phone app.
DR. WEST replied, "those are a glimpse into our workings of what
we do." He explained that when an earthquake begins, the
recordings come in from a number of different locations and are
put together for an initial assessment. As more data becomes
available, AEC's assessment of the magnitude and location
changes. He acknowledged that can sometimes cause consternation
but that's because the information is disseminated so quickly.
Information in generated through computer algorithms and it goes
out within a couple of minutes, before it's been reviewed by a
human. As an analysist goes through and adds and removes data it
evolves. For larger earthquakes like the one on November 30,
there can be some debate that can extend days or weeks after the
earthquake. He said magnitude is the best assessment and it is
dependent on the available data.
1:36:35 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE joined the committee.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if the last earthquake was magnitude 7.1 or
7.2.
DR. WEST replied there continues to be a vibrant discussion
among agencies that worked on this earthquake about whether it
was magnitude 7.0 and 7.1. And there's still a chance that
assessment could be revised.
DR. WEST said a third take away from the earthquake center is
the research to explain where and why different earthquakes
happen. He displayed a map on slide 4 that shows the 55,000
seismic events in Alaska that were large enough to be reported
in 2018. He said most of the events were very small, but they
paint a picture. Some of the earthquakes were the usual suspects
while others, like the January magnitude 7.5 earthquake off
Kodiak, are not anticipated. When this happens, there is
considerable research and analysis to put it in perspective and
specifically figure out what it means for the future.
He explained that the data from the past few slides are used to
develop building codes and the environmental review process for
any major projects. They also help determine insurance rates,
evacuation routes, and where shelters should be in coastal
community. He advised that any community that has a hazard
mitigation plan likely includes a seismic and/or tsunami
component.
1:38:48 PM
DR. WEST directed attention to AS 14.40.075 to show that the
legislature's directive sets the Alaska Earthquake Center's
general direction and responsibility to report under the
leadership of a state seismologist, a role he is currently
filling. He related that he pointed this out because he hopes
the legislature will view the earthquake center as a state
resource.
He displayed a map that shows the network of about 150
monitoring stations throughout the state. He said AEC operates a
majority of the stations, but they also have some partners in
this activity. He explained that when a seismic event occurs,
the recordings from each of the sites stream data live into the
headquarters in Fairbanks where it is assimilated into an
earthquake report. He displayed a slide depicting a typical
seismic station with a power system, sensor in the ground, and a
radio that communicates data back live. He noted that continuous
communication is a technical challenge during winter on the
North Slope, coastal storms, or in the Aleutians, but the
engineering to keep things running is something AEC is most
proud of.
DR. WEST related that he views the earthquake center as taking
the pulse of Alaska, because anything that moves the ground in a
significant way is reflected in the data that rolls through the
center. He displayed an example of 40 minutes of the data that
was recorded later in the morning of November 30. He explained
that each of the lines is a station that recorded about 50
aftershocks in that brief snapshot of time. It is the foundation
of what AEC does, he said.
1:41:37 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE asked why aftershocks are identified as such
instead of either another earthquake or one continuous
earthquake until things settle down.
DR. WEST clarified that an aftershock is no different than an
ordinary earthquake. However, when a large earthquake happens,
the earth has to adjust to the new position and that process
breeds many more, but generally smaller, earthquakes. Because
they're traceable back to the original earthquake, they are
referred to as aftershocks.
SENATOR MICCICHE asked if aftershocks are ever a larger
magnitude than the original event.
DR. WEST said yes. He advised that when an earthquake occurs
there is always a small statistical chance that it would trigger
a larger quake. Globally, the chance of that happening is one to
five percent, although it varies depending on the location. "You
have to look around and say, 'Well is there something reasonable
that may be triggered by this.'"
CHAIR HUGHES noted that after she downloaded the earthquake
application, she learned of a 7.0-7.2 magnitude quake in the
South Pacific that was followed by 7.9 magnitude earthquake. She
acknowledged that knowing that was a possibility made her more
nervous.
DR. WEST stressed that even before the November 30 earthquake,
AEC knew there was potential for something larger, whether
triggered or not.
1:44:47 PM
SENATOR KIEHL asked who AEC partners with to monitor earthquake
activity.
DR. WEST replied the Alaska Volcano Observatory has significant
instrumentation in the Aleutians, the Alaska Tsunami Center has
a handful of sites around the state, the U.S. Geological Survey
has a couple of sensors, and the Canadians are close partners.
He turned to slide 11 and noted that Alyeska is just one example
of a group that uses the seismic data to prioritize where
engineering resources and inspections should be focused and
where there is little risk.
He said AEC has answered a lot of questions (like those that
have come up today) over the last several weeks to try to put
perspective on the November 30 earthquake. He noted that a
recurring question has been whether that was a worse-case event.
The answer is that it was a learning experience, but Alaska's
history makes it clear that it was by no means a worse-case
event. While statistically not common, the 1964 earthquake
demonstrates the other kinds of earthquakes that are a
possibility. The lesson, he said, is that the next earthquake
will undoubtedly look different and be a surprise in some way.
CHAIR HUGHES asked him to talk about why the damage can be so
great in one location, but there can be almost no damage in
nearby locations. She pointed to slide 12 that depicts a section
of highway that was extensively damaged yet a mile down that
road there was almost no damage.
DR. WEST advised that zooming out on that picture would show
miles of road that were minimally impacted. Soil factors in
particular places led to different results. The experience was
the same in different neighborhood where the soils and
underlying geology is different and the response to an
earthquake is different.
CHAIR HUGHES characterized it as the difference between a bowl
of Jell-O and a bowl of ice cream. The shaking is the same, but
the Jell-O will jiggle more.
DR. WEST added that this earthquake occurred 30 miles beneath
the surface and while everywhere from Anchorage to Palmer to
Wasilla to Willow experienced the same basic forces, the
differences in impact was largely a result of the differences in
geology.
He reported that another question that has come up a lot is
whether there is the potential for this to occur elsewhere in
the state. He said the historical record provides a good
foundation to address the question. Southeast is certainly
capable of earthquakes of this magnitude, but the majority occur
out towards the coast. There is plenty of history for magnitude
7.0 earthquakes in the Interior, but they are less frequent than
in South Central.
1:50:58 PM
DR. WEST turned to slide 14 that responds to Senator Micciche's
earlier question about the distinction between an aftershock and
other earthquakes. Based on the last two months of aftershocks,
AEC anticipates that about a year from now the rate of
aftershocks will be low enough that it will be hard to
distinguish between an aftershock and the customary background
earthquakes. He acknowledged that that projection can change.
He said Eagle River, Palmer, Wasilla, and Willow experienced
roughly the same amount of shaking. But because Eagle River had
disproportionately high damage compared to the other places, it
was necessary to look at factors other than the earthquake
itself.
SENATOR MICCICHE asked if there was white paper on earthquakes,
and if there are earthquake categories that make Alaska more
earthquake prone.
DR. WEST offered to provide resources after the hearing to help
explain why Alaska is more earthquake prone.
CHAIR HUGHES noted that the presentation earlier today
highlighted that some schools suffered significant damage while
others had very light damage. The takeaway was that the soils
and geology as well as how and when the structures were built
are all factors. She, too, asked for follow-up information and
any available research to help understand the variability in
damage suffered in the November 30 earthquake and to be more
prepared going forward.
DR. WEST responded that if there is a silver lining to an event
like the November 30 earthquake, it is that it presents the
opportunity to do that research. "We don't get a lot of chances
to examine the societal impacts of an earthquake like this," he
said. That earthquake generated tremendous interest nationally
and internationally, particularly in the engineering world. A
number of teams came in motivated by the desire to help assess
which buildings were and were not safe and the opportunity to
learn from the event. This is how building codes advance. He
confirmed that significant research is ongoing, and the work
will continue for years.
1:57:09 PM
DR. WEST turned to slide 17. It is a map of Alaska that shows
the monitoring network through the state depicted by the
scattered white triangles. A map of California is overlaid on
Western Alaska that shows the highly concentrated
instrumentation in that state. He said he likens it to the
difference between doing astronomy with a Hubble Space Telescope
versus a pair of binoculars. He said the next slide provides a
concrete example. This brief introduction to the concept of
earthquake early warning is an operational reality in Southern
California and is in testing across the entire West Coast of the
U.S. - Washington, Oregon, and California, he said. The basic
premise is that if detection is early enough to warn ahead of
the seismic waves, people will receive some advance notice.
CHAIR HUGHES asked him to clarify that in this instance, the
western coast of the U.S. does not include Alaska.
DR. WEST confirmed that Alaska is not part of that system. He
continued to say that he uses this as an example of the kind of
federal initiative occurring in the nation that Alaska is not
part of because of a lack of foundation on which to build such a
thing.
CHAIR HUGHES pointed out that this is despite the fact that four
out of five earthquakes that occur are in Alaska.
DR. WEST agreed; the pie chart on slide 16 demonstrates that
four out of five earthquakes in the U.S. occur in Alaska.
SENATOR MICCICHE asked where you put your money; in an early
warning system that might provide 10-15 seconds of advance
warning or in better engineering for structures and other safety
precautions that are beneficial.
DR. WEST responded it's an excellent question.
He displayed slides 19 and 20 that show the monitoring network
throughout Alaska. He pointed to the yellow and orange dots
throughout the state and explained they are part of a massive,
temporary deployment by the National Science Foundation. It is a
3-4 year experiment recording high resolution data. The
earthquake center and the state have been the tremendous
beneficiary of this experiment, but it all goes away in 2020.
All the instrumentation represented by the dots will be removed
and the state will revert to the monitoring system it's had in
the past. Responding to a question from the chair, he confirmed
that the red dots, which have built over the years by the
earthquake center and others, would remain.
SENATOR KIEHL asked if this means he'll get fewer and less
reliable tweets from the earthquake center.
DR. WEST replied there will be fewer and less reliable tsunami
warnings, less reliable tweets, more jitter in the magnitude,
less clarity in the information, and less resolution in where
the shaking was and was not strong.
CHAIR HUGHES advised that in an earlier meeting Dr. West said
the National Science Foundation has run this experiment across
the U.S. and a number of states have elected to purchase and
retain the monitors in their states. She said that is an option
for Alaska and Dr. West has been working on it with the Alaska
delegation. She asked him to talk about the fact that the
federal government is more focused on the Lower 48 and that
Alaska is a bit "behind the 8 ball" regarding monitors.
DR. WEST offered his perspective that on the national level,
Alaska is often treated as a backwater. Alaska has a lower
population and doesn't fit the national mold in a number of
ways. He said he's quite comfortable saying that there has been
a decades long, chronic lack of federal investment in the
earthquake monitoring system in Alaska.
CHAIR HUGHES asked him to update the committee on the
conversations he's had with the congressional delegation about
retaining the instrumentation.
DR. WEST explained that for the last few years the university
has had a significant initiative to retain about half of this
federal instrumentation network. Engagement at the federal level
has been excellent and has included initial funds from various
federal agencies. He emphasized that the congressional
delegation has been outstanding in its support. There is real
potential to sustain this facility for long-term operation
through the support of multiple federal agencies that are using
this data live today, he said.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if he agrees that another silver lining of
the November 30 earthquake is an increased awareness at the
federal level.
DR. WEST replied that particular earthquake ought to be
instrumental in helping build the case but between the holidays
and the federal shutdown there has not been much interaction
with their federal partners. However, a day doesn't go by that
there aren't high-level discussions with NOAA, USGS, the
National Science Foundation, and others, he said.
DR. WEST noted that a capital request in the university's
budget, that predates the November 30 earthquake, includes
starter funds to retain some of the federal monitors.
2:06:07 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE asked if there are about 185 monitoring
stations currently in Alaska.
DR. WEST agreed and added that retaining 80 sites would put
Alaska on par with basic capabilities across the Lower 48.
He noted that the university has a capital request in the
university's budget for $300 million. He related that the yellow
dots on slide 20 reflect what they envision in federal support.
He said this has been a heavy lift and reiterated that the
capital request is intended to help in the next few years to
bring in the full support of the federal agencies.
2:07:36 PM
DR. WEST emphasized that building codes in Alaska are ultimately
premised on the history of the seismic data, including the
earthquakes that took everyone by surprise. He also reminded the
committee to keep the tsunami component on the radar because in
Alaska they are both part of the "same bad day." He directed
attention to slide 24 that demonstrates that the main road in
and out of Seward is well within the tsunami zone. The next
earthquake will look different than the last and it's very
plausible that the next significant event will include a tsunami
component. He also stressed the importance of instrumental
recording. To know whether Eagle River actually shook harder
than downtown Anchorage, instruments that record the data have
to be in place and working. He directed attention to slide 25
that shows the seismometers in key locations throughout
Fairbanks. He noted that many of the instruments are at schools,
which is a double benefit. Partnering provides better monitoring
data and it provides information about particular facilities. He
highlighted that a handful of bridges are instrumented,
generally through the U.S. Geological Survey. Looking at doing
things better, he recommended finding key places to include
instrumentation so there is hard data to work with. He noted
that is a policy recommendation from the Seismic Hazard Safety
Commission.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if she heard correctly that there are no
monitors in Eagle River and Chugiak.
DR. WEST replied there is one recording instrument at the fire
station in Chugiak but none in Eagle River. He related that the
maps that show shaking are based on point measurements put
together with algorithms. He emphasized that they are estimates
and can't be expected to replace actual measurements.
CHAIR HUGHES offered her understanding that he had checked on a
seismic instrument located in the Capitol that was installed 50
years ago.
DR. WEST confirmed that he did check on an instrument that the
building manager found several months ago. He will do further
forensic work, but he suspects that it dates back to the 1960s.
He noted that the building currently is not instrumented but
that will be remedied going forward. He added that it's an
example of instrumenting key facilities.
2:12:21 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE directed attention to slide 25, "seismometers
in key locations." He drew a parallel between the movement at
the top of a multistory building during an earthquake and the
movement on the flying bridge of a vessel when the water is
rough. He asked if there is a lag and that the movement at the
top is more intense.
DR. WEST confirmed that the slide, which reflects the five
recordings from the UAF engineering building, shows
progressively larger movement going toward the fifth floor.
Instrumented buildings in Anchorage, such at the Atwood Building
and the Hilton, provide even better examples of this phenomenon.
He recalled that the recordings at the top of the Hilton were
three times what they were on the ground level and this is
expected. Buildings are engineered and built to accommodate
this.
CHAIR HUGHES asked him to continue.
DR. WEST restated his final talking point which was that the
next earthquake will not be a repeat of November 30, 2019. "We
need to be careful not to think of how to plan for that specific
event. It will be different."
2:14:14 PM
CHAIR HUGHES thanked Dr. West for the presentation and his work.
She invited Mr. Kemp and Mr. Hodgin from the Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF) to the table.
2:15:08 PM
DAVE KEMP, Central Regional Director, Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF), Anchorage, related
that, for him, the earthquake started last March with the Eagle
River bridge strike. When that happened, he realized that the
department was not properly prepared for that kind of emergency.
To remedy the situation, training was initiated using FEMA's
Incident Command System. He explained that this is a method of
dividing responsibilities and running tabletop exercises so
everyone will understand their role and be ready to go should an
incident occur. Part of the process was to use the incident
command structure to practice on simulated incidents such as
avalanches, minor flooding, and additional bridge strikes.
CHAIR HUGHES asked where the incident command center for the
exercises was located.
MR. KEMP replied it was in the DOTPF aviation building at the
airport. Continuing the presentation, he displayed an example of
the substantial damage to the DOTPF deputy director's office.
His office just down the hall suffered almost no damage. He also
displayed the example of the severely damaged section of the
Glenn Highway near Mirror Lake.
CHAIR HUGHES opined that somebody is looking out for Alaskans
when this much damage occurs without serious injuries or death.
"It makes me incredibly grateful," she said.
MR. KEMP highlighted some of the close calls that motorists had.
He reviewed the immediate response timeline following the
Friday, November 30 earthquake:
• 8:29 a.m. 7.0 earthquake followed several minutes later by
a 5.7 aftershock
• 8:35 a.m. Aviation Building evacuated and cleared
• 8:44 a.m. First DOT&PF Facebook post reporting damage and
establishing hashtag #AlaskaEarthquake
• 9:30 a.m. DOT&PF Emergency Operations Center (EOC) up and
running
• 10:15 a.m. Traffic control & Anchorage Police Department on
site Minnesota & International
• 10:30 a.m. Repairs started on Minnesota & International
• 11:08 a.m. Earthquake webpage up and running to inform the
public
• 11:34 a.m. First electronic Situation Report published
He related a story about someone who complained that the road
damage at Minnesota and International was fixed so quickly he
didn't have an opportunity to view the damage.
2:19:56 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE asked if the department had a website to keep
the public informed before the earthquake.
MR. KEMP replied the public information officer posts on their
website, Facebook, and Twitter to keep the public informed about
events such as floods, avalanches, and other things. This is
ongoing.
MR. KEMP displayed a picture of the incident command structure
that was up and running in two hours and was operational 24/7
from November 30 to December 3. There were day and night
incident commanders, a public information officer, and
individuals in charge of maintenance, contracting, and design.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if implementation went smoothly because of
the training or if they learned things to add to the list for
the next event.
MR. KEMP deferred the question to later in the presentation. He
related that he was confident as incident commander because a
number of people on staff are former military and had been
through trainings and actual incident commands. He cited an
example to demonstrate that the transition from incident command
to project management was smooth.
SENATOR KIEHL asked how many contingent locations were
identified.
MR. KEMP replied the one fallback location was the annex where
Public Facilities is located, and it suffered more damage than
the primary location. Mr. Hodgin's team conducted a structural
inspection to make sure things were safe. He noted that air
quality was a concern and they didn't have masks so those are on
the list. He admitted that he showed the office with the worst
damage and highlighted that downstairs suffered very limited
damage.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if he was aware of any incident command plans
and identified locations for the other regions of the state.
2:24:18 PM
MR. KEMP replied he was not aware of any plans for other areas
but people from all the different regions came together to make
the response a success.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if he would follow up, so the legislature is
sure that all regions of the state have a similar plan and are
prepared for a disaster.
MR. KEMP said yes.
2:24:59 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE observed that the ICS structure appeared to be
more fit for this purpose than the military ICS structure. He
asked if this is a nation model for a department of
transportation response.
MR. KEMP replied the model came directly from FEMA and the ICS
leadership team took all the courses that were offered. He
agreed that it is a little different than the military ICS.
He continued to say that the next steps were to: 1) determine
the extent of the damage, 2) prioritize which work to do, 3)
communicate the priorities with the team (staff, consultants and
contractors), and 4) communicate with the public.
MR. KEMP listed the five sources of information used to
determine the extent of the damage: 1) maintenance staff in the
field, 2) bridge inspectors, 3) construction teams, 4)
consultant team, and 5) the public.
2:27:36 PM
MR. KEMP displayed a map that shows some of the 160 locations
that have been identified as DOTPF highway damage sites. He
explained that FEMA allows 180 days to identify and start
working on repairs. Because this is mid-winter, a 90-day
extension was granted.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if he expects to see more damage after
breakup than in a typical spring.
MR. KEMP said yes; he's seeing new bumps and humps on Minnesota
every day on his way to work. It's a concern that there may be
changes in slope stability and culvert damage that isn't readily
apparent.
He stressed that a key issue is the ability for the leadership
team, staff, consultants, and contractors to communicate with
one another. If cellphones and email doesn't work, radios are
the fallback so it's important that they're in working condition
with fresh batteries and people know how to use them.
MR. KEMP advised that to keep the public informed the public
information officer was on social media and updated the webpage
continually. He opined that the PIO did an excellent job.
2:30:51 PM
To demonstrate how quickly repairs were made, he displayed a
picture of the damage to the Minnesota Drive northbound onramp
to the airport immediately after the earthquake and four days
later on December 4, 2018 after it was repaired. He said it was
a unique experience to do things without permits or budgets and
it was fun to lead a team that was dedicated to effecting
repairs as quickly as possible.
MR. KEMP directed attention to the pictures of the Willow
Fishhook Road on November 30 just after the earthquake and on
December 10 after the apron slope and some of the asphalt was
repaired. He said the majority of the repairs that were done
will need to be done again because they were done in the winter
when paving generally isn't done.
2:32:37 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE observed that there might be some commonality
between the damaged sections of highway. He asked if they took
enough time to understand the factors that led to the failures
so that different construction methods could be used in the
future.
MR. KEMP explained that when they revisit the sites in the
spring, geotechnical investigation will be done to look at what
led to the failure and to ensure that the follow-up repair is
permanent. He added that they will look at bridge failures the
same way.
SENATOR MICCICHE cited Turnagain Arm bridge failures in the 1964
earthquake and the pancake bridges on the LA interstate and said
the relationship of VSM versus horizontal structures is very
complicated. He asked if that is something that DOTPF will also
evaluate.
MR. KEMP deferred to Richard Pratt, the chief bridge engineer
for DOTPF.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if small planes and drones were used to
assess the damage.
MR. KEMP replied most of the photos came from drones. Each of
the maintenance stations has a drone to respond to incidents, so
people at the incident command center could see what someone was
talking about. They also use Survey 123, which is an application
that allows someone with a cellphone or laptop to take a picture
that has GPS coordinates.
2:36:50 PM
CHAIR HUGHES recalled encouraging DOTPF to start using drones
four years ago.
MR. KEMP displayed pictures of the Glenn Highway at Mirror Lake
on November 30 after the earthquake and on December 5 after the
repair. He said this damage didn't get as much press as
Minnesota International, but it was high risk and had the
potential to lose both northbound and southbound lanes because
of sloughing. Transportation departments across the U.S. asked
how the repairs were done so quickly and he credited Alaska
contractors and their attitudes.
He displayed pictures of the damage on the Glenn-Parks
Interchange that will need geotechnical exploration to determine
why it failed where it did.
A picture of the northbound lane of the Eagle River bridge shows
a three inch drop at the break in the asphalt. The contractors
milled it down and traffic was back on the bridge fairly
quickly.
Pictures of the Seward Highway at Dowling show cracks running
through the asphalt. The only reason this sort of damage was
identified is that there was very little snow. The public,
contractors, consultants, and crews all feed information to DOT
about this sort of damage.
MR. KEMP displayed a picture of the extensive damage the Briggs
Bridge and pedestrian tunnel suffered when a waterline ruptured.
The department is working with the Anchorage Water & Wastewater
Utility (AWWU) on these repairs. He pointed to the rockfall
damage on the Seward Highway and described the challenges
presented by the high vertical rock face alongside the highway
that routinely sloughs. The road was reopened quickly but this
corridor routinely presents problems. Cutting the entire rock
face back is cost-prohibitive and a landslide consultant has
been engaged to advise on interim solutions.
2:42:20 PM
He displayed pictures of the earthquake damage to Vine Road and
the repairs the department quickly effected in partnership with
Mat-Su. He pointed out that the crew not only repaired and paved
the road in the winter, but also striped the new asphalt. He
noted that this section is another that will likely need to be
rebuilt. The road failed where it crossed a slough as opposed to
either side that is forested and suffered no damage. He said the
soils in that area are probably unstable, but that geotechnical
investigation will help explain why and how this happened.
SENATOR MICCICHE commented that it's obvious where this failed
and it appears to be a prime candidate to reevaluate whether a
bridge versus a ground-based highway is applicable.
MR. KEMP turned to slides 26 and 27 to discuss the results of
the hot wash method of road repair and the three meetings to
discuss what they learned about improvements going forward. He
noted that the incident command center lacked an areawide map,
and equipment that wasn't available included masks for those
inspecting buildings and a sniffer to detect gas leaks.
CHAIR HUGHES asked if the Central Region planned to share that
information with the other regions.
MR. KEMP said yes.
2:45:22 PM
MR. KEMP turned to slide 28 and listed the following current
activities: [original punctuation provided]
1. Identify additional damage due to earthquake &
aftershocks (Ongoing)
2. Request additional support to deliver our normal
program & all of the addition earthquake work (Request
submitted)
3. Request 90 day extension of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) 180 day time limit for
earthquake damage (Approved)
4. Accounting, negotiating and paying for all the
emergency work (Ongoing)
5. Establishing contracts for all the 160+ locations
that will require permanent repairs (Ongoing)
6. FEMA disaster declaration (Approved)
7. Current contracts total $7.27M
CHAIR HUGHES asked if the FEMA dollars go directly to DOTPF,
bypassing the legislative appropriation process.
MR. KEMP said he'd follow up with the answer.
MR. KEMP concluded the presentation highlighting the response
Central Region gave to other state transportation departments
that asked, "How did DOT do that in Alaska?"
• Last spring, we realized that we were not sufficiently
prepared to perform during an emergency.
• We undertook training and practiced what we learned in our
training.
• We have a very close working relationship and trust with
the contracting community.
• We are fortunate to have contractors who were ready, able
and willing to get to work immediately with only a
handshake.
• Alaskans know if we don't do it, there isn't going to be
anyone else coming to help.
2:49:25 PM
SENATOR KIEHL asked for a ballpark estimate of how much higher
the repairs will be because this occurred in the winter.
MR. KEMP said he could not give a percentage, but the head of
construction for the region says that the bills so far seem to
be reasonable considering the level of effort that was put
forth.
SENATOR KIEHL asked for a follow up once the numbers crystalize.
CHAIR HUGHES asked him to forward the information to her office.
She asked Mr. Hodgin if he had anything to add.
2:51:00 PM
CHRIS HODGIN, Facilities Services Project Manager, Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF), Anchorage said he
and Mr. Pratt would give an overview of the response metrics, a
high level look at the damage and repair efforts, and the steps
moving forward.
He related that the immediate actions included team welfare and
safety checks and an assessment of needs for the response
center. They assembled a response center at the facility annex
to liaison with the DOTPF headquarters response center. This
included support personnel from Anchorage, Fairbanks, and
Juneau. At the same time, facilities maintenance people were
deployed to do rapid evaluations of the facilities and ascertain
the immediate repair needs to open the facilities as soon as
possible. The first night the operations manager from Fairbanks
and the project coordinator from Juneau joined the response
team.
MR. HODGIN explained that the facilities were evaluated and
prioritized based on the affected intensity zones, starting with
critical facilities in the highest zones. Facilities that were
occupied 24/7 like API [Alaska Psychiatric Institute] and
McLaughlin Youth Center were prioritized first.
The immediate repairs were initiated by facilities technicians
and maintenance personnel partnered with local contractors.
Other facilities that were immediately repaired were the DOTPF
headquarters, the DOTPF annex, and the Boney Courthouse. The
contractors that were involved were janitorial, mechanical,
electrical, and environmental. Because of these efforts, the
majority of affected state buildings were ready to resume
operations within four days following the earthquake. Safety
assessments were occurring simultaneously. These teams were
comprised of architects, engineers, divisional staff, volunteer
engineers from the Structural Engineering Society of Alaska, and
out of state engineers from North Carolina and California. These
inspections followed the nationally recognized ATC-20 Post
Earthquake Detailed Evaluation protocols. This allowed
consistent postings of the buildings: green indicated inspected,
yellow indicated restricted use, and red indicated unsafe. He
directed attention to the timeline on slide 31 that lists the
activities within the first two weeks of the earthquake. He
noted that there were detailed assessments in the MatSu and
Kenai Peninsula boroughs.
2:54:08 PM
MR. HODGIN reported that the response metrics included strong
collaboration with partner agencies. There were daily
stakeholder communications to provide updates on building
inspections and repair status. The detailed safety assessments
were the result of teams inspecting 369 state facilities over 12
days and inspection assistance to state-owned facilities in the
MatSu and Kenai Peninsula boroughs. A majority of the state
facilities were identified as green, 13 were designated yellow
or restricted use, and none were found to be red or unsafe.
He reviewed the damage summary. For state facilities, the most
significant damage was found to the DOTPF headquarters and the
Boney Courthouse. Temporary repairs have been completed. The
majority of state facilities in Anchorage, MatSu, and Kenai
Peninsula Borough sustained comparatively minor damage. Common
damage included cinderblock type construction, ceiling grid, and
sheetrock cracks. Estimates for permanent repairs range from $6
million to $10 million. He said those numbers will continue to
be updated. He advised that they are currently working with risk
management and the state emergency office to coordinate the
repair work. The timelines for repairs will vary depending on
severity and the processes and requirements of the different
funding sources.
CHAIR HUGHES thanked Mr. Hodgin and asked Mr. Pratt to respond
to Senator Micciche's question about bridges.
2:56:41 PM
RICH PRATT, Chief Bridge Engineer, Department of Transportation
and Public Facilities (DOTPF), said he has about 35 years'
experience in bridge engineer. He related that his overall
reaction to the earthquake is that we got pretty lucky and the
bridges in the area came through relatively well.
He explained that DOTPF's bridge office responded from Juneau
and teamed up with the bridge maintenance team in Fairbanks.
Responding to Senator Micciche's earlier question, he explained
that the program for bridge inspections calls for annual
inspections by the department's professional bridge design
engineers. This is the team that responded to the event. These
engineers have the reports on all the affected bridges and have
been routinely inspecting them at maximum every 24 months. He
noted that these inspections require boots on the ground work,
so these people had to be prepared to spend their days outside
in the icy conditions under bridges.
2:58:47 PM
CHAIR HUGHES asked if his team was involved with the March Eagle
River bridge incident.
MR. PRATT said yes; a bridge inspector in Anchorage responded
that day and by that evening a bridge engineer from Juneau took
over the engineering responsibilities for the repair and
reopening of the Glenn Highway. The response was similar when
the dump truck struck the Tudor Road overpass last month.
He reiterated that four teams from Juneau and one from Fairbanks
responded to the earthquake. They prioritized 300 bridges that
needed inspections and accomplished this over four days. They
didn't find any significant damage. Those bridges were
prioritized in the normal prescribed approach. Dave Kemp's local
maintenance teams went out initially to identify anything
significant and report the findings to the bridge office who
follows up within 24-48 hours. He noted that high-traffic routes
like the Glenn Highway, the Seward Highway, and Minnesota Drive
were also prioritized. Consideration was given to the age of the
structures, whether the bridges had been strengthened to improve
their seismic performance, whether the bridges had known
vulnerable details, and if the bridge had an identified issue.
He explained that some structural details are known to be more
vulnerable than others.
3:00:49 PM
MR. PRATT pointed to the graphic on slide 37 that shows the
contours of ground shaking with bridge locations superimposed.
The next slide shows the ground slipped 16 inches vertically
when the slope failed in front of the wingwalls and abutments on
a bridge near Eagle River. He said bridges are founded on
pilings that go 50-150 feet into the ground, so this indicates
that the soil failed below. He explained that the graphic on
slide 39 shows the underside of a relatively new bridge that
carries Dowling Road over the top of Arctic Boulevard in
Anchorage. A shear key cracked due to the lateral load of the
earthquake that tried to push the bridge sideways off its
supports. He noted that shear keys function like electrical
fuses that fail before a more critical part of the
infrastructure fails. The shear key did its job and kept the
girders on the supports. He reported that 19 bridges still
require some form of repair and the estimated repair costs are
$860,000.
3:02:52 PM
MR. PRATT, responding to Senator Micciche's earlier question,
said the department learned a lot from the 1964 earthquake when
a lot of bridges collapsed in Turnagain Arm. They also learned a
lot in the 1970s and 1980s when bridges collapsed in the
California earthquakes. He said the key is to keep the girders
on the abutments and piers and off the ground. No collapse is
the national design standard for bridges and DOTPF follows those
design standards. He shared that he chairs the committee that
writes the national standards for seismic design for bridges and
a colleague wrote two of the chapters. He described Alaska as a
leader in this area. He said he wasn't sure how much they
learned other than that what they've been doing seems to have
worked in this event. It could have been otherwise but not
because anything is wrong or substandard. The earthquake was 30
miles deep and there was a lot of shaking where the ground was
disturbed but the structures don't appear to have been disturbed
in the same way.
3:04:29 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE thanked him for the answer and asked if some
people within DOTPF thought that Vine Road should have been a
bridge.
MR. PRATT said bridges are at least ten times more expensive to
construct than roads. In the example of the bridge with the
cracked shear key ground improvements were done and it helped
but the cost was $3 million for just the two abutment sites.
Other strategies could be used such as removing the vulnerable
soil. The geotechnical engineers consider that and optimize
their designs based on that to the best of their ability.
SENATOR MICCICHE said it comes down to a cost benefit analysis
in every case.
MR. PRATT agreed.
3:06:43 PM
CHAIR HUGHES thanked the presenters.
SENATOR MICCICHE suggested she extend a huge thank you to DOTPF
for its response.
CHAIR HUGHES said everyone is most grateful for the response and
preparedness of all the DOTPF employees.
3:07:48 PM
There being no further business to come before the committee,
Chair Hughes adjourned the Senate Transportation Standing
Committee meeting at 3:07 pm.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| STRA Agenda 2.7.19.pdf |
STRA 2/7/2019 1:30:00 PM |
|
| Mike West Earthquake Presentation.pdf |
STRA 2/7/2019 1:30:00 PM |
|
| DOT&PF Earthquake Presentation.pdf |
STRA 2/7/2019 1:30:00 PM |
|
| DOT&PF 2.7.19 Follow up.pdf |
STRA 2/7/2019 1:30:00 PM |