Legislature(2011 - 2012)SENATE FINANCE 532

03/29/2012 09:00 AM FINANCE

Download Mp3. <- Right click and save file as

Audio Topic
09:06:08 AM Start
09:07:16 AM SB192
10:09:37 AM Adjourn
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
<Above Item Removed from Agenda>
<Above Item Removed from Agenda>
Heard & Held
+ Bills Previously Heard/Scheduled TELECONFERENCED
                 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE                                                                                       
                      March 29, 2012                                                                                            
                         9:06 a.m.                                                                                              
9:06:08 AM                                                                                                                    
CALL TO ORDER                                                                                                                 
Co-Chair Stedman called the Senate Finance Committee                                                                            
meeting to order at 9:06 a.m.                                                                                                   
MEMBERS PRESENT                                                                                                               
Senator Lyman Hoffman, Co-Chair                                                                                                 
Senator Bert Stedman, Co-Chair                                                                                                  
Senator Lesil McGuire, Vice-Chair                                                                                               
Senator Johnny Ellis                                                                                                            
Senator Dennis Egan                                                                                                             
Senator Donny Olson                                                                                                             
Senator Joe Thomas                                                                                                              
MEMBERS ABSENT                                                                                                                
ALSO PRESENT                                                                                                                  
Janak Mayer, Manager, Upstream and Gas, PFC Energy.                                                                             
SB 192    OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION TAX RATES                                                                                      
          SB 192 was HEARD and HELD in committee for                                                                            
          further consideration.                                                                                                
Co-Chair Stedman discussed the meeting's agenda.                                                                                
SENATE BILL NO. 192                                                                                                           
     "An Act relating to the oil and gas production tax;                                                                        
     and providing for an effective date."                                                                                      
9:07:16 AM                                                                                                                    
JANAK MAYER,  MANAGER, UPSTREAM AND  GAS, PFC  ENERGY, began                                                                    
the  PowerPoint  presentation   titled  "Discussion  Slides:                                                                    
Alaska  Senate   Finance  Committee."  (copy  on   file)  He                                                                    
indicated that the presentation  would look in particular at                                                                    
the ideas of removing  progressivity from the net production                                                                    
tax,  having the  net production  tax be  a flat  25 percent                                                                    
tax, and  levying progressivity in  the form of a  gross tax                                                                    
on oil instead; the gross tax  would begin at a certain rate                                                                    
and  increase  similarly  to  the  progressivity  under  the                                                                    
current measure.                                                                                                                
Mr.  Mayer   discussed  slide  2  titled   "Difficulties  in                                                                    
Existing Fiscal Structure."                                                                                                     
   · The incorporation of progressivity into the Profit-                                                                        
    Based Production Tax (Net) in ACES creates two                                                                              
    significant problems                                                                                                        
        · Large-scale gas production at low gas prices                                                                          
          could   in   the   future   significantly   reduce                                                                    
          production   tax   revenue   from   existing   oil                                                                    
          · Resolving this problem within the framework of                                                                      
           ACES requires significant complexity                                                                                 
          · Approach to decoupling in CSSB 192 requires                                                                         
             ability to  split  costs  between oil  and  gas                                                                    
             production,    creating    high    degree    of                                                                    
             administrative burden, and limiting capacity of                                                                    
             state to effectively audit                                                                                         
        · Options for incentivizing new production are                                                                          
          limited, and relatively complex                                                                                       
          · Proposed incentives within existing framework                                                                       
             focus on either allowances to reduce Production                                                                    
             Tax Value, or revenue exclusions                                                                                   
9:10:02 AM                                                                                                                    
Mr. Mayer  spoke to slide  3 titled "Summary  of Progressive                                                                    
Severance Tax(Gross) Option."                                                                                                   
     · A Progressive Severance Tax (Gross) option would                                                                         
        instead remove progressivity from the Profit-Based                                                                      
        Production Tax (Net), instead levying this tax at                                                                       
        the flat, base rate of 25%                                                                                              
     · To retain an element of progressivity, a new                                                                             
        Progressive Severance Tax (Gross) would then be                                                                         
        added to the system. The tax would:                                                                                     
        · Be non-deductible for Profit-Based Production Tax                                                                     
        · Be levied on gross production (net of royalties)                                                                      
        · Be levied solely on oil                                                                                               
        · The tax would use a progressivity structure not                                                                       
          dissimilar to that under  the current system, with                                                                    
          progressivity    coefficients   that    apply   at                                                                    
          different  thresholds. The  optioned modeled  here                                                                    
          has the following parameters:                                                                                         
          · Base rate of 0%                                                                                                     
          · Progressivity of .25% commencing at a threshold                                                                     
             of $65 (gross value at point of production)                                                                        
          · At $125 GVPP, a tax rate of 15% is reached. At                                                                      
             this point, progressivity is reduced to 0.05%                                                                      
          · Progressivity is capped 20%                                                                                         
Mr.  Mayer  noted  that previously  presented  analyses  had                                                                    
shown what a  new progressive severance tax  would look like                                                                    
if  it  was  deductible   for  profit-based  production  tax                                                                    
purposes; however, for  the sake of simplicity  and from the                                                                    
perspective of retaining progressivity,  the modeled tax was                                                                    
non-deductible for profit-based  production tax purposes. He                                                                    
added that  if the  tax was deductible  for the  purposes of                                                                    
production tax,  each increment of progressivity  would have                                                                    
a partial offset  in the form of reduced  production tax and                                                                    
that it  would result in smaller  overall progressivity than                                                                    
might  have  otherwise  existed.  He pointed  out  that  the                                                                    
progressive severance  tax option would be  levied solely on                                                                    
oil  and  would  eliminate   the  decoupling  issue  because                                                                    
instead  of having  a  variable rate  applied,  the flat  25                                                                    
percent  tax  rate would  be  applied.  He related  that  if                                                                    
everything was  taxed at  the 25 percent  rate, the  cost of                                                                    
gas versus the cost of  oil no longer mattered. He furthered                                                                    
that  the option  eliminated  the  decoupling issue  without                                                                    
having   to   answer   questions  regarding   the   separate                                                                    
accounting of  costs for oil  and gas, separate  tax returns                                                                    
for  industry,  and the  abilities  of  the state  regarding                                                                    
auditing powers. He related that  based on the wishes of the                                                                    
committee,  what  was  modeled  was a  system  with  revenue                                                                    
similar to  CSSB 192 at the  $100 per barrel level,  but one                                                                    
that  also   diverged  and   flattened  the   split  between                                                                    
companies and the state at higher oil prices.                                                                                   
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 4  titled "Benefits of Progressive                                                                    
Tax (Gross) Structure."                                                                                                         
   · By removing progressivity from the Profit-Based                                                                            
     Production Tax (Net), and having the progressive                                                                           
     element of the structure be a Progressive Severance                                                                        
     Tax (Gross), two things become much easier to achieve                                                                      
        · The issue of gas production reducing production                                                                       
          tax revenue ceases to be a problem without                                                                            
          progressivity in the Profit-Based Production Tax                                                                      
             · Complex provisions to split costs between                                                                        
               oil and gas production under CSSB 192 are                                                                        
               thus no longer required                                                                                          
        · Significant incentives can be provided to new                                                                         
          production, by eliminating or reducing the                                                                            
          Progressive Severance Tax (Gross) for new                                                                             
   · A wide range of levels of government take can be                                                                           
     achieved using this structure, depending on the                                                                            
     parameters applied                                                                                                         
Mr. Mayer addressed the fourth bullet and stated that the                                                                       
incentives could be offered for a particular period of time                                                                     
or on an indefinite basis. He furthered that under this                                                                         
system, incentivizing was easier because the only                                                                               
information needed was what a particular production stream                                                                      
was, as well as the oil price. He reiterated that the                                                                           
model's parameters were aimed to have similar revenue to                                                                        
the state as CSSB 192 at a price of $100 per barrel and                                                                         
have an evening of the split between companies and the                                                                          
state at current price levels.                                                                                                  
9:15:21 AM                                                                                                                    
Mr.  Mayer  explained  slide  5   titled  "FY  2013  Revenue                                                                    
Comparison." He  stated that the  slide showed, on an  FY 13                                                                    
basis,  the  levels of  production  tax,  total state  take,                                                                    
total government  take, and cash  to companies of  the three                                                                    
listed options at crude prices  ranging from $40 to $150 per                                                                    
barrel.  He  observed that  at  the  $100 per  barrel  price                                                                    
level, the total revenue under  ACES was about $3.7 billion;                                                                    
Under  CSSB 192,  the revenue  generated at  same price  was                                                                    
reduced to a  little over $3.5 billion. He  pointed out that                                                                    
CSSB  192  with the  progressive  severance  tax option  had                                                                    
slightly reduced revenue  from CSSB 192 at a  price level of                                                                    
$100.  He  warned  that  it was  very  difficult  to  attain                                                                    
exactly the same  revenue at $100 per barrel  and that there                                                                    
was  a  significant  margin  of   error  involved  with  the                                                                    
calculations at  the macro level.  He explained  that, given                                                                    
the  high margin  for error,  the structure  seemed to  "get                                                                    
quite  close"  to CSSB  192  at  the  $100 price  level.  He                                                                    
related  that  at prices  upwards  of  $100 per  barrel,  in                                                                    
particular above  the $130 level, the  government take under                                                                    
the progressive  severance tax flattened  and resulted  in a                                                                    
more   even   split;   whereas,  the   model   showed   that                                                                    
progressivity under ACES and CSSB  192 continued to escalate                                                                    
at prices above $100 per  barrel, which resulted in a higher                                                                    
take for the state.                                                                                                             
Co-Chair Stedman noted that the  committee did not have time                                                                    
prior  to   the  meeting  to   review  the  charts   in  the                                                                    
presentation. He  stated that  prior testimony  in committee                                                                    
had indicated  that the current  tax system  functioned well                                                                    
at  a  price  of  $100   per  barrel,  but  that  it  became                                                                    
problematic  at prices  north  of $100.  He  added that  the                                                                    
committee  was zeroing  in  on  the $100  range  due to  the                                                                    
current system's problems at prices over that level.                                                                            
Co-Chair Stedman clarified that  the government take numbers                                                                    
on slide 5 included  property taxes, severance taxes, income                                                                    
taxes, and royalties.  He inquired if the  model showed that                                                                    
at  a  price   of  $100  per  barrel,  CSSB   192  with  the                                                                    
progressive severance tax  option was close to  CSSB 192 and                                                                    
was  within   $70  million.  Mr.  Mayer   responded  in  the                                                                    
Co-Chair  Stedman noted  that  he had  been  looking at  the                                                                    
wrong  line  and  corrected that  under  the  severance  tax                                                                    
option, the  difference in the  cash position was  closer to                                                                    
$130  million. He  observed that  the progressive  severance                                                                    
tax option  was pretty close  to CSSB  192 at prices  of $90                                                                    
and $80 per barrel.                                                                                                             
Co-Chair Stedman  requested a clarification  on slide  5 and                                                                    
asked  for an  explanation of  the  $40 and  $50 per  barrel                                                                    
price range.  Mr. Mayer responded  that at prices  below $65                                                                    
per barrel,  there was  no difference  between the  two CSSB                                                                    
192  options  because  progressivity  did  not  occur  until                                                                    
higher oil prices.                                                                                                              
Mr. Mayer  discussed slide  5 and  stated that  although the                                                                    
two CSSB  192 options  were identical to  each other  at the                                                                    
$40 and $50 per barrel range,  they were higher than ACES at                                                                    
those  price levels  due to  the 10  percent floor  that was                                                                    
entailed in both the CSSB 192 options.                                                                                          
9:20:43 AM                                                                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman spoke  to slide 5 and noted that  the FY 13                                                                    
revenue   projections   from   the  Revenue   Sources   Book                                                                    
represented the  homogenized numerics  and that  it included                                                                    
companies with  no production. He added  that companies with                                                                    
no production were absorbing around  $400 million in credits                                                                    
and that it had an impact on the numbers.                                                                                       
Co-Chair  Stedman requested  PFC  Energy to  run the  tables                                                                    
again using  only current producers  in FY 13 as  inputs. He                                                                    
furthered  that he  would like  to get  a feel  for how  the                                                                    
numbers  moved  in  the  currently  producing  category  and                                                                    
inquired if  Mr. Mayer  had looked at  that aspect  yet. Mr.                                                                    
Mayer responded that he would  see if additional analysis in                                                                    
the requested area was possible.                                                                                                
Co-Chair Stedman noted that there was  a lot more work to be                                                                    
done,  but  that it  was  his  goal  to keep  the  committee                                                                    
informed throughout the process.                                                                                                
Co-Chair Hoffman noted that under  the projections for FY 13                                                                    
and at the current price of  around $109 to $110 per barrel,                                                                    
the revenue generated from  the progressive severance option                                                                    
would represent  a reduction of  one-third of $1  billion in                                                                    
revenue  to the  state over  ACES; however,  the total  cash                                                                    
returned to  companies at  the same  price was  $217 million                                                                    
and was  substantially lower than  the reduction  in revenue                                                                    
to the state.                                                                                                                   
Co-Chair  Stedman  interjected  that  the  figures  Co-Chair                                                                    
Hoffman was  referring to were  reflective of oil  prices at                                                                    
$110 per barrel.                                                                                                                
Co-Chair  Hoffman reiterated  that  the figures  represented                                                                    
the current projections for revenue in FY 13.                                                                                   
Mr.  Mayer inquired  if Co-Chair  Hoffman  was pointing  out                                                                    
that  the additional  cash received  by  companies would  be                                                                    
lower  than the  reduction in  take to  the state.  Co-Chair                                                                    
Hoffman  responded in  the  affirmative.  Mr. Mayer  replied                                                                    
that the gap  between the two numbers was a  function of the                                                                    
federal government take being increased.                                                                                        
Co-Chair Hoffman queried  if the state had  any control over                                                                    
the increase  in federal  take. Mr.  Mayer responded  in the                                                                    
Co-Chair  Hoffman opined  that  oil  futures were  currently                                                                    
selling for  roughly $200  per barrel.  He pointed  out that                                                                    
slide 5  did not  go up  to the $200  price level,  but that                                                                    
there was  an even more  substantial reduction to  the state                                                                    
and oil  companies at  that price. He  observed the  need to                                                                    
examine  where oil  futures were  at  currently. He  offered                                                                    
that a  common mistake made  during the formulation  of ACES                                                                    
was that  people had  looked at  the $40  to $70  per barrel                                                                    
range;  however, futures  at the  time were  way above  that                                                                    
price range and the oil prices rose as expected.                                                                                
Co-Chair  Stedman   reiterated  the  comments   of  Co-Chair                                                                    
Hoffman  and clarified  that the  figures on  slide 5  would                                                                    
change when  the non-producing companies were  excluded from                                                                    
the data.                                                                                                                       
Co-Chair  Hoffman  stated  that   the  committee  needed  to                                                                    
examine  what futures  were selling  for and  what the  take                                                                    
would  be  under  those scenarios.  He  reiterated  that  he                                                                    
believed futures were selling for around $200 per barrel.                                                                       
9:25:32 AM                                                                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman  pointed out  that the  numbers on  slide 5                                                                    
showed  that  at  prices  north  of  $130  per  barrel,  the                                                                    
percentage split  between the industry and  the state should                                                                    
remain  fairly  close to  constant.  He  requested that  Mr.                                                                    
Mayer explain  how the  split worked  above $130.  Mr. Mayer                                                                    
responded that  Co-Chair Stedman  was correct  regarding the                                                                    
government  to  industry  take above  $130  per  barrel  and                                                                    
directed the committee's attention to slide 6.                                                                                  
Mr.  Mayer  spoke  to  slide   6  titled  "FY  2012  Revenue                                                                    
Comparison"  and discussed  the  top left  chart. He  stated                                                                    
that  at the  $100 per  barrel  price level  there was  very                                                                    
little difference between the  three options, that there was                                                                    
a  slightly increasing  divergence  from $110  to $130,  and                                                                    
that there  was flattening  out of  government take  above a                                                                    
price of $125.  He added that the $125 per  barrel price was                                                                    
the inflection  point at  which the  decreased progressivity                                                                    
of the  progressive severance tax option  occurred. He noted                                                                    
that the  purpose of the  minimal .05  percent progressivity                                                                    
was to offset the slightly  regressive nature of the royalty                                                                    
and hold government take flat from that price onward.                                                                           
Co-Chair Hoffman offered that there  was another way to view                                                                    
the difference in the split.  He stated that at prices above                                                                    
$130  per  barrel,  the  state's take  under  the  CSSB  192                                                                    
progressive severance  option would continue to  decline and                                                                    
the industry's  share would continue  to rise  in comparison                                                                    
to ACES. Co-Chair Hoffman asserted  that he agreed with this                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman agreed  that Co-Chair Hoffman's perspective                                                                    
was another way of looking at the situation.                                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman  stated that  currently, the  percentage of                                                                    
the  pie would  shrink to  the industry,  even though  their                                                                    
dollars increase.  He furthered that currently,  the state's                                                                    
percentage of the  pie continued to get  larger. He observed                                                                    
that under  the CSSB  192 progressive severance  option, the                                                                    
percentage sharing  would stay  constant at prices  north of                                                                    
$130 per  barrel; however, if  you compared  the progressive                                                                    
option to  ACES, a substantial  reduction could be  seen. He                                                                    
commented  that   the  $200  per   barrel  range   could  be                                                                    
calculated and represented on the  slide in dollar terms. He                                                                    
pointed out  that at a price  of $200, the costs  would move                                                                    
because the state was under a  net system. He opined that if                                                                    
the  price was  at $200  for very  long, there  would be  an                                                                    
incremental  rise in  costs which  would "pull  that down  a                                                                    
bit."  He pointed  out that  the idea  was to  stabilize the                                                                    
sharing  relationship between  the  industry  and the  state                                                                    
without sending the state into a regressive environment.                                                                        
Co-Chair  Hoffman  pointed  out  that  one  of  the  primary                                                                    
concerns from industry  was that there was  no advantage for                                                                    
development because  it kept losing  more share at  the high                                                                    
end.  He   added  that   industry  had   expressed  concerns                                                                    
regarding high end pricing scenarios  and concluded that the                                                                    
CSSB 192  progressive severance  tax option  addressed those                                                                    
Co-Chair  Stedman  requested  an  explanation  of  the  four                                                                    
quadrants on slide 6.                                                                                                           
9:30:24 AM                                                                                                                    
Mr. Mayer  spoke to  the four  charts on  page 6  and stated                                                                    
that  the   top  left  chart  reflected   revenue  from  the                                                                    
production tax,  including the severance  tax. The  red line                                                                    
represented ACES,  the yellow line  reflected CSSB  192, and                                                                    
the  blue line  represented  CSSB 192  with the  progressive                                                                    
severance tax  alternative. The bottom right  chart depicted                                                                    
the cash to companies for each of the three given options.                                                                      
He  stated  that  cash to  companies  experienced  the  same                                                                    
divergence and evening  at higher price levels  as the prior                                                                    
chart, but that the two  CSSB 192 options returned more cash                                                                    
to companies at those price levels when compared to ACES.                                                                       
He  observed that  all three  scenarios had  a very  similar                                                                    
result at  prices below  $100 per  barrel; however,  at very                                                                    
low  price levels,  both the  CSSB 192  options resulted  in                                                                    
reduced cash  to companies and  increased take to  the state                                                                    
as a  result of the  10 percent tax  floor that was  in CSSB                                                                    
192. He  continued to speak to  slide 6 and stated  that the                                                                    
bottom  left and  the  top right  charts  depicted what  the                                                                    
total state  and government  take would  be under  the given                                                                    
scenarios. He  added that because there  were other elements                                                                    
at play,  the gap  between the options  looked significantly                                                                    
smaller when you compared the  total state take to the total                                                                    
government take.                                                                                                                
Co-Chair Stedman  requested that PFC Energy  include some of                                                                    
the take  numbers in  percentages when  it removed  the non-                                                                    
producing  companies in  its  calculations.  He pointed  out                                                                    
that the  state based its  numbers on the  homogenized data,                                                                    
which represented  the entire revenue  stream to  the state,                                                                    
while the industry  ran its own numbers. He  stated that the                                                                    
industry and  the state  numbers did not  match up  and that                                                                    
the disparity between  the two was partly a  function of the                                                                    
approximately $400 million impact of non-producer credits.                                                                      
Co-Chair Hoffman commented that  if oil futures were selling                                                                    
for $200  per barrel, it  would be  nice to have  the graphs                                                                    
depict  that  price  range. He  requested  that  PFC  Energy                                                                    
provide  the  $200 pricing  scenario  in  future graphs  and                                                                    
opined that the numbers  would probably reflect a difference                                                                    
north of $1 billion.                                                                                                            
Co-Chair   Stedman  reiterated   the  request   of  Co-Chair                                                                    
Hoffman. He  clarified that he  had requested PFC  Energy to                                                                    
bring the  x-axis to $150  per barrel because the  lines ran                                                                    
parallel  at prices  north of  $125  to $130,  but that  the                                                                    
graphs  could be  remade  with the  x-axis  stretching to  a                                                                    
price of  $200. He added that  it might be a  distraction to                                                                    
look at  prices such as $230  per barrel when the  price was                                                                    
currently at $120.                                                                                                              
Co-Chair Hoffman  commented that if futures  were selling at                                                                    
$200   per  barrel,   looking  at   that  price   should  be                                                                    
considered. Co-Chair Stedman  voiced agreement with Co-Chair                                                                    
Hoffman  and reiterated  that the  charts would  be produced                                                                    
for the committee.                                                                                                              
Mr. Mayer remarked  that he could look into  the question of                                                                    
what the  ANS West  Coast and crude  oil futures  in general                                                                    
were  trading  at;  however, given  that  spot  prices  were                                                                    
currently  around the  $120  per barrel  mark,  he would  be                                                                    
"very surprised"  to see futures trading  dramatically above                                                                    
that  price to  the  levels that  had  been suggested.  [The                                                                    
comment  was  in  respect  to  the  recently  discussed  oil                                                                    
futures  price of  $200 per  barrel.] He  furthered that  he                                                                    
would look  into the matter of  oil futures and get  back to                                                                    
the committee.                                                                                                                  
Co-Chair Stedman  directed the  presentation to slide  7 and                                                                    
stated that  incentives for new production  was another area                                                                    
of challenge.                                                                                                                   
9:34:56 AM                                                                                                                    
Mr.  Mayer  spoke to  slide  7  titled "Incentives  for  New                                                                    
   · Significant incentives can be provided to new                                                                              
     production, by eliminating or reducing the Progressive                                                                     
     Severance Tax (Gross) on any combination of:                                                                               
        · Production from new areas                                                                                             
        · Production   from   new   plans   of   development                                                                    
          (determined through the regulatory process to be                                                                      
          for "new production")                                                                                                 
        · Production above a fixed decline rate                                                                                 
   · Here, a reduced rate of Progressive Severance Tax has                                                                      
     been modeled, using the following parameters for new                                                                       
        · Base rate of 0%                                                                                                       
        · Progressivity of .05% commencing at a threshold                                                                       
          of $65 (gross value at point of production)                                                                           
        · Progressivity is capped 5%                                                                                            
   · Following slides show a new, high-cost 10 mb/d                                                                             
     development under                                                                                                          
        · The regular rate                                                                                                      
        · The reduced rate (with a time limit of 7 years)                                                                       
        · The reduced rate (with no time limit)                                                                                 
Mr.  Mayer  recapped  that  one   of  the  benefits  of  the                                                                    
progressive  severance  option  was  that  it  overcame  the                                                                    
decoupling  issue without  addressing the  complex issue  of                                                                    
accounting for costs; furthermore,  it also created a number                                                                    
of   ways  to   provide  significant   incentives  for   new                                                                    
production. He  added that  the progressive  severance tax's                                                                    
increased  options  for  incentives  were a  result  of  not                                                                    
having to  look at the question  of which costs came  with a                                                                    
particular   production;  under   this   system,  only   the                                                                    
production  numbers associated  with  the production  stream                                                                    
and the crude oil price needed to be determined.                                                                                
Mr. Mayer began to speak to slide 8.                                                                                            
Co-Chair Stedman  requested a clarification  on slide  7 and                                                                    
asked  for an  explanation of  the third  bullet point.  Mr.                                                                    
Mayer responded  that the following  slides were based  on a                                                                    
stylized,   10,000   barrel   per  day   (bbl/d)   high-cost                                                                    
development that had  been used in previous  analysis in the                                                                    
committee; furthermore,  using the  hypothetical development                                                                    
as  a   benchmark,  the  slides   examined  the   levels  of                                                                    
government take  and the  project economics  in each  of the                                                                    
three scenarios.                                                                                                                
Mr.  Mayer  explained  slide  8  titled  "Severance  Tax-20%                                                                    
Maximum   (New  Producer)."   He  stated   that  using   the                                                                    
hypothetical development  and applying a 20  percent maximum                                                                    
on the  severance tax,  the slide's  model showed  levels of                                                                    
government  take  that  were relatively  steady  at  the  75                                                                    
percent to 76  percent mark. He added that  the slide showed                                                                    
a  little  regressivity, but  that  the  structure was  more                                                                    
perfectly steady when  it was applied to  base production or                                                                    
an  existing  producer.  He  reiterated  that  the  scenario                                                                    
represented a  very high-cost field  and that it  only broke                                                                    
even at  oil prices a  little south  of $100 per  barrel. He                                                                    
added that  the scenario  had a  negative net  present value                                                                    
(NPV)  in the  $40  and $60  per barrel  cases  and did  not                                                                    
achieve a  positive NPV until  the $100  level; furthermore,                                                                    
the  $100 price  level only  gave the  scenario an  internal                                                                    
rate  of return  (IRR) of  around 11  percent. He  concluded                                                                    
that  the scenario's  development was  marginal, even  at an                                                                    
oil price of $100 per barrel.                                                                                                   
Co-Chair Stedman  requested an  explanation of  the expenses                                                                    
that were  used in the  slide. Mr. Mayer responded  that the                                                                    
expenses  were based  on  capital  expenditures (CAPEX)  and                                                                    
operating expenditures  (OPEX) of  about $17 per  barrel. He                                                                    
stated  that the  OPEX costs  in particular  were accurately                                                                    
reflective of  recent high-cost new developments.  He shared                                                                    
that the expenses were particularly  indicative of the newer                                                                    
producers who  may have to share  facilities and incorporate                                                                    
implicit costs  and back-out agreements.  He added  that the                                                                    
high  level  of  CAPEX  was reflective  of  the  significant                                                                    
increases   in   capital   costs   for   new   developments,                                                                    
particularly in areas where there  was little or no existing                                                                    
infrastructure. He noted that  the costs associated with the                                                                    
slide reflected a light oil  development, but that the CAPEX                                                                    
and  OPEX rose  significantly  in some  of  the viscous  oil                                                                    
projects that had been proposed.                                                                                                
9:40:00 AM                                                                                                                    
Co-Chair  Stedman observed  that there  were members  of the                                                                    
public  who were  probably unfamiliar  with  the charts  and                                                                    
requested a walkthrough of the four quadrants on slide 8.                                                                       
Mr. Mayer  responded that  the top left  portion of  slide 8                                                                    
depicted  a  basic  cash  flow   diagram  and  that  capital                                                                    
spending  was  reflected  in the  yellow.  He  continued  to                                                                    
describe the  cash flow  diagram and  stated that  it showed                                                                    
negative  production   in  the  early  years,   followed  by                                                                    
production,  and  then  positive   revenue  over  time  with                                                                    
declining production. He pointed  out that the revenue curve                                                                    
came  from production  and that  it was  represented in  the                                                                    
blue;  however,  as  a  result   of  inflation,  the  actual                                                                    
production  decline   curve  was   steeper  than   what  was                                                                    
depicted. He  explained that the impact  of inflation partly                                                                    
offset  the slide's  decline curve  and  resulted in  higher                                                                    
nominal cash flows in the  forward years, even as production                                                                    
itself  declined. He  shared that  the  red represented  the                                                                    
operating  costs,  while  the  black  line  represented  the                                                                    
after-tax cash flow that was  produced. He added that in the                                                                    
early years, the diagram showed  an after-tax cash flow that                                                                    
was not as strongly negative as  the yellow of the CAPEX and                                                                    
that  the disparity  between the  two  was a  result of  the                                                                    
impact of the 20 percent capital credit.                                                                                        
Mr. Mayer  discussed the  blue table next  to the  cash flow                                                                    
diagram  and  stated that  it  depicted  the basic  economic                                                                    
metrics  of the  NPV and  IRR  for the  stylized project  at                                                                    
prices of $40, $60, and $100 per barrel.                                                                                        
Mr. Mayer spoke  to the table on the upper  right portion of                                                                    
slide  8 and  stated that  it depicted  the total  levels of                                                                    
government and state takes at  each of the prices ranges. He                                                                    
shared that  different elements, such as  royalty, severance                                                                    
tax,  or  production  tax  were examined  as  a  portion  of                                                                    
divisible income  and that they were  summed horizontally on                                                                    
the chart to equal the total state or government take.                                                                          
Mr. Mayer  discussed the  two bottom charts  on slide  8 and                                                                    
stated  that  they  depicted  the  particular  development's                                                                    
total state and government take  figures in dollar terms and                                                                    
in percentages.                                                                                                                 
Mr.  Mayer  addressed  slide  9  titled  "Severance  Tax-20%                                                                    
Maximum  with  first  seven  years  at  a  5%  maximum  (New                                                                    
Producer)"  and  stated  that  the  slide  showed  the  same                                                                    
discounted rate  as the previous  slide, but with  a maximum                                                                    
rate of  5 percent  for the first  seven years;  the maximum                                                                    
rate would  then revert to  the 20 percent after  the seven-                                                                    
year period. He remarked that  if you compared this scenario                                                                    
to  the previous  slide, the  economics of  the two  options                                                                    
were identical in  the $40 and $60 per  barrel cases because                                                                    
the  progressive  severance tax  did  not  apply below  that                                                                    
price range;  however, at  higher price  levels, the  NPV of                                                                    
the  project rose  from $29  million to  $77 million,  which                                                                    
resulted in  an increase to  the IRR  from 11 percent  to 12                                                                    
percent.  He  concluded  that  slide   9  showed  a  further                                                                    
reduction  in  government  take  from  the  previous  slide,                                                                    
particularly  at  the  higher  price levels,  and  that  the                                                                    
government  take   levels  peaked  at  around   73  percent,                                                                    
regressing only slightly from that point onward.                                                                                
Co-Chair Hoffman inquired if the  having the maximum rate at                                                                    
5 percent  for the first  seven years could be  considered a                                                                    
tax  holiday.  Mr.  Mayer  responded   that  it  was  a  tax                                                                    
reduction,  but  that it  was  not  a tax  holiday  entirely                                                                    
because every barrel was still taxed, only at a lower rate.                                                                     
Mr.  Mayer  spoke  to  slide  10  titled  "Severance  Tax-5%                                                                    
Maximum   (New  Producer)."   He  stated   that  the   slide                                                                    
illustrated  the same  scenario as  the previous  slide, but                                                                    
had the  maximum rate  stay at  5 percent  indefinitely. For                                                                    
the first  seven years, the  cash flows of the  scenarios on                                                                    
slides 9 and 10 were  identical; however, after that period,                                                                    
the cash flow  from slide 10 increased  significantly due to                                                                    
the 5  percent maximum  being applied  across the  board. He                                                                    
noted that  the NPV from  slide 10's scenario  had increased                                                                    
to  $119 million  when  compared  to slide  9's  NPV of  $77                                                                    
million. He  concluded that the  increase in slide  10's NPV                                                                    
represented a gain  of 1 percentage point to the  IRR of the                                                                    
stylized project.  Slide 10's scenario  had a  flattening of                                                                    
government  take from  the $70  per barrel  price range  and                                                                    
upwards.  He concluded  that the  scenario had  a government                                                                    
take  figure  of about  65  percent  if  you looked  at  the                                                                    
lifecycle of the project as a whole.                                                                                            
9:45:09 AM                                                                                                                    
Mr. Mayer explained slide 11  titled "20-year Revenue Impact                                                                    
of  Reduced Rate  for  New Production"  and  stated that  it                                                                    
examined  the potential  impact, over  a 20-year  period, of                                                                    
offering  the  discussed  benefits for  new  production.  He                                                                    
reiterated that  there were  a variety  of ways  to identify                                                                    
new  production and  offered that  the simplest  way was  to                                                                    
provide incentives  for production  from new areas,  such as                                                                    
the incentives for new oil under  HB 110. He warned that the                                                                    
problem with  only defining new  production on the  basis of                                                                    
being from  a new area was  that most of the  new production                                                                    
was  expected  to  come  from   within  existing  areas.  He                                                                    
furthered  that  the  second option  for  incentivizing  new                                                                    
production  would  be  to apply  the  benefits  through  the                                                                    
regulatory  process,  such  as providing  authority  to  the                                                                    
"executive"  to   approve  that  particular  new   plans  of                                                                    
development  provided new  production; if  the determination                                                                    
was   made  that   the   development   plans  provided   new                                                                    
production, the lower  rate of taxation could  be applied to                                                                    
those projects.  He added  that with  the first  two options                                                                    
for defining  new production,  it was easy  to apply  a time                                                                    
limit to  the reduced rate  because there was  clear initial                                                                    
start  of  production.  He related  that  the  third  option                                                                    
available  for  incentivizing new  production,  particularly                                                                    
for existing producers, was  to incentivize production above                                                                    
a  set decline  level. He  mentioned the  current 6  percent                                                                    
base rate of decline and stated  that the decline at a given                                                                    
time could be determined and  the curve of the decline could                                                                    
be projected  forward. In this third  option, any production                                                                    
above  that  determined  curve of  decline  would  have  the                                                                    
preferential  rate of  taxation applied  to it.  He observed                                                                    
that  with the  third option,  it would  not be  possible to                                                                    
apply  a  time limit  because  there  was not  a  particular                                                                    
stream of production  and starting date from which  to set a                                                                    
stopping point.  He added that  if a time limit  was applied                                                                    
to the  first two options and  the goal was to  equalize the                                                                    
impact  of  the  benefit  for new  production,  a  different                                                                    
gradient  might be  applied to  new production  above the  6                                                                    
percent base rate  "so that over time, the  benefit of those                                                                    
two options  were more  equal. If one  doesn't apply  a time                                                                    
limit  at all,  then one  doesn't need  to differentiate  on                                                                    
that basis."                                                                                                                    
Mr. Mayer  drew the committee's  attention back to  slide 11                                                                    
and stated  that the purpose  of the slide was  to determine                                                                    
an initial figure that would  result from the 20-year impact                                                                    
of a  policy for new  production. He observed that  the 2013                                                                    
impact would be next to  nothing because there would be very                                                                    
little production that would count  as new during that year.                                                                    
He shared that  the slide examined the  increasing impact of                                                                    
the  policy over  time and  that it  used the  Department of                                                                    
Revenue's (DOR)  20-year production figures, as  well as the                                                                    
department's  cost  forecasts.  He added  that  the  20-year                                                                    
production  figures  extended  to  2032 and  that  the  cost                                                                    
figures ran to approximately 2021.                                                                                              
9:49:04 AM                                                                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman interjected that  the committee had not yet                                                                    
seen cost  figures from DOR  extending to 2021, but  that it                                                                    
had seen  figures that went  through 2016. He  observed that                                                                    
the  cost figures  extended farther  out than  the committee                                                                    
had  been  aware  of  and requested  that  the  document  be                                                                    
produced for committee members.                                                                                                 
Mr.  Mayer continued  to address  slide 11.  He stated  that                                                                    
using DOR's  production profile  and cost  estimates enabled                                                                    
the modeling of  the cash flows under a  range of scenarios.                                                                    
In order  to get a  rough estimate based on  DOR's forecast,                                                                    
which included  projects in development and  anticipated new                                                                    
development, the slide used the  6 percent decline curve and                                                                    
applied  the differential  between  old  and new  production                                                                    
over the  course of  20 years. He  furthered that  the slide                                                                    
examined the difference in the NPV  of the cash flows if the                                                                    
20  percent  maximum  rate was  applied  to  all  production                                                                    
versus applying  the 5 percent maximum  rate indefinitely to                                                                    
all production above  the 6 percent decline.  He pointed out                                                                    
that  there was  approximately a  $10 billion  difference in                                                                    
the NPV of  the cash flows for the production  tax over that                                                                    
20-year period at the $100  per barrel price level. He added                                                                    
that when production above a  6 percent decline was taxed at                                                                    
the lower rate,  the slide's NPVs of the  20-year cash flows                                                                    
dropped from  about $40 billion  to $30 billion.  He related                                                                    
that  his intention  with the  analysis was  not to  suggest                                                                    
that the  figures would represent  how policy would  work in                                                                    
practice because  significant parts  of the  production were                                                                    
new  projects,  while  relatively  little  would  come  from                                                                    
increased production  in existing fields. He  furthered that                                                                    
the  analysis did  not suggest  that the  6 percent  decline                                                                    
curve  would be  applied the  way it  depicted, but  that it                                                                    
showed how  big, in theory,  the potential  difference could                                                                    
be if the preferential rate was applied.                                                                                        
9:52:03 AM                                                                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman  recalled that  one of his  concerns during                                                                    
previous discussions with  Mr. Mayer had been  that when the                                                                    
committee  conceptualized   a  process  or   adjustment  for                                                                    
incremental  production,  the  state  was  not  put  into  a                                                                    
position where "several years out,  we have walked down some                                                                    
curve and  we have  no revenue." He  expressed the  need for                                                                    
caution regarding  how to transition into  new production in                                                                    
a manner that treated state and industry fairly.                                                                                
Mr. Mayer  spoke to slide  12 titled  "Regime Competiveness:                                                                    
Relative Government  Take (Existing Production)."  He stated                                                                    
that  the slide  benchmarked competiveness  against a  range                                                                    
other  regimes,   particularly  the  Organisation   for  the                                                                    
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  countries,                                                                    
which were represented  by the yellow bars.  He related that                                                                    
at a  price of $100  per barrel, the ACES  existing producer                                                                    
scenario  was a  little under  Norway, who  was the  highest                                                                    
taxing OECD  producer; however, if  the price  was increased                                                                    
to   $140,  ACES   for  an   existing   producer  would   be                                                                    
significantly  above   Norway.  He  shared  that   CSSB  192                                                                    
represented only  a slight reduction  in government  take in                                                                    
comparison  to ACES  and that  it was  a difference  of only                                                                    
about  1   percentage  point.  He  stated   that  under  the                                                                    
severance   tax  option   for  CSSB   192,  the   scenario's                                                                    
government take dropped  from 73 percent or  74 percent down                                                                    
to about 70 percent.                                                                                                            
Mr.    Mayer    explained    slide   13    titled    "Regime                                                                    
Competitiveness:     Relative    government     take    (New                                                                    
Development)" and  stated that  the slide examined  the same                                                                    
competiveness  but in  the  case of  a  new development.  He                                                                    
reiterated that  under ACES, the  levels of  government take                                                                    
were frequently  higher for new developments  than they were                                                                    
for  existing production,  partly due  to the  development's                                                                    
higher cost structure, but also  because without an existing                                                                    
base  production portfolio  there  was not  as much  benefit                                                                    
from   writing  down   existing   expenditures  on   current                                                                    
production. He pointed  out that both the CSSB  192 and ACES                                                                    
scenarios  for new  developments  were above  Norway on  the                                                                    
slide. He  stated that the  severance tax option with  the 5                                                                    
percent  maximum for  seven years  took the  government take                                                                    
down significantly,  but that  it was  still around  some of                                                                    
the higher  taxing jurisdictions; however, if  the 5 percent                                                                    
maximum was  applied indefinitely, the levels  of government                                                                    
take became  quite competitive with some  of the higher-cost                                                                    
developments,  such as  the  unconventional developments  in                                                                    
Louisiana and Texas.                                                                                                            
9:56:10 AM                                                                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman inquired why Alaska  would want to be below                                                                    
developments in  Louisiana and Texas in  terms of government                                                                    
take.  Mr.  Mayer   pointed  out  that  the   chart  made  a                                                                    
distinction  that   the  Louisiana  and  Texas   plays  were                                                                    
different from conventional developments  and added that the                                                                    
reason  that  there  was a  difference  in  government  take                                                                    
"between  the two"  was because  that, relatively  speaking,                                                                    
costs were higher for  unconventional developments than they                                                                    
were  for regular  onshore drilling.  He stated  that higher                                                                    
costs led  to a higher  government take; however,  the costs                                                                    
from  plays  like Louisiana  and  Texas  remained below  the                                                                    
costs  on   the  North  Slope.   He  stated   that  although                                                                    
government take was  one part of the  metric, the associated                                                                    
costs were  another factor that determined  if something was                                                                    
economic  or not.  He concluded  that  a jurisdiction  being                                                                    
competitive on  government take did not  necessarily make it                                                                    
an attractive destination for investment.                                                                                       
Co-Chair  Stedman inquired  if  the  variable severance  tax                                                                    
option with the  5 percent maximum for seven  years could be                                                                    
tweaked by  either stretching the seven-year  time period or                                                                    
by changing  the maximum rate  in order to enable  the state                                                                    
to adjust as  needed in the range between  the two severance                                                                    
tax  options  on  slide  13.  Mr.  Mayer  responded  in  the                                                                    
affirmative and that by changing  the seven-year period to a                                                                    
greater  timeframe, the  bars could  be adjusted  within the                                                                    
specified range.                                                                                                                
Co-Chair  Stedman   further  inquired  if  this   method  of                                                                    
adjustment  could potentially  be used  to target  different                                                                    
hydrocarbons.  Mr. Mayer  responded in  the affirmative  and                                                                    
added that  one benefit of  taking progressivity out  of the                                                                    
production  tax was  that question  of costs  was no  longer                                                                    
important;  the  only  information needed  for  calculations                                                                    
under  this  system  was  to  know  the  production  volumes                                                                    
associated with a  given production stream and  the price of                                                                    
oil.   He  added   that   for   a  particularly   challenged                                                                    
hydrocarbon  type,  such  as   heavy  oil  where  a  greater                                                                    
incentive might  be required, one alternative  was to reduce                                                                    
the production  tax on all  production and then make  up the                                                                    
difference for  existing production  by further  raising the                                                                    
progressive  severance tax;  this would  enable the  overall                                                                    
take for  existing production to  remain close to  the same,                                                                    
while still enabling  additional incentives for particularly                                                                    
challenged development.                                                                                                         
Senator McGuire inquired if  the regime competiveness slides                                                                    
could be  remade to  include oil prices  at $140,  $150, and                                                                    
$160 per barrel. Mr. Mayer responded that he would do so.                                                                       
Co-Chair  Stedman offered  that it  might be  easier if  the                                                                    
regime competiveness  slides were remade in  $20 increments,                                                                    
such as $80, $100, $120, $140, and $160 per barrel.                                                                             
Senator   McGuire  observed   that   Co-Chair  Hoffman   had                                                                    
requested that the slides display up  to a price of $200 per                                                                    
barrel.  Co-Chair Stedman  responded  that  $200 per  barrel                                                                    
could also be displayed.                                                                                                        
10:00:24 AM                                                                                                                   
Senator  Thomas   wondered,  given   the  large   number  of                                                                    
variables,  how  regime  competiveness  was  calculated.  He                                                                    
inquired how  much investment was  actually taking  place in                                                                    
the top four  countries on slides 12 and 13.  He stated that                                                                    
the  top four  countries were  not places  that he  would do                                                                    
business in and observed  that there several other countries                                                                    
above Alaska  on the  slide that also  fit that  profile. He                                                                    
pointed out that the slide  depicted Alaska below Venezuela,                                                                    
which had nationalized its oil  fields and opined that there                                                                    
were a  variety of countries  that might be  undesirable for                                                                    
oil companies to  do business with. He  furthered that there                                                                    
were  jurisdictions  within  the   U.S.  that  Alaska  would                                                                    
probably never be "directly" competitive  with, based on the                                                                    
cost of  doing business in  those areas versus the  costs on                                                                    
the  North  Slope  of  Alaska.  He  concluded  that  he  was                                                                    
struggling with the concept of  how a determination was made                                                                    
regarding  what was  competitive,  other  than using  strict                                                                    
dollar terms.                                                                                                                   
Co-Chair Stedman  added that Ireland and  Greenland had very                                                                    
low  government take  on  the  regime competiveness  slides,                                                                    
even though  the two  countries essentially  had no  oil. He                                                                    
furthered that  the numbers could  look attractive  in these                                                                    
two areas, but that prospectivity was pretty low.                                                                               
Mr. Mayer  agreed that the  points made by  Co-Chair Stedman                                                                    
and  Senator Thomas  were valid.  He concurred  that at  the                                                                    
higher level of the scale,  there were a number of countries                                                                    
that may  be significantly less attractive  destinations for                                                                    
investment; however,  government take was only  one variable                                                                    
regarding  a  destination's competiveness  and  desirability                                                                    
for investment.  He related although some  jurisdictions may                                                                    
have greater  political risks or  a higher  government take,                                                                    
they  might  have  resources  that  could  be  developed  at                                                                    
minimal cost; therefore,  in certain circumstances, projects                                                                    
remained attractive despite high  levels of government take.                                                                    
He  stated  that   Ireland  and  New  Zealand   had  a  very                                                                    
attractive  fiscal  regime,  but  that  they  did  not  have                                                                    
significant resources.  He pointed out that  Alaska did have                                                                    
a  higher government  take  than regimes  in  the Lower  48;                                                                    
however,  the  costs  in  Alaska   were  also  much  higher,                                                                    
particularly for conventional  onshore production. He shared                                                                    
that   in   Alaska,   the   competiveness   difference   was                                                                    
compounding because  there was a higher  government take and                                                                    
higher  associated  costs.  He  concluded that  all  of  the                                                                    
aspects  needed  to  be   considered  regarding  a  regime's                                                                    
competiveness, but that the  slides examined government take                                                                    
because the  committee had been  relatively focused  on that                                                                    
metric. He added that the  slides excluded other factors and                                                                    
compared  Alaska  to other  jurisdictions  on  the basis  of                                                                    
government take.                                                                                                                
10:04:10 AM                                                                                                                   
Senator  Thomas  asserted  that the  production  level  "per                                                                    
well" was another important aspect  to consider and inquired                                                                    
if   Mr.  Mayer   agreed.  Mr.   Mayer   responded  in   the                                                                    
10:04:23 AM                                                                                                                   
AT EASE                                                                                                                         
10:05:37 AM                                                                                                                   
10:05:41 AM                                                                                                                   
Co-Chair Hoffman  pointed out that  there was an  article in                                                                    
that morning's newspaper that  quoted the governor regarding                                                                    
his comments  on commitments from industry.  He related that                                                                    
the article had quoted the  governor as saying that he would                                                                    
veto  legislation if  it did  not  include commitments  from                                                                    
industry. He stated  that he did not  recall any commitments                                                                    
from industry  in HB 110,  and inquired if  Co-Chair Stedman                                                                    
had received any communications  from the governor regarding                                                                    
that topic or any proposed ideas of commitments.                                                                                
Co-Chair Stedman replied  that he had not  been contacted by                                                                    
the  governor's office  regarding  industry commitments  and                                                                    
stated that  he was only  aware of what  he had read  in the                                                                    
newspaper  regarding  that  issue. He  recalled  that  EXXON                                                                    
Mobile had  testified that the  state would  need additional                                                                    
production every  year matching the Oooguruk  and Nikaitchug                                                                    
fields  in  order  to  flatten   out  the  oil  decline.  He                                                                    
continued that  Alaska's oil  decline was  $3 billion  to $5                                                                    
billion a  year, and  was not  $5 billion  over an  eight or                                                                    
ten-year  period. He  related that  the scale  and magnitude                                                                    
that was  discussed in the  press and the magnitude  of what                                                                    
was  needed  to  flatten  out   the  oil  decline  were  not                                                                    
comparable. He  opined that if additional  production in the                                                                    
magnitude  of  Oooguruk  and   Nikaitchug  was  needed,  the                                                                    
expectation  of advancing  production  to  600,000 bbl/d  on                                                                    
state lands was  problematic; however, he was  open to ideas                                                                    
of how to achieve that goal.                                                                                                    
Co-Chair Stedman  noted that Iraq  did not appear on  any of                                                                    
the slides  and inquired  if Mr. Mayer  had any  comments on                                                                    
where Iraq  would be on the  list. He noted that  Iraq had a                                                                    
service  contract  regime  where  companies  were  paid  per                                                                    
barrel. Mr. Mayer responded that  Iraq had a relatively high                                                                    
government take  and that it  was mostly due to  the service                                                                    
contract  fiscal structure  for  new developments  involving                                                                    
international  oil companies.  He furthered  that in  Iraq's                                                                    
service contract system, a number  of points were negotiated                                                                    
as  part   of  the  awarding   of  the  contract   and  that                                                                    
international  oil  companies  were paid  for  oil  produced                                                                    
above  existing levels  of production.  A country  using the                                                                    
service  contract   system  would   have  a  set   level  of                                                                    
production  that it  was  unable to  go  above; the  country                                                                    
would  then pay  a company  for  the barrels  that it  could                                                                    
produce above that existing production plateau, but paid                                                                        
"very little" for anything below that level.                                                                                    
Senator McGuire thanked Mr. Mayer for his hard on work on                                                                       
SB 192.                                                                                                                         
SB 192 was HEARD and HELD in committee for further                                                                              
Co-Chair Stedman discussed the following meeting's agenda.                                                                      
10:09:37 AM                                                                                                                   
The meeting was adjourned at 10:09 AM.                                                                                          

Document Name Date/Time Subjects
SB 192 PFC Presentation Alaska Senate Finance - March 29.pdf SFIN 3/29/2012 9:00:00 AM
SB 192