03/16/2018 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB387 | |
| HB75 | |
| Adjourn |
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| *+ | HB 387 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | HB 75 | TELECONFERENCED | |
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
March 16, 2018
1:01 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Matt Claman, Chair
Representative Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins, Vice Chair
Representative Louise Stutes
Representative David Eastman
Representative Lora Reinbold
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Gabrielle LeDoux
Representative Chuck Kopp
Representative Charisse Millett (alternate)
Representative Tiffany Zulkosky (alternate)
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 387
"An Act relating to scheduled substances; relating to the
Controlled Substances Advisory Committee; and authorizing the
attorney general to schedule substances by emergency regulation
or repeal an emergency regulation that scheduled a substance."
- HEARD & HELD
HOUSE BILL NO. 75
"An Act relating to gun violence protective orders; relating to
the crime of violating a protective order; relating to a central
registry for protective orders; relating to the powers of
district judges and magistrates; requiring physicians,
psychologists, psychological associates, social workers, marital
and family therapists, and licensed professional counselors to
report annually threats of gun violence; and amending Rules 4
and 65, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 9, Alaska
Rules of Administration."
- HEARD & HELD
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
BILL: HB 387
SHORT TITLE: AG SCHEDULE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
SPONSOR(s): REPRESENTATIVE(s) CLAMAN
02/21/18 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
02/21/18 (H) JUD, FIN
03/16/18 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
BILL: HB 75
SHORT TITLE: GUN VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
SPONSOR(s): REPRESENTATIVE(s) TARR
01/23/17 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
01/23/17 (H) JUD, FIN
02/28/18 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
02/28/18 (H) Heard & Held
02/28/18 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/12/18 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
03/12/18 (H) Heard & Held
03/12/18 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/12/18 (H) JUD AT 7:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
03/12/18 (H) Heard & Held
03/12/18 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/14/18 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
03/14/18 (H) Heard & Held
03/14/18 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/16/18 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM GRUENBERG 120
WITNESS REGISTER
KACI SCHROEDER, Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section
Criminal Division
Department of Law
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 387, answered
questions.
ROBERT HENDERSON, Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Law
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 387, answered
questions.
SEAN MOORE, Director
State and Local Government Affairs
Consumer Healthcare Products Association
Washington, DC
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 387, answered
questions.
SEAN MOORE, Director
State & Local Government Affairs
Consumer Healthcare Products Association
Washington D.C.
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 387, offered an
amendment.
MICHAEL DUXBURY, Captain
Deputy Commander
Statewide Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU)
Division of Alaska State Troopers
Department of Public Safety
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 387, answered
questions.
DARIO BORGHESAN, Assistant Attorney General
Opinions, Appeals, & Ethics Section
Civil Division (Anchorage)
Department of Law
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 75, answered
questions.
STACIE KRALY, Chief Assistant Attorney General
Statewide Section Supervisor
Human Services Section
Civil Division (Juneau)
Department of Law (DOL)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 75, answered
questions.
KACI SCHROEDER, Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section
Criminal Division
Department of Law
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During the hearing of HB 75, answered
questions.
ACTION NARRATIVE
1:01:02 PM
CHAIR MATT CLAMAN called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting to order at 1:01 p.m. Representatives Claman, Stutes,
Kreiss-Tomkins, Reinbold, and Eastman were present at the call
to order.
HB 387-AG SCHEDULE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
1:01:31 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that the first order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 387, "An Act relating to scheduled substances;
relating to the Controlled Substances Advisory Committee; and
authorizing the attorney general to schedule substances by
emergency regulation or repeal an emergency regulation that
scheduled a substance."
1:02:52 PM
KACI SCHROEDER, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services
Section, Criminal Division, Department of Law, explained the
Sectional Analysis, as follows:
Section 1 makes the president of the Board of Pharmacy
the chairman of the Controlled Substances Advisory
Committee.
Section 2 makes a conforming change in conforming with
the change in Section 1 and removes the attorney
general as the chair and makes the chair the president
of the Board of Pharmacy.
Section 3 adds a new duty to the Controlled Substances
Advisory Committee and that duty is to advise the
attorney general of the need to schedule substances by
emergency regulation.
Section 4 is the meat of the bill, and Section 4
allows the attorney general to schedule substances by
emergency regulation and then outlines a number of
things that must be considered before the substance
can be scheduled. Among them are that the attorney
general must assess the actual or probable abuse of
the substance; the attorney general must consider
whether the substance has been already scheduled on a
temporary basis under federal law; the attorney
general must consult with the Controlled Substances
Advisory Committee; and the attorney general must also
consult with the chief medical officer in the
Department of Health and Social Services.
1:04:19 PM
Section 5 adds to the definition of controlled
substances that are scheduled on an emergency basis by
the attorney general.
Section 6 adds the definition of substance and that
substance means a drug, controlled substance, or
immediate precursor included in the schedules that are
set out in statute, as well as substances that are
scheduled on an emergency basis by the attorney
general.
Section 7 adds to the duties of the attorney general
to schedule substances on an emergency basis.
Section 8 says that notice of scheduling a substance
on an emergency basis must be put on the Alaska Online
Public Notice System.
Section 9 says that the notice must include a summary
of compliance with the considerations that I just
outlined in Section 4.
Section 10 exempts the attorney general's emergency
scheduling process from the normal emergency
regulation scheduling process. So, this is a
different emergency regulation scheduling process that
we're setting up.
1:05:36 PM
Section 11 adds the new process that we are
establishing to the emergency regulation statute. So,
if you looked up that statute you would find both the
normal emergency regulation process and the one for
the attorney general.
Section 12 exempts the process that we are
establishing for the attorney general from the
timelines that are in place for the current emergency
regulations. Currently, they are only in effect for
120-days and we're exempting the attorney general's
process from that timeframe.
Section 13 says that a regulation -- a substance that
is scheduled by an emergency regulation by the
attorney general is in effect for 720-days. It will
expire unless the attorney general follows the normal
regulation process and makes the regulation permanent.
Section 14 is the state policy that emergencies are
held to a minimum and exempts the attorney general's
ability to schedule on an emergency basis from that
statute.
1:06:50 PM
ROBERT HENDERSON, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Law, advised that
as Ms. Schroeder described, this bill creates a new emergency
regulation process that is unique to controlled substances and
unique to designer drugs. It is different from the regular
regulatory process and the current emergency regulation process,
he advised. It is well known that designer drugs come on the
market quickly, and the state as a whole, is not nimble,
flexible, or quick enough to address these drugs as they arrive
on the market. He related that the Department of Law (DOL) has
heard this information from law enforcement, prosecutors, public
health, and different venues. The legislature would then take
up the issue and make a decision as to whether to schedule that
controlled substance, and where on the list the drug should be
scheduled. Currently, he offered, a bill can take several years
to pass, the DOL has found that during that time period, people
are getting hurt and abusing the substance, and law enforcement
is without the tools necessary to interdict those new drugs. He
pointed out that depending upon the circumstance, once the drug
is scheduled by statute, the makers of that drug may change its
chemical compound. This legislation, he described, allows the
department to be nimbler as those new chemical compounds come up
and the DOL can quickly and appropriately respond.
1:08:36 PM
MR. HENDERSON explained that HB 387 has several protections to
ensure that the attorney general exercises that authority
appropriately. He highlighted examples of where this issue was
recently seen and why there is a need now for this legislation
and he referred to the new drug "tramadol." He explained that
it is an opioid derivative, a mild pain killer, that is
currently a Schedule IVA controlled substance, and the members
of the Controlled Substance Advisory Committee (CSAC) started
hearing about tramadol from community members of Bethel in 2014.
Tramadol, he explained, was purchased on the internet, sent to
Western Alaska, was abused, and sold illegally as a substitute
for other opioids in the region. Tramadol was introduced to the
2015 Alaska State Legislature, and for several reasons it was
not actually enacted until later and added to the controlled
substances schedule, he offered. During that time, he
commented, there was a two and one-half year window where the
CSAC knew from law enforcement and public health that the drug
was being purchased illegally, distributed illegally, and
abused, but there was nothing state law enforcement could do
about tramadol. The federal government passed an emergency
regulation and it started to take on the large cases, and this
bill is designed, in part, based upon how the federal government
schedules drugs. He advised that another good example is the
drug "spice" wherein law enforcement was unable to address
enforcement. This body dealt with the issue of spice several
years ago and shortly after it was added to the controlled
substances schedule, the chemical compound changed, he advised.
Ultimately, he explained, the way spice is handled under current
law is through packaging, wherein there is certain packaging
that someone engages in, represents it to be something that it
is not, and that person can be held liable. He described that
it is not an effective means of interdicting some of these drugs
that result in real life public health consequences.
1:11:45 PM
MR. HENDERSON explained that HB 387 creates permission to pass
emergency regulations. The legislation provides that the
attorney general will provide 30-days public notice on the
Alaska Online Public Notification System, and the attorney
general shall also consider the various factors that go into
determining whether a substance should be controlled. Broadly,
he offered, it relates to the pattern of abuse such as, whether
the substance is dangerous, addictive, and subject to abuse.
The code in the proposed bill is more specific in that the CSAC
goes through the degree of danger or probable danger, the way
the drug is abused, the type, the severity, the duration, the
scope, and the CSAC talks to its public health partners. He
pointed out that those are the issues the attorney general would
have to access and make written findings as to all of those
factors. The attorney general would have to consult the
Controlled Substance Advisory Committee, which was created by
statute and contains a unique group of skill sets where people
have come together who are all subject matter experts in the
realm of controlled substances, but for different purposes and
different reasons, he explained. The current makeup of the
advisory committee has nine members and Mr. Henderson then
listed all of the members of the CSAC. He described the
committee as a unique and robust group of individuals who all
have an expertise in controlled substances and are looking at
the issues through their particular areas of expertise. The
group then comes together to discuss these drugs in order to
determine whether it is necessary to schedule a certain drug.
Under current law, the CSAC evaluates those drugs and makes a
recommendation to the governor Under this legislation, that
recommendation would be made to the attorney general and the
attorney general would then consider that recommendation, he
explained. When offering written findings and making a
recommendation, the CSAC would have taken testimony, sought out
public input as it is subject to the Open Meetings Act, and it
moves through the public notice process. Under this proposed
bill, he offered, an abbreviated version of the public
participation would occur at the attorney general level.
1:15:20 PM
MR. HENDERSON advised that in addition to the Controlled
Substance Advisory Committee and in addition to reviewing all of
the previously listed factors, the attorney general must consult
with the chief medical officer as to the public health aspect,
in addition to receiving information from the Controlled
Substance Advisory Committee. Once all of those steps have
occurred, the attorney general can issue an emergency
regulation scheduling a new designer drug at one of six
controlled substance schedules in Alaska. He advised that the
information would be forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor's
Office and posted on the Alaska Online Public Notification
System, wherein that regulation would be in effect for 720-days.
The intent of the bill, he described, is that during that 720-
days, the legislature would then have adequate time to consider
the regulation and possibly enact legislation to annul that
regulation. Within that 720-days, if the attorney general
decides to move to make that regulation permanent, the attorney
general would follow the regular regulation process wherein
public notice is posted to solicit comments and then responds to
the comments and questions the public posted online. The
regulation must be reviewed by the Department of Law (DOL), and
it then goes back to the Lieutenant Governor's Office and
becomes effective 30 days after receipt of the regulation.
Under the proposed bill, he advised, if the attorney general did
not move to make the regulation permanent, the emergency
regulation would automatically be repealed and the attorney
general would not be permitted to re-issue that emergency
regulation.
1:17:45 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked what takes place if the attorney general
decided to schedule a particular substance on a different
schedule than the federal government had already ready scheduled
the substance.
MR. HENDERSON responded that the attorney general, under this
proposed bill, would have that authority, "and we do that
already." He explained that currently, there are several
controlled substances that the State of Alaska schedules
differently than the federal government.
CHAIR CLAMAN interjected that that was done by the legislature
at the current time.
MR. HENDERSON added that the manner in which the bill is
drafted, the attorney general would have the authority to make a
determination as to where this new designer drug goes in the one
of six schedules. The most obvious example of where this state
is dramatically different than the federal government, is
marijuana. Marijuana, he explained, under federal law is a
Schedule I drug, meaning that it has no medical purpose and it
cannot be prescribed. In Alaska, it is a Schedule VIA
Controlled Substance and legalized as recreational under certain
circumstances. There are other examples, he offered, such that
the state's Schedule IA Controlled Substances, generally
speaking, are opiate or opiate derivatives, such as heroin,
morphine, fentanyl, and so forth, and the federal government
schedules opioids and opioid derivatives under Schedule II, the
state defines its schedules differently.
1:19:39 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether the state could schedule a substance
that the federal government had chosen not to schedule, or does
this bill require that first the federal government must take
action before the state can take action to schedule a substance.
MR. HENDERSON answered that the bill does not require the
attorney general to follow the path of the federal government,
but it does require the attorney general to consider what
actions the federal government had taken.
1:20:18 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN suggested that one option would be to have a
regulation sunset after two or three years or whatever period if
the legislature chose to not take action to make it a controlled
substance by act of the legislature. This legislation removes
any legislative authority to take that action, and he asked why
not start the process and then "kick it over" to the legislature
to determine, whether it is 720-days or a longer period of time.
MR. HENDERSON replied that that is how some other states address
the issue, for example, the State of Florida's attorney general
is authorized to schedule drugs on an emergency basis, and then
that action must be ratified by the legislature within a certain
amount of time. The Controlled Substance Advisory Committee
discovered, when researching this issue, that the 1980 Alaska
Supreme Court had already spoken, generally, as to how to annul
or take action against a regulation. The Alaska Supreme Court
found that for the legislature to annul a regulation, the
legislature must follow the constitutional mechanics of bill
passage, meaning that there must be three readings and a
majority vote in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
He offered that it is the opinion of the Controlled Substances
Advisory Committee that the ratification procedure is not
possible given the interpretation of the Alaska Supreme Court as
to how it interprets the regulation and annulment practice.
1:22:19 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Mr. Henderson to cite the decision from the
Alaska Supreme Court upon which he was relying.
MR. HENDERSON responded that the decision the CSAC reviewed is
State of Alaska v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (1980).
1:22:56 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked whether Mr. Henderson had
reviewed the 3/16/18 letter submitted by the Consumer Health
Care Products Association regarding HB 387.
MR. HENDERSON answered that he saw the letter this afternoon and
briefly reviewed it, but he has not had a chance to analysis the
letter in depth.
1:23:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS explained that the crux of the
letter was adding language to HB 387, Sec. 4. [AS 11.71.125(e)],
page 3, lines 28-30, which would read as follows:
(e) The attorney general may not adopt an
emergency regulation under this section that schedules
an alcoholic beverage as defined in AS 04.21.080,
marijuana as defined in AS 17.38.900, non-narcotic
drugs if such drugs may [under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 921 USC 301 et seq] be lawfully sold
over the counter or behind the counter without a
prescription, or tobacco.
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked the department's perspective
on this suggestion.
MR. HENDERSON responded that he is not prepared to analyze that
suggestion at this time, although he said he does understand
what the proposed language it attempting to do. Wherein, he
related, if something has been reviewed, monitored, and
accepted, by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Administration, and it is permitted to be an over the counter
drug, should the attorney general be allowed to schedule that on
an emergency basis. He advised that he could not speak to the
effect of the breadth of that type of amendment at this time.
1:24:33 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KREISS-TOMKINS asked whether Mr. Henderson was
aware of any over the counter drugs and not over the counter
drugs that have been approved by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act that can be dramatically abused. He asked whether
Mr. Henderson was aware of any currently abused legal drugs in
Alaska "that could be for which emergency regulations could be
adopted."
MR. HENDERSON answered, "Not at this point." There are certain
over the counter drugs that are abused, but he could not speak
to whether there are drugs that would be scheduled that are sold
over the counter. After reading the subject suggestion, he
advised that that is one of the first things he would want to
review as well.
1:25:44 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked why the emergency regulation
process was not working currently, and why not simply fix the
system rather than passing a bill.
MR. HENDERSON responded that, in part, it is because the
legislature has not given the attorney general the authority to
regulate on this precise issue. When the Alaska Supreme Court
reviewed the Delegation Doctrine, meaning the legislature
delegating certain authority to the executive branch, the court
determined that the delegation must be clear, precise, with
standards, and specific to the topic, he offered. Currently,
the attorney general does not have that authority to pass
emergency regulations, he explained.
1:26:53 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that Mr. Henderson had said
that there was a procedure in place for emergency regulations,
so why is this bill necessary.
MR. HENDERSON responded that there is a procedure for emergency
regulations. Currently, he explained, the first step is that an
agency must have been given authority to pass regulations. For
example, he offered, the Alaska Department of Fish & Game
(ADF&G) has been given the authority to pass regulations. The
agency can then pass an emergency regulation if, under the
current law, the regulation is necessary for public peace,
health, safety, and general welfare. He explained that the
interpretation [of public peace, health, safety, and general
welfare] is different for every agency, such that the ADF&G's
interpretation of an emergency is different than another agency.
He offered that when the ADF&G issues an emergency regulation to
close the Little Susitna River for king salmon, for example,
that decision is based upon its express authority to pass
regulations "that has been delegated to the legislature." In
this instance, the attorney general has not been delegated that
authority so they do not have the authority to pass an emergency
regulation.
CHAIR CLAMAN commented that currently, no one in the executive
branch has the authority to schedule controlled substances, only
the legislature has that authority today.
1:28:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked why [the authority would not be
given to the] Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS)
because it employs medical professionals.
MR. HENDERSON replied that some states have this authority in
DHSS or the Board of Pharmacy, and every state's authority
process is a little different. The model used for this
legislation was crafted after the federal government which
delegated that authority to the United States Attorney General,
and it is modeled after the State of Florida of which delegated
that authority to the state attorney general. For example, he
offered, the State of Indiana delegated that authority to the
Board of Pharmacy because every state's process is a little
different.
1:29:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether the attorney general would
oversee the Board of Pharmacy.
MR. HENDERSON explained that the delegation of authority to pass
emergency regulations can be delegated to a specific body or
individual within the executive branch. This bill, as proposed,
delegates the authority to the attorney general, but the
legislature could delegate that authority to another executive
body.
1:30:05 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to HB 387, Sec. 1
[AS.71.100(c)] page 1, lines 6-7, which read as follows:
(c) the president of the Board of Pharmacy or the
president's designees [ATTORNEY GENERAL] is the chair
[CHAIRMAN] of the committee.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Mr. Henderson to describe the
relationship between the Board of Pharmacy and the attorney
general because it appears to be a diversion from normal
practice.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether part of this statute is to take the
attorney general off of the Board of Pharmacy so the attorney
general would not be involved in those decisions, or is it just
removing the attorney general as chair of the Board of Pharmacy.
MR. HENDERSON answered, "No," the bill changes the chairman of
the Controlled Substance Advisory Committee from the attorney
general to the Board of Pharmacy. The attorney general is not
on the Board of Pharmacy, and the bill makes the Board of
Pharmacy designee as the chairman of the Controlled Substance
Advisory Committee. Under current law, the attorney general is
the chair of the Controlled Substance Advisory Committee, he
explained.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that his explanation was
extremely helpful.
1:31:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Mr. Henderson how many people, in
general, are using, abusing, and trafficking controlled
substances.
MR. HENDERSON deferred to the Department of Public Safety (DPS)
because he does not know the answer to that question.
1:31:39 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD requested a ballpark number because she
was trying to determine how many of the general population is
affected by this bill, and whether a lot of substances are being
abused, and that trafficking is taking place.
MR. HENDERSON advised that he could not answer the question of
how many substances are being abused because he does not have
that data. Over the last several years, he advised, there have
been only two new drugs, tramadol-U47700 and pink, that the
Controlled Substance Advisory Committee recommended be
scheduled.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that there is broad recognition that the
state does have substance abuse issues and that prosecutions are
taking place every week for controlled substance violations.
1:32:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that it would be helpful to know
how many people are using and abusing controlled substances
outside of their doctor's recommendation, and how much
trafficking is taking place in Alaska.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Mr. Henderson that he could do his best to
provide the information that is available. While it is
interesting information, he opined that many of the questions of
use versus abuse is pretty tough to get answers to, particularly
on a statewide level.
1:33:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that there are one through six
schedules of drugs, and asked the current law when dealing with
them, such as possession, use, abuse, and trafficking.
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that this question is far beyond the
scope of this bill.
MR. HENDERSON answered that generally speaking, there are six
schedules and five different categories of classifications of
drug offenses of misconduct involving a controlled substance,
one through five, found under Title 11.71.
1:34:16 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked the law when people are using,
abusing, and trafficking controlled substances.
MR. HENDERSON answered that it depends on the circumstances, for
example, someone merely possessing a schedule IA controlled
substance, such as heroin, would be misconduct involving
Schedule IV Controlled Substances.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Representative Reinbold that her questions
are regarding the general criminal law, a subject within which
she previously offered a lot of opinions. Chair Claman noted
that this is not a hearing for her to receive a basic
explanation of the law because Representative Reinbold already
understands the law.
1:35:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that this bill will "do a
little emergency regulation" and put it up on the Alaska Online
Public Notification System. She said that she would like to
know whether it is being criminalized, or getting substance
abuse programs, or is this "just another little posting?"
MR. HENDERSON answered that if the attorney general were to pass
an emergency regulation and schedule a drug, for example,
tramadol as a schedule IVA, that depending upon the
circumstances, possession and distribution of that drug would be
a criminal offense.
1:35:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether he had said "possession
and use?"
MR. HENDERSON clarified that he had said possession and
distribution.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Mr. Henderson to repeat his
response.
MR. HENDERSON replied that the law classifies possession or
distribution of a controlled substance based upon its severity,
depending on what the person is doing and what type of drug the
person has in their possession. In the event a drug was
scheduled as IA, the distribution of the drug could either be a
class B or a class C felony depending upon the circumstances.
Possession of that drug would be a misdemeanor.
1:36:33 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to the "Distribution Sheet" in
front of her, and paraphrased as follows:
Heroin is a class B felony if it is more than one
ounce, and a class C felony if less than one ounce; if
it is cocaine or meth, it is a class B felony in any
amount if it is more than 2.5 ounces; and a class C
felony if it is less than 2.5 ounces; and possession
of a hard drug is class C felony and a misdemeanor
jailtime is generally not authorized.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether this will just be an
Alaska Online Public Notification System posting or whether it
will figure out how many people are using, abusing, and
trafficking, and the state actually do something to penalize and
help these people, or is this just a "simple little" online
posting.
MR. HENDERSON responded that once the emergency regulation is
passed, the possession and use would become a criminal action
and the state could prosecute that offense; therefore, it would
be more than just a posting.
1:37:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Mr. Henderson to carefully explain
whether it will be a class C felony with no jailtime.
MR. HENDERSON reiterated that it depends upon the classification
in which the drug is scheduled and it depends on what the person
is doing with that drug. In the event it is a schedule IA
controlled substance, possession would be a misdemeanor;
distribution over one gram would be class B felony; and
distribution of under one gram would be a class C felony.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether this bill addresses
anything other than posting or will there be efforts to
understand what is taking place in the communities and causing
the crime.
MR. HENDERSON reiterated that this would be an important tool to
law enforcement, prosecutors, and public health because the tool
allows the state to be quick and nimble when new drugs hit the
market. Once the new drugs hit the market, they can be
scheduled, get a search warrant, and have the people prosecuted,
he advised.
1:39:44 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN surmised that HB 387 would give the
attorney general the ability to take a substance which is
currently legal and make it illegal with the potential of being
a felony.
MR. HENDERSON reiterated that depending upon the sentence, yes.
1:40:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN said that in the event the attorney
general believed a substance was misclassified and a class C
felony was not high enough, could the attorney general, through
this bill, then reclassify the substance and put it on a new
schedule and turn that previous class C felony into a class B
felony.
MR. HENDERSON answered "No," and he reiterated that the bill
only allows the attorney general to add new controlled
substances, it does not allow the attorney general to reschedule
or delete existing scheduled drugs.
1:40:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to HB 387, [AS 44.62.260(c)(1)
and (2)], page 7, lines 4-14, and asked the specifics within
which the 720-day limit can be extended.
MR. HENDERSON asked whether Representative Eastman was asking,
"can the 720-day limit be extended?"
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked when the regulation can continue to
be in effect past the 720-day limit, and referred to HB 75, page
7, lines 4-14.
MR. HENDERSON answered that a drug could remain in regulation
and extend past the 720-days if the attorney general followed
the standard and normal regulation process.
1:41:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN surmised that the language states that
simply because [a drug was identified] in this emergency status,
it would not need to continue in this emergency status.
Basically, he said, sometime before the 720-days, [the
regulation] would leave emergency status and be concurrent with
the attorney general's current authority without this bill.
MR. HENDERSON clarified that if the attorney general followed
the Administrative Procedures Act before the expiration of the
720-days, the regulation could remain.
1:42:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the attorney general can
currently follow the Administrative Procedures Act, or whether
this bill is necessary.
MR. HENDERSON reiterated that currently, the attorney general
does not have the authority to schedule controlled substances
under the Administrative Procedures Act.
1:42:50 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Mr. Henderson to describe, under
the Administrative Procedures Act, the role of the legislature.
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that the Administrative Procedures Act
relates to the executive branch, and the legislature has a
process in which to schedule controlled substances.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Mr. Henderson to respond to his
question for the record.
MR. HENDERSON replied that the Administrative Procedures Act
effects and requires the executive branch and the state agencies
to follow a specific procedure when enacting a regulation. The
legislature has the authority, which cannot be taken away under
this bill, to enact a proper bill to annul a regulation, he
explained.
1:43:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN surmised that with the passage of this
bill there could be a legal substance, and if the attorney
general followed this procedure with absolutely no action by the
legislature, that substance could become illegal in perpetuity.
MR. HENDERSON reiterated, "Depending on the substance, yes."
1:44:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that Mr. Henderson testified that
tramadol was being purchased and used illegally, and there was
nothing the state could do about the issue. He asked what laws
were being violated if it was purchased and used illegally, and
why could the state not take action.
MR. HENDERSON answered that the federal government temporarily
scheduled tramadol via emergency regulation and at that point it
became illegal under federal law. Alaska's prosecutors and law
enforcement are charged with enforcing state law. Therefore, he
pointed out, it was illegal under federal law but not illegal
under state law because it was not a controlled substance.
1:45:07 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to Sec. 4. [Sec. 11.71.125(a)]
page 2, lines 26-30, which read as follows:
(a) The attorney general may, by regulation,
schedule a substance under this chapter regardless of
whether the substance is substantially similar to a
controlled substance listed in AS 11.71.140 -
11.71.180, if the attorney general finds that
scheduling the substance on an emergency basis is
necessary to avoid an immediate hazard to public
safety.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether there is a definition of
public safety the attorney general must follow or is public
safety subjective on their part.
MR. HENDERSON answered that public safety is not a defined term
under Title 11.81, meaning that the definition of immediate
hazard to public safety would be defined by the attorney general
under this proposed bill, taking into account the factors listed
on page 3.
1:46:14 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether there is anything in this
bill that would prohibit the attorney general from deciding that
high fructose corn syrup, for example, was an immediate hazard
to public safety. Thereby, scheduling that syrup, making that
syrup illegal for 720-days, and then go through the regulatory
process of making it illegal in perpetuity.
MR. HENDERSON answered, in theory, that could occur. Although,
he offered, given what the attorney general must consider, the
individuals with whom the attorney must consult, whether it had
been temporarily scheduled by federal law, and whether there was
clandestine importation, manufacture, and distribution of the
substance, it is highly unlikely.
1:47:20 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN said that if the Controlled Substance
Advisory Committee were to unanimously recommend to the attorney
general to not schedule high fructose corn syrup, whether
anything in the bill would require the attorney general to act
upon that recommendation or could the attorney general simply
decide not to take that recommendation.
MR. HENDERSON replied that the attorney general has the
authority to not follow the recommendations of the Controlled
Substance Advisory Committee. Except, he pointed out, by doing
so, the attorney general would have to articulate the reason in
writing and post it on the Alaska Online Public Notification
System for the public.
1:48:17 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that because the attorney general
would be given this greater and increased authority, does the
department have a position on making the department's seat on
the Controlled Substance Advisory Committee a non-voting member
status.
MR. HENDERSON responded that that is not anything that had been
considered at this point. Under the proposed bill, the attorney
general would no longer be the chair of the Controlled Substance
Advisory Committee in order to address that precise issue. The
Controlled Substance Advisory Committee can meet only at the
call of the chair and by removing the attorney general as chair,
the bill requires the Board of Pharmacy to call a meeting, he
explained.
1:49:16 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that she had misspoken and would
like to put her clarification on the record.
REPRESENTATIVE CLAMAN pointed out that he was trying to get to
public testimony and that this discussion has been well over the
usual 15 minutes for questions.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD related that it is a point of
clarification.
CHAIR CLAMAN said that he understands, but Representative Stutes
is next for questions, and then the committee will turn to
public testimony.
REPRESENTATIVE STUTES indicated that she would not ask questions
at this point.
1:49:34 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CLAMAN opened public testimony.
1:50:07 PM
SEAN MOORE, Director, State and Local Government Affairs,
Consumer Healthcare Products Association, said he is testifying
today on behalf of the Consumer Healthcare Products Association
(CHPA), and reiterated that this bill would provide the attorney
general authority to schedule a substance under emergency rule.
The CHPA is the national trade association representing leading
manufacturers and marketers of over the counter (OTC) medicine
as well as dietary supplements, he offered. The CHPA's member
companies appreciate the intent of this legislation as it is
something several other states have grappled with, and the CHPA
is sympathetic to the difficulties in the ever-revolving nature
of synthetic drugs that are used and distributed by criminals.
He referred to his [previously discussed] written comments and
pointed out that the CHPS is concerned that this bill may
unintentionally threaten access to over the counter medications
that are certified through the Federal Food and Drug
Administration for use and are actually used by hundreds of
thousands of Alaskans. The CHPS proposed one minor amendment to
address those concerns and specially, the CHPS would like to see
Sec. 4, page 3, lines 28-30 amended on such a manner that the
bill excludes marijuana and tobacco from the scope of this
expanded authority, and the CHPS would like to see OTC
medication included in that exclusion. It is the CHPS's belief,
he described, that this amendment is a straight forward fix and
a fix that has been adopted in several other states that have
delegated this authority to their attorneys general or another
body. He offered that the amendment would maintain the sense of
the bill and ensure that Alaskans' access to FDA approved OTC's
is not interrupted, and it would ensure that the CHPS' member
companies are able to operate in a predictable regulatory
environment. For these reasons, he said, the CHPA respectfully
encourages the committee to amend HB 387, and it appreciates the
committee's consideration of CHPA's position.
1:52:21 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN, after ascertaining that no one wished to testify,
closed public hearing on HB 387.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD pointed to "a chart in front of me" and
asked Captain Duxbury, Alaska State Troopers, to clarify where
it read, and she paraphrased as follows: "Heroin distribution
per Senate Bill 91 [passed in the Twenty-Ninth Alaska State
Legislature] was an A felony in any amount. And, post-Senate
Bill 91, it was a B felony if more than one-ounce. And then,
heroin distribution post-Senate Bill 91 was a C felony if less
than one-ounce." She asked Captain Duxbury to describe how much
heroin people are allowed to possess because she believed it was
2.5 grams and it was enough to kill 25 people. Her overall
point, she offered, is whether this is simply allowing the
attorney general "a whole lot more authority or are we actually
going to do something with this bill to actually improve public
safety?"
1:54:10 PM
MICHAEL DUXBURY, CAPTAIN, Deputy Commander, Statewide Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU), Division of Alaska State Troopers,
Department of Public Safety, responded that the key to HB 387 is
its responsiveness and agile ability for law enforcement to go
after, especially in the deadly era of opioids such as fentanyl
and car-fentanyl, something that could be another version of
that drug. As is known, these drugs are deadly, he said.
Recently, he offered, another drug called "preydom" has come up
and it is another drug sold in smoke shops with a contamination
of salmonella that the country is "trying to get a hold on." In
response to Representative Reinbold's question as to what amount
of heroin people are able to have, he pointed out that heroin is
illegal and possession is illegal. However, the committee would
do well to re-address, with the deputy attorney general, some of
the issues that are taking place. There has been some movement
...
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Captain Duxbury that his testimony is
limited to the topic matter of HB 387, this is not a forum in
which to debate the past acts of the legislature.
1:55:48 PM
CAPTAIN DUXBURY advised that possession of heroin is not (audio
difficulties) trying to adjust that and he has been working with
the attorney general. Also, he related, the amount of heroin
and the other linked aspects are not necessarily part of this,
but what is part of this bill is the response and agile aspect
that will help law enforcement enforce laws, especially on
things that are coming which are unknown at this time.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that previously the possession and
distribution of cocaine and meth was a class B felony. She then
reiterated her previous description of the current
classifications. She added that prior to Senate Bill 91,
possession was a class C felony and now it is a class A
misdemeanor with almost no jailtime, and "I had the Department
of Law budget and basically they were dismissing about 7,000
misdemeanors and that's all that possession is right now." Her
concern, she offered, is whether the legislature is actually
going to be doing something with this bill to address the drug
issue or is this simply giving the attorney general more
authority and simply posting the drug classification. She asked
whether Captain Duxbury supports HB 387, and whether the Alaska
State Troopers are taking a position on this bill.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Captain Duxbury that these questions and
statements are about the fourth time Representative Reinbold has
asked the same question and Captain Duxbury is not to answer her
questions. Chair Claman pointed out that Captain Duxbury
testified that the point of this bill is to give more
flexibility within which to schedule controlled substances, and
Representative Reinbold's concerns with past acts of the
legislature are not the topic of this bill.
[HB 387 was held over.]
HB 75-GUN VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
1:58:02 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN announced that the final order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 75, "An Act relating to gun violence protective
orders; relating to the crime of violating a protective order;
relating to a central registry for protective orders; relating
to the powers of district judges and magistrates; requiring
physicians, psychologists, psychological associates, social
workers, marital and family therapists, and licensed
professional counselors to report annually threats of gun
violence; and amending Rules 4 and 65, Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 9, Alaska Rules of Administration."
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that this is the fifth hearing of HB 75 in
the House Judiciary Standing Committee. In recap, Chair Claman
offered that on Wednesday the committee heard from the
Department of Law (DOL) and the Alaska Court System (ACS)
regarding constitutional issues, how the gun violence protective
order structure compares to domestic violence protective orders,
the structure in existing statutes, and how the gun violence
protective order compares to civil commitment motions. The
committee learned the following: individuals do not have a right
to counsel in a domestic violence protective order proceeding
because it is a civil proceeding and not a criminal proceeding;
there may not be a right to counsel on a gun violence protective
order proceeding because it is also a civil proceeding and the
committee will learn more about a right to counsel today; the
difference between a civil commitment under Title 47 based on a
civil court finding that a person suffers from a mental disease
or defect and a procedure to address a criminal defendant's
competency to stand trial in a criminal case; the criminal
competency proceeding addresses whether a person is able to
understand the proceeding against them or to assist in their own
defense under AS 12.47.100 and there are no competency hearings
if there are no criminal charges.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that during the last hearing, Dario
Borghesan, Department of Law, indicated that he would perform
research on the right to counsel in civil matters, the status of
the State of Indiana law and that court's review of that
particular gun violence protective order.
2:00:05 PM
DARIO BORGHESAN, Assistant Attorney General, Opinions, Appeals,
& Ethics Section, Civil Division (Anchorage), Department of Law,
responded that on the issue of whether HB 75 would trigger the
right to a court-appointed counsel, the short answer is that
possibly in a relatively rare case and if they had a publicly
funded attorney, there might be an obligation to provide the
respondent with a court-appointed attorney. He explained that
the right to court-appointed counsel typically attaches in
criminal prosecutions, and HB 75 is a civil proceeding that does
not entail any threat of jailtime. Typically, civil proceedings
do not require court-appointed counsel; however, the Alaska
Supreme Court ruled that in child protection proceedings and in
private child custody proceedings, if one parent has a publicly
funded attorney through the Alaska Legal Services Corporation,
the parent on the other side is entitled to court-appointed
counsel under the Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (1979) decision
and the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed that principle in 2011.
As to HB 75, there is the right to parent your children and the
right to bear arms. Although both are constitutionally
protected rights, it does not mean that a person receives the
same constitutional protections against a temporary seizure of a
person's firearms, then a person would receive if there was a
risk of a person's children being removed from their custody.
He pointed out that those are different constitutional rights
and the parties might be entitled to different judicial
protections. It is important to advise, he offered, that it is
"pretty rare" that the party seeking a domestic violence
protective order does so with the help of an attorney.
Therefore, in the case of the gun violence protective order it
would also be fairly rare that someone would seek that order
with the help of an attorney. He remarked that only if a person
was seeking a gun violence protective order with the help of a
publicly funded attorney, there might be some obligation to have
court-appointed counsel on the other side.
2:03:11 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Mr. Borghesan to respond to the question
about the State of Indiana case addressing the Indiana gun
violence protective order. He commented that the committee had
received a copy of the Indiana Court of Appeals opinion via
email.
MR. BORGHESAN answered that under Redington v. State of Indiana,
997 N.E.2d 356 (2013) decision a particular individual was
observed by law enforcement to be acting strangely and
potentially dangerously. The State of Indiana law enforcement
obtained a warrant to remove Mr. Redington's firearms and then,
ultimately received a court order removing all of his firearms
from his possession. In turn, Mr. Redington challenged the
Indiana statute on constitutional grounds arguing that it
violated the constitutional provision of the Constitution of the
State of Indiana guaranteeing the right to bear arms. The State
of Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that "No," the protective
order statute was constitutional and it did not violate the
Constitution of the State of Indiana's right to bear arm.
2:05:03 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Stacie Kraly, DOL, to describe the
consequences of a civil commitment pursuant to Title 47, and the
full range of rights and privileges a person loses as a result
of a civil commitment.
2:05:46 PM
STACIE KRALY, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Statewide
Section Supervisor, Human Services Section, Civil Division
(Juneau), Department of Law (DOL), answered that when a person
is civilly committed, the most obvious consequence is the loss
of their liberty interest because they are being held by court
order in a psychiatric hospital for treatment and evaluation.
She reiterated her previous testimony and advised that the
initial period of commitment is up to 30-days and the 30-days
can be extended to 90-days, and to 180-days, but at any point
during that time period when the person no longer meets the
commitment criteria, they must be released. She related that
there are also collateral consequences to a civil commitment
which include: under federal law the loss of gun rights; the
social stigma of a civil commitment, and on different occasions
the person may have to identify that civil commitment as a part
of an application for employment or healthcare, or applied in
future legal proceedings to identify that the person does have a
mental illness, which is a predicate to being civilly committed;
it could also be used in other proceedings such as judicial
notice; and there is a potential consequence of having to pay
for the services they received at [the institution]. The cost
of the person's period of commitment is borne by the State of
Alaska, but there is a mechanism by which the state can seek
recovery of some or all of that cost if the person has insurance
or a third-party recovery. Those collateral consequences of a
civil commitment were discussed under In re Joan K. v. Alaska,
273 P.3d 594 (2012), she advised.
2:08:50 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Kraly to describe the
difference between the civil confinement of 2-3 days versus the
30-days, 90-days, and 180-days.
MS. KRALY reiterated that under the civil commitment statute
there is a preliminary evaluation period which, in nomenclature
common parlance, is called ex parte. An ex parte allows for a
person to be taken into custody and evaluated to determine
whether a civil commitment should be granted and that ex parte
order expires after 72-hours. The civil commitment, she
explained, is when it was determined that the person had not
stabilized and truly did need additional commitment, or to be
committed in order to get better. The facility has the ability
to petition the court for an initial period of civil commitment
of 30-days. In that circumstance, two mental health
professionals and a psychiatrist identify that the person is
suffering from a mental illness, is a threat to self or others,
or is gravely disabled, she explained. There is then a full
evidentiary hearing in front of a superior court judge or a
magistrate, the person is given court-appointed counsel, and
other individuals could also be appointed to assist the judge in
determining whether the person met the above criteria.
2:10:24 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked the success rate, for example, the
state had [committed] 100 people, how many of those people get
better, what are the treatment programs, and what are the
outcomes.
MS. KRALY clarified that the collateral consequences only apply
after the 30-day civil commitment, they do not attach during the
72-hour hold.
2:11:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that the gun cannot be removed
during the first 72-hour hold.
CHAIR CLAMAN clarified that typically the guns would not go with
a person [to a psychiatric hospital] so the guns would be left
behind.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD stated that that is her point, that the
person loses their liberties.
MS. KRALY responded that there are consequences, but the
collateral consequences to which the chairman requested
information only attach after the civil commitment, and the
federal law that a person cannot possess or own a firearm
becomes effective upon the civil commitment. When applying for
a job, the application may ask whether the person has been
civilly committed, and the answer does not require a "yes"
unless the person had gone through a 30-day commitment hearing.
The answer does not require a "yes" if the person had only gone
through a 72-hour hold.
2:12:39 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether Ms. Kraly was referring to
18 USC 922(g)(1-9).
MS. KRALY answered in the affirmative.
2:12:59 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that it is appropriate to
discuss that code because Ms. Kraly mentioned the cite.
CHAIR CLAMAN interjected that the point of hearing about civil
commitments is because people have asked a lot of questions and
Ms. Kraly can answer to some extent, but Ms. Kraly is not here
as an expert in criminal law, she is here from the DOL civil
division.
2:13:22 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said that she is not an expert but she
can certainly read the law.
MS. KRALY advised that she did not have a copy of the law in
front of her and was unable to recite the sub-sections.
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said that she has the law in front of
her.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked the relevance because Ms. Kraly testified
that there are federal laws requiring that a person committed to
a psychiatric hospital have their guns rights taken away. He
further asked whether there was anything ambiguous about that
statement.
2:14:03 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD noted that it is important that people
understand how the federal law works with this because the
discussion is about civil confinement, a federal rule comes into
play ...
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Representative to read the statute and the
committee would then move on.
2:14:16 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to 18 USC 922(g)(1-9), which
read as follows:
18 USC 922(g)(1-9) prohibits the following from possessing,
shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802));
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or who has been committed to a mental
institution;
(5) who, being an alien
(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United
States; or
(B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2),
has been admitted to the United States under a
nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section
101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)));
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces
under dishonorable conditions;
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United
States, has renounced his citizenship;
(8) who is subject to a court order that
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such
person received actual notice, and at which such
person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such
person or child of such intimate partner or person, or
engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate
partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the
partner or child; and
(C)
(i) includes a finding that such person
represents a credible threat to the physical safety of
such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against such intimate partner or child that
would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury;
or
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.
2:15:58 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Kraly whether it is true that
civil confinement interacts with this code and whether they are
related to one another.
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that her questions have been asked and
answered, and her reading of the United States Code makes clear
that Ms. Kraly had referred to paragraph (4) and she does not
need to answer that question because Representative Reinbold
answered it for herself.
2:16:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN referred to the collateral consequences
Ms. Kraly had offered and asked whether there were further
collateral consequences.
MS. KRALY answered that "that a pretty exhaustive list of the
collateral consequences" was identified by the Alaska Supreme
Court in the In re Joan K. matter.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN surmised that these collateral
consequences would not attach to an ex parte 72-hour hearing.
MS. KRALY answered that Representative Eastman was correct.
2:17:02 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that he was finding it difficult to
understand whether Ms. Kraly was saying that the collateral
consequences would not interact with an ex parte 72-hour
hearing.
MS. KRALY explained that she had been discussing the collateral
consequences for employment and reiterated that a person would
not have to disclose that they were subject to an ex parte 72-
hour hold petition on an employment application. There is the
social stigma and potentially the financial consequences of the
72-hour hold, and those two collateral consequences may attach
to a 72-hour hold or an ex parte proceeding. A person must be
civilly committed in order for the remaining collateral
consequences to attach and a civil commitment does not occur
until a 30-day petition is filed, she reiterated.
2:18:25 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Ms. Kraly to help him understand
how that would work where someone took away a person's gun
rights and their prospective employer asked whether they had
ever been (audio difficulties). He further asked why the person
does not have to disclose that information, and whether there is
some legal protection that no one can come after the person if
they lie and say they had not been involved in such a hearing.
MS. KRALY said she was unsure she understood Representative
Eastman's question.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN offered a scenario that if a person is
party to an ex parte hearing and, for example, the person was a
recipient of protective order request, they attended the
hearing, and the judge decided that was a frivolous request, but
at a future date a prospective employer asked whether the person
had ever been party to that type of hearing. He noted that Ms.
Kraly had testified that the person would not have to disclose
that situation because it is an ex parte 72-hour hearing. He
asked whether the law is giving the person an opportunity to lie
to their prospective employer or whether there is some other
protection so that the disclosure does not become affected.
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out to Representative Eastman that his
question has the whole process completely convoluted and
confused. He presented an example wherein someone had requested
an ex parte request to institutionalize a person regarding
concerns about the person's mental state, and by being an ex
parte hearing, the person is not present. In the event someone
had related their concern that there was a problem with a
person, the court would issue an ex parte order without the
person present, which is what ex parte means in Latin. The
contested hearing is for the 30-day commitment in which the
person would have a right to be present and a right to counsel.
He explained that the 30-day hearing is where the collateral
consequences would attach, and if the person was committed based
upon the judge's findings, the person would have to report that
situation to a prospective employer. By the simple nature that
the person is not party to an ex parte proceeding, there is
nothing for the person to report, he pointed out.
MS. KRALY responded that Chair Claman was correct.
2:21:04 PM
[CHAIR CLAMAN and Representative Eastman discussed the rulings
of the chair.]
2:21:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN noted that during the last hearing the
committee did not receive a definitive answer as to the
situation of two people appearing at the courthouse at the same
time with (audio difficulties) maybe a marriage dispute, that
the judge could not choose to hear "both of those, you know,
parties together individually in those respective petitions."
Therefore, if the committee was not able to receive a firm
answer that ex parte means that there is no way for a person to
be involved, he would like to go under the possibility that
someone could appear at a 72-hour proceeding.
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that Representative Eastman had changed
his topic from a civil commitment under Title 47, which is what
Ms. Kraly was discussing. Representative Eastman's questions to
Ms. Meade during the last hearing were with regard to domestic
violence protective orders. He further pointed out that that is
not an area in which Ms. Kraly had provided testimony. He asked
Representative Eastman to limit his questions to Ms. Kraly's
expertise as to Title 47, civil commitments.
2:22:35 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN offered a scenario wherein a person is
the recipient of an ex parte 72-hour hold request, and a
prospective employer asks whether they were involved in a 72-
hour hold and asked how it is that the person does not have to
disclose that 72-hour hold and he asked whether the law read
that he is permitted to lie to his prospective employer and the
person could not be legally affected.
CHAIR CLAMAN added "With respect to Title 47."
MS. KRALY pointed out that she is not an employment lawyer and
is not able to answer Representative Eastman's specific
questions as to the consequences of not disclosing. Although,
she pointed out, as Chair Claman previously explained, when an
ex parte 72-hour hold is granted, it is exactly as Chair Claman
identified, the proceeding is ex parte and the person is not
involved. She reiterated that a mental health professional, a
friend of the family, a doctor, or a psychiatrist contacts the
judicial officer, explains the circumstances and why they
believe that the person is mentally ill, is a threat to self or
others, or is gravely disabled. Under that scenario, she
offered, the judge can determine, based upon the evidence
offered ex parte, that there is enough evidence for the person
to be held for 72-hours to determine whether the person is truly
mentally ill, truly a threat to self or others, or is truly
gravely disabled. Under those circumstances, she reiterated,
the person would not have the due process that would normally be
afforded to a person to rebut or protect their liberty
interests. Therefore, she further reiterated, that sort of
information should not generally be required to be disclosed
because the person did not have a chance to defend themselves in
those proceedings. It is the 30-day commitment that becomes a
collateral consequence because the person had the entire array
of due process wherein the person was in front of a judge with
their appointed counsel, the person's counsel can cross-examine,
present their own witnesses, and defend against the petition
alleging that the person is mentally ill, a threat to self or
others, or is gravely disabled, she explained.
2:25:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether Ms. Kraly is aware of any
provision of law that would limit a prospective employer from
being able to ask these types of questions dealing with an ex
parte hearing setting.
CHAIR CLAMAN added, "Within the Title 47 context."
MS. KRALY said that she was not able to answer that question.
2:25:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD referred to gun violence protective
orders and surmised that questions could be asked "because she
said something about ex parte and I think it's really important
to get clarification there."
CHAIR CLAMAN reiterated that Ms. Kraly is available to discuss
Title 47 civil commitments with an ex parte component.
Representative Reinbold could ask questions regarding ex parte
hearings in the civil commitment context, Ms. Kraly is not here
to testify about either domestic violence protective orders or
the proposed gun violence protective orders, which is a
different subject in the area of Ms. Kraly's expertise.
2:26:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that with the ex parte
proceeding, the person receives no representation and cannot
defend themselves, "it went to the immediate family member who
can petition and then it's reporting the evidence and then it -
it says on this chart, 'expires 20-days unless ..."
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out that Representative Reinbold was asking
questions about the gun violence protective order, which is the
proposal of this statute. He further reiterated that Ms. Kraly
is available to discuss civil commitments under Title 47, and
this particular proposal has nothing to do with civil
commitments. Ms. Kraly was asked to testify in order that the
committee could understand the differences and she is not here
to answer questions about the bill.
2:27:08 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD said, "Basically, you were talking very
specifically about ex parte" and mentally ill. She related that
she was not sure whether Ms. Kraly had used the words "and" or
"or" when describing the commitment criteria.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised that Ms. Kraly could answer in the context
of Title 47, as she had answered the question three times and
this is the last time she would answer that question.
MS. KRALY reiterated that in order to be civilly committed,
under AS 47.30, the judge must find by clear and convincing
evidence that a person is mentally ill, and is a threat to self
or others, or is gravely disabled.
2:28:30 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Kaci Schroeder, Department of Law, that the
bill contains language on page 4, referring to "less restrictive
alternatives."
2:28:42 PM
KACI SCHROEDER, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services
Section, Criminal Division, Department of Law, noted that "less
restrictive alternatives" is an area in which Ms. Kraly could
respond.
CHAIR CLAMAN noted that in this particular bill there is
reference on page 4, line 13 that "less restrictive
alternatives" have been tried and were ineffective. He asked
whether that is a question for Ms. Kraly to answer.
MS. KRALY responded that she performed research as to "less
restrictive alternatives" and the term is used in approximately
15-16 different places in state law. There is no statutory
definition of "less restrictive alternatives" and in the big
scheme of things it is a fact specific question that would be
evaluated by the agency, but in most cases, it would be
evaluated by the judicial officer. For example, this comes up
in civil commitment hearings, and before the person can be
committed for up to 30-days, the criteria and predicate for
commitment must be established. There must also be an
evaluation that there are "no less restrictive alternative than
placement in a secure psychiatric hospital." In doing so, she
explained, it must be established on an evidentiary basis with
the judge as to whether there is a means to provide care,
custody, keep the person safe, the community safe, or keep them
from harming themselves by not putting them into the hospital.
In that regard, could the person go to, for example, the Juneau
Alliance for Mental Health (JAMHI) Health & Wellness housing in
Juneau, whether there is enough support at JAMHI housing that
the person did not need to be civilly committed, can the person
remain in their own home, can they remain in their parent's
home, can they go to a non-locked secure facility for possible
substance abuse treatment, and so forth. It must be established
with the judge that an array of services had been considered and
were discounted for purposes of maintaining health, safety, and
welfare, she explained. When reviewing how "less restrictive
alternatives" is used in other provisions in state law, she
offered that the same sort of concept comes up, as to whether
all of the other circumstances had been qualitatively and
quantitatively evaluated in order for the judge to determine
what has to happen in this circumstance because there are no
less restrictive alternatives. In the context of a mental
commitment, it would mean something that is less restrictive
than being placed in a psychiatric hospital, she explained.
2:31:57 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked, in the context of HB 75, that would mean
some less restrictive alternative than removing a person's
firearms.
MS. KRALY answered that Chair Claman was exactly correct, it
would be a fact specific analysis to present to the court to
advise that all of these other alternatives, such as locking the
guns, removing the guns, and putting them in another place, had
been considered. There could be an array of less restrictive
alternatives potentially presented to the court for the court to
ultimately determine whether those were sufficient to maintain
the safety of the situation, she related.
2:32:32 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN surmised that the less restrictive alternatives in
HB 75, page 4, would be specific to the less restrictive
alternatives for the guns at issue rather than removing the
guns.
MS. KRALY noted that that is how she read the bill.
2:32:56 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that the fact specific analysis
(audio difficulties) more restrictive has to work. For example,
it may be less of a burden to the state if the neighbor with a
locked safe, locks up the person's guns, rather than law
enforcement confiscating the guns. She commented that she was
trying to think of effective and less burdensome alternatives
for the state and possibly more comfortable alternatives "for
the accused." (Audio difficulties throughout this testimony."
MS. KRALY answered that that is exactly the type of evidence
that would be presented to a judge. The judge would evaluate
whether they believed locking a person's guns in a neighbor's
locked safe was an appropriate disposition, such that the gun
violence protective order was not necessary because the guns
were safe.
CHAIR CLAMAN advised Representative Reinbold that in the
evidentiary context, what would more likely arise would be that
"the person came to the court and said, 'I asked this person in
my house 'Can I put your guns in the next-door neighbor's gun
safe because I think you are a risk to yourself?' And, the
person said, 'You can't -- no, I won't let you put the guns in
the neighbor's gun safe.' So, the likelihood is that you're not
going to get someone in court saying, 'the guns from the
neighbor's gun safe' you are going to get the person saying, 'I
tried to get them in the neighbor's gun safe and they wouldn't
agree.'"
2:34:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether an amendment should be
proposed that would make certain this was an option, or whether
the court would automatically determine whether there are any
effective options other than law enforcement seizing the guns
and the state having to manage the guns.
MS. KRALY responded that she is not in any position to make a
recommendation on amendments. She offered her belief that the
manner in which the statute is crafted, such as the requirement
that the judge engage, identify, and make a finding as to
whether there are no less restrictive alternatives, meets those
needs because the judge would have to make a specific finding as
to that evidence, she explained.
2:35:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD surmised that the judge automatically
must see the least restrictive options.
MS. KRALY related that that is how she reads the bill.
CHAIR CLAMAN added that that is what the bill clearly requires.
2:36:11 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN referred to HB 75, [Sec. 6. Sec. 18.65.845], page
8, lines 4-5, which read as follows:
In AS 18.65.815 - 18.65.840, "immediate family
member" means a spouse, child, stepchild, parent, or
stepparent.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked Kaci Schroeder, Department of Law, whether
there was a particular reason it was limited to those
individuals and why there would be limits on more people being
identified, such as grandparents or domestic unmarried partners.
He asked whether it was simply a choice made by the drafter.
2:36:58 PM
KACI SCHROEDER, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services
Section, Criminal Division, Department of Law, responded that
the reason it is defined in this manner would be a question for
the drafter or the sponsor. The Department of Law (DOL) views
this as solely in the hands of the legislature as to how it
wants to define that provision.
2:37:12 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether there are other statutes that allow
these types of requests, other than those listed in this
particular statute.
MS. SCHROEDER answered that the department had not looked at
that issue, there are other statutes in the state code that
define household member, and those definitions are broader, but
it is not the same terminology of "immediate family member."
2:37:34 PM
CHAIR CLAMAN asked whether the domestic violence protective
orders use a definition of household member or does it actually
list the individuals.
MS. SCHROEDER responded that it is household member.
CHAIR CLAMAN asked who is determined to be a household member
under the domestic violence protective order statute in contrast
to this statute.
MS. SCHROEDER referred to AS 18.66.990(5), which read as
follows:
(5) "household member" includes
(A) adults or minors who are current or former
spouses;
(B) adults or minors who live together or who have
lived together;
(C) adults or minors who are dating or who have dated;
(D) adults or minors who are engaged in or who have
engaged in a sexual relationship;
(E) adults or minors who are related to each other up
to the fourth degree of consanguinity, whether of the
whole or half blood or by adoption, computed under the
rules of civil law;
(F) adults or minors who are related or formerly
related by marriage;
(G) persons who have a child of the relationship; and
(H) minor children of a person in a relationship that
is described in (A) - (G) of this paragraph;
2:39:50 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Schroeder to describe what
this bill does that is not already in federal or state statutes.
MS. SCHROEDER replied that she cannot speak to that question and
she could only speak to the state criminal aspects of HB 75.
2:40:10 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked Ms. Schroeder what she could speak
to on this bill.
MS. SCHROEDER answered that this bill establishes a gun violence
protective order that is a civil proceeding and it is not
something within which the criminal division would be involved.
However, she said, under this bill, the violation of the order
would become a crime which is when the criminal division would
get involved and potentially prosecute for the violation of the
protective order. She added that that would be the extent of
the criminal division's involvement.
2:40:37 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked why this would be a civil
proceeding and not a criminal proceeding.
MS. SCHROEDER answered that protective orders, in general, are
civil proceedings because the state is not involved, it is one
party against another party. The violation of those orders
generally, whether it be a domestic violence, sexual assault, or
stalking protective order, is a crime wherein the state is
involved so it is a criminal matter.
2:41:08 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked when the United States Code, that
she previously read, is invoked in this whole process.
MS. SCHROEDER advised that that question is outside of her area
of expertise as she practices solely in state criminal law.
2:41:46 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD asked whether the United States Code
previously referenced, is applicable in the department and for
Alaskans. Representative Reinbold commented that "I would say
yes."
CHAIR CLAMAN pointed out to Representative Reinbold that Ms.
Schroeder does not need to answer that question because the
federal law applies to everyone. The authority to prosecute
federal law is given solely to the federal government and state
prosecutors do not have authority to prosecute federal crimes,
which has been the law of the land for centuries.
2:42:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE REINBOLD commented that there is currently a "big
movement" wherein the Anchorage Police Department is working
with the Alaska State Troopers and is also working with the
federal government on all of the crime taking place in the
state. It appears that, at some point, the USC cite would be
invoked and she asked, at what point would the criminal division
invoke this USC cite if collaborating.
CHAIR CLAMAN ruled that he would not ask Ms. Schroeder to answer
that question, if the FBI, APD, the Alaska State Troopers
cooperate, they make decisions about where folks will be
charged. There will be crimes charged in federal court that
have multi-agency obligations and they are charged only with
federal crimes in federal court. The same is true with the
cooperation between the state and the FBI in what becomes state
prosecutions wherein the person is charged with state crimes in
state courts because the particular codes are jurisdictional, he
said.
[HB 75 was held over.]
2:44:43 PM
ADJOURNMENT
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 2:44 p.m.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| HB387 ver A 3.16.18.PDF |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/4/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 387 |
| HB387 Sponsor Statement 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 4/4/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 387 |
| HB387 Sectional Analysis ver A 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 387 |
| HB387 Additional Document-CHPA Testimony 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 387 |
| HB387 Fiscal Note DHSS-PHAS 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 387 |
| HB387 Fiscal Note DPS-COMM 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 387 |
| HB387 Fiscal Note LAW-CRIM 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 387 |
| HB075 ver D 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Sponsor Statement 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Sectional Analysis 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Washington Post Article - Five States Allow Gun Seizures 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Washington Post Article - Missouri Case 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-The Trace Article - ERPOs Reduce Suicides 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Sandy Hook Promise Letter 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Sandy Hook Promise Letters (Part 1) 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Public Comment (Part 1) 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Fact Sheet 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Fiscal Note DHSS-EPI 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Fiscal Note LAW-CRIM 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Fiscal Note DPS-CJISP 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Fiscal Note DPS-DET 2.28.18.pdf |
HJUD 2/28/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-NYT Opinion - Mental Health System Can't Stop Mass Shooters 3.12.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Opposing Document-Public Comment (Part 1) 3.12.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/12/2018 7:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Fiscal Note JUD-ACS 3.12.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/12/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Public Comment (Part 3) 3.14.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Sandy Hook Promise Letters (Part 2) 3.14.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Opposing Document-Public Comment (Part 2) 3.14.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/14/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Additional Document-Redington v. State 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |
| HB075 Supporting Document-Connecticut, Indiana, & Alaska Comparison Table 3.16.18.pdf |
HJUD 3/16/2018 1:00:00 PM HJUD 3/19/2018 1:00:00 PM |
HB 75 |