04/23/2003 01:10 PM House JUD
| Audio | Topic |
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+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
April 23, 2003
1:10 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Lesil McGuire, Chair
Representative Tom Anderson, Vice Chair
Representative Jim Holm
Representative Dan Ogg
Representative Ralph Samuels
Representative Les Gara
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Max Gruenberg
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 102
"An Act relating to concealed deadly weapons."
- MOVED CSHB 102(STA) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 31
"An Act relating to initiative and referendum petitions; and
providing for an effective date."
- MOVED HB 31 OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 5
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of
Alaska relating to initiative and referendum petitions.
- MOVED HJR 5 OUT OF COMMITTEE
SPONSOR SUBSTITUTE FOR HOUSE BILL NO. 86
"An Act relating to permits issued by the state; and amending
Rules 65, 79, and 82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure."
- HEARD AND HELD
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: HB 102
SHORT TITLE:CONCEALED DEADLY WEAPONS LEGAL
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)CROFT
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/14/03 0215 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
02/14/03 0215 (H) STA, JUD
02/19/03 0257 (H) COSPONSOR(S): GATTO
03/13/03 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
03/13/03 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
03/27/03 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
03/27/03 (H) Heard & Held
03/27/03 (H) MINUTE(STA)
03/28/03 0688 (H) COSPONSOR(S): ANDERSON
04/07/03 0830 (H) COSPONSOR(S): DAHLSTROM, KOTT
04/08/03 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
04/08/03 (H) Heard & Held
04/08/03 (H) MINUTE(STA)
04/10/03 (H) STA AT 9:00 AM CAPITOL 102
04/10/03 (H) Moved CSHB 102(STA) Out of
Committee -- Time Change --
04/10/03 (H) MINUTE(STA)
04/14/03 0960 (H) STA RPT CS(STA) 3DP 3NR
04/14/03 0960 (H) DP: GRUENBERG, DAHLSTROM,
HOLM;
04/14/03 0960 (H) NR: SEATON, BERKOWITZ,
WEYHRAUCH
04/14/03 0960 (H) FN1: ZERO(LAW)
04/14/03 0977 (H) COSPONSOR(S): HOLM, SEATON
04/16/03 1017 (H) COSPONSOR(S): SAMUELS, MASEK
04/16/03 (H) JUD AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 120
04/16/03 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
04/17/03 1030 (H) COSPONSOR(S): HAWKER
04/22/03 1058 (H) CORRECTED CS(STA) RECEIVED
04/23/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 31
SHORT TITLE:INITIATIVE/REFERENDUM PETITIONS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)WILLIAMS
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
01/21/03 0039 (H) PREFILE RELEASED (1/10/03)
01/21/03 0039 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
01/21/03 0039 (H) STA, JUD
03/04/03 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
03/04/03 (H) Heard & Held
03/04/03 (H) MINUTE(STA)
03/25/03 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
03/25/03 (H) Moved Out of Committee
03/25/03 (H) MINUTE(STA)
03/31/03 0703 (H) STA RPT 2DP 4NR
03/31/03 0703 (H) DP: HOLM, WEYHRAUCH; NR:
SEATON,
03/31/03 0703 (H) GRUENBERG, LYNN, DAHLSTROM
03/31/03 0704 (H) FN1: ZERO(GOV)
03/31/03 0721 (H) COSPONSOR(S): MEYER
04/04/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
04/04/03 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
04/23/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HJR 5
SHORT TITLE:CONST AM: INITIATIVE/REFERENDUM PETITIONS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)WILLIAMS
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
01/21/03 0025 (H) PREFILE RELEASED (1/10/03)
01/21/03 0025 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
01/21/03 0025 (H) STA, JUD, FIN
03/04/03 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
03/04/03 (H) Heard & Held
03/04/03 (H) MINUTE(STA)
03/25/03 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
03/25/03 (H) Moved Out of Committee
03/25/03 (H) MINUTE(STA)
03/31/03 0703 (H) STA RPT 1DP 5NR
03/31/03 0703 (H) DP: HOLM; NR: SEATON,
GRUENBERG, LYNN,
03/31/03 0703 (H) DAHLSTROM, WEYHRAUCH
03/31/03 0703 (H) FN1: (GOV)
03/31/03 0721 (H) COSPONSOR(S): MEYER
04/04/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
04/04/03 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
04/23/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 86
SHORT TITLE:INJUNCTIONS AGAINST PERMITTED PROJECTS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)FATE
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/10/03 0169 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
02/10/03 0169 (H) RES, JUD
02/21/03 (H) RES AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 124
02/21/03 (H) Failed To Move Out Of
Committee
02/21/03 (H) MINUTE(RES)
02/24/03 (H) RES AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 124
02/24/03 (H) <Bill Hearing Postponed>
03/07/03 (H) RES AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 124
03/07/03 (H) Heard & Held
03/07/03 (H) MINUTE(RES)
04/02/03 0738 (H) SPONSOR SUBSTITUTE INTRODUCED
04/02/03 0738 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
04/02/03 0738 (H) RES, JUD
04/02/03 (H) RES AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 124
04/02/03 (H) Heard & Held
04/02/03 (H) MINUTE(RES)
04/04/03 0798 (H) COSPONSOR(S): FOSTER,
ROKEBERG, HOLM,
04/04/03 0798 (H) KOTT, LYNN, CHENAULT,
DAHLSTROM, WILSON
04/04/03 (H) RES AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 124
04/04/03 (H) Moved Out of Committee
MINUTE(RES)
04/08/03 0837 (H) RES RPT 6DP 1DNP
04/08/03 0837 (H) DP: WOLF, MASEK, MORGAN,
GATTO, LYNN,
04/08/03 0837 (H) FATE; DNP: KERTTULA
04/08/03 0837 (H) FN1: ZERO(LAW)
04/08/03 0837 (H) REFERRED TO JUDICIARY
04/09/03 0901 (H) COSPONSOR(S): HEINZE
04/23/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
MAE ALICE HOPKINS
Soldotna, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Expressed concerns about HB 102.
REPRESENTATIVE ERIC CROFT
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified as sponsor of HB 102.
JOHN L. SMALLWOOD
Soldotna, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on HB 102, and indicated that his
only concern was about the need for training.
BRIAN JUDY, Alaska State Liaison
Institute for Legislative Action
National Rifle Association of America (NRA)
Sacramento, California
POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions on HB 102.
ROD CHRISTOPHER, Owner
Peninsula Weapons Academy
Soldotna, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During hearing on HB 102, emphasized the
need for training that includes safety, handling of weapons, and
knowledge of the law, both for those who carry weapons openly
and those who carry them concealed.
ALVIN A. ANDERS, Chair
Alaska Libertarian Party (Juneau);
Secretary, Alaska Libertarian Party (Statewide)
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified in opposition to HB 31 and HJR 5,
saying this change is unnecessary and doesn't do what its
proponents intend.
KATHRYN KURTZ, Attorney
Legislative Legal Counsel
Legislative Legal and Research Services
Legislative Affairs Agency
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: As drafting attorney, offered her belief
that HB 31 is vulnerable to a legal challenge without a
constitutional amendment.
JIM POUND, Staff
to Representative Hugh Fate
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented SSHB 86 on behalf of
Representative Fate, sponsor.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 03-42, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR LESIL McGUIRE called the House Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 1:10 p.m. Representatives
McGuire, Anderson, Holm, Samuels, and Gara were present at the
call to order. Representative Ogg arrived as the meeting was in
progress.
HB 102-CONCEALED DEADLY WEAPONS LEGAL
Number 0059
CHAIR MCGUIRE announced that the first order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 102, "An Act relating to concealed deadly
weapons." [In packets was CSHB 102(STA), Version 23-LS0515\Q,
the corrected version of what was reported from the House State
Affairs Standing Committee.]
Number 0123
MAE ALICE HOPKINS testified on her own behalf. She expressed
concern about the portion of HB 102 that was described by
Representative Croft as relating to Vermont's laws and that
allows a person who meets current requirements for a concealed-
weapon permit to carry a concealed weapon without the permit.
She asked about the process for determining that the person
actually meets the current requirements. For example, will it
be done by a registration of an intent to carry [a concealed
weapon]? Or will it come up when the person carrying a weapon
is approached by a law enforcement official? She further asked
whether this portion of the bill increases responsibility for
law enforcement, whether law enforcement [agencies and
personnel] would have access to the names of those who carry
concealed weapons without a permit, or whether it will be
assumed that anyone may be carrying a concealed weapon.
MS. HOPKINS told members that as a permit holder, she knows the
importance of citizens' knowledge of the laws for concealed
carrying of a deadly weapon, including restrictions. Most
important, however, is knowledge and skill to handle the
firearm. She asked who will check to ensure that carriers of
firearms have a good understanding of the laws and know their
firearms. Emphasizing that it is a community concern, Ms.
Hopkins said she didn't see it addressed in the bill.
Number 0284
REPRESENTATIVE ERIC CROFT, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor of
HB 102, replied that there would be no list kept by government.
He added:
I'm a permit holder as well. I thought much of the
information was useful. But right now somebody does
not have to take any test, and the government keeps no
list of people who own guns. ... The distinction that
we're addressing here is between ... "concealed" or
not. And no, ... I wouldn't be in favor of the
government having that list, necessarily. We do think
that in a number of areas we've helped law enforcement
by extending more broadly the requirement that you
tell [law enforcement about a concealed weapon]. ...
The express reason for the bill, really, is to not
have some of these requirements.
MS. HOPKINS observed that people may be overconfident and
mistakenly believe they understand what is needed for them to
carry [a concealed weapon], as well as everything there is to
know about the firearm.
Number 0459
JOHN L. SMALLWOOD testified on his own behalf, noting that he
also is a permit holder. He offered his understanding that laws
currently in effect protect most citizens, and that a person
isn't allowed to have a firearm in possession at home or
elsewhere unless "qualified and not prohibited by federal or
state law." Referring to an "instant-check" system in place for
police officers relating to people who already have permits, he
suggested it might be a good idea with respect to safety. Doing
away with the permitting system as Vermont has done would be
within the constitution, he said, but some people might think it
isn't good enough. He referred to a bill passed by Senator
Robin Taylor the previous year with regard to reciprocity with
other states.
MR. SMALLWOOD indicated training is his only concern about the
bill. He said he likes the idea, if a person is going to carry
a concealed weapon and be among fellow citizens, that some kind
of training be required, as well as good knowledge of laws on
concealed weapons and self-defense. He also expressed concern
about allowing people who don't have training to come into the
state [with a concealed weapon]. As for the permit, however,
Mr. Smallwood said he didn't care one way or the other, since he
believes Alaska's constitution includes the "right to carry a
concealed weapon for legitimate purposes."
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked Brian Judy, who'd testified at the
previous hearing, to state the most significant parts of current
handgun-training courses that wouldn't be required if this bill
passes, especially safety aspects. He said the big concern is
that some segment of the population that currently is required
to take safety courses won't take them; he recalled debate about
how many people wouldn't do so.
Number 0738
BRIAN JUDY, Alaska State Liaison, Institute for Legislative
Action, National Rifle Association of America (NRA), replied
that he and the NRA assert that the training courses really
don't add much to the "safety situation" in Alaska. He said
empirical evidence from many states, whether they have no
training requirements or significant ones, is the same: that
there aren't any training-related problems. He observed that in
Alaska, a person doesn't need a permit or training to carry a
weapon openly; however, someone who dons a coat to cover a
firearm must take the training and "go through all the other
bureaucratic hoops." He suggested that there is no problem in
Alaska with people "carrying" openly or carrying concealed while
engaged in an outdoor activity, which is another exemption from
the permitting requirement. He concluded that nothing indicates
a problem now with people who don't go through a mandatory
training course, and said he doesn't think that would change.
MR. JUDY, in further response to Representative Gara, offered
his belief that the existing courses go over state laws and
handling of firearms, including loading and unloading. Under
existing law, there also is a competency requirement that he
characterized as fairly minimal.
Number 0910
ROD CHRISTOPHER, Owner, Peninsula Weapons Academy, informed
members that Peninsula Weapons Academy is a firearms school in
Soldotna. A weapons inspector for more than 20 years, he
reported that he has done inspections for law enforcement, the
military, and the private sector. People come into his CCW
[carrying a concealed weapon] classes who never have held a gun
before; these are mostly females - but a few males - who want to
carry for protection. The personal protection course is a basic
handgun course that addresses handling, safety, ammunition,
loading and unloading the gun, and so forth; it allows
participants to shoot the weapon and develop a knowledge of how
it feels. Emphasizing the importance of learning the laws, he
expressed concern about turning people loose on the street who
lack "weapons knowledge," including safe handling, and who don't
know when or when not to use deadly force. He indicated those
are taught in his classes, and told the committee that he
believes it is a grave mistake to turn people loose on the
street without training.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked Mr. Christopher whether he'd be supportive
of requirements for training, familiarity with state laws, and
competency for people who carry weapons openly as well.
MR. CHRISTOPHER said he believes that it's common sense to have
all those things when carrying a weapon. Furthermore, he added,
"If you get into a gunfight, God forbid, and you do use deadly
force and you do kill somebody, that 'concealed carry' permit is
used as an affirmative defense for you in court."
CHAIR McGUIRE remarked, "We're about to change all that in our
other bill." Returning to HB 102, she asked why those
requirements should be in place for people who carry concealed
weapons, since they're not required for those who carry weapons
openly.
MR. CHRISTOPHER replied, "I can't answer that question, because
I don't know why we don't. I think we should."
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked whether Mr. Christopher has had
students who believed they could shoot at somebody in instances
when it is illegal.
MR. CHRISTOPHER said yes, in almost every class he's taught. He
explained, "They are not aware of the acronym JAM, which is
jeopardy, ability, and means. They think if somebody breaks
into your house, you can automatically shoot them. And that's
not true. And this is what I'm trying to prevent."
CHAIR McGUIRE asked whether anyone else wished to testify.
Hearing no response, she then closed public testimony.
Number 1170
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to adopt CSHB 102(STA) as the work
draft. There being no objection, CSHB 102(STA) was before the
committee.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked Representative Croft what level of
burden he believes is imposed on the public by the current
permit requirement, and why he believes it is unjustified.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT responded that the burden of attending the
course and training is "medium," but can result in a significant
time delay for people who feel threatened and want to carry a
concealed weapon. He said he'd rather leave it up to the
individual. Acknowledging that there are reasonable people on
both sides of the issue, he said he believes it comes down to a
"a fundamental ideological ... definition on who do you trust."
He noted that some people, including legislators, believe
[training] ought to be a general requirement of gun ownership,
and that the government should keep a list of owners as well.
"I just fundamentally come down on the opposite side of the
equation," he added.
CHAIR McGUIRE said she doesn't know, but suspects there was some
case law, for instance, that said although a person has a Second
Amendment right to carry a weapon, the right to conceal it isn't
absolute; the state has a [duty of] public protection "and so
forth," and, thus, there will be qualifiers a state can place
upon it. She asked to hear about any discussion that had taken
place.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT replied that he didn't know of any cases on
whether carrying a concealed weapon is a fundamental
constitutional right, and was fairly certain there hadn't been
any cases since Alaska changed its constitution in 1996 to
clarify that Alaska's [right to keep and bear arms - with no
reference to concealment] - is an individual right. He said
there is an ongoing question under the Second Amendment as to
whether [the right to keep and bear arms] is a "militia-
governmental right or individually held." Offering to look
again, he surmised that there is so little case law on this
because of a continuing question under federal law as to whether
"it's even an enforceable right." He added, "Some courts hold
that it is; some don't. It's the very reason we clarified ours
to be an individual right.
Number 1386
CHAIR McGUIRE asked what the rationale was when the Alaska
legislature decided there would be no requirement for training
and so on when a person carries a weapon openly, but that there
would be limitations for carrying a concealed weapon.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said he didn't know; he offered to look.
He offered his opinion that it hasn't been questioned over time
or thought through as rigorously as it should have been.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA informed members that he didn't think he'd
be able to vote for this bill, in contrast to the handgun bill
with regard to reciprocity just voted on, on the House floor,
that day. He explained that Mr. Judy and Representative Croft
make a good point about the lack of statistics showing that this
bill would make Alaska a more dangerous place. After weighing
that heavily, however, Representative Gara said he sides with
the view espoused by Mr. Christopher [with regard to the need
for training] - that some people think they may use a gun
[legally] in circumstances when it isn't true, and that some
people benefit from a gun-safety course. He indicated those are
the reasons for his discomfort with the bill.
CHAIR McGUIRE remarked that it would be nice to know why the
policy exists to begin with; she noted that she still had
unanswered questions. In support of the bill, however, she said
she hadn't been able to put her finger on statistical evidence
that says someone who carries a concealed weapon is more likely
to perpetuate violence or be a risk. Saying it has been an
interesting philosophical debate, she compared it with
philosophies about whether there is a need to [read manuals,
know the law, and get training] to obtain a driver's license;
she noted, however, that driving is a privilege, whereas there
is a constitutional right to bear arms. She thanked
participants.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to report [CSHB 102(STA)] out of
committee with individual recommendations and the accompanying
zero fiscal note. There being no objection, CSHB 102(STA) was
reported from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
HB 31-INITIATIVE/REFERENDUM PETITIONS
HJR 5-CONST AM: INITIATIVE/REFERENDUM PETITIONS
Number 1612
CHAIR McGUIRE announced the that the committee would next
consider HOUSE BILL NO. 31, "An Act relating to initiative and
referendum petitions; and providing for an effective date"; and
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 5, Proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to initiative and
referendum petitions.
CHAIR McGUIRE recalled good points made by Representative Gara
at the previous hearing with respect to the burden being placed
on the initiative process in general and on the people gathering
signatures, as well as the effect on costs "and so forth." She
also recalled comments by Representatives Samuels and Anderson
about proportional representation. She said that was her line
of thinking as well, that there is an effort to heal the so-
called urban-rural divide in other areas, and that even though
it costs more to "reach out to rural areas," [the legislature
still does so]; thus perhaps it should be done in this area
also. She mentioned previous testimony via teleconference and
reminded members that public testimony was still open.
Number 1708
ALVIN A. ANDERS, Chair, Alaska Libertarian Party (Juneau);
Secretary, Alaska Libertarian Party (Statewide), referred to his
previous testimony and said this bill should be opposed because
it is unnecessary and doesn't accomplish what its proponents
want it to do; the initiative process works fine, helping to
increase turnout and voter registration and allowing citizens to
decide contentious issues. If the sponsors' real goal is to
include more of the state in the initiative process - rather
than just having the new requirements act as a "veto" on issues
they don't want to see on the ballot - Mr. Anders asserted that
the legislation doesn't accomplish what the sponsors want.
MR. ANDERS suggested it would be better to make the initiative
one page so that it could be posted on the Internet, downloaded
as an Adobe Acrobat file, printed, signed, and mailed in.
Offering a copy of an initiative petition used in Anchorage and
other areas in the state as an example of a one-page form, he
assured the committee that it works fine, that citizens'
signatures are still checked for voter registration, and that
having one page instead of a booklet will make it easier for
"folks in the hinterlands" to fill out and mail in without
feeling that they have to get 150 signatures in order to turn in
their petition booklet. He said that reform could be done
without having to do a constitutional amendment.
MR. ANDERS said he'd like the committee to vote against the
legislation. He suggested that the "very good reform" supported
by Ken Jacobus and the Republican Party with regard to instant-
runoff voting failed in the 2002 election because voters were
already upset with the Republicans for the closed primary and
saw the instant-runoff voting as another way that Republicans
were trying to seize control of the state. Saying it should
have passed, he said that type of reform is the way to go.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked whether anyone else wished to testify on
HB 31 or HJR 5; hearing no response, she then closed public
testimony on both.
CHAIR MCGUIRE turned attention specifically to HB 31. She
requested a motion.
Number 1890
REPRESENTATIVE OGG moved [to adopt the proposed CS for HB 31,
Version 23-LS0201\D, Kurtz, 4/7/03, as a work draft].
REPRESENTATIVE GARA objected. Saying he wouldn't talk about his
many substantive objections to the bill, he noted, however, that
the constitution says all that is required is a certain total of
signatures from voters who reside in two-thirds of the districts
throughout the state; the bill makes the signature requirement
much more difficult, defeating the intent of the [Alaska State]
Constitution's framers, to his belief. He suggested the bill
would be sent back as clearly being unconstitutional.
CHAIR McGUIRE clarified that the motion to adopt the proposed CS
was in error. She requested a motion to rescind it.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG [moved to rescind his motion]. There being
no objection, it was so ordered.
Number 1990
REPRESENTATIVE OGG [moved to report HB 31 out of committee with
individual recommendations and the accompanying zero fiscal
note].
REPRESENTATIVE GARA objected. He requested that Kathryn Kurtz
tell the committee what she thinks about the bill's
constitutionality.
Number 2018
KATHRYN KURTZ, Attorney, Legislative Legal Counsel, Legislative
Legal and Research Services, Legislative Affairs Agency,
drafting attorney for HB 31, offered her sense that the bill
adds a requirement for initiative petitions above and beyond
what is specified in the constitution; she suggested that
without a constitutional amendment, the bill is potentially
vulnerable to legal challenge.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked Ms. Kurtz, if she were a judge ruling
on the information she has, whether she would say it is more
likely than not that the bill would be unconstitutional.
MS. KURTZ replied, "I would."
CHAIR McGUIRE pointed out that HJR 5 proposes an amendment to
the constitution for that reason. She expressed appreciation to
Ms. Kurtz for her legal memorandum on the subject, and said
there is no question that both the statute and the constitution
need to be amended [if this law is to be changed].
REPRESENTATIVE GARA maintained his objection.
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Samuels, Anderson,
Ogg, Holm, and McGuire voted in favor of reporting HB 31 from
committee. Representative Gara voted against it. Therefore,
HB 31 was reported from the House Judiciary Standing Committee
by a vote of 5-1.
Number 2132
REPRESENTATIVE OGG moved to report HJR 5 out of committee [with
individual recommendations and the accompanying fiscal note].
REPRESENTATIVE GARA objected. He explained that he'd heard all
the points in favor of changing the initiative process, but
disagreed. First, he said, this will limit peoples'
constitutional rights, which he believes should only occur when
there is an incredibly compelling reason to do it; however, he'd
heard no such compelling reason. Furthermore, although it isn't
the intention of the sponsor or the committee, he said that
making it more burdensome to collect signatures will preserve
the initiative process only for the wealthiest people who have
the staff to go to [30] different districts to gain 500 or 1,000
signatures in each district.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA offered his belief that perhaps Alaskans'
most important right with regard to democracy is the right to
take a matter into their own hands and put it on the ballot.
With respect to the ability of people who live outside of
Anchorage to have initiatives placed on the ballot, he said the
current system is fair because no matter how many signatures are
obtained from various districts, the question is whether the
majority of Alaskans will vote for an initiative at the ballot
box. He said that is how democracy works, and that he couldn't
support HJR 5.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM offered his belief that the preservation of
the rights of one set of people at the expense of another is in
jeopardy without passage of this [legislation]. He suggested
that Alaska is unique because more than half of the population
lives in one area and thus can pass laws that adversely affect
rural residents all over the state. He asserted that people in
this country have a representative republic, not a democracy.
He added, "We try to make sure that the majority cannot act in
an unruly manner to subject the minority to its whims."
Representative Holm said it isn't unreasonable to require a seat
at the table for people whose cultures and lives will be
affected by laws or initiatives. He suggested that this
[constitutional change] would allow that seat at the table, and
that it would be a grave injustice to do otherwise.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG concurred with Representative Holm's
comments. He also suggested that the movement here is towards
exercising democracy in its truest form, since [the proposed
constitutional change] will be submitted to the voters.
TAPE 03-42, SIDE B
Number 2380
REPRESENTATIVE OGG concluded by saying this is a suggestion [to
voters] that this is a good direction, and that if they see fit
to pass it, they will. If not, the people will have spoken.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA acknowledged that as a fair point, and said
although [HB 31] takes away peoples' rights without asking their
permission, HJR 5 asks their permission before doing so.
Nevertheless, he said he thinks [changing the initiative process
in this way] is a bad policy for the reasons he'd stated
earlier.
Number 2297
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Anderson, Ogg,
Holm, Samuels, and McGuire voted in favor of reporting HJR 5
from committee. Representative Gara voted against it.
Therefore, HJR 5 was reported from the House Judiciary Standing
Committee by a vote of 5-1.
[HB 31 was reported from committee earlier by a vote of 5-1.]
HB 86-INJUNCTIONS AGAINST PERMITTED PROJECTS
Number 2287
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the final order of business would
be SPONSOR SUBSTITUTE FOR HOUSE BILL NO. 86, "An Act relating to
permits issued by the state; and amending Rules 65, 79, and 82,
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure."
CHAIR McGUIRE indicated no testifiers had signed up.
Number 2275
JIM POUND, Staff to Representative Hugh Fate, Alaska State
Legislature, presented SSHB 86 on behalf of Representative Fate,
sponsor, noting that the bill had been rewritten in order to
pass muster constitutionally. Mr. Pound explained that it
approaches the issue of asking for and receiving injunctions
that delay work on already permitted projects. Under current
law, a plaintiff who files for an injunction against a project
and loses in court is responsible for part of the court costs
and part of the attorney fees for the defendant. Indicating the
bill will guide the judiciary but leave decisions up to the
bench, he told members that SSHB 86 makes those who improperly
seek and cause an injunction responsible for full court costs
and attorney fees.
MR. POUND explained that SSHB 86 also adds statutory language
which requires that costs incurred as the result of a delay will
be paid for by the responsible party; those include wages and
salaries for employees working on the project, material costs,
and penalties and interest on contracts associated with the
project. When a project is permitted, a contractor goes to work
hiring employees and purchasing materials; these are commitments
that a contractor makes. An improper delay of a project costs
more than just court costs and attorney fees, he said; it
disrupts the lives of the contractor, his or her employees, and
subcontractors who do the work. "It is unreasonable for someone
to have an effect on this many lives without bearing some of the
true cost," he concluded, adding that SSHB 86 means that the
responsible party will have to be responsible. He urged support
for the bill.
CHAIR McGUIRE brought attention to the phrase "bad faith legal
challenge" on page 1, line 10. She asked whether that is
referring to Rule 11 [of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure] as
the standard that will be in law.
MR. POUND replied that "bad faith" comes up a lot in insurance
[case] law and that it seems every judge has a different
definition for what it is or isn't. "We're leaving that to the
discretion of the bench," he specified.
CHAIR McGUIRE offered her belief that Rule 11 sets up that
standard, whereas this would leave it to the judge's discretion.
She asked at what stage of the litigation the bad-faith
determination would be made.
MR. POUND offered his understanding that in most cases, it will
be determined with the final decision by the judge or jury
because it will fall under "the substantially prevail
situation."
Number 2155
REPRESENTATIVE OGG asked why the present court rules that deal
with frivolous lawsuits don't cover this issue.
MR. POUND replied that existing court rules allow for partial
court costs and partial attorney fees, but nothing else for a
construction-type project.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG noted that [page 1, line 11] says
"substantially prevail". He asked whether someone could prevail
and yet not "substantially prevail", and thus could be a winner
but also a loser under this.
MR. POUND responded:
That is another one of the terms, sort of like "bad
faith", where a lot of it ... really depends on the
particular court and particular judge. ... About the
best definition I could come up with came out of the
U.S. Fifth Circuit Court [of Appeals is]: a plaintiff
may be considered a prevailing party - which they do
reference back to "substantially prevail" - if they
succeeded on any significant issue of litigation ...,
which achieves some of the benefits that the party
sought in bringing the suit.
Number 2078
REPRESENTATIVE OGG asked whether Mr. Pound believes that
"prevailing" isn't a high enough [standard].
MR. POUND responded, "I believe we need to have a higher
standard in order to spell out what the legislative intent is."
He relayed that the goal is to eliminate frivolous suits and
frivolous injunctions before the process ever starts.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG observed that there are penalties for people
who bring frivolous lawsuits. He requested clarification about
bringing those together [under] the "substantially prevail"
standard.
MR. POUND replied that frivolous lawsuits fall into one category
that presently allows for partial court costs and partial
attorney fees. However, this primarily deals with permitted
projects that have gone through the entire public process and
"all the hoops" to get the needed permits. He used as an
example an intertie from the Healy coal project up to Fairbanks
that had gone through all the permitting: Someone filed a
lawsuit saying it was an eyesore and received an injunction that
held the project up for nearly a year and a half. There were
millions of dollars in attorney fees [and court costs]. There
also were people, including contractors and laborers, who were
unable to work on the project, although they'd planned to do so
and had made related commitments to subcontractors and for
materials. He said that while it may not be considered a
frivolous lawsuit, the judge may look at the information basic
to the injunction process, grant the injunction, and then later
decide there was no reason for it in the first place.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG asked whether the court action was determined
to have been frivolous in the preceding example.
MR. POUND apologized, saying he wasn't that familiar with the
case, but knows the project is now moving forward. He offered
his belief that "all the company got out of it was [attorney]
fees and court costs."
CHAIR McGUIRE shared a point brought to her attention, that Rule
11 deals with sanctions against attorneys, rather than
plaintiffs themselves.
Number 1912
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON remarked that he could see the merit of
the bill on face value, since an injunction delays a project,
thereby slowing development and economic growth, and since a
person would be less likely - under the bill - to unjustly
pursue delaying a project. Conversely, however, it would
discourage a person from [rightly] seeking an injunction against
a state-permitted project. He mentioned the confusion in the
committee over Rule 11 and bad faith; he suggested that
discussing those is appropriate for the committee.
REPRESENTATIVE ANDERSON acknowledged that sometimes injunctions
produce results beneficial to the public. He referred to page 2
[lines 6-7], which read, "(5) any other costs or damages that
the person who is materially damaged demonstrates were caused by
the disruption." Characterizing those damages as "fairly
expansive," he cautioned against making it so prohibitive that
people are frightened away from to [seeking an appropriate
injunction]. He again highlighted the undefined nature of "bad
faith."
MR. POUND reiterated that the "bad-faith" argument is seen a lot
in "insurance case law." He suggested that leaving its
definition up to the bench would be best.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked, "Why don't we just make it ...
discretionary to the judge to award damages as well, so the
defining of 'bad faith' is [discretionary] and then the awarding
of damages is discretionary too? Why do we have it as 'shall be
liable'?"
MR. POUND indicated that [the bill] expands it beyond the
discretionary court costs and attorney fees that currently can
be awarded under the court rules.
Number 1751
REPRESENTATIVE GARA explained his concerns. First, the bill is
confusing, he said, apart from the substance. It says a person
should not be allowed to file a bad-faith injunction. Although
it is a fair point, Representative Gara noted that he'd asked
legislative counsel to share with him the standards one must
meet before being able to obtain an injunction or preliminary
injunction in the first place. He reported that injunctions
rarely are granted; furthermore, the issue of whether a claim is
frivolous is always dealt with in an injunction case at the
outset.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA, to that point, referred to page 3 of a
memorandum [dated April 7, 2003] he'd received from Kathryn
Kurtz, legislative drafter, noting that it quotes from an Alaska
case with regard to the abuse-of-discretion standard and
balance-of-hardships test used by the Alaska Supreme Court to
review preliminary and temporary injunctions. Representative
Gara pointed out that it says the plaintiff must raise serious
and substantial questions going to the merits of the case; that
is, the issues raised cannot be frivolous or obviously without
merit. Representative Gara summarized by saying that before a
court will prohibit someone from doing something pending the
outcome of a trial, the court already imposes a heightened
standard and says that it had better not be a frivolous claim,
and there is a hearing on that.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA questioned the need for the bill, noting
that if it passes, the court would make the determination at the
outset and have a hearing to ensure there was merit to the
claim; the defendant would get a second bite at the apple later
by requesting another hearing on whether the claim was
frivolous. He said it seems the protection already exists, and
asked whether the need to change existing law had been
[thoroughly] considered.
MR. POUND responded, "Essentially, that's correct. But the
reality of it is," he added, "when it's all said and done, the
judge looks at the defendant and says, 'We'll award you part of
your [attorney] fees and part of your court costs.'"
REPRESENTATIVE GARA replied, "I could agree with what you
wanted; I think what you want is already in the law, though."
He offered his understanding that [the sponsor wants more than
partial attorney fees] if someone has filed a frivolous claim
and obtained an injunction; in that case, he agreed that the
person should be entitled to full attorney fees, but relayed his
belief that [a party already may be awarded full attorney fees]
under Rule 11 or Rule 82, the way the courts interpret it, when
a claim is frivolous. He suggested that it is "sort of
circular" whether an injunction can properly be obtained on a
frivolous claim in the first place, because it appears that
hurdle with the court must be cleared first. Highlighting how
unlikely it would be to have a frivolous injunction, he
reiterated that he agreed with awarding full attorney fees if it
happened.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA explained that his bigger concern with the
bill, however, is that it goes beyond awarding full attorney
fees. It says the plaintiff may be charged for all lost profits
during the time the injunction was in place. He said that if
the other remedies were deleted and it just said full attorney
fees, he'd sign off on the bill right now. However, he said he
worries about real-world examples.
Number 1699
REPRESENTATIVE GARA offered an example of a "gas lease off the
Kenai River" for which some fishermen believe that it is a bad
idea and that the gas lease is illegal. They succeed in getting
an injunction from a court that sees it as a good-faith claim.
The injunction lasts two years, and ultimately the plaintiffs
lose for whatever reason. It has cost the oil company millions
of dollars. Representative Gara noted that under the bill, a
fisherman or average person, when filing for such an injunction,
could be liable for millions of dollars. Furthermore, under
Rule 65, the person would have to post a multimillion-dollar
bond before filing the suit. He suggested that it would leave
injunction law available to just the richest of people, knocking
95 percent of Alaskans out of the mix. He asked why that would
be good policy.
MR. POUND answered by posing a scenario in which a commercial
fisherman owns a boat, has boat payments, has house payments,
and has a crew working for him. If a group decides to get an
injunction because that fisherman might catch a seal in his net,
that fisherman would lose the entire season of fishing and
instead spend it in court, hiring an attorney and incurring
court costs. He asked, "If it was a frivolous case, why should
you not be allowed to recover your loss?"
REPRESENTATIVE GARA replied:
If we could write a law that said in that case, you
can get the remedies you have in this bill, but in the
other case, when you're trying to get them against the
fisherman and you're the oil company and you wouldn't
apply this bill, I'd be OK with that. But the reality
is, to apply it in your case, you also have to [have]
it apply in my case. And by passing this bill, it's
going to be a bill of ... general applicability. It
will be used by the large oil companies to scare a
fisherman out of court in the first place.
MR. POUND responded, "I'm not inclined to say that the large oil
companies won't use this." He suggested a hypothetical
situation in which an oil-service company subcontracts to
another company, which subcontracts to another company, which,
ultimately, hires an employee, all under a contract. Once a
project is stopped at the highest level, it has a trickle-down
effect that hurts not just the large corporation, but also the
individual who just wants to go to work.
Number 1448
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked Mr. Pound whether he has any evidence
that too many frivolous injunctions are being granted today.
MR. POUND replied:
I have no specific -- but this is also a preventative
[measure]. We have many large projects that are
getting ready to start in this state in the next four
years; ... certainly the potential is going to
increase as we start looking at resource development
in the state.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS remarked that it's not only the lost
profits, but also the lost operating expense. He suggested
deciding on a policy, regardless of whether it is a big oil
company or some small construction company. If someone is
filing an injunction in bad faith and talks a judge into it, and
the judge later decides [the plaintiff] should have known
better, that the person should be punished, he opined.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM, on the issue of whether any frivolous
lawsuits have been filed, mentioned a right-of-way for Golden
Valley Electric Association (GVEA) that was completely permitted
across the Tanana Flats. When someone sued, it cost $7 million
and nine years of greater costs in electrical power to the
people of Interior Alaska, but there was no penalty, no charges
for attorney fees, and no reimbursement whatsoever, he said. He
added that he believes this bill is intended reduce lawsuits.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM opined that [Representative Gara] is more
concerned about preserving the profits of attorneys, whereas he
himself is worried about preserving the profits of others.
Number 1273
REPRESENTATIVE GARA objected on "a point of personal privilege."
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM asked, "This bill preserves the profits of
attorneys, right?"
CHAIR McGUIRE warned: "Well, let's be careful, there,
Representative Holm. Representative Gara doesn't practice in
this area of law, and I don't think he's trying to preserve
profits."
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM suggested there is a concern about
preserving the ability of attorneys to be compensated for what
they are doing. He then referred to the discussion that this
bill allows the judge to decide whether the case is substantial
or has merit. He said he could offer hundreds of examples -
although he didn't have them at his fingertips - where judges
have, in his opinion, "ruled very inappropriately." He said it
may be correct that Rule 11 says attorneys can be sanctioned for
inappropriate or frivolous actions, but then he alluded to a
successful lawsuit against [the McDonald's Corporation] over
some very hot coffee, and suggested that many times, judges take
cases just to make a name for themselves.
CHAIR McGUIRE acknowledged Representative Holm's frustration.
She said she doesn't believe the bill's premise is wrong, and
opined that injunctions probably are too liberally granted in
some areas. However, she observed, at least seven different
terms seem vague, including "substantially prevail", "materially
damage", "disrupt", and "improperly disrupt". Notwithstanding
Mr. Pound's suggestion that "bad faith" would be interpreted by
a judge, she emphasized the there is still a need to consider
sideboards and definitions. She asked whether, for example, if
a judge determines that a person was correct on two claims but
not a third, does that constitute "substantially prevail"?
CHAIR McGUIRE also asked Mr. Pound whether there had been any
consideration given to looking at Rule 65 itself with regard to
raising the standard for when a court will actually grant an
injunction. Instead of imposing large penalties on people [who
obtain injunctions], she suggested that a higher standard could
provide a "stopping point" for the judge because of the
consequences on businesses, jobs, "and so forth." She remarked
that if something is right, it is right for big businesses,
small businesses, and individual employees. She noted that
corporations represent working people because they provide jobs
for the average men and women in Alaska.
Number 0963
CHAIR McGUIRE added that she's long believed Rule 11 doesn't
have enough teeth, but questioned whether creating a whole new
"crime/penalty" is the right way to go. She agreed with
[Representative Anderson] about not wanting a chilling effect on
a person who believes something is wrong but who doesn't have a
million-dollar bond. She again asked Mr. Pound whether there
had been any consideration given to looking at Rule 65 itself
and raising the standard for injunctions.
MR. POUND referred to discussions with the Department of Law and
said the department was leaning towards dropping any reference
to the court rules whatsoever. He noted that he had an
amendment to that effect.
CHAIR McGUIRE clarified that she agrees there are many instances
when someone files for an injunction to purposely disrupt an
economically viable and environmentally sound project for impure
motives; she said Rule 11 could apply to an attorney that would
bring that [action]. Putting that aside and looking at the
plaintiffs themselves, however, she explained:
We're saying that bad faith is a standard in and of
itself, and I don't disagree that we ought to have
one. But I think it's the commiserate damages that
you're then asking this individual ... to pay, which
could be literally billions of dollars, that is
somewhat troubling to me from the standpoint of
chilling legitimate injunctions that might be granted.
And so I guess what I'm wondering is whether or not we
don't want to go back one step - rather than the point
at which it's already said and done and you've got a
billion-dollar penalty hanging over your head - that
you go back up one step, to the granting of the
injunction itself, and put more teeth in that, so that
the judge has the ability to say, "This doesn't look
right, feel right, or anything else; we're not
granting the injunction." And ... if these
injunctions have been granted in a frivolous way,
clearly, either the judge ... has done it improperly
or the judge doesn't have enough tools at his or her
disposal.
CHAIR McGUIRE, in response to Mr. Pound, specified that she was
speaking of Rule 65, not Rule 11, since the latter clearly deals
with sanctions against attorneys.
Number 0748
REPRESENTATIVE OGG suggested focusing on the laws themselves.
He said the fishing industry has been held up many times by "the
environmental side of programs," even though in good faith. He
suggested the problem is that the statutes and regulations under
which the agencies manage the fisheries aren't tight enough as
written. He explained, "They don't have the information, or
they're written in such a way that, in good faith, somebody can
come and, based on that law, say that this fishery is not being
managed properly." He read from Rule 11 and indicated that if
the permit law is wrong itself, an injunction could be done in
good faith and yet there could be a chilling effect "based on
what you have here."
REPRESENTATIVE OGG offered his belief that a defendant has the
ability to file a counterclaim for compensatory damages under
the present law in relation to an injunction. He questioned the
need to duplicate it with SSHB 86.
MR. POUND responded that this bill is primarily designed to
clarify what those compensatory damages could be. Now, he
suggested, it is anyone's guess regarding what would be awarded
under existing statute.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG noted that Mr. Pound hadn't previously
mentioned counterclaims, and said he wanted more time to study
this bill.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS referred to page 2 and said somebody is
going to pay for the costs incurred. Assuming it is a bad-faith
injunction, he suggested that everyone will pay for it because
of higher insurance costs "and so forth." He said he agreed
with the need to separate the good-faith claims from the bad-
faith claims, however, adding that people who go forward with
bad-faith claims should pay full costs, not just attorney fees.
Number 0423
CHAIR McGUIRE said she believed that was a valid point. When
the situation is at the point when the bill applies, she noted,
everyone will be in a bad spot: all the costs will have been
expended, and someone will have to pay them. She emphasized,
however, that she wants to "bump it back a step" to avoid all
the damages that anyone would pay, one way or the other. She
again mentioned altering the injunction standard.
CHAIR McGUIRE offered her understanding that the statute brought
up by Representative Ogg is AS 09.40.230, mentioned in the
memorandum [from Ms. Kurtz]. She suggested that that statute
could be a place [for amendment], since it pertains to the
authorization for an injunction itself. She proposed perhaps
adding a [paragraph] (4) to that statute to specify that it
cannot be based on bad faith "and so forth," to raise [the
standard] more, "if you don't think Rule 11 gets you there."
REPRESENTATIVE GARA suggested, heated discussion to the
contrary, that there wasn't that much difference of opinion on
the bill. He surmised that if Rule 11 were clarified to provide
full attorney fees for a frivolous lawsuit, that would resolve
the problem. He said that this isn't a matter of people suing
corporations. Rather, this addresses the public process - the
right of citizens to challenge their government's conduct. He
cautioned about treading softly in this area, noting that this
bill only comes into play if the government issues a permit and
a citizen believes the government didn't act properly. He said
that businesses know this is part of the governmental process:
the permit is issued, and someone may challenge it, which is
likely to happen on a controversial project - the public is
invited to the table.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA pointed out that what stops people from
improperly challenging the government's conduct in a way that
causes businesses huge amounts of unjustified damages is the
threat of paying huge amounts of attorney fees if the lawsuit is
unsuccessful - the bigger the project, the more attorney fees.
He noted that even against a small business, attorney fees might
be $50,000, whereas against a large business the amount of might
be up to $1 million. Again proposing to clarify Rule 11, he
emphasized that the law already deters people from doing
frivolous things in court.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA suggested this bill could be rewritten to
deter people from doing things frivolously, but cautioned
against requiring damages to include [all those listed in the
bill]. He emphasized that this could "chill somebody out of the
courtroom" and would take away citizens' rights to challenge
government conduct in cases involving large and medium-sized
corporations.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA referred to Representative Holm's mention of
the GVEA case; he noted that Representative Holm had indicated
the court allowed the injunction and that the plaintiff wasn't
penalized. Representative Gara remarked that this suggests that
what Representative Ogg said was correct.
TAPE 03-43, SIDE A
Number 0001
REPRESENTATIVE GARA, elaborating, said that perhaps when the law
allows for an injunction, maybe it's the law that the sponsor
has the dispute with - maybe the law is a bad law - but the
court was enforcing the law. He suggested that if the plaintiff
had a frivolous claim, it would not have held up the project for
10 years. The claim probably involved a law that many would
disagree with; that's different from a frivolous claim. By
increasing the penalty for attorney fees and lost profits, the
legislature has just closed the courtroom doors, taken away
peoples' due process rights, and peoples' rights to challenge
the government. It's a balance.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA acknowledged Representative Samuels's point
that there's a burden on the business community, especially when
they're doing things right. Alaskans try to appoint the best
judges possible, he noted, adding that there is a high standard
before a plaintiff can get an injunction. He said he would like
to hear strong evidence that injunctions are being issued willy-
nilly, for no good reason; he remarked that he doesn't think
that is happening. He surmised that judges have made terrible
mistakes in the past, but noted that it's not happening in a big
enough way to justify a radical change in the law as is proposed
by SSHB 86.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG read sections of Rule 65, noting that there
is always a balancing test in the court: The plaintiff must be
faced with irreparable harm, and the plaintiffs have to make a
showing of what that is. In some [cases], he explained, the
court will require bonding by the plaintiff to cover the damages
the defendant may suffer should the case not work out in the
[plaintiff's] favor. The court has plenty of tools, he said,
adding that the plaintiff must raise serious and substantial
questions going to the merits of the case. All of these things
are discussed by the court and the opposing parties before the
judge grants the injunction.
Number 0201
REPRESENTATIVE OGG said that [an injunction] is a very serious
move on the part of the court and there are high standards
before the court will grant an injunction. He said some study
of this would be helpful before the committee starts changing
things. Maybe the answer, he surmised, involves adding more
teeth to the statute that deals with injunctions. He said he
agrees that these standards should surface early in the lawsuit
process, not after everybody has expended time and energy in
court; that determination of a frivolous case needs to be made
upfront. He said he thinks that Rule 65 requires that [merit]
has to be [demonstrated] before an injunction is granted.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS reiterated that "somebody has to pay."
He then proffered the following example of an air carrier with
an injunction prohibiting it from flying to certain
destinations. While the injunction is in force, the carrier
still has to make aircraft payments, still has 450 employees to
pay, and still has leases to pay and sales to honor. The
business's money is tied up, with the company never knowing when
the injunction will be lifted. The situation worsens: the
employees being laid off are finding other jobs, and there are
training costs for new ticket agents and ramp workers. That's
the way a large oil company looks at an injunction, he surmised.
So once the injunction is lifted, and the case is determined to
be frivolous according to SSHB 86, who makes the business whole,
he asked. Who makes up for the aircraft that were returned or
who gets the company out of bankruptcy?
REPRESENTATIVE GARA remarked that if such an example were the
reality, he would be much more sympathetic to the bill. But its
not, he assured members, adding that "that's why nobody has ever
gotten an injunction against your company to keep it from flying
all over the state."
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS argued there have been injunctions
against airlines.
Number 0514
REPRESENTATIVE GARA said it's not so easy to get an injunction
for no reason, adding that SSHB 86 has to do with a reality
that's different from the hypothetical case Representative
Samuels presented. This bill concerns state permits and whether
someone can get an injunction that says a state permit is
invalid. He said he disagrees that somebody can get an
injunction easily for no reason; it's just not that easy and it
doesn't happen. Were injunctions against state permits an
everyday circumstance, were this happening all the time, he
said, he would support this bill. But its not; he said the
committee is considering a bill to deal with a circumstance that
doesn't exist. If the committee considers the circumstances
that do exist, all of a sudden the injunctions start looking
reasonable. Were there rampant injunctions out there for
illogical reasons, he would be much more sympathetic, he said;
however, that isn't the case.
CHAIR McGUIRE remarked that, clearly, [injunctions] will involve
things in which development is occurring and generally it
pertains to sub-surface development, oil and gas, minerals,
railroads, et cetera. She noted that there is a tendency to
villainize the oil and gas and development industries of the
state.
CHAIR McGUIRE requested a few real-life examples from the
sponsor's staff. She said that she agrees with what
Representative Samuels and Mr. Pound are saying with respect to
the policy, and with what Representatives Gara and Ogg are
saying with regard to the chilling effect. She acknowledged
that more information would help identify any areas in which
injunctions are being improperly granted. Furthermore, she also
acknowledged, this could be the fault of the legislature in not
changing the court rule or the statute or both in order to
provide the judge more guidance. She agreed that Rule 11 in
combination with Rule 65 and AS 09.40.230, regarding
authorizations for injunctions in the Alaska Statutes, should be
enough for a judge to review something that's clearly in bad
faith and [deny the injunction] based upon one of the
aforementioned.
Number 0912
MR. POUND directed the committee's attention to the committee
packet, which included six pages from Stoel Rives, LLP, of cases
from states other than Alaska that are representations from
environmental law. He offered the following as a quote from
Fran Ulmer: "Anyone advocating more marine protection areas in
Alaska must be able to demonstrate convincing scientific
evidence that such an extreme action is necessary and not be
driven by simplistic desire to limit commercial fishing."
MR. POUND explained that when an individual or group challenges
a permit, the first process should be the administrative
process. Ultimately, when these go to court, they go through
superior court, where they fall under a different set of
guidelines because there are standards of review for
administrative proceedings at the superior court level. Mr.
Pound claimed that nonprofit law firms tend to approach many of
their cases in the same manner as the advertising which implies
that [Alaska] is killing wolves left and right. He added that
he wouldn't put it past such groups to use the same tactics in
their initial argument to obtain an injunction.
Number 1039
CHAIR McGUIRE noted that a judge is allowed to weigh scientific
information. Therefore, she suggested including a separate
standard for environmental-related injunctions under Title 9
wherein "the Fran Ulmer standard" is adopted. Such a standard
would require that one demonstrate convincing scientific
evidence that an extreme action is necessary.
MR. POUND pointed out that such language was included in the
original legislation; however, there was a [potential] problem
pertaining to due process. Therefore, the sponsor substitute
was introduced and its language is a variation of Utah's law.
CHAIR McGUIRE noted that the judge is already ascertaining
whether it's broad and in good faith. She also noted that in
the area of injunctions, a series of three different additional
questions must be answered before an injunction can be issued.
Therefore, she said she still questions why a judge couldn't
decide whether the injunction request is based on scientific
information. She asked if there is a legal opinion on the due
process issue.
MR. POUND answered that both Legislative Legal and Research
Services and the Department of Law agreed that there were due
process problems.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM said that the GVEA situation is a classic
example of "this." He noted that when he was on the borough
assembly, it dealt with this problem at length because [the
process resulted in] 100,000 people in the borough having
increased electric payments for seven years. When the process
finally went through for an expansion of GVEA, Fort Knox entered
[the market] and the cut price in the area by 20 percent. He
relayed his understanding that Representative Fate is trying to
create a positive environment for economic development rather
than one that is under the thumb of potential litigation. He
agreed that [the legislature] doesn't want to chill the ability
of people to question government.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM asked if there is some methodology whereby
[the law] could require judges to come down on certain sides of
issues rather than providing freedom with their judgments.
Although he said he didn't know how the process works, he said
he did know how it impacts people when the process is stopped
even though the individual has gone through all the proper
steps. For example, he noted, the Susitna Dam was stopped due
to litigation. He added that if the purpose is to put Alaska on
firm financial footing, then these issues need to be addressed
without destroying the ability of people to address government's
inappropriate actions.
Number 1381
REPRESENTATIVE OGG stated that when there is an ambiguity in
law, the courts try to tighten it up and make it clear, which
the legislature can do when it sees the need to clarify the
court's discretion. He pointed to mandatory sentencing as an
example, and noted the need to be careful when crafting such.
Representative Ogg mentioned that in none of the cases cited in
the backup material was there an example in which the appellate
court said an injunction was granted and it was frivolous to
begin with, [or] that the trial judge made an error at the
inception. Representative Ogg requested that concrete examples
be provided to the committee, preferably from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals or the Alaska Supreme Court. If there aren't
any cases in Alaska in which the courts say that the injunction
was granted on a frivolous basis, then there isn't a problem, he
surmised; if there are such cases, the judges' [remarks] could
be reviewed and the language could be crafted such that it does
the most good.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA reminded the committee of a well-meaning
district attorney who was recently before the committee
presenting one side of a case saying it was outrageous.
However, the district attorney left out the other side.
Therefore, Representative Gara said, it would be helpful to have
both sides of the story in the examples. He said he believes
this is about snail darters and the Susitna Dam, in some sense.
In such cases, the problem isn't the injunction process but
rather the law that the court is enforcing.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA relayed his understanding that in the snail
darter situation, there was a law that said snail darters are an
endangered species. If there is a law specifying that, or
supporting such a conclusion, then perhaps an injunction is
warranted and maybe someone should revisit the law classifying
the snail darter as an endangered species. With regard to the
Susitna Dam, Representative Gara recalled that there was a
vigorous debate with regard to whether the project was one in
which the economic benefits exceeded its fisheries impact or
whether the fisheries impact exceed the economic benefits;
again, the question relates to Alaska's law rather than the
injunction process. Representative Gara predicted that in most
of these cases, one would find examples in which courts are
enforcing existing laws.
Number 1611
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS offered his belief that a dam project
would involve groups that are philosophically opposed to the dam
and that would look for a way to slow down the project. With
regard to the suggestion that injunctions are part of the
process, he opined that injunctions are part of the problem with
the process.
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that she would hold SSHB 86 over until
[the next meeting].
ADJOURNMENT
Number 1684
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 5:17 p.m.
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