Legislature(1999 - 2000)
04/29/1999 03:10 PM House JUD
| Audio | Topic |
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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
April 29, 1999
3:10 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Pete Kott, Chairman
Representative Joe Green
Representative Norman Rokeberg
Representative Jeannette James
Representative Lisa Murkowski
Representative Eric Croft
Representative Beth Kerttula
MEMBERS ABSENT
All members present
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
* HOUSE BILL NO. 214
"An Act relating to litigation involving correctional facilities;
and amending Rules 59(f), 60(b), 62, and 65, Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure."
- HEARD AND HELD
HOUSE BILL NO. 135
"An Act relating to use of eavesdropping and recording devices by
peace officers."
- MOVED CSHB 135(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 6
Proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
relating to state aid for education.
- MOVED HJR 6 OUT OF COMMITTEE
(* First public hearing)
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: HB 214
SHORT TITLE: PRISON LITIGATION
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) MULDER
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
4/27/99 1027 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
4/27/99 1027 (H) JUD
4/29/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 135
SHORT TITLE: POLICE USE OF EAVESDROPPING DEVICES
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) KOTT
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
3/12/99 438 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
3/12/99 438 (H) JUDICIARY
4/09/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
4/09/99 (H) SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
4/21/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
4/21/99 (H) HEARD AND HELD
4/21/99 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
4/29/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HJR 6
SHORT TITLE: CONST. AM: EDUCATION FUNDING
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) KOHRING, Coghill
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
1/19/99 17 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 1/15/99
1/19/99 17 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
1/19/99 17 (H) HES, JUDICIARY, FINANCE
2/05/99 146 (H) COSPONSOR(S): COGHILL
3/16/99 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
3/16/99 (H) SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
3/23/99 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
3/23/99 (H) HEARD AND HELD
3/23/99 (H) MINUTE(HES)
4/01/99 (H) HES AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 106
4/01/99 (H) MEETING CANCELED
4/10/99 (H) HES AT 10:00 AM CAPITOL 106
4/10/99 (H) MOVED OUT OF COMMITTEE
4/10/99 (H) MINUTE(HES)
4/12/99 724 (H) HES RPT 1DP 4NR
4/12/99 724 (H) DP: COGHILL; NR: GREEN, MORGAN,
DYSON,
4/12/99 724 (H) WHITAKER
4/12/99 724 (H) FISCAL NOTE (GOV)
4/26/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
4/26/99 (H) HEARD AND HELD
4/29/99 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
REPRESENTATIVE ELDON MULDER
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 507
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-2647
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified as sponsor of HB 214.
DEAN GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section-Juneau
Criminal Division
Department of Law
P.O. Box 110300
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300
Telephone: (907) 465-3428
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on HB 214 and explained proposed
amendments.
GERALD LUCKHAUPT, Attorney
Legislative Legal and Research Services
Legislative Affairs Agency
130 Seward Street, Suite 409
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-2450
POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions on HB 214.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 99-45, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIRMAN PETE KOTT called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting to order at 3:10 p.m. Members present at the call to order
were Representatives Kott, Rokeberg, Croft and Kerttula.
Representatives Murkowski, Green and James arrived at 3:12 p.m.,
4:35 p.m. and 4:44 p.m., respectively.
HB 214 - PRISON LITIGATION
CHAIRMAN KOTT announced that the first item of business would be
House Bill No. 214, "An Act relating to litigation involving
correctional facilities; and amending Rules 59(f), 60(b), 62, and
65, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure."
Number 0067
REPRESENTATIVE ELDON MULDER, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor,
explained that HB 214 is largely modeled after a federal statute
that sought to accomplish the same end. It provides that court
decisions affecting Alaska's prison system be as direct and
unobtrusive as possible to the overall operations of the prison
system. Currently, as seen with the Cleary case, judicial
judgments are allowed to make broad, sweeping requirements of the
entire system in order to solve specifically identified,
nonsystemic problems within the Department of Corrections (DOC).
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER noted that HB 214 requires that any court
orders or consent decrees be limited in scope, to include only the
specific problems or issues contained in the original complaint.
It also requires the court to consider the overall effect of its
decisions on the management of, and fiscal impact upon, the
department. Alaska's constitution clearly states that the
legislature has the exclusive right to appropriation, he said.
Recent court orders and consent decrees that require certain levels
of funding and services, however, are in direct conflict with the
legislature's exclusive appropriation powers. Representative
Mulder commented, "And I'm sure we all remember the ... ongoing
battle that we've had with the court in relation to noncompliance,
and being fined, and paying the fines back to ourselves."
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER told members that the far-reaching effects of
court orders and consent decrees have also conflicted with the
administrative branch's requirement to manage state facilities and
to carry out several constitutional goals of prison administration.
While the legislature recognizes the judiciary's ability to ensure
the constitutional rights of Alaska's prison population, it also
recognizes that a constitutional separation of powers and duties
allows the state to effectively carry out its function.
Representative Mulder said that HB 214 will hopefully accomplish
that goal.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER stated his belief that the DOC doesn't really
run its own institutions, which instead are run by a
court-appointed monitor who determines what the right conditions
are, including appropriate population levels within each
institution, whether meals should be hot, and a myriad of other
considerations, to determine whether the state is in compliance.
This has set up a fundamental problem in trying to administer the
DOC. Representative Mulder expressed the belief that HB 214 will
go a long way towards restoring control to the commissioner.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER pointed out that Alaska's prison system is
successful and progressive, not antiquated, and he isn't seeking,
to return the state to the Dark Ages. Rather, he is trying to
retain a balance within this prison system and its funding,
recognizing that every dollar the state must spend for prisoners,
beyond what it would normally spend, otherwise could go for roads,
education, universities or other essential services, especially
when there are huge budget deficits. He noted that Mr. Luckhaupt,
drafting attorney, had done a lot of research over the years
regarding the national model of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), and was available for questions.
Number 0389
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked, "What do you mean we pay fines to
ourselves? How does the Cleary fine work?"
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER replied, "It was a matter where the court
ordered us to pay fines for overcrowding at a certain preset
amount, over millions of dollars each year. And we'd end up
appropriating the money -- well, the House would take the action,
where we'd actually appropriate it and ... appropriate it back to
ourselves, because ... there was no entity to receive it. And the
Senate just flat refused to make the appropriation at all. ... She
[Judge Hunt] was fining us with no definite end recipient, other
than the general fund."
Number 0444
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked if, in the House version of that, the
legislature would write a check to the court system for the fine
and then appropriate the money back from the court system to
wherever they want.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER clarified that it would be to the general
fund.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked whether that is much of a deterrent.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER replied, "Not really, and I think Judge Hunt
recognized that."
Number 0470
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked why the monitor remained in place
even after the finance committees and the subcommittee on
corrections made an agreement the previous year regarding sending
prisoners to Florence, Arizona, to get relief from Cleary.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER responded with his interpretation that they
had reached a critical point with the court-appointed monitor and
the court. The judge, increasingly impatient with the
noncompliance, was deliberating about either taking money from the
general fund, for some undetermined action or forcing the early
release of prisoners. Representative Mulder stated:
And when working with the department, and with the Governor's
office - he appealed directly to us, asking us to take the
leap of faith and try and ... come in full compliance with
capacity levels, which cost us somewhere between $8 and $10
million - it was with the hope or desire that ... the
court-appointed monitor would leave. And I believe that is
still going to be the action taken by the department, after we
leave this spring. But, heretofore, that has still not
happened.
And, as you've read the paper recently, the court-appointed
monitor is still finding problems, and will probably continue
to find problems with the prison system. ... We think ...
we've complied. They will continue to find little things that
they feel are not in compliance, in my estimation. And I have
great fear whether we would ever be able to petition the court
... to get ourselves out of Cleary.
Number 0644
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI asked whether the consent decree in HB 214
is open-ended in duration.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER affirmed that.
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI inquired whether anything in it would
allow that if situations changed, the consent decree would no
longer be in force.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER deferred to Mr. Guaneli and Mr. Luckhaupt.
Number 0689
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI asked if Representative Mulder's
understanding is that it could possibly continue in perpetuity.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER noted that the legislature had passed a
resolution several years ago, requesting the Department of Law to
go to court, in an appeal to have this removed; the department
hasn't taken that action yet. He pointed out that the Department
of Law would be testifying that day, largely in support of HB 214,
which they believe would enhance their position in court, he said,
were they to go forward and do that.
Number 0730
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked how much the legislature has
increased the DOC's budget, both by percentage and dollar amounts,
since the Cleary settlement.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER indicated he would provide those numbers,
which are substantial.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked if there has ever been a court
challenge regarding the court's ability to make appropriations,
which is what he believes has happened here, in effect, by
overstepping its powers to mandate appropriations.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER answered, "The only way to effectively do
that, I believe, Representative Rokeberg, is to get ourselves out
from underneath the consent decree, because the court would say by
joining into the consent decree we implicitly agreed to ... provide
these certain functions."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked whether the legislature had agreed to
that.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER said no, the Department of Law did. The
legislature has never agreed to a consent decree, and has
repeatedly tried to reflect that position to the courts and to the
Department of Law.
Number 0848
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG noted that the latest complaints by the
monitor were regarding the Arizona facility under contract. He
asked if it has been the policy, or is part of the settlement, that
any privately owned correctional facilities would not be under
Cleary.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER replied that although the DOC still maintains
that the outside facility doesn't fall under Cleary, the judge has
ruled otherwise, in the court monitor's favor.
Number 0915
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER advised members that the Department of Law
had requested amendments. He specified that he had no problems
with the first two, but would like some discussion on the third.
Number 0940
DEAN GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services
Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law, reminded
members that running a prison system is perhaps one of the most
difficult tasks of government. It is particularly difficult in
Alaska because the state not only does what most states do in
running a standard penitentiary system, but it also takes over
functions usually handled at the county level, which is running
jails. In many instances, jails are more difficult to run, because
of the hundreds or thousands of people in and out yearly.
Therefore, the state needs the utmost flexibility to run its prison
system.
MR. GUANELI emphasized the difficulty that the legislature has in
putting together a budget every year, particularly when revenues
are wildly cyclical. These two functions - the executive branch
actually running the prison and the legislative branch setting the
policies and fiscal constraints - set up a certain amount of
tension. In addition, the courts sometimes get involved in these
cases and must resolve certain legal issues that arise.
MR. GUANELI advised members that the Alaska Supreme Court has
recognized that the courts shouldn't be involved in the day-to-day
running of the prison, which is an executive branch function.
"That generally has not been our experience in the trial court, in
superior courts," he added. "Many people don't know it, but we
actually went to trial in the Cleary case in 1984. As a result of
that trial, the judge found that we had one of the safest, most
humane systems in the country, and it was not overcrowded at the
time. But, the judge said, '... Even though it is not
unconstitutionally overcrowded now, I think it is going to be in
the future, and, therefore, I am going to impose certain limits ...
on the population.'"
MR. GUANELI said as a result of that order and getting back into
negotiations with the plaintiffs, the state ultimately entered into
the Cleary consent decree, agreeing to certain population caps that
actually were higher than the caps that the judge was going to
impose. Therefore, the state got a better deal out of negotiation
than the judge was going to impose.
MR. GUANELI told members that legislation like HB 214 takes the
court out of that role. In the first instance, it requires that
the court find that some current unconstitutional condition that
justifies taking action. Even then, this legislation recognizes
that the landscape may change completely in a couple of years,
including changes in population, facilities, staffing or budgets.
All of those executive and legislative branch activities are really
beyond the court's control, and after a couple of years, the
court's decision may be out of date. Under HB 214, the state is
allowed back into court after two years, asking that a order be
terminated; if the plaintiffs can't show that conditions are still
unconstitutional, the court is obligated to terminate its order.
MR. GUANELI explained that all states have the same system of court
rules allowing that unusual, unexpected changed circumstances
justify some relief; it is only rarely that states can get out of
these court orders. Under Alaska law, it has to be an
extraordinary circumstance to allow getting out of an order, and it
must be proved that it would be unfair to make compliance with the
order continue. Furthermore, that is a discretionary decision by
the court, and those kinds of discretionary decisions are rarely
overruled. This kind of situation has been hampering state
correctional facilities and legislatures all over the country. It
led Congress to adopt this kind of legislation at the federal
level. Mr. Guaneli commended Representative Mulder for introducing
this needed legislation.
MR. GUANELI addressed how HB 214 would apply to consent decrees or
orders issued in the past. After a one-year period following the
effective date of this Act, the state could make a motion to
terminate any existing court decrees. Unless the plaintiffs could
prove that there are still unconstitutional conditions, the judge
would be obligated to terminate the order. That provides the
plaintiffs a year to gather evidence, Mr. Guaneli said, and it
recognizes that conditions change. He noted that the three
proposed amendments were in writing.
Number 1271
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked Mr. Guaneli to walk the committee through what
the court looked at to determine whether there would be future
overcrowded conditions. He asked if there is any correlation with
what has happened nationwide, particularly in the federal system,
and if Alaska's system is being overburdened.
Number 1305
MR. GUANELI restated that there had been a trial in this case;
after a six-week trial in 1984, the judge issued his decision in
1985 that there was anticipated overcrowding. The judge set
certain population limits, based on expert testimony from both
parties at the trial. Although there are general standards that
the experts ordinarily apply, it isn't an exact science. Square
footage standards aren't hard and fast, and also considered must be
the condition of the facilities, including plumbing, lighting and
ventilation, as well as the training level of the staff and the
other programs that are available for inmates. The decision is
highly subjective. In this case, after the judge considered those
factors and decided upon population levels, after a time the state
got back into negotiations with the plaintiffs, who actually agreed
to higher population limits than the judge had decided upon.
MR. GUANELI pointed out that it is often difficult to compare
conditions in Alaska with those in other states. Although many
states have received federal funding and built new prisons, many
others have had their prison systems challenged based upon their
antiquated, decrepit or dangerous facilities, or upon dangerous
levels of overcrowding and conditions far worse than Alaska's.
MR. GUANELI expressed belief that as the DOC gets more
sophisticated in classifying inmates - as far as who needs maximum
security and who needs minimum security, for example, and to
segregate certain inmates from others - the better they will be
able to control the populations and handle higher populations
levels in their facilities. That factor also changes over time, he
said, and the DOC has found an ability to handle a few more inmates
than they believed they could handle several years ago. Because it
is a moving target, the utmost flexibility is needed to run the
system, which legislation like HB 214 would provide.
Number 1476
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked if there was a nationwide movement at the time
of Cleary regarding challenges to prison systems.
MR. GUANELI replied that this has been going on for 25 years.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, prison systems, particularly in the
South and East, were hit with a large number of challenges. Even
now state systems, under the federal counterpart to this type of
legislation, are getting out of consent decrees. "But there are
other systems, Texas being one that is continually being hit with
more and more lawsuits because they continue to run their systems
in really deplorable ways," he told members. "I'm not saying all
of their facilities are, but certain of them are, and the judges
... keep hammering them. At least ... under the federal
legislation now, a judge hammers the state of Texas, ... they've
got two years to kind of get their act in shape, and then they can
get out of the judgment if things are okay after two years. At
least they aren't burdened with that kind of order in perpetuity,
which has been the case in the past."
Number 1541
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked what the consent decree on population
was, and whether Mr. Guaneli has a rough breakdown on that.
MR. GUANELI explained that it is set out in the Cleary judgment
itself, and there have been subsequent modifications. As
facilities change slightly, the population limits change. They
vary by facility, setting out both a maximum operating capacity and
an emergency capacity. The department is required to do certain
things when the population hits each of those levels; after a
certain level is hit, and after a certain number of facilities hit
that level, then the fines start to be imposed. Mr. Guaneli
pointed out that the fines are no longer being imposed, however,
because the legislature gave money to transport prisoners to
Arizona, which reduced the population in in-state facilities. But
it is conceivable that could happen again.
Number 1596
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA requested numbers or examples from the time
when the state was fined for overcrowding.
MR. GUANELI responded that although he couldn't provide that
immediately, he certainly could provide a large amount of data on
that, perhaps focusing on a specific facility. He noted that the
department had kept excellent records about how much, as a
percentage, they were over the capacities on a daily basis for the
several years; all that is available.
Number 1637
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to Representative Mulder's mention
of a resolution asking the Department of Law to bring an action on
this issue. He asked what the direction was, and whether they had
heard from the attorney general about that.
MR. GUANELI responded that a specific provision in the Cleary
agreement itself says that if conditions have significantly
changed, the state can go back and ask the court to modify the
judgment; it is the same as the provision under Rule 60 of the
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedures, which allows parties to go back
and ask courts to change their judgments. A body of case law has
arisen around that rule, giving judges direction as to how to
interpret and apply it, and in what circumstances. Mr. Guaneli
explained:
It was our judgment that we would not prevail if we brought
that action too prematurely. ... Once enough prisoners had
been sent to the Arizona, and the population level in the
state had been lowered, we were hoping to bring that kind of
action under the current court rules, and give the judge an
opportunity to modify the order.
Unfortunately, what has happened is the court and the court
monitor now believe that the Arizona facility falls under
Cleary, as well. They think that there are problems at that
facility. And so, again, we don't find ourselves in the kind
of good litigation posture to bring that kind of motion. ...
We just don't think we're going to win, and we don't think the
court is going to allow us to keep bringing that motion time
and time again. We want to put ourselves in the best position
to do that. ... We haven't had the situation where we think we
can win that, and ... we don't want to try unless we think we
can win.
MR. GUANELI said that kind of situation has faced a number of
states, which therefore are turning to this kind of legislation to
force the courts to look at whether there are current
unconstitutional conditions that justify continuing such an order.
Number 1758
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to his own conversation with the
warden at "CCA," in particular, saying one of the biggest concerns
was the requirement for certain specific due process steps before
punishing an offending prisoner. He asked Mr. Guaneli to explain
that issue and what the Cleary settlement required the people
on-site to do.
MR. GUANELI responded that in 1975, the Alaska Supreme Court issued
an opinion that established certain requirements for the DOC to go
through in order to discipline a prisoner. Those requirements
differ from those applied by courts in other states or the U.S.
Supreme Court. The DOC adjusted to that precedent and now, after
25 years, rather takes it in stride. However, it was new for the
private prison in Arizona, which hasn't similarly taken it in
stride. Mr. Guaneli believes that it is a source of tension. He
pointed out that it was not specifically in Cleary.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG suggested it is subsumed under it, though,
because it differs from what happens nationally. He asked Mr.
Guaneli to address the fact that Cleary wasn't assumed to be
enforced in private facilities, and to explain how the change came
about.
MR. GUANELI pointed out that the Cleary agreement itself, which is
1/2-inch thick, contains specific definitions of what facilities it
applies to. He stated:
We believe that the wording in those definitions was pretty
crystal-clear that it would not apply to a facility that's
operated by somebody else. It doesn't apply to halfway
houses, it doesn't apply to community jails not operated by
the Department of Corrections, and it wouldn't apply to a
private prison.
The judge, however, ruled - after the plaintiffs asked her to
rule this way - that, in essence, it was unfair to, quote,
deprive a prisoner of their rights under the Cleary settlement
by involuntarily transferring them to a prison outside the
state of Alaska, where Cleary might not apply. The judge
thought that that was unfair, thought that perhaps there was
some ambiguity in the definition, and therefore applied the
decision to ... the facility in Arizona. ...
It was not a result that we ever anticipated. We always
thought that if it was another facility, operated by someone
else, that the Cleary settlement would not apply. ... But, in
fact, it does at the present time.
Number 1921
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked whether that is just for those who were
involuntarily transferred.
MR. GUANELI said he believes the voluntariness was one factor that
the judge looked at in determining that Cleary applies. However,
it applies to any Alaska prisoner in the entire facility, whether
or not an individual volunteered to go. At the time of transfer,
most of the inmates didn't want to go, Mr. Guaneli pointed out,
although he believes that many of them have found that it isn't
bad.
Number 1948
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER asked Mr. Guaneli what he estimates it costs
the Department of Law to try to determine compliance with Cleary.
MR. GUANELI replied that since the time of trial, about 12 years,
the department has probably had the equivalent of one full-time
attorney working on nothing but Cleary, costing several hundred
thousand dollars in state salaries. For the trial itself, the DOC
hired outside counsel from San Francisco to work with the
Department of Law, costing another few hundred thousand dollars.
He emphasized the further costs to the DOC, which has people at
every facility who are specifically designated to determine whether
there is compliance with the agreement, and who collect and submit
records, an enormous undertaking.
Number 2007
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA referred to page 3, lines 8 through 10,
which read: "Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically
expire 90 days after the entry of the order unless the court orders
final relief in the civil action before the expiration of the
90-day period." She asked if Mr. Guaneli could provide any other
examples where preliminary injunctions work that way, noting that
she herself is more used to natural resource cases, in which an
injunction stays in effect throughout the case unless the parties
come back in or something has changed.
MR. GUANELI replied that he doesn't know that there is another
example under state law, although there is certainly a provision
under the federal PLRA. He said it goes back to the underlying
theory of the bill that courts shouldn't enter orders against state
prison systems unless there are unconstitutional conditions. He
pointed out that the standards for getting a preliminary injunction
or a temporary restraining order, in contrast, don't require proof
of an unconstitutional condition, just that there are serious and
substantial questions. He suggested that in this type of case, as
long as the case wasn't frivolous, there would likely be some kind
of injunction, which ought to be temporary, not lasting more than
90 days unless it can be proved that there is something
unconstitutional, in which case the judge ought to rule.
Number 2080
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked what happens with the prospective
relief section, which is right under that in the bill. She asked
whether it is correct that prospective relief has to be only for
a current violation.
MR. GUANELI affirmed that the legislation would require the judge
to find some current violation of a state or federal right. He
clarified that when he says "unconstitutional conditions," the
standard in here is a state or federal right, which includes a
violation of state law. Therefore, violation of a statute would
also justify relief. The bill prevents the type of situation that
occurred in 1985, when the judge said Alaska had one of the safest,
most humane systems in the country but nonetheless entered an order
based on what he believed was going to happen.
Number 2121
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA asked what happens if it is known that a
situation will occur one week hence. She then suggested that
perhaps the section about a consent order or private settlement
agreement overcomes that.
MR. GUANELI agreed that there is a provision for a private
settlement, where the parties get together and themselves agree,
although it is not enforceable in court. He explained that the
third amendment proposed by the department, with which the sponsor
had not expressed agreement, would allow the state to continue to
enter into consent decrees even with no finding of an
unconstitutional condition. This is simply a matter of litigation
tactics, he said. The federal PLRA doesn't allow consent decrees,
as it doesn't allow the parties to get together and have the judge
order something, unless the judge makes an absolute finding of an
unconstitutional condition. The federal PLRA was strongly
supported by states nationwide, except for Texas, where they said,
"You're tying our hands. We want to be able to go in there and
negotiate, because we think we can get a better deal from the
plaintiffs' attorneys than from the judge."
MR. GUANELI said that has really come back to haunt the state of
Texas, where they are constantly in court because these issues
can't be settled out of court through a consent decree. The one
advantage with HB 214 that after two years the consent decree can
be terminated, he pointed out, if the state goes in and if no
unconstitutional conditions can be proved. It is, therefore, a
two-year consent decree rather than a 12-year consent decree, as
Cleary has been. That is Amendment 3, he concluded, which is just
a matter of litigation tactics.
Number 2255
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 1, which
reads as follows:
1. Page 3, lines 20-22: Replace the sentence beginning
with "prospective relief ..." with the following:
"Prospective relief must be modified upon the motion of a
party whenever, and to the extent, the findings required by
this section no longer apply to one or more provisions of the
prospective relief then in effect."
2. Page 3, line 26: Insert the words "modify or"
between "to" and "terminate."
CHAIRMAN KOTT objected for discussion purposes.
Number 2262
MR. GUANELI explained that Amendment 1 would set a more certain
standard for courts to apply when the state is moving for partial
termination or modification of a consent decree, rather than
termination of the entire decree. The standard on page 3, lines
20-22, can be tightened up a little, and that is what the amendment
does. He noted that the Cleary settlement is a hundred pages long,
and the state believes itself to be in compliance with all but the
population caps. If HB 214 had been in effect two years ago, he
added, the state could have gone in and had all of the Cleary
settlement - perhaps except for the population caps - set aside.
Number 2310
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked about the legal distinction between the
original wording and the newly proposed language.
MR. GUANELI explained that the department felt that the wording "no
longer justify the imposition" perhaps could be interpreted to
allow an exercise of more judicial discretion than is justified.
He said he believes that the entire subsection requires a judge to
find certain definite things and then allows the judge to ask
whether those justify the imposition or not. The question is: Do
the findings apply to these provisions, or don't they? If they do
apply, then the order can stay in effect. If they don't apply,
however, then that part of the order must go.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT expressed his understanding that those are the
four conditions in subsection (a).
MR. GUANELI affirmed that. He suggested it is a fairly minor
point.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT reviewed those four conditions, then said he
still has a hard time understanding the distinction.
Number 2397
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA commented that she was having the same
trouble, although she thinks an argument could be made either way
as to whether "apply" or "justify" is broader.
Number 2409
CHAIRMAN KOTT withdrew his objection and asked if there was any
further objection. There being none, Amendment 1 was adopted.
Number 2416
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 2, which
reads as follows:
Page 4, line 18: replace the word "prison" with "correctional
facilities"
CHAIRMAN KOTT objected for discussion purposes.
MR. GUANELI told members it was felt that this legislation should
apply broadly to all correctional facilities. Whereas the term
"prison" tends to be interpreted as a larger facility holding
longer-term prisoners, broadening it to "correctional facilities"
would allow it to apply to community jails, for example, providing
the benefit of this legislation to all facilities.
Number 2450
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked whether the word "prison" is used
elsewhere in the bill.
TAPE 99-45, SIDE B
Number 0001
MR. GUANELI noted that the phrase "civil action with respect to
prison conditions" probably rolls off the tongue easier than does
"civil action with respect to conditions in correctional
facilities," which is why he believes it was used there. However,
when they actually go in and define it, the broader term
"correctional facilities" is the appropriate language.
Number 0019
REPRESENTATIVE MURKOWSKI pointed out that whereas the title says
"litigation involving correctional facilities," AS 09.19.200 on
page 2 is titled "Prison litigation."
MR. GUANELI responded that the titles of legislation have no
substantive impact. He indicated there was probably a feeling that
a more commonly used term is better for titles, whereas in
substantive definitions the more specific would be preferable.
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked if Mr. Guaneli was satisfied with the term
"prison litigation" used in AS 09.19.200.
MR. GUANELI affirmed that, indicating the department is also
satisfied with the other references.
Number 0065
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG recounted that in five years on the budget
subcommittee, he doesn't recall ever talking about "prisons." He
said the term of art in the state seems to be "correctional
facilities," and he wonders if there is a statutory distinction
between the two.
MR. GUANELI responded that he believes "correctional facilities" is
the broadest term in the statutes, particularly in Title 33,
relating to the DOC. He clarified that he isn't suggesting that
this will apply to halfway houses that are run by private
individuals; for those, their contracts with the state will largely
determine how they are handled.
Number 0112
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked whether "prison" is defined under
statute.
CHAIRMAN KOTT suggested that Mr. Luckhaupt could help with that.
He said he had the same question, noting that the McGinnis case
talks about the administration of the "state prison system." He
asked if that is the correct term of art in discussing jails.
Number 0132
MR. GUANELI pointed out that "prison" in other states usually
applies to the penitentiaries, whereas the jail system is separate.
"Correctional facilities" applies to a broader range. He asked for
confirmation by Mr. Luckhaupt.
Number 0143
GERALD LUCKHAUPT, Attorney, Legislative Legal and Research
Services, Legislative Affairs Agency, clarified that Alaska has no
definition of "prison" in statutes. "Correctional facilities" is
used in Title 33 in reference to Alaska's correctional facilities.
"Correctional facility" means any place where the commissioner
decides to put anybody, he said, and "state correctional facility"
means any correctional facility run by the state. He told members
his own choice of words regarding prison litigation was modeled
basically after the federal Act, which talks about prison
litigation; that applies both to places normally thought of as
prisons, where people are serving sentences, and to jails. No
distinction is made in the federal Act between a prison and a jail.
He added, "In Alaska, we don't make any distinction, but prison
just seems to sound a little better to the public."
MR. LUCKHAUPT pointed out that the title or short title of any
section isn't law, by statute. Only the language of each section
of statute itself is law. Although the titles can be changed at
any time, the Revisor of Statutes has the ultimate authority, under
the statutes, to make that choice.
Number 0228
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked if the use of "state prison system" in the bill
correlates to the decision in McGinnis v. Stevens.
MR. LUCKHAUPT noted that in the 1960s and 1970s, there were
"prisons" in Alaska. "We then entered the enlightened era of
deciding we didn't have prisons anymore, but we had correctional
facilities," he noted. Mr. Luckhaupt pointed out that many states
now use the term "correctional facilities" rather than "prisons,"
and "wardens" have become "superintendents."
CHAIRMAN KOTT asked if there is a distinction between "prison
conditions" and "jail conditions."
MR. LUCKHAUPT said he doesn't believe the prisoners think there is
a difference. [There was laughter.]
Number 0290
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said the definition under AS 33.30.901 of
a correctional facility says a prison, jail, camp, farm, halfway
house, group home or other placement designated by the commissioner
for custody, care or discipline of prisoners. He expressed concern
that by leaving "prison" in there, a distinction will be assumed
regarding the applicability of the new statute.
MR. GUANELI said that was the specific reason for Amendment 2. "We
think that making that change in the definition, only, ... so that
the phrase, 'civil action with respect to prison conditions,'
applies broadly to all correctional facilities, ... that that's the
appropriate place to make that change," he stated. "And it's not
necessary to make it throughout the rest of the bill. We certainly
could, though."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG proposed defining "prison" for the purpose
of this section.
Number 0336
MR. LUCKHAUPT suggested just changing it in the other two places,
then, and doing a definition in the committee substitute. He
restated that it makes no substantive difference.
Number 0405
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said she sees somewhat the same issue with
the definition of "prisoner" in Title 33, which also leaves out
"correctional facility" and just includes "official detention."
She said she doesn't know if there is a need to keep the two
parallel, but she believes they should look at it and be certain.
Number 0421
MR. LUCKHAUPT explained that the definition of "prisoner" in AS
33.30 had been expanded for this, as a result of discussions
between himself and Michael Stark of the Department of Law, to
ensure that also covered under this Act are prisoners being held
for federal or other jurisdictions. They had decided to add in
anyone who is confined in a correctional facility. Also in the
definition of AS 33.30, not included are prisoners held under the
authority of municipal law. Mr. Luckhaupt stated, "We added that
in here to make sure that those people are covered by this Act, and
any lawsuits they bring - and potential consent decrees that result
therefrom - would be covered by this Act."
MR. GUANELI agreed that the intent, which he believes is being
accomplished, is to expand both of those definitions, so that it
covers as many facilities and prisoners in those facilities as
possible. He acknowledged that it gets a bit complicated, though.
Number 0513
CHAIRMAN KOTT said he understands and appreciates the intent, but
he isn't as confident that the intent has been accomplished. He
asked whether Representative Rokeberg was satisfied with the
explanation.
Number 0524
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG restated that the term "correctional
facility" is used as a broad-brush term around the corrections
subcommittee. He expressed the desire to not cause confusion but
said he would rely on Mr. Luckhaupt's judgment.
Number 0557
MR. LUCKHAUPT suggested that the committee just tell him to replace
"prison" in the two places it appears with "correctional facility."
As Mr. Guaneli had said, it would also be changing the term being
defined to read, "litigation involving conditions in correctional
facilities," for example. He said now that he thinks about it,
that sounds better.
CHAIRMAN KOTT said he was convinced, agreeing that it probably
clears up ambiguity.
Number 0594
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt a conceptual
amendment "to accede to the definition suggestions of legislative
counsel."
CHAIRMAN KOTT noted that they were changing "prisons" to
"correctional facilities" and doing the corresponding change
regarding conditions. He withdrew his objection to Amendment 2,
then specified that the conceptual amendment is inclusive of
Amendment 2, broadening it to clarify that nobody is slipping by.
There being no objection, Chairman Kott announced that [Conceptual]
Amendment 2 was adopted.
Number 0633
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 3, which
reads as follows:
1. Page 2, line 15: Insert "and (e)" after "(b)"
2. Page 4, line 3: Insert the following at the
beginning of this subsection: "Notwithstanding (a) of this
section, in a civil action with respect to prison conditions,
a court may order prospective relief as provided in a consent
decree without complying with (a) of this section. In
addition,"
3. Page 4, line 3: change the P in "Parties" to a lower
case p.
CHAIRMAN KOTT objected for discussion purposes.
MR. GUANELI referred to his earlier testimony and said the intent
is to allow the state to enter into consent decrees when it can
predict that it would lose in court, to avoid being in the position
of the state of Texas, where they are forced to go in and lose
these cases in court.
Number 0666
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER asked Mr. Guaneli if the national model
includes this language.
MR. GUANELI said no, which is why he had explained that the
representatives from the Texas corrections department had objected
to that at the federal level. He added, "It got enacted anyway,
without this provision, and I think they're regretting that part of
it, at least."
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER explained that he is reluctant to adopt it
without additional sideboards. He expressed concern about getting
into the same situation as under Cleary. The Department of Law
could agree to a consent decree, for example, and there would be
the two-year time frame, without legislative authority or approval.
The legislature could want to get out of it, but the department
could disagree. With absolute time frames, it is a little more
clear and direct, he said, adding that he is trying to think of a
middle ground.
Number 0745
MR. GUANELI said he understands the concern and hopes his
explanation would make the sponsor feel better. He then explained
that HB 214 is structured so that any court order entered is
subject to the two-year limitation, after which the state can move
to terminate the order; that is regardless of whether the order
follows a trial in a contested case, or, if Amendment 3 is adopted,
results from a consent decree. If there really were such a
disagreement between the legislative and executive branches over
moving to amend, nothing in HB 214, without the amendment, would
force the state to move to terminate the court order.
MR. GUANELI said he thinks the difference, however, is that here
there is a mechanism to go in and, with some degree of certainty,
get the court order terminated. Under current law, that isn't the
case, which is why the state has not proceeded in spite of the
legislature's request to do so. He emphasized that the landscape
changes significantly under this bill. If the legislature passed
a resolution asking the attorney general to move to terminate, for
example, but the attorney general did not without good grounds, Mr.
Guaneli said it seems that would present the legislature with an
opportunity to adjust its funding decisions in light of that. He
believes that would be acting in good faith, just as the
legislature has acted in good faith in responding to the Cleary
order, coming up with the money to send prisoners to Arizona to
lower the in-state population. This completely changes the ground
rules for this type of litigation, which is something the House
Finance Standing Committee would have to take into account, he
added.
Number 0874
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT indicated that although a consent decree would
still be subject to the same restrictions, this essentially allows
one to try to get a better deal without going to court.
MR. GUANELI affirmed that.
Number 0895
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA suggested it would also solve the problem
where there is no current violation, but it is known that in two
days, there will be a violation. She added, "And right now, under
the statute, as it would be rewritten, the judge couldn't make the
order. But the parties could say, 'We're not going to waste the
time, and energy and money to come back to court.'" She asked
whether that is correct, then added, "So, you really could end up
having to do the whole thing all over again, for no good reason."
MR. LUCKHAUPT said that has been one dispute between the
legislature and the executive branch about Cleary over the years,
that the executive branch saw they were getting a little better
deal, but the legislature, the first few years, didn't care because
there was ample money. In the last nine years he has been in this
job, there has been a constant dispute about how the executive
branch entered into an agreement without legislative involvement,
but the legislature is then expected to fund everything in that
agreement, even though some items aren't of a constitutional
dimension. That is something which parties might agree to give up
in a settlement or in a consent decree, he noted.
MR. LUCKHAUPT pointed out that while the court system cannot
require the legislature to appropriate those funds, the courts
could fine the legislature or executive branch for not providing
that level of services. For a number of years, the legislature
chose not to pay those fines, claiming the right to appropriate.
Therefore, there is constant friction caused by consent decrees.
MR. LUCKHAUPT informed members that in the past, he had
participated in consent decrees in another state. He said he can
understand the concerns of Mr. Guaneli and the department that
there are cases where litigation choices are made, deciding it may
be cheaper in the long run to make an agreement or settle a case.
The way the amendment is written now, it is open-ended. Although
a motion could be filed to terminate an order two years after
entering into a consent decree, the parties could choose not to,
either, and the legislature would still be bound the same way.
MR. LUCKHAUPT noted that the federal litigation doesn't include
this. The state of Texas, to his understanding, had objected to
some portions, and other states didn't want any consent decree
language in there or to allow any consent decrees that did not meet
this requirement. That was because federal courts, in some cases,
were seemingly pressuring state attorneys into entering into
certain settlements, Mr. Luckhaupt told members, when it didn't
appear to the states that there was a present constitutional
violation; that was one of the issues the state appealed on in the
original Cleary case.
MR. LUCKHAUPT suggested that the state was able to obtain a better
deal in that case because the judge's decision to impose injunctive
relief was potentially going to be overturned by the supreme court.
He further suggested that a remedy would be having the ability to
enter into consent decrees but being bound by a time limit, so they
don't go on forever without the legislature's involvement. He
noted that Mr. Guaneli had suggested that the legislature's remedy
would be to basically gut the funding for the Department of Law or
the Department of Corrections. "And those things usually don't get
anybody anywhere, on either side," he added.
Number 1203
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER responded that Mr. Luckhaupt had expressed
his own concern. He stated that the purpose of this legislation
was to try to limit, in time and scope, consent decrees and court
orders. "And I was just concerned about putting us back into that
same position again," he stated.
Number 1292
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated his understanding that a consent
decree would have to have the agreement of both the plaintiff and
the administration, in this case. He asked whether there is any
way to inject the legislature here without it becoming a massive
burden of decision making.
Number 1329
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER surmised that the separation of powers would
prohibit that from being entered into. "This is one of those
'Really, trust me' issues," he added.
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA noted that it would be, "Trust me for two
years."
Number 1344
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked how this would keep going. He asked if
there would be separate consent decrees, noting that it says it
"shall be terminated upon the motion of the defendant unless the
court finds that there exists". He stated, "You can put the same
language into this section (e), that is, any consent decree expires
after two years, unless the court finds that there continue to
exist violations of law. They could sunset, in effect, unless the
court stepped in and said ... there are existing violations."
Number 1378
MR. GUANELI asked whether Representative Croft's idea is that it
would automatically terminate after two years, even if the state
didn't affirmatively move for it, unless the plaintiffs could come
in and show the unconstitutional violations. He said he sort of
likes that idea.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER responded that he likes it, too. He
indicated it provides the sideboards he was looking for.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT affirmed that it was the idea, although he
expressed ambiguity about it.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER said that there has to be some trigger
mechanism. He agreed with Representative Croft's interjection that
the court review it again.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT agreed to work on that.
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated that he did not believe that would be a
substantial amendment to get to that end. He noted that HB 214 has
another committee of referral. He inquired as to the wishes of the
committee.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT expressed his discomfort in sending a
judiciary issue to the capable House Finance Standing Committee.
CHAIRMAN KOTT commented that the committee could address this
tomorrow.
REPRESENTATIVE MULDER pointed out that the only outstanding issue
is the fiscal note, which is currently indeterminate. He indicated
that money could actually be saved with this.
CHAIRMAN KOTT agreed. Chairman Kott withdrew his objection to
Amendment 3 and requested that Amendment 3 be withdrawn.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG withdrew the motion to adopt Amendment 3.
CHAIRMAN KOTT announced that HB 214 as amended would be held to
tomorrow, April 30, 1999, in order for the sponsor and the
committee to work on this legislation. He requested that Mr.
Luckhaupt incorporate the language into a clean committee
substitute with the other two noted amendments. [HB 214 was held
over.]
CHAIRMAN KOTT called for a brief at-ease at 4:34 p.m. and called
the meeting back to order at 4:40 p.m.
HB 135 - POLICE USE OF EAVESDROPPING DEVICES
CHAIRMAN KOTT announced that the next order of business would be
House Bill 135, "An Act relating to use of eavesdropping and
recording devices by peace officers."
Number 1679
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt the proposed
committee substitute for HB 135, version 1-LS0427\H, Luckhaupt,
4/28/99, as a work draft. There being no objection, it was so
adopted.
CHAIRMAN KOTT explained that two changes were made to Version H.
The first change is the removal of a subsection that dealt with the
making of an audio recording in conjunction with a video recording
of a traffic or other law enforcement control, at the request of
Representative Kerttula. The second change is the addition of a
"FINDINGS AND INTENT" section, at the request of Anne D. Carpeneti
from the Department of Law.
Number 1750
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to move the proposed
committee substitute for HB 135, version 1-LS0427\H, Luckhaupt,
4/28/99, from the committee with individual recommendations and the
attached fiscal note(s). There being no objection, CSHB 135(JUD)
was so moved from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
HJR 6 - CONST. AM: EDUCATION FUNDING
CHAIRMAN KOTT announced the next order of business is House Joint
Resolution 6, Proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State
of Alaska relating to state aid for education.
Number 1926
CHAIRMAN KOTT noted that he has provided a copy of the comments
from the law firm Josephson and Associates regarding the
constitutionality of the proposed constitutional amendment. He
found the comments somewhat interesting, but he doesn't believe
that if this amendment was adopted it would not be a violation of
church and state separation provisions since similar vouchers have
been incorporated at the municipal level around the country.
Number 1980
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to move HJR 6 from the
committee with individual recommendations and the attached fiscal
note(s).
CHAIRMAN KOTT noted that there is a $1,500 fiscal note.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT objected. The $1,500 fiscal note does not
come close to reflecting the cost of such a program to the school
systems.
Number 2060
CHAIRMAN KOTT echoed the concern of Representative Croft. However,
from a legal standpoint he doesn't find anything ... From a public
policy standpoint he has problems with it, but it clearly meets the
intent of the constitution. It would require a lot of convincing,
however, before he would vote for it on the House floor.
Number 2099
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated that he is in favor of the concept,
but how it is accomplished and carried out is a huge issue.
Nevertheless, the House Judiciary Standing Committee has done its
job and has met its responsibilities.
Number 2133
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated there was a lot of discussion in regards to
the funding, the provisions of any subsequent legislation, and the
parameters placed on private institutions.
Number 2164
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated that it would be relatively
impossible for the electorate to consider the amendment without
seeing an outline or design of the statutory backup in order to see
the ramifications.
Number 2206
CHAIRMAN KOTT noted it would be a massive change to the state
education system. Really, the jury is still out on those
communities who have tried a voucher system; he is not convinced,
therefore, it would work at this point. Until he is convinced
otherwise, he would not be supporting a voucher system.
Number 2246
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES stated she's not convinced that the language
in the proposed constitutional amendment is what she would like.
She doesn't have a problem with a prohibition on direct funding to
a religious school, but she has a problem with a child not having
some money to go somewhere else to school. She disagrees with the
idea of having a statute outlined beforehand because one can't be
passed unless the constitutional amendment has passed.
Furthermore, the funding of education should consider every
schoolage child in a district. How the money is spent is the next
issue. She said, "I don't think that the whole amount of money
divided by the kids would go with the kid, but I think a certain
portion of it would. Maybe a thousand or fifteen hundred bucks or
something would do that. And, I wish that I had more confidence in
charter schools, but I think they're limited pretty much by the
statutes that we've provided. Charter schools might provide the
information that we need that would eliminate a lot of private
schools. But somehow or another I do not believe that the public
schools fully support all of the needs of all of the kids and they
need to have some options and we should be helping to give them
that option."
Number 2416
CHAIRMAN KOTT stated certainly there could have been legislation
crafted to accompany the resolution, which could have included an
effectuation depending on the passage of the resolution.
Nevertheless, the House Judiciary Standing Committee did its best
with the information available, and from a constitutional
standpoint...
TAPE 99-46, SIDE A
Number 0001
REPRESENTATIVE KERTTULA said, "...I mean we've had a lot of
hearings on other pieces of legislation that don't rise to this
level of concern, so I'm not comfortable that it does. I'd much
prefer to be able to flush that out, understand it better."
Fundamentally, she further stated there is enough money to fund
education, but the legislature is not doing it and this would not
help any.
Number 0049
REPRESENTATIVE GREEN stated he understands why a parent would want
to send his/her child to a different school. But he wouldn't want
to be charged anymore than what he is being charged now. "Whether
or not I select then to send my child to somewhere else I don't
know that it's necessarily the right thing to do to say instead of
funding there I want you to fund him at my choice. There I'm
having a real fundamental problem and so I will support moving it
from here because I agree with you [Chairman Kott] it does stand
the gaff of the legal portion. I have a lot of problems with it."
CHAIRMAN KOTT called for a roll call vote. Representatives Green,
Rokeberg, James and Kott voted in favor of the motion.
Representatives Croft and Kerttula voted against the motion. The
motion passed by a vote of 4-2. House Joint Resolution 6 was so
moved from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
ADJOURNMENT
CHAIRMAN KOTT adjourned the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting at 4:55 p.m.
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