04/10/2007 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB196 | |
| HCR5 | |
| HB90 | |
| HB159 | |
| Adjourn |
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| *+ | HB 90 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| *+ | HCR 5 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | HB 159 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 196 | TELECONFERENCED | |
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
April 10, 2007
1:02 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Jay Ramras, Chair
Representative John Coghill
Representative Bob Lynn
Representative Ralph Samuels
Representative Max Gruenberg
Representative Lindsey Holmes
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Nancy Dahlstrom, Vice Chair
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 196
"An Act relating to the handling of matters after a person's
death."
- MOVED CSHB 196(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 5
Supporting the 2007 National Crime Victims' Rights Week.
- MOVED HCR 5 OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 90
"An Act relating to bail."
- HEARD AND HELD
HOUSE BILL NO. 159
"An Act relating to the issuance of a certificate of birth
resulting in a stillbirth."
- MOVED CSHB 159(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
BILL: HB 196
SHORT TITLE: HANDLING MATTERS AFTER A PERSON'S DEATH
SPONSOR(S): JUDICIARY
03/14/07 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
03/14/07 (H) JUD
04/04/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
04/04/07 (H) Heard & Held
04/04/07 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
04/10/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HCR 5
SHORT TITLE: 2007 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS WEEK
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) STOLTZE
03/27/07 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
03/27/07 (H) JUD
04/10/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 90
SHORT TITLE: BAIL
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) SAMUELS, STOLTZE
01/16/07 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 1/12/07
01/16/07 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
01/16/07 (H) JUD
02/05/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/05/07 (H) <Bill Hearing Rescheduled to 02/08/07>
02/08/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/08/07 (H) <Bill Hearing Canceled>
02/12/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/12/07 (H) <Bill Hearing Canceled>
03/28/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/28/07 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
03/30/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/30/07 (H) -- MEETING CANCELED --
04/10/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 159
SHORT TITLE: STILLBIRTH CERTIFICATE
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S) GATTO
02/28/07 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS
02/28/07 (H) HES, JUD
03/06/07 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
03/06/07 (H) Heard & Held
03/06/07 (H) MINUTE(HES)
03/15/07 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
03/15/07 (H) Moved CSHB 159(HES) Out of Committee
03/15/07 (H) MINUTE(HES)
03/16/07 (H) HES RPT CS(HES) 3DP 3NR
03/16/07 (H) DP: FAIRCLOUGH, ROSES, WILSON
03/16/07 (H) NR: NEUMAN, GARDNER, SEATON
03/16/07 (H) FIN REFERRAL ADDED AFTER JUD
03/30/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/30/07 (H) -- MEETING CANCELED --
04/10/07 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
STEPHEN E. GREER, Attorney at Law
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Responded to questions during discussion of
HB 196.
REPRESENTATIVE BILL STOLTZE
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Sponsor of HCR 5.
ANNE CARPENETI, Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section-Juneau
Criminal Division
Department of Law (DOL)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented the provisions of HB 90,
Version K, on behalf of the joint prime sponsors.
TAMARA LIENHART
(No address provided)
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified in support of HB 90.
KATHERINE J. HANSEN, Interim Director
Office of Victims' Rights (OVR)
Alaska State Legislature
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments on Section 5 of HB 90,
Version K.
PATRICIA HAAG
(No address provided)
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments during discussion of
HB 90.
MARTI GREESON, Alaska Monitoring Services, LLC;
Executive Director
Anchorage Chapter
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments on Section 6 of HB 90,
Version K.
STEVE CHRISTOPHER, Chief Operations Manager
Alaska Monitoring Services, LLC
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments on Section 6 of HB 90,
Version K.
DWAYNE PEEPLES, Deputy Commissioner
Office of the Commissioner - Juneau
Department of Corrections (DOC)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Responded to questions during discussion of
HB 90, Version K.
QUINLAN G. STEINER, Director
Central Office
Public Defender Agency (PDA)
Department of Administration (DOA)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Expressed concerns during discussion of
HB 90, Version K.
JOSHUA FINK, Director
Anchorage Office
Office of Public Advocacy (OPA)
Department of Administration (DOA)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments during discussion of
HB 90, Version K.
SANDRA WILSON, Intern
to Representative Carl Gatto
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented HB 159 on behalf of the sponsor,
Representative Gatto.
RICHARD OLSEN
Phoenix, Arizona
POSITION STATEMENT: Provided comments during discussion of
HB 159.
PHILLIP MITCHELL, Chief
Vital Statistics
Division of Public Health (DPH)
Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Responded to questions and provided
comments during discussion of HB 159.
REPRESENTATIVE CARL GATTO
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Sponsor of HB 159.
ACTION NARRATIVE
CHAIR JAY RAMRAS called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting to order at 1:02:57 PM. Representatives Gruenberg,
Coghill, Samuels, Lynn, and Ramras were present at the call to
order. Representative Holmes arrived as the meeting was in
progress.
HB 196 - HANDLING MATTERS AFTER A PERSON'S DEATH
1:03:39 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the first order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 196, "An Act relating to the handling of matters
after a person's death."
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Amendment 1, which read:
Page 3, line 5, following "estate":
Insert ", except that if the decedent owes money
for child support arrearages, for spousal support
arrearages, or under AS 47.07.055, the provisions of
(d) of this section do not apply"
Page 3, line 7, following "will":
Insert ", except that if the decedent owes money
for child support arrearages, for spousal support
arrearages, or under AS 47.07.055, the provisions of
(d) of this section do not apply"
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG offered his understanding that
Amendment 1 will preclude people from using this legislation to
avoid paying child support arrearages, paying spousal support
arrearages, or - under AS 47.07.055 - repaying Medicaid
overpayments.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 1.
There being no objection, Amendment 1 was adopted.
1:05:19 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS began a motion to move the bill, as
amended, from committee.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG interjected. He referred to the term
"value" as used on page 2, line 4, and characterized it as
ambiguous because it is not clear whether it refers to fair
market value or ownership equity and thus might be used by
someone to avoid probate.
1:07:18 PM
STEPHEN E. GREER, Attorney at Law, indicated that existing
Alaska law - specifically the phrase "less liens and
encumbrances," found in AS 13.16.680(a) - addresses that point
already. In response to a question, he offered his
understanding that the term "value" means "equitable interest".
1:08:07 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to report HB 196, as amended, out
of committee with individual recommendations and the
accompanying fiscal notes. There being no objection, CSHB
196(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary Standing
Committee.
HCR 5 - 2007 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS WEEK
1:08:25 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the next order of business would be
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 5, Supporting the 2007 National
Crime Victims' Rights Week.
1:08:49 PM
REPRESENTATIVE BILL STOLTZE, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor,
offered that HCR 5 is important because Alaskan agencies
responsible for assisting victims of violent crimes need to be
reminded of the rights of crime victims as outlined in the
Alaska State Constitution. In addition, [adoption of] HCR 5
will coincide with the 2007 National Crime Victims' Rights Week.
The resolution contains boilerplate language with the exception
that it references Alaska's constitutional rights of crime
victims.
CHAIR RAMRAS, after ascertaining that no one wished to testify,
closed public testimony on HCR 5.
1:10:55 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to report HCR 5 out of committee
with individual recommendations and the accompanying zero fiscal
notes. There being no objection, HCR 5 was reported from the
House Judiciary Standing Committee.
HB 90 - BAIL
1:11:26 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the next order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 90, "An Act relating to bail."
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS, speaking as a joint prime sponsor, moved
to adopt the proposed committee substitute for HB 90, Version
25-LS0331\K, Luckhaupt, 3/7/07, as the work draft. There being
no objection, Version K was before the committee.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS mentioned that HB 90 has many parts, and
that department representatives would explain the bill.
1:13:33 PM
ANNE CARPENETI, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services
Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law (DOL), said
that the provisions of the bill that were suggested by the DOL
are intended to fine tune legislation passed in the last 10
years; for example, legislation passed last year, Senate Bill
218, addressed sentences for sex offenders and mandatory minimum
terms of probation for sex offenders, and other pieces of
legislation funded a cold case prosecutor and addressed the
electronic distribution of indecent material to minors. In
addition to fine tuning such legislation, HB 90 also proposes to
insert into statute standards regarding when a court can order
credit against sentences for time spent in treatment facilities.
MS. CARPENETI indicated that Section 1 of Version K can best be
explained in terms of last year's Senate Bill 218, which in part
established mandatory probation periods for felony sex
offenders, but which neglected to change the mandatory probation
period for rape from 10 years to 15 years. Section 1 makes it a
crime for a sex offender to violate certain provisions of
probation/parole, and does so for two reasons, one being that
one main way of delaying or preventing recidivism is to maintain
a pretty aggressive supervision program while an offender is on
probation/parole. However, because the current mandatory period
of probation for rape was not altered by Senate Bill 218, rape
offenders may run out of "time hanging over their heads" in
terms of doing a revocation of probation procedure if, for
example, they don't show up for a polygraph or are committing
other behavior indicative of recidivism. The change proposed
via Section 1 will establish another tool for prosecutors to
supervise sex offenders and perhaps delay recidivism.
1:17:01 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked whether there are any other
crimes that fall into that category as well.
[Chair Ramras turned the gavel over to Representative Coghill.]
MS. CARPENETI said she is not aware of any but would research
that issue further. She went on to explain that Section 2 of
the bill fine tunes previously-passed legislation that
prohibited an adult from electronically distributing indecent
material to minors; that legislation arguably only pertained to
electronic distribution by an adult of indecent material
depicting minors to children, and Section 2 would specifically
prohibit an adult from distributing indecent material - whether
it depicted adults or minors - to children. Section 3 adds a
reference to the statute being changed via Section 2 to AS
11.61.129, which pertains to the forfeiture of equipment used in
the commission of the crimes referenced therein; this change
will allow forfeiture of the equipment used in the distribution
of indecent material to children.
MS. CARPENETI explained that Section 4 changes the statute of
limitations for the crime of "attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy to commit murder" from five years to indefinitely.
The concept of this change came to the DOL's attention after the
legislature funded the DOL's cold case prosecutor; in
investigating/reinvestigating certain old murder cases, the cold
case prosecutor found that it would be helpful, when there are a
series of possible defendants, to be able to charge not only
murder but also attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit
murder. Doing so, however, is not currently possible with a
five-year statute of limitations on those crimes.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked why currently only the crime of
murder has no statute of limitations.
MS. CARPENETI surmised that it is because of the seriousness of
the crime of murder, but said she would research that issue
further.
[Representative Coghill returned the gavel to Chair Ramras.]
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked whether Section 4 ought to
include crimes such as "accessory after the fact to a murder."
1:23:28 PM
MS. CARPENETI characterized that as a reasonable suggestion;
although Alaska's statutes don't specifically list that crime,
current statute does make it a felony crime to hinder the
prosecution of another felony.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG posited that an indefinite statute of
limitations should apply just to situations involving murder.
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN said he is surprised that the crime of
kidnapping doesn't have an indefinite statute of limitations,
since it does in most other states.
MS. CARPENETI said she would research that issue further.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he would be reluctant to have the
crime of kidnapping have an indefinite statute of limitations,
offering his belief that most cases of kidnapping originate from
family disputes.
MS. CARPENETI remarked that there are different levels of
kidnapping. She then noted that Section 5 is intended to limit
what she termed "serial" bail hearings, which are disconcerting
to the victims; Section 5 would require those representing
offenders to get all information supporting a bail release
presented at one time, rather than piecemeal over the course of
several bail hearings - in essence limiting what information may
be considered to be new information for the purpose of
justifying a new bail hearing.
1:26:34 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG remarked that a "newly discovered
evidence" standard has been established via the court in Salinas
v. State, and suggested that Section 5 will engender litigation
regarding what constitutes new evidence. He questioned whether
the committee ought to "engraft the Salinas-type contours onto
this" provision.
MS. CARPENETI went on to explain that Section 6 would enact
standards that the courts must follow in deciding how much
credit and whether to give credit against a term of imprisonment
for time spent in a treatment facility. These standards follow
"decisional law" to a great degree, and the rationale for this
provision is that the DOL would like judges throughout the state
to be reasonably consistent when granting credit against a term
of imprisonment, since right now there is some inconsistency.
Section 6 proposes to assist judges in granting credit in a
reasonably fair way by requiring three things: the treatment
must be ordered by the court; the program must meet the standard
set out in Section 6 - which pretty much mirrors what the courts
have set out in Nygren, that being that the treatment program
has to be pretty similar to incarceration and the person must
participate fully in the program; [and the director of the
treatment program must inform the court in writing that the
person has participated in and complied with the program's
requirements].
MS. CARPENETI, in response to a question, noted that in Section
6, proposed AS 12.55.027(c) stipulates:
(c) To qualify for credit against a sentence of
imprisonment for time spent in a treatment program,
the treatment program and the facility of the
treatment program must impose substantial restrictions
on a person's liberty that are equivalent to
incarceration, including the requirement that a
participant in the program
(1) must live in a residential facility operated
by the program;
(2) must be confined at all times to the grounds
of the facility or be in the physical custody of an
employee of the facility;
(3) is subject to disciplinary sanctions by the
program if the participant violates rules of the
program and facility; sanctions must be in writing and
available for court review;
(4) is subject to immediate arrest, without
warrant, if the participant leaves the facility
without permission.
CHAIR RAMRAS, referring to a situation he was familiar with
wherein a young woman attended and successfully completed a
treatment program in the Lower 48, characterized the criteria
outlined in proposed subsection (c) as being too specific given
what the state currently has to offer.
MS. CARPENETI remarked that Section 6 doesn't limit or address
the original sentence imposed by the court. For example, if the
best thing would be for a person to attend a treatment program
that doesn't fit the aforementioned criteria, the court does
have discretion to fashion the sentence based on a particular
program.
1:33:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG, referring to proposed subsection
(c)(4), suggested that the words, ", without warrant," be
deleted since "the normal body of law" determines when a warrant
is necessary.
MS. CARPENETI pointed out, however, that if one wants credit
against a sentence for time spent in a treatment program, that
program has to be similar to incarceration, and since escaping
from jail results in the person being arrested without a
warrant, the same ought to hold true for the treatment program.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS remarked that if a person is able to come
and go from a particular treatment program, then time spent in
that program shouldn't be credited towards a jail sentence.
MS. CARPENETI, in response to a question, said that the point of
putting these standards into statute is that the court will then
be required to look at and comply with this statute before
granting someone credit towards a sentence of imprisonment. It
should provide judges with the incentive to actually investigate
whether time spent in a particular treatment program is worthy
of credit.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES referred to Section 6, specifically
proposed AS 12.55.027(d) - which says, "A court may not grant
credit against a sentence of imprisonment for time spent in an
private residence or under electronic monitoring" - and noted
that the words, "in an private residence" should instead read,
"in a private residence". She asked whether anyone is currently
being given credit for time served under electronic monitoring.
MS. CARPENETI said that that issue was recently litigated in the
Alaska Court of Appeals case, Matthew v. State; the court ruled
that a person's time under electronic monitoring should not
qualify for credit against a sentence of imprisonment. She
offered her understanding that there have been some cases in
which credit has been awarded for time spent in a private
residence. The DOL wanted to clarify that point, and so brought
forth the language in proposed subsection (d). In response to a
question, she acknowledged that Section 6 only applies to the
courts, not to the Department of Corrections (DOC).
CHAIR RAMRAS asked whether a person must comply with all four of
the requirements outlined in proposed AS 12.55.027(c)(1)-(4).
MS. CARPENETI said yes, noting that the word, "and" should be
added to the end of subsection (c)(3) to clarify that point.
CHAIR RAMRAS expressed interest in hearing from the court system
regarding how it will interpret this provision given the lack of
state resources. He indicated that he is concerned that HB 90
will be applied in situations where the person is more of a
danger to himself/herself than to society.
MS. CARPENETI offered her understanding that Section 6 won't
apply to such people, and merely reflects past court rulings.
1:43:36 PM
MS. CARPENETI explained that Section 7 expressly deals with a
problem raised by Senate Bill 218 wherein the mandatory maximum
period of probation outlined in AS 12.55.090(c) should have been
extended but wasn't.
[Chair Ramras turned the gavel over to Representative Coghill.]
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked how the proposed period of 25
years was arrived at.
MS. CARPENETI said that given that the current mandatory minimum
period of probation is now 15 years, the mandatory maximum
period of probation should exceed that amount. In response to a
comment, she said that this provision pertains to probation
periods, and that electronic monitoring could be imposed for
probation.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked whether, under Section 7, one
might be subject to electronic monitoring for the full 25 years.
MS. CARPENETI said that such seems really unlikely, but offered
to research the issue further. She then relayed that Section 8
pertains to the crime of electronic distribution of indecent
material to minors, which, when originally established, was
inadvertently not included as a sex offense, which requires sex
offender registration. The behavior outlined in proposed AS
11.61.128, which is being added and referred to in AS
12.63.100(6) via Section 8, is classic grooming behavior and
should be considered a sex offense for registration purposes.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES noted that there is no section 126 in AS
11.61, and yet Section 8 of the bill proposes to reference AS
11.61.125 - 11.61.128.
MS. CARPENETI explained that such references are commonly
drafted that way, and surmised that should future legislation
propose to insert a section 126, it too will pertain to a sex
offense. She went on to explain that Section 9 addresses post
conviction relief applications. Under Section 9, applications
based on a claim of ineffective counsel must be filed within one
year after the court's final decision on the prior application.
This provision is important for victims and the whole judicial
system because it will provide an end date for litigation
pertaining to post conviction relief.
1:51:00 PM
TAMARA LIENHART relayed that on April 22, 1985, her grandmother,
grandfather, and great aunt were murdered by Winona Fletcher and
Cordell Boyd. She said that she feels strongly about supporting
HB 90, adding that she and her remaining family members were
surprised to learn that Ms. Fletcher's case was reopened and had
been open for several months and yet they were not notified even
though such notification is required by law.
[Representative Coghill returned the gavel to Chair Ramras.]
MS. LIENHART said that all the pain and suffering her family was
subjected to at the time of the murders was relived upon
discovering that Ms. Fletcher is pursuing post conviction
relief; the first petition was filed on August 9, 2005, and for
the last year the district attorney's office and the Office of
Victims' Rights (OVR) have repeatedly said that Ms. Lienhart and
her family needn't worry, "this will all go away," but as of
today, April 10, 2007, Ms. Fletcher's case is still not
resolved. Ms. Lienhart said that over the last year and a half
she and her family have seen newspaper articles featuring Ms.
Fletcher and a television interview with Mr. Boyd; Ms. Fletcher
has gone through several attorneys and her case remains open
though technically, legally, nothing has changed. The
possibility remains that something could happen and Ms. Fletcher
could be set free.
MS. LIENHART said she and her family have been told that Ms.
Fletcher's case was reopened on the basis that there was "new"
information submitted after sentencing, but this so-called "new"
information was actually submitted into the case file over 20
years ago. How can such a situation be possible, Ms. Lienhart
asked. Over 20 years have gone by and there still are no laws
to keep such requests for post conviction relief from
resurfacing. This has been a difficult process, Ms. Lienhart
remarked, given that Ms. Fletcher was originally sentenced to
298 consecutive years - 99 years given for each person she
murdered - but then had her sentence reduced to 99 years to be
served concurrently; 22 years later, Ms. Fletcher is trying to
get yet another reduction in her sentence via post conviction
relief.
MS. LIENHART said that the language in HB 90 regarding post
conviction relief is a start, adding her hope that no one else
will ever have to go through the same ordeal that her family has
had to go through when her grandparents and great aunt were
murdered. She also offered her hope that HB 90 will be expanded
to address situations such as the one she and her family are now
being subjected to; the bill should set a time limit on
information submitted as "new" and a time limit on open requests
for post conviction relief. One year and seven months is an
excessive period of time for victims to have to relive their
ordeal. She concluded by saying that she knows it's too late
for her family to see relief in this area; instead, with regard
to post conviction relief, they will have to continue to wait,
watch, hope, and pray that nothing further transpires to reopen
this case.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS remarked that without the passage of
[HB 90], even the great grandchildren of a victim could be faced
with an ordeal similar to what Ms. Lienhart and her family are
currently undergoing.
MS. CARPENETI went on to explain that Section 10 pertains to the
DOC and says that a prisoner may not be awarded a good time
deduction in his/her sentence for time he/she spends in a
treatment program, in a private residence, or while on
electronic monitoring. Section 11 contains applicability and
effective date clauses.
2:00:15 PM
KATHERINE J. HANSEN, Interim Director, Office of Victims' Rights
(OVR), Alaska State Legislature, said her comments would be
focused on Section 5 of Version K. She relayed that since the
enactment last year of AS 12.30.020(j), crime victims have had
continuing problems with having to come to court multiple times
on short or no notice for repeat bail hearings. She said she
has had several victims tell her that they felt as though they
were equally or more so victimized through the bail process and
criminal justice process in addition to what they suffered at
the hands of their perpetrator. One of her clients, Ms. Hansen
explained, whose partner had made three attempts on her life,
has had to face 14 bail hearings, and each time she has had to
decide whether she would be able to face the person who'd tried
to kill her and make a statement against him, knowing that there
was a chance that he would be released.
MS. HANSEN said she has had more than one client who's had to
face a similar situation. She offered her belief that the
change proposed by Section 5 is necessary in order to protect
the constitutional rights of victims to be treated with dignity,
respect, and fairness, and to fairly balance those rights with a
defendant's rights to reasonable bail. She relayed that she has
attended bar bench conferences in which private defense
attorneys have requested that judges start a process whereby the
attorneys don't have to submit written information to make a
subsequent bail hearing request to change from asking for third
party custodians that have been denied to later asking for
electronic monitoring; to justify this request, these attorneys
cited strategic benefits for the defendants. Section 5 would
reduce the trauma and unfairness experienced by victims in
having to repeatedly come back to court for bail hearings, often
on very short notice.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES asked whether an exception to Section 5
could be carved out for those in jail on minor charges.
MS. HANSEN opined that the two legal questions that a judicial
officer has to answer in considering whether and what bail is
appropriate are whether reasonable conditions to protect the
public and the victim can be set and whether the defendant will
make his/her court appearance, not whether the crime is a major
or a minor one. She said her focus is on the crime victim, and
so her concern is that these victims are being treated unfairly
by the system and are being hurt, day after day, without anyone
being there to speak up for them. Realistically, she remarked,
tightening bail provisions will promote fair settlement of
cases, even minor ones. Currently there are numerous options
available to defendants seeking bail, and the OVR simply wants
defendants to raise all those points at one hearing rather than
piecemeal at several hearings simply for strategic reasons. The
problem currently, she remarked, is that [the judicial system]
is not looking at how the victim is being affected by all the
options currently available to a defendant.
2:05:44 PM
PATRICIA HAAG relayed that more than once her ex-husband has
tried to kill her, and seemingly he has all the rights while she
has very few. She offered her belief that the bill should be
passed because the laws need to be changed. This man who has
repeatedly attempted to kill her currently gets to pull her into
court without appearing himself, thereby keeping her - the
victim - wrapped up with legal issues. This situation has
affected her and her entire family, she relayed, remarking again
that the current laws need to be tightened in order to help both
the public and the victims.
2:10:19 PM
MARTI GREESON, Alaska Monitoring Services, LLC; Executive
Director, Anchorage Chapter, Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD), relayed that she has also been involved with an
Anchorage community action group that is looking at how alcohol
abuse and underage drinking is harming families and communities
and at what can be done to increase safety and health in the
communities. A goal, she remarked, is to be able to look at
criminal prosecution and sentencing in a holistic manner and in
an individual manner, identifying the difference between violent
crimes and other crimes, and to look at how the provisions of
Version K will impact the DOC. Specifically, she opined,
Section 6 will have a fiscal impact on the DOC; the cost to the
DOC for incarceration is approximately $120 per day, while the
cost for electronic monitoring is approximately $12-$15 per day
and this cost is borne by the offender. Heavy case loads for
correctional and probation officers make it unlikely that they
will engage in random electronic monitoring and drug testing,
and must instead perform such monitoring and testing regularly,
thus allowing defendants to know when they will be monitored or
tested.
MS. GREESON said that with regard to what impact taking away
credit will have on the doc's electronic monitoring program, a
tremendous point of consideration is, what is the ultimate
impact on the community; the focus, hopefully, will be on
changing behaviors. The majority of those serving jail time
will be returning to the community and so the DOC must do more
than simply warehouse them. Cognitive thinking classes and
victim impact classes were once offered but budgetary cuts have
eliminated them. Life skills classes are currently being
planned, but they won't address responsibility and
accountability for behaviors or learning new tools for behavior
change once offenders return to the community. Alaska does have
options in terms of new technology; for example, alcohol
monitoring and Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring are
available, thereby allowing alcohol consumption monitoring and
the establishment of inclusion and exclusion zones. Each
offender under electronic monitoring [by her company] is
assigned a case manager who will immediately contact and
confront violators and addresses their violations.
MS. GREESON mentioned that she has also been working with
Anchorage's [Anti-Gang & Youth Violence Policy Team], which has
discussed the fact that offender/criminal behavior is resulting
from disenfranchisement. She referred to the cultural diversity
of Anchorage's residents, and remarked that the aforementioned
policy team is noticing that there are fewer opportunities and
less knowledge available that would allow people to find
appropriate representation or understanding of the criminal
justice system or programs that could provide assistance.
2:17:46 PM
STEVE CHRISTOPHER, Chief Operations Manager, Alaska Monitoring
Services, LLC, after noting that he, too, would be speaking to
Section 6 of Version K, referred to the Matthew case, and said
that there is currently another Alaska Court of Appeals case
wherein the argument is being made that the intent of
legislation enacted in 1998 - House Bill 272 - was for time
spent under electronic monitoring when used by private providers
to be awarded credit as if it were time served in jail. He also
mentioned that a study [conducted] by the Alaska Judicial
Council (AJC) shows a 66 percent recidivism rate in the state.
Section 6 of HB 90, he opined, doesn't address how tightening
down on preventing those seeking treatment from getting jail
credit is going to reduce the recidivism rate since they will
instead simply be sitting in a jail cell, or address where the
money will come from for incarcerating them, and won't ease the
current overcrowding of Alaska's jails.
MR. CHRISTOPHER opined that the language of proposed AS
12.55.027(c)(2) - located on page 4, lines 24-25 - creates a
double standard because it requires employees of a treatment
facility to escort defendants whenever they leave the facility;
currently many treatment programs allow defendants to work in
the community without escort, and time spent in these programs
does count for jail credit. He also suggested that the zoning
requirements for residential facilities need to be looked at if
those facilities are to meet the standards set out in Section 6.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS argued that not adopting Section 6 will
result in a double standard because - for the exact same crime -
those who can afford a treatment program won't have to go to
jail whereas those who can't afford a treatment program will
have to spend time in jail. With regard to the issue of
recidivism, he pointed out that those who are in jail are not
committing crimes while there, and remarked that if recidivism
rates are as high as has been suggested, it is imperative that
the legislature ensure that those treatment programs for which a
person can receive jail credit actually work.
MR. CHRISTOPHER concurred with the latter point, but argued that
treatment programs must address a person's behavior while he/she
is out in the community rather than while sitting in jail.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS, referring to the aforementioned AJC
study, opined that the recidivism rates for those who've
undergone treatment look the same as for those who haven't.
CHAIR RAMRAS asked whether the language in subsection (c)(2)
will affect the halfway house in Fairbanks.
MR. CHRISTOPHER said he is not able to address that specific
issue, but pointed out that that facility currently doesn't have
enough staff to escort its cliental out in the community as
would be required by subsection (c)(2).
2:23:53 PM
DWAYNE PEEPLES, Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Commissioner
- Juneau, Department of Corrections (DOC), in response to a
question, offered his understanding that Section 6 applies only
when the court has ordered someone to attend a specific facility
for treatment, and he is not aware of the court ever having
ordered someone to attend the halfway house in Fairbanks. The
DOC contracts with that facility would not be affected by
Section 6.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES asked Mr. Peebles to comment on
Section 10.
MR. PEEBLES relayed that the DOC's interpretation of Section 10
is that it will significantly impact its electronic monitoring
programs - reducing the number of participants - but the DOC
will be discussing this point further with the DOL. In response
to a question, he said that there is a difference in cost
between an offender being on electronic monitoring and being in
jail. If this provision adversely affects the DOC's electronic
monitoring program significantly, a greater number of people
will be spending time in DOC facilities or moved to out-of-state
institutions.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS suggested instead that it will result in
more people being on electronic monitoring for a longer period
of time because all that is being altered is that those people
won't be earning credit against their jail sentences.
MR. PEEBLES argued that a person may simply choose not to go on
electronic monitoring to begin with.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS asked, "Why would we let them make that
choice."
MR. PEEBLES said offenders are in part helping pay for the
electronic monitoring program; again, the DOC anticipates an
impact on the number of participants on electronic monitoring.
He offered his understanding that such an impact has already
occurred with regard to court assigned electronic monitoring.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS asked of Ms. Carpeneti, "A prisoner may
not be awarded 'good time' for any time done under any
circumstances after they've been offered [electronic
monitoring]?"
MS. CARPENETI acknowledged that as a possibility. She surmised
that the philosophical question is, does the legislature think
somebody on electronic monitoring - after being released from
prison and put on electronic monitoring - should be granted an
additional one-third reduction in his/her overall jail sentence
for that period when he/she is out, living at home, eating
dinner with his/her family, and watching TV. She offered her
belief that the DOL will be able to address the DOC's concerns.
2:29:23 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS - remarking that he is interested in the public's
wellbeing, the number of people who are in correctional
facilities, and the offender's welfare - asked what kinds of
offenses does a person commit that would qualify him/her to be
on electronic monitoring.
MR. PEEBLES offered to get that information to the committee.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL surmised that Ms. Carpeneti is raising
the question of why should someone be granted both the ability
to be at home under electronic monitoring and a reduction in a
prison sentence that is earned simply because he/she was first
granted the ability to be at home under electronic monitoring.
Granting good time is meant to be a reward for being a model
citizen while in jail, and it is not necessarily the case that
someone who is granted the ability to stay home under electronic
monitoring is going to be behaving like a model citizen while at
home. He noted that there is a difference between being a model
citizen and simply refraining from acting badly.
CHAIR RAMRAS argued, though, that simply because one has a
higher quality of life while being on electronic monitoring, it
doesn't equate with being free altogether. In one instance that
he knew of, he relayed, the person behaved better while wearing
an electronic monitor and was ultimately released for time
served while on electronic monitoring.
MS. CARPENETI remarked that the DOL supports electronic
monitoring in many situations because it's a wonderful tool;
however, the question, again, is whether, when a person is
sentenced, is serving a term of imprisonment, and is released on
electronic monitoring, that person should also get good time
credit for that time they've been released. In response to a
question, she explained that Section 10 only applies to
electronic monitoring by the DOC; it doesn't apply to the courts
because the courts don't give good time.
2:35:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS, referring to the provision regarding
post conviction relief, asked what could be done to ensure that
the descendants of a victim don't have to face repeat court
hearings as has Ms. Lienhart.
MS. CARPENETI offered her belief that it is not possible to tell
a person that he/she can't file a lawsuit regardless that the
lawsuit may have no basis and will be thrown out. She surmised
that an application for post conviction relief as described in
the bill would ultimately be dismissed, but a person can still
file such an application. In response to another question, she
said that legislation passed in 1995 has had a huge affect on
post conviction relief and litigation by prisoners, though there
was a period, right after passage of that legislation, wherein,
because the legislation included time limits, people brought
suits in an effort to meet those time limits; however, after
that particular period, there has been a steady decrease in the
amount of post conviction relief litigation and applications
that have been granted. She opined, therefore, that that
legislation has really had a good affect on limiting litigation
by prisoners who've been convicted. She also offered her
understanding that Ms. Fletcher filed her latest application for
post conviction relief pro se, though it may be that an
[attorney from the Public Defender Agency (PDA)] has since been
assigned to her case.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS questioned whether the defendant's right
to counsel applies to post conviction relief litigation.
MS. CARPENETI said it does for a defendant's first application
for post conviction relief, and for presenting a claim that
one's first lawyer was ineffective.
CHAIR RAMRAS asked whether proposed AS 12.55.027(c)(4) would
have an affect on someone seeking out-of-state treatment.
MS. CARPENETI remarked that it wouldn't have a negative effect
on people attending out-of-state treatment programs, though any
such program would have to comply with the standards set forth
in [Section 6]. In response to further questions, she indicated
that people will still be able to seek out-of-state treatment,
though under proposed AS 12.55.027(c)(4), a person could be
subject to arrest in the jurisdiction of the treatment program.
2:41:36 PM
QUINLAN G. STEINER, Director, Central Office, Public Defender
Agency (PDA), Department of Administration (DOA), relayed that
he would be commenting on some unintended consequences of HB 90.
For example, Section 5 could result in someone sitting in jail
beyond his/her potential maximum jail time without getting a
bail hearing; he suggested that a release valve could be crafted
for this provision, particularly for "smaller" offenses.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to the fiscal note provided by
the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) and read the second
paragraph of the analysis. He too suggested that language could
be added to Section 5, and perhaps some of the bill's other
sections, to eliminate the problem expressed by Mr. Steiner and
the OPA's fiscal note analysis. He asked Mr. Steiner to work
with the OPA and review Section 5 and craft some alternative
language.
MR. STEINER offered his understanding that at least one of the
concerns expressed in the OPA's fiscal note analysis - the
concern regarding third-party custodians - has been resolved in
Version K.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG requested that the bill be held over in
order to give the OPA and the PDA an opportunity to provide
alternative language.
CHAIR RAMRAS remarked that perhaps Section 5 may unfairly affect
those people that seem to do more harm to themselves than to the
community.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG surmised that Section 6 may be unfair
because only some can afford treatment.
MR. STEINER acknowledged that treatment is something that is
available for those that can afford it. He went on to say that
one other unintended consequence of the bill pertains to
proposed AS 12.55.027(c)(2) - the requirement that a defendant
be in the physical custody of an employee of a treatment
facility when not in the facility; this requirement might make
it difficult for a person to visit his/her attorney or attend
court hearings because of a lack of sufficient staff. Sometimes
such circumstances are addressed via the court wherein it will
order that a person may not leave a facility except for court
hearings and visitation to counsel.
2:48:25 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked whether Section 6 is
unconstitutional because only some can afford treatment.
MS. CARPENETI pointed out that Section 6 merely attempts to
address the [fact] that one person gets to go to a treatment
program because he/she can afford it while another person goes
to jail because he/she can't afford to go to a treatment
program.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG clarified that he is concerned that
Section 6 might violate a person's right to treatment.
MS. CARPENETI assured the committee that Section 6 does not
violate that right; instead it simply ensures that when
attending a treatment program, the time spent in that treatment
facility must be similar to time spent in jail in order to
qualify for credit.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS opined that if Section 6 is deleted,
judges will continue to award credit for time served
inconsistently because there will be no criteria established
regarding what type of treatment programs qualify; Section 6
establishes qualifying criteria.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG argued that only some will be able to
afford to take advantage of Section 6.
MS. CARPENETI remarked that the issue of who can afford
treatment is broader than the issues addressed in the bill;
again, Section 6 merely tries to equalize the criteria regarding
the awarding of credit towards one's sentence.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG again questioned whether, under the
criteria established in the bill, the state is denying
financially poor felons equal protection under the law when only
some people can afford treatment and the state does nothing to
provide treatment to those who can't.
MS. CARPENETI said she would research the issue of a person's
right to treatment.
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN pointed out that all persons are subject to
inequities in life due to their differing financial
circumstances.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG clarified that he is simply questioning
whether allowing some people - those that can afford it - to
attend a treatment program will strengthen the constitutional
argument made by those that can't afford to attend a treatment
program at all if the state provides no treatment.
2:57:24 PM
JOSHUA FINK, Director, Anchorage Office, Office of Public
Advocacy (OPA), Department of Administration (DOA), said that
there may be an unintended consequence of Section 6 regarding
Nygren credit. In the past, he relayed, back when he still
represented clients, he sent a number of them to the Salvation
Army program, which is available to low-income defendants; as
part of the year-long rehabilitative program, the Salvation Army
requires clients to get a job after a certain number of months.
Therefore, under Section 6, he opined, a low-income defendant
may be precluded from attending such a program if he/she is
going to be denied credit when complying with a program that
requires him/her to hold a job. It may be worthwhile, he
remarked, for the committee to speak to some treatment providers
to see what they require in their residential treatment
programs. He also mentioned that the Akeela House Residential
Substance Abuse Recovery Center is another treatment center that
requires its clients to find employment as part of its treatment
program.
MR. FINK, in response to a question regarding the OPA's fiscal
note, relayed that it pertained to the original bill, and that
[Section 5 of Version K] addresses the OPA's concern as
expressed in the fiscal note somewhat though not completely. He
indicated that should Section 5 be adopted as currently written
the OPA would still be able to use a different, though
cumbersome, process to ensure that a defendant is not held
longer than his/her potential maximum sentence without a bail
hearing. There is a constitutional problem, he opined, with
holding someone pretrial beyond any possible maximum jail
sentence for what he/she might be convicted of.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG indicated that he would be researching
the issue raised about treatment programs further, particularly
given that certain treatment programs require their clients to
hold down a job.
CHAIR RAMRAS closed public testimony, and relayed that HB 90,
Version K, would be held over so that the concerns raised could
be addressed.
HB 159 - STILLBIRTH CERTIFICATE
3:04:04 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the final order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 159, "An Act relating to the issuance of a
certificate of birth resulting in a stillbirth." [Before the
committee was CSHB 159(HES).]
3:04:43 PM
SANDRA WILSON, Intern to Representative Carl Gatto, Alaska State
Legislature, sponsor, relayed on behalf of Representative Gatto
that HB 159 is intended to give closure to parents of a
stillborn child, which [will be defined as a fetal death
occurring after a gestational age of 20 completed weeks].
Currently 15 states offer a certificate of stillbirth, and
HB 159 proposes to give parents of a stillborn child the option
of receiving a stillborn birth certificate in addition to a
death certificate. Members' packets, she indicated, contain
[copies of a "Certificate of Birth Resulting in Stillbirth" from
Texas and Indiana]. She offered her understanding that
approximately 1 percent of all births are stillbirths, and that
an average of 30,000 fetuses die of Sudden Antenatal Death
Syndrome (SADS). House Bill 159 is intended to give parents of
a stillborn child the recognition that they had a child.
3:06:38 PM
RICHARD OLSEN relayed that on August 17, 2000, he became the
father of a stillborn child. After describing his stillborn
child, he mentioned that after the stillbirth, he and his wife
were left with no record that the birth event occurred. He
offered his understanding that a certificate of birth currently
specifies that it pertains to a live birth, and characterized
this as recognition of another type of birth - a stillbirth. He
also offered his understanding that it is virtually impossible
for a pregnant woman to cause her child to be stillborn.
Stillbirths are naturally occurring events, and the mother of a
stillborn baby goes through the same processes as one who gives
birth to a live baby, and so the certificate being authorized by
HB 159 would recognize that the mother did give birth. He
opined that parents of a stillborn child are entitled to that
recognition. In conclusion, he attempted to assure the
committee that proponents of such certificates are not claiming
personhood for the stillborn child.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to the language on page 1,
lines 4-8 - which says, "(a) The person required to file a fetal
death registration under AS 18.50.240(b) shall advise the mother
and, if the father is present, the father of a stillborn child
(1) that the parent may request the preparation of a certificate
of birth resulting in stillbirth;" - and suggested that the
committee insert language stipulating that the notification
referred to therein be written notification rather than just
oral notification. He asked whether providing written
notification would be a difficult process.
3:12:41 PM
PHILLIP MITCHELL, Chief, Vital Statistics, Division of Public
Health (DPH), Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS),
said it would not be impossible to do, adding that the division
has considered providing hospitals with some form of information
card that they could distribute to parents of stillborns. He
also mentioned that information could put on the division's web
site.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG suggested that the words, ",if the
father is present," be changed to, ", the father if known,".
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN suggested instead using the words, ", the
father if available,".
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said that that would be fine.
MR. MITCHELL indicated that such a change would not create
difficulties.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to the language in proposed
subsection (b), which in part stipulates that the certificate
shall include the last name of the parent who requests the
certificate, and asked what would happen in situations wherein
the parents have different last names and both request the
certificate.
MR. MITCHELL said that on a live birth certificate, if the
mother is not married, the father's name is not allowed to go on
the certificate regardless of parental acknowledgement;
therefore, under HB 159, he surmised, the father wouldn't be
able to request the certificate. He mentioned that currently if
the mother and father are married but have different last names,
the division requires them to come to an agreement regarding
which last name to use on the certificate. He also mentioned
that he would research these issues further.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG opined that these issues need to be
addressed in the legislation itself. He then asked whether the
legislation would apply to stillbirths that took place in the
past.
MS. WILSON explained that proposed subsection (g) says: "(g) A
parent may request that the bureau issue a certificate of birth
resulting in still birth regardless of the date on which the
certificate of fetal death was issued."
MR. OLSEN, with regard to the earlier question about which last
name to use on the certificate, suggested that the same
procedures used for certificates of live birth should be used
for certificates of stillbirth.
MR. MITCHELL, in response to a question, said that the division
plans on charging the same fee for a certificate of stillbirth
as it currently does for a certificate of live birth - $20.
MS. WILSON, in response to a question, indicated that [proposed
subsection (h) says, "(h) The department may adopt regulations
needed to implement this section.]".
MR. MITCHELL added that the division already has the statutory
authority to charge fees for its services.
3:19:24 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS, after ascertaining that no one else wished to
testify, closed public testimony on HB 159.
MR. MITCHELL relayed that [the division] supports HB 159, though
he suggested that proposed subsection (f) be deleted because the
fetal death record already contains all necessary information.
In every real sense, he remarked, the division already registers
stillbirth events and could start issuing certificates right
away.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES questioned whether the bill needs to have
language added that would allow the division to conform its
procedure for issuing a certificate of stillbirth with its
procedure for issuing a certificate of live birth.
MR. MITCHELL said he would check on that point, but offered his
understanding that the fetal death record would be the same as a
record of live birth, and so it would contain the mother's last
name if she is unmarried. He mentioned that the division may
need to establish a procedure whereby paternity can be
established for the purpose of including it in fetal death
records.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG remarked that some of the
aforementioned issues of concern could be resolved by the
division via regulation if the bill were amended to give the
division the necessary regulatory authority.
3:22:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 1, to
change the language on page 1, lines 5-6, to read, "required to
file a fetal death registration under AS 18.50.240(b) shall, if
possible, in writing, advise the mother and, if the father is
available, the father of a stillborn child".
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES objected. She said that she is assuming
that this notification would be occurring in the hospital at the
time of delivery, and opined that the term, "the father is
available" is ambiguous and could place an unnecessary burden on
the division to go hunting down fathers who are not present at
time of delivery.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG suggested that the language could be
changed, to "if known".
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN suggested instead using the words, "makes
himself known".
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said he would accept that wording.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES said she doesn't want to put a burden on
the division to round people up.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG restated Amendment 1 such that it would
instead change the language on page 1, lines 5-6, to read:
"shall, if possible, in writing, advise the mother and, if the
father makes himself known, the father of a stillborn child".
MR. MITCHELL pointed out that any burden would be on hospital
personnel because they are the persons required to file the
fetal death record.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES removed her objection.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG again restated Amendment 1 such that it
would now instead change the language on page 1, lines 5-6, to
read: "shall, if possible, in writing, advise the mother and,
if the father has made himself known, the father of a stillborn
child".
CHAIR RAMRAS after ascertaining that there were no further
objections, announced that Amendment 1 was adopted.
3:28:31 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 2, to
delete subsection (f).
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN objected for the purpose of discussion. He
said he is not sure why this deletion is necessary.
MR. MITCHELL remarked that other states that issue such
certificates do not create a special record as would be required
by subsection (f); instead, those other states just use the same
information that is already on the fetal death record. In
response to a question, he indicated that the deletion of
subsection (f) would result in the language of the bill
reflecting best practices as they are known in the states that
currently issue certificates of stillbirth.
REPRESENTATIVE CARL GATTO, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor,
relayed that he has no objection to Amendment 2.
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN removed his objection.
CHAIR RAMRAS, after ascertaining that there were no further
objections, announced that Amendment 2 was adopted.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked whether the division would
currently be able to resolve - via regulation - potential
disputes wherein both parents request that their [different]
last names be included on the certificate.
MR. MITCHELL said he would research that issue further, but
remarked that the division may currently be able to resolve any
such disputes given that for certificates of live birth the
division is already able to require parents to agree on a last
name.
REPRESENTATIVE GATTO offered his belief that the division's
current regulations already address this point.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG suggested that an administrative
procedure could also be used deal with disputes. He then asked
Mr. Mitchell to check on the issue of fees.
MR. MITCHELL agreed to do so.
3:32:11 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG moved to report CSHB 159(HES), as
amended, out of committee with individual recommendations and
the accompanying fiscal notes. There being no objection, CSHB
159(JUD) reported from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
ADJOURNMENT
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 3:32 p.m.
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