02/13/2002 01:12 PM House JUD

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* first hearing in first committee of referral
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ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE February 13, 2002 1:12 p.m. MEMBERS PRESENT Representative Norman Rokeberg, Chair Representative Scott Ogan, Vice Chair Representative Jeannette James Representative John Coghill Representative Kevin Meyer Representative Ethan Berkowitz MEMBERS ABSENT Representative Albert Kookesh COMMITTEE CALENDAR HOUSE BILL NO. 375 "An Act making corrective amendments to the Alaska Statutes as recommended by the revisor of statutes; and providing for an effective date." - MOVED HB 375 OUT OF COMMITTEE CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 6(FIN) "An Act relating to required notice of eviction to mobile home park dwellers and tenants before redevelopment of the park." - HEARD AND HELD HOUSE BILL NO. 381 "An Act relating to the crime of failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer; and providing for an effective date." - MOVED HB 381 OUT OF COMMITTEE HOUSE BILL NO. 384 "An Act relating to submission of civil litigation information; and amending Rules 41(a) and 58, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 511(c) and (e), Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 503(d), Alaska Rules of Evidence." - SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD PREVIOUS ACTION BILL: HB 375 SHORT TITLE:REVISOR'S BILL SPONSOR(S): RLS BY REQUEST OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action 02/01/02 2121 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS 02/01/02 2121 (H) JUD 02/11/02 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120 02/11/02 (H) <Bill Postponed> 02/13/02 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120 BILL: SB 6 SHORT TITLE:MOBILE HOME PARK EVICTION NOTICE SPONSOR(S): SENATOR(S) ELLIS Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action 01/08/01 0013 (S) PREFILE RELEASED - 12/29/00

01/08/01 0013 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRALS

01/08/01 0013 (S) Committee AUSTERMAN, LEMAN; 532 TITLE LEMAN; 532 203 UNAN CONSENT REFERRALS CROFT BILL: HB SHORT TITLE:FAILURE TO STOP FOR PEACE OFFICER SPONSOR(S): JUDICIARY Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action REFERRALS WITNESS REGISTER REPRESENTATIVE JOE GREEN Alaska State Legislature Capitol Building, Room 403 Juneau, Alaska 99801 POSITION STATEMENT: Presented ACTION NARRATIVE TAPE 02-17, SIDE A Number 0001 CHAIR NORMAN ROKEBERG called the House Judiciary Standing Committee meeting to order at 1:12 p.m. Representatives Rokeberg, Ogan, Coghill, Meyer, and Berkowitz were present at the call to order. Representative James arrived as the meeting was in progress. HB Number 0088 CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the first order of business would be HOUSE BILL NO. 375, "An Act making corrective amendments to the Alaska Statutes as recommended by the revisor of statutes; and providing for an effective date." Number 0099 REPRESENTATIVE JOE GREEN, Alaska State Legislature, speaking as the chair of the Legislative Council, sponsor of mentioned that the committee may wish to address two or three points in the bill, one of which pertains to an amendment made during a House floor session last year. PAM FINLEY, Revisor of Statutes, Legislative Counsel, Legal and Research Services Division, Legislative Affairs Agency (LAA), with regard to Section 2, explained that last year there was a "floor amendment" [to AS It says an action based on a claim of sexual abuse under AS 09.55.650 a lot of sexual abuse cases there. Most of them are felonies, a few of them are misdemeanors. The felonies -- that's really no longer relevant because there is no statute of limitations for felonies any more. However -- so that is why I added this: "that is not otherwise allowed under HB felony [sexual abuse of a minor or felony sexual assault] crimes, not to change the statute of limitations for misdemeanors. He added that the standing statute of limitations for misdemeanors, prior to the enactment of the floor amendment, was three years. Thus, he opined, there is no reason for it to revert to a two-year statute of limitations. MS. FINLEY explained that since the floor amendment repealed and reenacted AS 09.10.060(c), there is no longer any reference to those misdemeanor crimes nor a statute of limitations for them. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked whether the committee was free to amend HB 297. MS. FINLEY indicated that the committee could do so as long as "we're not making policy decisions. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ surmised, then, that the committee could amend Section 2 so that it said three years instead of two. MS. FINLEY said that would be fine except that the problem is that Section 2 does not set a statute of limitations at three years; instead, it is an exception to the statute of limitations. She said that she would be perfectly happy to remove Section 2 from AS 09.10.060(c) also causes her concern. CHAIR ROKEBERG mentioned that the House Judiciary Standing Committee already has a full calendar. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he would be willing to 375 Number 0647 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN asked whether there might be a constitutional problem with amending HB Number 1722 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ moved to report SB Number 1731 CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the next order of business would be CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 6(FIN), "An Act relating to required notice of eviction to mobile home park dwellers and tenants before redevelopment of the park." He noted that there is a proposed committee substitute (CS) available for the committee to consider. Number 1750 SENATOR JOHNNY ELLIS, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor, said that through the work that the House Judiciary Standing Committee has done, the proposed CS is a better product. As background, he said that [the concept of] SB satisfy their obligations and enable them get on with their projects even though actual relocation costs are significantly greater than $5,000. SENATOR ELLIS noted that when SB as a work draft. There being no objection, Version W was before the committee. SENATOR ELLIS relayed that Chair Rokeberg had suggested that instead of blanketing the entire state with the requirement for developers to pay compensation or give a year's notice, could be simplified so that it proposes a 270-day notice requirement, which is less than the 365-day requirement that the Senate proposed and greater than the 180-day requirement in current statute, and that any local government that would like to set up its own relocation fund be allowed to do so through local ordinance. Senator Ellis explained that local governments could work out the details of how such a fund would be financed. Surprisingly, he noted, some of the private sector folks said that they would like the state to set up the fund with state dollars so that developers wouldn't have to pay any sort of fee or pay for any change in the assessed valuation. SENATOR ELLIS noted that Chair Rokeberg "shot that down rather quickly, and said there will be no state fund because there is no likelihood of new state money for such a program." CHAIR ROKEBERG remarked that that is old "Alaska-think" - that the state will be able to pay for everything. SENATOR ELLIS explained that since there will be no state- administered fund and no state funding, Version W provides for the option of allowing local governments to set up their own funds at the local level. Hence this is not an un-funded mandate; it is just an option giving local governments the ability to create their own fund if they decide that there should be compensation to folks moving on to other housing arrangements. He also pointed out that Version W, in addition to providing a 270-day-eviction-notice requirement, prohibits eviction of a mobile home park resident during the winter months; everybody on all sides of this issue agreed that it is hard enough to move a mobile home without having to do so in the winter. CHAIR ROKEBERG offered that the funding for a local relocation fund could come from the revenue differential between the prior zoning and the new zoning, as well as from contributions made by the community itself. He noted, therefore, that this local funding option is mostly applicable to larger communities although smaller communities could set up such a fund as well. He mentioned that he still has concerns with changing the notice requirement from 180 days to 270 days because that would then become the standard for eviction notices. SENATOR ELLIS said that he believed that the 270-day requirement would only apply to mobile home parks. The current 180-day requirement for all other types of evictions would remain the same. In response to questions, he reiterated that in addition to the 270-day requirement for mobile home parks, no one could be evicted from a mobile home park during the winter months, which is a prohibition not currently in law. He noted that a number of states have a 365-day requirement, as was proposed in a Senate version of SB statutes relating specifically to mobile home park evictions because of the special nature of mobile home parks and their redevelopment. Number 2124 TYSON FICK, Staff to Senator Johnny Ellis, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor of SB 6 the quit date provision prohibiting evictions during the winter months. MS. LISTON said, with regard to changing the notice from 180 days to 270 days, that if the state is not creating a relocation fund, then the tenants absolutely need at least 270 days. And [that time frame] is needed not just to relocate but also to secure the funds that are necessary to make that relocation happen. She opined that seven months is probably the least [amount of time] that would be necessary to raise $5,000 for relocation. She noted that she would feel a lot better about it if "we had some information from the municipalities that in fact the funds would be set up. She said that she supports the quit date provision as written, and asked that the 270-day notice provision remain in place. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER noted that during his service on the assembly, "this was always a major issue and very controversial." He said he recalled that with the bigger developments, the city was requiring the "developers to pay to help move some of the mobile homes; ... I thought is was up to $5,000." MS. LISTON clarified that that was never required of the developers; they were simply encouraged to do it. CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that this decision was reached during community council meetings. He noted, however, that not every developer "has as deep a pocket" as those that were able to help with relocation costs. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER indicated that he agreed with Ms. Liston regarding the need for the 270-day notice provision. TAPE 02-17, SIDE B Number 2490 JEWEL JONES, Director, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Municipality of Anchorage, testified via teleconference and said that the DHHS has certainly had a great deal of experience with homeless issues, with affordable housing issues, and specifically with "the first notice of a movement with the Alaskan Village trailer park." The DHHS was also involved in the establishment of the mobile home task force, she said, adding that she participated in many of its discussions. MS. JONES, referring to Version W, said that it is much more palatable and workable for the municipality, and that the DHHS encourages its passage. She remarked that the DHHS, too, is concerned about notices [to quit the property] being given during a period of time in which the end of that period is in the winter. Moving a mobile home is, at best, a very difficult and expensive process, she noted. Many people living in mobile homes are there because they can't afford any other form of housing. In addition, mobile home living does afford a way for many people to achieve the American dream of having a place of their own; mobile homes certainly do hold that promise for many people, and the DHHS supports that. MS. JONES noted, as Mr. Marsh did, that there aren't new mobile home parks being developed, and that she has been made aware of another mobile home park - Lahonda Trailer Court - in the Anchorage area "that will be going away." however, that in addition to the lack of suitable new locations, even if there were to be a relocation fund, many mobile homes are in such bad condition and so old that they could not be moved regardless of how much money is spent to move them; they would just fall apart. She suggested that a human impact statement could assist the municipality in determining the overall effects that some of these redevelopments have on the community. MS. JONES indicated a preference for the language in Version W that allows but does not mandate municipalities to establish local relocation funds, although she is not sure yet where "all of those dollars" would come from. She noted that the local municipality, the DHHS, and the planning department have been working with - and will continue to work with - some of the smaller mobile home parks should they become candidates for redevelopment. Number 2302 SENATOR ELLIS said that he appreciates all the work that Ms. Jones has done on this issue. After noting that Mr. Marsh has indicated a preference for the 180-day-notice requirement, and that Ms. Liston prefers the 270-day requirement, Senator Ellis asked Ms. Jones what her "take on that" is, in terms of how much time lower-income folks need to plan and save up money for a relocation. MS. JONES said that the DHHS has not given a lot of thought to that issue, but she personally thinks that the longer period of time would be the most helpful, particularly for low-income people. Because the average cost of moving a mobile home ranges between $5,000 and $8,000, and even if money is available from a relocation fund, tenants must still raise quite a bit of money, which takes time; therefore, 270 days is a reasonable amount of time, she opined. MR. MARSH added that 270 days is much better than the 365 days that was proposed in an earlier version of SB seemed to be okay with 365 days since it takes awhile to arrange for financing and contractors; therefore, 270 days is doable and is a compromise compared to 365 days. CHAIR ROKEBERG said that from a commercial real estate standpoint, he disagrees with Representative Meyer on the issue of how long it might take to mobilize a project. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER offered that since no developers have come forth to testify, they must not be in opposition to the 270-day- notice requirement. CHAIR ROKEBERG surmised that the bigger developers that did testify during previous hearings of 6 Number 1914 REPRESENTATIVE JAMES indicated agreement with Chair Rokeberg, and remarked that with the shrinking of the economy, the number of investors has also decreased. She suggested that it wouldn't be the big developers that will be taking on future redevelopment projects; it will be the smaller developers. She said that she did not think that 270 days, by itself, is too long a period of time, but when coupled with the wintertime restriction, it can become an extensive period of time. She opined that aside from going to a 365-day provision, which wouldn't be encumbered by a seasonal restriction, 180 days is the maximum that would be needed when coupled with the wintertime restriction. She said that her inclination is to go to the shorter period of time - 180 days. CHAIR ROKEBERG said that it is conceivable that there could be a notice period of [over] 15 months. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER said that according to his experience, developers "pretty much have this figured out, so that the 270 days would be the maximum; they would give notice so that it is the 270 days and it includes the winter months." REPRESENTATIVE JAMES reiterated that she thinks 180 days is better so as not to discourage development. SENATOR ELLIS pointed out that the current statutory timeframe of 180 days has not proved adequate in the situations considered by the task force. The genesis for SB municipality in that discussion," so if the municipality decides that the time frame is not long enough, it can be extended. Number 1666 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, after noting that he has been involved in commercial real estate transactions and is interested in the economic development of Alaska, offered that fundamentally, is about protecting people who live in mobile home parks, and that the discussion heard thus far - that 180 days is adequate - seems to focus on the developers' side of the equation. He continued: One of our responsibilities [is] to bring a little balance to this debate, and the balance side of what the developers require is what the mobile home residents require. Representative Coghill spoke of his own example, and Representative Coghill, just by dint of being here, has demonstrated that he has some wherewithal, and I don't think that everybody who's in a mobile home park, at least not in my experience, has the ability to get up and move easily: people on fixed income, people ... with pets who might have a difficult time. We ought to be mindful of the fact that these are tough economic times out there for a good number of our constituents, and we ought to be careful that we don't put them in a position where they don't have a place to go. So I would suggest that while you're factoring in whether 180 days or 270 days is appropriate, you think about what serves the people - the common people. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES opined that what Representative Berkowitz said "is very real and is our concern." Nonetheless, she added, Alaska is a big state; as long as municipalities have the ability to alter the time period, as is proposed in Version W, that issue should be decided at the local level. SENATOR ELLIS asked Chair Rokeberg to hold SB 6 in conflict with existing state law, it could create problems. CHAIR ROKEBERG acknowledged that that [provision] is ambiguous. He noted that Representative Coghill's motion to adopt Amendment 1 is still before the committee. Number 1450 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ made a motion to lay on the table the motion to adopt Amendment 1. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ withdrew the motion to lay on the table the motion to adopt Amendment 1. Number 1436 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL withdrew the motion to adopt Amendment 1. CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that HB Number 1396 CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the last order of business would be HOUSE BILL NO. 381, "An Act relating to the crime of failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer; and providing for an effective date." Number 1364 HEATHER M. NOBREGA, Staff to Representative Norman Rokeberg, House Judiciary Standing Committee, Alaska State Legislature, presented HB HB 381 first-degree failure to stop at the direction of a police officer. She noted that currently, there are two degrees of this offense. Second-degree failure to stop occurs when the driver doesn't realize that there is police officer behind him/her and so fails to stop right away but then ultimately does stop. [First]-degree failure to stop occurs when the driver fails to stop and violates a traffic law - as defined in AS MS. NOBREGA said that the change proposed by Section 1. 28.35.182 (a) is amended to read: (a) A person commits the offense of failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer in the first degree if the person violates (b) of this section, and, during the commission of that offense (1) the person violates AS 28.15.261]; (2) the person is subject to an arrest warrant issued by a federal, state, or local court; (3) as a result of the person's driving (A) an accident occurs; (B) any person suffers serious physical injury; or (C) any person, including a pedestrian or bicyclist, must take evasive action to prevent an accident or injury; (4) the person is committing vehicle theft; (5) the person is in possession of an unlawful controlled substance; or (6) the person is on probation or parole supervision for a felony offense. Number 0711 ANNE CARPENETI, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law (DOL), noted that she, too, was present during discussions of the legislation that became the current statute, adding that at the time, she thought that that legislation was too broad. She opined that it is a good idea to limit its application. She noted, however, that she is concerned that limiting it to reckless driving is going a little bit too far in the opposite direction, which is why the DOL is suggesting the aforementioned amendment that would include, in addition to reckless driving, other [circumstances] that often result in dangerous driving or bringing harm to people and property. MS. CARPENETI pointed out that in order for a person to commit first-degree eluding, he/she must first commit second-degree eluding, which is "knowingly" failing to stop rather than just not stopping. She mentioned that there have been occasions when she has driven for some time without noticing that a police officer has been signaling for her to stop. Those were not instances of eluding because "you have to know that somebody is trying to pull you over, and you have to ignore them and go on," she added. MS. CARPENETI explained that first-degree eluding, as proposed by the suggested amendment, involves knowing that a police officer is trying to pull "you" over, and, after ignoring the police officer, going on to commit the crime of reckless driving or doing several other things that the DOL thinks would give rise to dangerous conditions - for example, if a person ignores a police officer because he/she has an "arrest warrant out"; causes somebody to suffer serious physical injury as a result of the driving; is in the process of committing vehicle theft; is in possession of an unlawful controlled substance; or is on probation or parole supervision for a felony offense. She remarked that the DOL thinks the suggested amendment is a good compromise: it is somewhere in the middle between a moving violation and driving recklessly after ignoring a police officer. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, referring to [paragraph] (2) of the suggested amendment, said that this language presumes that the person is aware that he/she is subject to an arrest warrant. He added that it seems to him that if the person is aware of the warrant, he/she would be subject to the terms of AS - which involves creating a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person and which, he opined, is underutilized. MS. CARPENETI acknowledged that that is an interesting argument because [reckless endangerment] requires the culpable mental state of reckless, whereas the concept of [paragraph (3)(C)] embodies negligent behavior. She added that in AS 11, risk", knowing that something is a substantial risk, and then disregarding that risk, as opposed to negligent, which involves not understanding the risk. Number 0197 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, referring to [paragraphs (4) and (5)], said that in a way, those items seem redundant and would merely provide "a way of bootstrapping" the crime of eluding into a felony. MS. CARPENETI noted that a person who has drugs in his/her vehicle is more apt to elude and cause harm to other people CHAIR ROKEBERG asked how the police officer, merely by following someone, would know that he/she was in possession of drugs. MR. SMITH surmised that first the person would have to be arrested for misdemeanor eluding, then, if drugs were found during the arrest, he/she would be charged with felony eluding. CHAIR ROKEBERG noted, however, that the person could be charged with other crimes and, thus, wouldn't need to be charged with felony eluding. MR. SMITH pointed out that the intention is to cut down on the number of people who decide that they need to try to get away, so that there are not people careening through the streets. I want them to pull over and say, "Fine, I've already got a warrant," or "I've got drugs in I just go with that misdemeanor possession of marijuana as opposed to creating a felony here". Now that presumes, of course, that they pay attention to what the legislature has done in the way of passing laws, and [that] they know the law. TAPE 02-18, SIDE A Number 0001 MR. SMITH continued: "I guess I'm looking for ways that would persuade people that it's better to stop, take your medicine, and not create a problem." MS. CARPENETI indicated that in creating the suggested amendment, the DOL was trying to envision circumstances where people would behave in a dangerous way after they notice that they're being pulled over, and having drugs in the car or being subject to an arrest warrant are things that would probably cause people to go ahead and drive in a way that could be harmful to other people. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ mentioned that this is presuming a rational response in the criminal mind. CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that the suggested amendment is basically a laundry list, and if "the committee agrees with the concept of reckless as the base standard," then, if the committee wants to, it could add other items. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES opined that most of the people who are out there doing these dumb things don't have a clue what the penalties are; those people are merely being reactive. She suggested that the more "we try to tighten this down," the more it might create other problems. She indicated that she has an aversion to turning young people into felons early in their lives, that she did not want to entrap anybody, and that she wants to be cautious when going in "that direction." CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that he is comfortable with the reckless standard. He mentioned, however, that although he is not entirely opposed to the additional items proposed by the suggested amendment, he does have concerns about some of them, such as [paragraph (2)], which pertains to having an arrest warrant. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ posited that [providing for] officer safety and public safety are always at the forefront of what the legislature is trying to do. He added, however, that one of his concerns is that when [crimes] are escalated to felonies, it might, in a perverse way, encourage more flight, which creates more risk. He said: I would feel better able to help craft a bill if I understood what the dimensions of the problem were a little bit more. What kind of behavior, exactly, are we trying to stop that we're [currently] unable to stop, and what's going on out there that requires us to make these folks felons? Number 0310 MR. SMITH provided an example: Recently, the Alaska State Troopers received a report of a potential stolen vehicle located at the Palmer Correctional Center. When the trooper arrived, the vehicle was there and, ultimately, an 18-year-old woman who was from Anchorage jumped in the stolen vehicle and took off. When the troopers finally got her stopped after a 90-mile-an- hour chase toward Palmer, they discovered that she was subject to an arrest warrant, she was driving a stolen vehicle, she didn't have a driver's license, and she was driving recklessly. He added that many times when a person is finally pulled over after eluding, the police officer discovers that there is a warrant out on that person, or that it is a stolen vehicle, or that the person is in possession of a controlled substance. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked how would turning the crime of eluding into a felony have helped in the prosecution of that case. MR. SMITH acknowledged that that defendant is subject to felony charges anyway under the current law. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ pointed out that that woman is subject to "felony joy riding", a handful of misdemeanors, and the second felony for eluding, which means that if she ever does anything bad in the future, she is "presumptive third." CHAIR ROKEBERG asked if that example qualified as "three strikes." MR. SMITH said he did not think so in her case because she was only 18. MS. CARPENETI clarified that none of "these crimes" is one that would be considered under "three strikes and your out," which is only considered for what is defined as most serious felonies. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ mentioned that he would be comfortable prosecuting a reckless driving case as an assault when the defendant is truly driving recklessly. He added that if the community condemnation is out there, a prosecutor could get 12 people on a jury to agree with that charge. MS. CARPENETI noted that in terms of presumptive sentencing, these felonies would certainly count, but not for "three strikes and your out." Number 0516 MR. SMITH opined that it is no less a danger to be hurtling through city streets in a 4,000-pound vehicle than it is for a person to step outside of his/her downtown house and start shooting a rifle. Both behaviors endanger other people. He added that the original intention of the current statute was to keep people from eluding to begin with; however, that's not quite worked out as planned. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked why people who are wildly driving around aren't charged with a felony assault, as would be that case for someone who is wildly shooting a rifle in a downtown area. He said that it seems to him that the nub of the problem centers on a policy decision within the DOL as to how it is charging and prosecuting certain types of conduct. "The tools are in the tool box to go after people, and that's one of the reasons why we have broadly written laws, is so we can take it to a jury and see if the community agrees with that assessment," he opined. And, although there are clearly some changes that should be made to the current law, rather than giving up on the existing code and seeking an answer with some ephemeral statute, "it would be better to just use what we've got and start hammering people with it," he concluded. MR. SMITH opined that the DOL has exercised the right kind of discretion at the screening level; unfortunately, he added, people are being arrested as felons before the DOL can intervene. He added that a solution might be to forgo elevating a charge of misdemeanor eluding to a felony until after a decision is made by the district attorney at the screening level. He noted, however, that it might not be possible to place such a policy in statute, so there is the potential that it wouldn't be applied consistently. CHAIR ROKEBERG remarked that he is satisfied with ADJOURNMENT Number 0801 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ made a motion to adjourn. There being no objection, the House Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 3:00 p.m.

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