02/27/1998 01:06 PM House JUD
| Audio | Topic |
|---|
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
February 27, 1998
1:06 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Joe Green, Chairman
Representative Con Bunde, Vice Chairman
Representative Norman Rokeberg
Representative Jeannette James
Representative Eric Croft
Representative Ethan Berkowitz
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Brian Porter
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 390
"An Act relating to marriage; and amending Rules 54 and 56, Alaska
Rules of Civil Procedure."
- MOVED CSHB 390(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 5
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
relating to freedom of conscience.
- FAILED TO MOVE HJR 5 OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 50
Proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
relating to a public corporation established to manage the
permanent fund.
- HEARD AND HELD
* HOUSE BILL NO. 430
"An Act relating to noneconomic damages resulting from an
automobile accident."
- HEARD AND HELD
HOUSE BILL NO. 406
"An Act relating to subsistence uses of fish and game."
- BILL HEARING CANCELLED
(* First public hearing)
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: HB 390
SHORT TITLE: CHARTER MARRIAGES
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) KELLY, Dyson, Therriault
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/11/98 2280 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
02/11/98 2280 (H) JUDICIARY, FINANCE
02/25/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/25/98 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
BILL: HJR 5
SHORT TITLE: CONST AM: FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) MARTIN
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
01/13/97 22 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 1/3/97
01/13/97 22 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
01/13/97 23 (H) STATE AFFAIRS, JUDICIARY, FINANCE
02/25/97 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
02/25/97 (H) MINUTE(STA)
02/27/97 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
02/27/97 (H) MINUTE(STA)
01/20/98 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
01/20/98 (H) MINUTE(STA)
01/27/98 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
01/27/98 (H) MINUTE(STA)
01/30/98 2176 (H) STA RPT 5DP 1DNP
01/30/98 2177 (H) DP: JAMES, IVAN, DYSON, VEZEY,
HODGINS
01/30/98 2177 (H) DNP: ELTON
01/30/98 2177 (H) FISCAL NOTE (GOV)
01/30/98 2177 (H) REFERRED TO JUDICIARY
02/11/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/11/98 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
02/27/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HJR 50
SHORT TITLE: PERMANENT FUND PUBLIC CORPORATION
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) JAMES, Vezey
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
01/21/98 2099 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
01/21/98 2099 (H) STA, JUDICIARY, FINANCE
01/29/98 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
01/29/98 (H) MINUTE(STA)
02/12/98 (H) STA AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 102
02/12/98 (H) MINUTE(STA)
02/12/98 2299 (H) STA RPT 1DP 3NR
02/12/98 2300 (H) DP: DYSON; NR: VEZEY, HODGINS, IVAN
02/12/98 2300 (H) FISCAL NOTE (GOV)
02/27/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 430
SHORT TITLE: AUTOMOBILE CIVIL LIABILITY
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVES(S) KOTT, Mulder
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/18/98 2353 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME - REFERRAL(S)
02/18/98 2353 (H) JUDICIARY, FINANCE
02/27/98 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
REPRESENTATIVE PETE KELLY
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 411
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-2327
POSITION STATEMENT: Sponsor of HB 390.
REPRESENTATIVE TERRY MARTIN
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 502
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-3783
POSITION STATEMENT: Sponsor of HJR 5.
SARAH FELIX, Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division (Juneau)
Department of Law
P.O. Box 110300
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300
Telephone: (907) 465-3600
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified that the department has serious
problems with HJR 5.
PATRICK LOUNSBURY, Legislative Secretary
to Representative Jeannette James
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 102
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-3743
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented HJR 50 on behalf of sponsor.
JAMES HORNADAY, Legislative Assistant
to Representative Pete Kott
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 204
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 465-6848
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented HB 430 on behalf of sponsor.
JOHN GEORGE
National Association of Independent Insurers
3328 Fritz Cove Road
Juneau, Alaska 99801
Telephone: (907) 789-0172
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified in support of HB 430.
JUANITA HENSLEY, Chief
Driver Services
Division of Motor Vehicles
Department of Administration
P.O. Box 20020
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0020
Telephone: (907) 465-4361
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on HB 430,; also testified on
HB 95 in relationship to HB 430.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 98-26, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIRMAN JOE GREEN called the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting to order at 1:06 p.m. Members present at the call to order
were Representatives Green, Bunde, James and Croft.
Representatives Berkowitz and Rokeberg arrived at 1:07 p.m. and
1:15 p.m., respectively. Representative Porter was excused.
HB 390 - CHARTER MARRIAGES
Number 0039
CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the first item of business would be a
revisit of HB 390, "An Act relating to marriage; and amending Rules
54 and 56, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure." Before the committee,
but not yet formally adopted, was Version Q (0-LS1062\Q,
Lauterbach, 2/26/98).
REPRESENTATIVE PETE KELLY, sponsor, referred members to the fourth
paragraph of a letter dated February 27, 1998, from Terri
Lauterbach, legislative counsel. He indicated at the previous
hearing Mr. Zangri of Vital Statistics had requested a change so
that anybody who currently had a marriage license in Alaska could
come to them and opt for a new license. Representative Kelly
stated, "If you'll look in that bottom paragraph, they point out
some real difficulties in that, as far as equal protection
problems, because we need to recognize marriages from other states.
And there's really no way that they can. And the alternative,
which is to say we'll only recognize Alaskan marriages, we'd
probably end up having to defend that in court."
Number 0138
REPRESENTATIVE KELLY told members that although he thought the
provision was a good idea, he could certainly live without it. He
suggested a conceptual amendment on page 2, line 1.
CHAIRMAN GREEN noted that there was a written amendment to cover
that, which specified the amendment was to Version Q and which
read:
Page 2, Lines 1-15,
Delete all material and all additional references
REPRESENTATIVE KELLY affirmed that was the right one.
Number 0186
REPRESENTATIVE JEANNETTE JAMES offered that as Amendment 1.
REPRESENTATIVE ETHAN BERKOWITZ objected, saying it was for equal
protection purposes.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said that is why they are taking it out.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ disagreed, saying it leaves him in a spot
that the other members aren't in. He explained, "As the only
single person here, speaking on behalf of all single Alaskans, I'd
just like to say it's not really fair that we have to make this
difficult choice about testamentary or charter marriage. And those
of you who have already entered into that holy state of matrimony
don't have to make that choice."
Number 0304
REPRESENTATIVE KELLY asked whether they need to make references to
any possible collateral amendments that would go along with that.
He said he wasn't 100 percent sure there wouldn't be any.
REPRESENTATIVE ERIC CROFT noted the technical matter of deleting
"(a)". He asked whether the effect of the bill would be that a
couple could enter into a new charter marriage but could not go
from a testamentary marriage into a charter marriage.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLY said yes.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked, "So you could get a divorce and
then come back and get it straightened out the second time?"
REPRESENTATIVE KELLY said that is correct.
CHAIRMAN GREEN added, "Any marriage subsequent to the passage of
the bill."
Number 0353
REPRESENTATIVE KELLY said that was actually recommended, but he had
thought it was a little overly complicated.
CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested that is the effect. He asked whether the
objection was maintained.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said yes.
Number 0416
CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting for adoption of
Amendment 1 were Representatives James, Bunde and Green. Voting
against it were Representatives Berkowitz and Croft.
Representatives Porter and Rokeberg were absent. Therefore,
Amendment 1 was adopted by a vote of 3-2.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLY advised members he had no objection to the
next amendment, relating to licensed clinical social workers.
Number 0442
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES offered Amendment 2, her own amendment, which
read:
Page 3, line 13:
After associate insert:
"licensed clinical social worker"
CHAIRMAN GREEN pointed out that it adds licensed clinical social
workers to the people qualified to do the counseling. He asked
whether there was any objection. There being none, Amendment 2 was
adopted.
Number 0522
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether there were questions or further
discussion, then indicated HB 390 would be held until later in the
meeting.
HJR 5 - CONST AM: FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
CHAIRMAN GREEN brought before the committee HJR 5, proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska relating to
freedom of conscience. The resolution had been heard previously.
Number 0568
REPRESENTATIVE TERRY MARTIN, sponsor, indicated he agreed with the
proposed committee substitute [not yet adopted]. He suggested it
goes along with probably the most important recommendation of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice O'Connor, and it follows the law of
Washington State. He expressed hope that it would answer many
questions for those who thought the original version was too broad.
Number 0622
REPRESENTATIVE CON BUNDE made a motion to adopt Version E [0-
LS0199\E, Cook, 2/25/98] as a work draft.
REPRESENTATIVE ERIC CROFT objected in order to review it.
REPRESENTATIVE NORMAN ROKEBERG asked whether the language had been
provided by the sponsor or the committee.
CHAIRMAN GREEN said it is committee language, beginning with
"however" on line 8. [It read, "; however, the freedom of
conscience provided under this section does not excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the State."]
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked whether counsel had suggested
addition of the words, "does not excuse acts of licentiousness".
CHAIRMAN GREEN answered that this is wording used in several other
states to avoid problems that might be associated with people who
are hiding behind this, rather than exercising it because of a true
belief.
Number 0694
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG suggested it is the "other states"
argument, but it also clarifies for the public, because this is a
constitutional amendment, that these particular acts will not be
excused.
Number 0746
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said he was still concerned about the
distinction discussed at the previous hearing: Does this authorize
someone to violate a law if that person's conscience says to? Even
with the amendment, he wasn't sure how it would play out
practically or in statute. He asked the sponsor, "Does it allow
someone to object to a law and therefore refuse to comply with a
valid law? Or only in these areas?"
Number 0813
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether Representative Croft was referring to
the first part or to the amendment.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT suggested that if the first part allowed it,
that would show the need for the amendment. If not, he was unsure
of the purpose of the amendment.
CHAIRMAN GREEN said the purpose is to eliminate any confusion. He
explained, "You can't do it if it's inconsistent with laws or the
peace and safety of the state."
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT pointed out that it doesn't say "laws of
general application." It says "licentiousness or peace and
safety." He asked whether he could violate a law with impunity if
it was outside of the scope of this amendment.
Number 0854
CHAIRMAN GREEN said that is not the intent, and this language is
intended to prevent that. He suggested that if it would make it
more clear, they could put in, "inconsistent with existing laws or
the peace and safety of the state."
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE pointed out that if they want this to go
before the voters, it should be explicit. He stated a preference
for the language, "doesn't violate existing law," saying he could
imagine a huge court fight over what is inconsistent with peace and
safety.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT added, "Or what licentiousness means."
Number 0905
REPRESENTATIVE JEANNETTE JAMES commented that freedom of conscience
has been around for so long. People do violate the law based on
freedom of conscience and spend time in jail, even where there
exists freedom of conscience. One argument she has heard against
having this constitutional amendment is that we have it already;
she agrees but thinks this just makes it perfectly clear that we
do. However, historically, if people choose to disobey the law,
they pay whatever the price is.
CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested this doesn't change that.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES concurred.
Number 0978
CHAIRMAN GREEN responded, "Well, what I'm saying is that what this
says is that you are allowed a freedom of conscience. You can't do
it because you're going to break the law. You can't do it if it
interrupts the freedom and safety of the state. But under existing
law, as has been shown, you may be held accountable for lawfully
objecting."
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE noted that he'd heard on the radio that
morning that a 70-year-old nun in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is going
to jail for six months. She'd been warned at a protest a year ago,
relating to training of South American soldiers, not to do it
again. When she did it anyway, she was sentenced to jail.
Representative Bunde asked whether anything about this resolution
would change that.
CHAIRMAN GREEN answered, "Not if she broke the law."
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE said that is critical for his support. There
must be consequences for people's actions, even if they believe
they are doing it for a greater good.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said if it was the intention to add that
amendment, he was removing his objection to adoption of Version E.
Number 1099
CHAIRMAN GREEN noted that there being no further objection, Version
E was before the committee as a work draft.
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE specified that he had been speaking to the
proposed language to amend Version E, to say that it "does not
excuse acts that violate ...."
CHAIRMAN GREEN said, "... licentiousness, [comma] existing laws or
justify ...."
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE replied, "As long as 'existing law' is in
there, I guess we can leave the others in there."
Number 1131
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said Representative Bunde's example sounds
like apples and oranges. Demonstrating is entirely different from
not doing something that is against one's conscience.
CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested Representative Bunde wanted this in here
so that people couldn't break the law.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES agreed that they shouldn't excuse people from
breaking the law.
CHAIRMAN GREEN concurred.
Number 1186
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN told members this came from Washington State,
and "licentiousness" is a word James Madison had used. He agreed
that people have always tested the freedom of conscience, and he
cited examples relating to civil rights and the teaching of
evolution. He pointed out that it is how laws have been changed.
Number 1311
REPRESENTATIVE ETHAN BERKOWITZ said those examples are like
Representative Bunde's, where someone got into trouble for doing
something. They are sins of commission.
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN agreed.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested Representative James'
understanding is that the proposition solely covers sins of
omission, a big difference.
Number 1330
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN replied, "I didn't say that, omission or
commission. Both ways it works."
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked, "So, omission and commission?"
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN answered, "Sure. It's called freedom." He
reminded members that someone would pay the price for daring to
challenge authority, however.
Number 1344
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES referred to a memorandum from the sponsor,
dated February 11, 1998, that quoted from Oregon's Bill of Rights,
Article I, Section 3, as follows: "No law shall in any case
whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religious
opinions or interfere with the rights of conscience ..."
Representative James said that is the way she reads this whole
issue. Generally, one can refuse to do things that are against
one's conscience.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES cited the example of conscientious objectors
in the military, where generally people whose objection was to war
itself, or to killing, would be placed where they wouldn't be
exposed to that; there was an understanding that a right of
conscience is a basic right. Representative James said she didn't
know that there is a big problem in Oregon, with this in the
constitution. She concluded, "I think what it means to me is that
you shall not make a law that requires somebody to do something
against their conscience. That's what you shan't do."
Number 1571
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he'd looked over the list provided by
Representative Martin, and those propositions are so "well and
good" that they are already included in Alaska's constitution. He
read from Article I, Section 4, Freedom of Religion: "No law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof." He said that covers the concerns that were
raised.
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN disagreed.
CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested it almost does, saying it covers the right
of religion but not the freedom of conscience.
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN said that is exactly the point. In calling
around to hospitals, he'd found that Providence Hospital had
thought it was safe because it is a religious institution.
However, he had asked about the hospitals managed by Providence,
such as in Sitka and Seward. Now, Providence Hospital doesn't know
whether it is safe, because those were previously public
institutions.
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN asked why a person of religion should have
more freedoms than a person who is nonreligious but is a moral
individual. He asked if only by having a religious conviction are
we safe from what authorities tell us to do. He further asked if
a moral person with freedom of conscience, who does not have a
religious conviction, is a secondary citizen.
Number 1488
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE said he feels "licentiousness" is vague. He
made a motion to remove "of licentiousness" on line 9 and replace
it with, "contrary to existing law."
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected, saying he believes that is also
vague.
CHAIRMAN GREEN stated his belief that he already had an amendment
on the floor. He offered to withdraw it.
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE said he'd thought it was just discussion. He
withdrew his own motion.
Number 1564
CHAIRMAN GREEN said the motion that was made is that after the word
"licentiousness", they insert, "violate existing laws, [comma]",
which would be followed by "or justify practices ...."
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT pointed out it would have to say, "that
violate".
Number 1571
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said his objection has two parts. First,
they don't know what "existing law" means. Is it existing at the
time the constitutional amendment is enacted or at the time the
interpretation is made? Second, it seems they are subordinating a
constitutional provision to a statute, a strange anomaly. He
explained, "We're basically saying, 'This constitutional amendment
is all right except if there's a law.' In most cases, the
constitution trumps law."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES agreed.
CHAIRMAN GREEN responded that it doesn't say, "unless there's a
law," but just says one can exercise freedom of conscience that
does not violate a law, is not licentious, and so forth. He said
if "licentiousness" is a problem, that can be eliminated.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he was talking about the law part.
CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested they could fix it to include laws passed
in the future, by just saying "laws."
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ referred to use of the term "law" within
a constitutional amendment. He restated, "The normal progression
of events is that the constitution trumps statutes. And here, what
we're saying is if there's a statutory provision, it's going to
trump the constitution."
Number 1647
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE replied, "Existing law means, to me, law that
exists at the time that this freedom of conscience issue would come
before the courts. And while I understand 'rocks over scissors,'
... we have a constitutional amendment here that says existing law
still applies."
CHAIRMAN GREEN expressed willingness to drop "existing" from the
amendment, so that it covers future laws.
Number 1681
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said Representative Berkowitz is on point
here, and they haven't even talked about retroactivity. For
example, what would be the effect of an existing statute that may
be inconsistent with this? He suggested this fails by that
construct.
CHAIRMAN GREEN said he would agree on that issue; if existing law
would prevent this free exercise, this would prevail. He
acknowledged the question about a law that passes next year.
Number 1722
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES agreed with Representative Berkowitz that the
constitution is a higher power than the statutory law. She
suggested that by putting a basic right in our constitution for
freedom of conscience, the state cannot make any law that would
violate a person's freedom of conscience; that is the point.
Neither can they make a law that requires people to violate their
own religion, or the free exercise thereof, under a federal
constitutional amendment. Conscience is just as important to
people as their religion; it is the very inside of them.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES suggested this added language is to clarify
that taxes are not necessarily a violation of the conscience, for
example, but part of the peace and safety of the state. It sorts
through what one can and cannot do. However, putting "laws" in
there messes it up, because laws have to match the constitution,
not the other way around.
CHAIRMAN GREEN responded that the peace and safety of the state, in
large part, are made up of laws. He said, "And so, if we are going
to allow this regardless, or not allow any law to interfere with
the freedom of conscience, and that freedom of conscience is that
you join my religious organization that advocates something that's
illegal, then the constitution should not give you a privy to hide
behind that."
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN agreed.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said, "I don't think it does, sir."
CHAIRMAN GREEN replied, "It doesn't. And so, by putting in laws,
we make sure that no young lawyer or someone else is going to
misconstrue what we're really after here."
Number 1842
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES emphasized that with "laws" in there, it says
this constitutional amendment is subject to statutory law, which is
the wrong way to go. "The constitution is a guide," she said.
"You can't do any laws that violate the constitution."
CHAIRMAN GREEN replied, "Well, if you don't do that, then we can't
have this."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said that might be true.
CHAIRMAN GREEN disagreed with Representative James on that point.
Number 1868
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN first said he kind of agrees with
Representative Berkowitz. He noted earlier discussion about having
constitutional amendments that are general and broad, not tied up
with too many details, as done by the constitutional drafters from
the early days. He suggested the courts over the years have been
balanced in deciding when someone uses or misuses the so-called
freedom of conscience; they had been flexible regarding an
individual, as long as it doesn't impact someone else. He cited a
case where the person's religious beliefs would not allow him a
blood transfusion; the court had upheld that person right, and his
family's right, to not force him to have the transfusion. On the
other hand, when there was a law pertaining to children, the
government was allowed by the courts to overtake the protection of
a sick child against his parent's wishes, in order to save the
child's life.
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether that was because of some statute.
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN said yes, even though the objections were for
religious rights, such as not wanting a vaccination, they had ruled
in favor of the child, that "the government has the right to
protect the life of that child against their conscience." He said
it will always be give and take. Representative Martin then
stated, "But as Representative James said, if you've already put
the law in there, your conscience cannot be objected to the law.
That's the whole idea. That's why every time it comes to
(indisc.), whether it be in Athens, whether it be in Rome, whether
it be in Europe or even in America, these laws people objected to,
as a freer people. And our Founding Fathers made it very clear:
Freedom of conscience is extremely important."
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN asked that the committee not alter it much
more, because this wording has been tested in at least two states.
He said, "And if we put, say, 'as the law is,' then there's no
conscience, because anyone can make a law. Any judge can
interpret, as the supreme court here did - they interpreted a law
of right to privacy. It was a constitutional right ...."
Representative Martin recounted how a California pharmacist had
lost his license and was sued because he wouldn't dispense some
drugs meant to kill. He stated, "If a doctor believes in assisted
suicide, let him administrate the pill; don't send it to the
pharmacist to give these pills to someone he knows that it's going
to be their deaths. And so, they're up in arms because the
pharmacist feels just because he has a license it doesn't mean to
give pills to someone for death. And he upheld the Hippocratic
oath, 'I'm here to help people to live better. To help them, not
to terminate their life.' And so, that's his defense in the
California court."
Number 2013
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked: If they didn't have that, but just peace and
safety, would it be Representative Martin's opinion that these
other states have not had the problem raised by Representative
Croft?
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN said no, then cited Jamestown in 1620 and the
Mayflower Compact as having included freedom of conscience.
Number 2014
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE commented that those people weren't perfect,
mentioning the holding of slaves and the burning of people. He
agreed that peace and safety of the state relate to laws. From his
point of view, he said, existing law is already covered; if not, he
certainly can't support this. He noted that Representative James
had said that if this passes, they couldn't pass a law that would
impact somebody's freedom of conscience. Representative Bunde
suggested if that is the case, they couldn't pass another law. He
said he could search the state of Alaska and find someone, on
almost any law, who thinks it limits his or her rights too much.
CHAIRMAN GREEN agreed, saying the way it was before, with just
"peace and safety," that is how he interpreted it also, which would
be proactive into the future. Additional laws passed would still
fall under peace and safety of the state, to answer Representative
Rokeberg's question. Chairman Green said he had been trying to
ease a concern brought up by a member, but it seems to be stirring
up more problems than it is answering.
Number 2108
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated his belief that the problems are
inherent in HJR 5. He suggested they are putting a weight on
freedom of conscience that it can't hold. He referred to materials
provided by the sponsor quoting Sandra Day O'Connor and talking
about Rhode Island's charter of 1663. In discussing "liberty of
conscience," that document protected residents "from any ways being
molested, punished, disquieted or called into question for any
differences in opinion in matters of religion." Representative
Croft suggested that conscience was used nearly identically with
religion then.
CHAIRMAN GREEN said, "Nearly."
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT suggested they used it synonymously. He said
the reason that is appropriate and can work is that it is easy to
identify. He explained, "It said the state has no right to
interfere in your religious beliefs, and that's still true today.
It said when your beliefs turn into action - 'I must do anything,
I must drink Communion wine on Sunday and it's Prohibition, ... or
I cannot go to war' - that's where your religious beliefs turn into
actions."
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said that is where the court has had the most
trouble, in identifying real religions and not shams. He stated,
"There are the Holy Church of Not-Paying-Taxes right now, so that's
been tough, because who is the state to question what is a real
religion and not? The courts have been very sensitive about ...
getting them down to bona fide beliefs, and not saying, 'Has this
church existed for a hundred or a thousand years?' That's really
none of the state's business. 'Do we like the terms of its
religion?' None of our business. But just, 'Is it something that
you truly believe,' is finally what they settled on, which is
pretty close to the definition of 'conscience' that we have today."
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said when it comes to actions is where it has
been toughest. Until recently, there would be exceptions of a very
limited nature, the biggest being sacramental wine during
Prohibition; that was in statute, but a lot of people agree that if
it had not been, they would have created one, because it would have
been prohibiting the free exercise of the Catholic religion by this
general prohibition.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said the federal free exercise clause was
recently re-interpreted by Justice Scalia to stop that; they took
a church of Indians who used peyote for hundreds of years and said
they couldn't do that. A lot of people thought that was a poor
decision that hurt people's free exercise. Representative Croft
stated, "We have kept the very limited, 'You can have an exception
not immunizing yourself, not taking your kids to school.' So, we
have that protection." He said if we open it to "any belief gives
you this exception," he worries that goes too far. It has been
troublesome from the day it came before this committee. He
concluded, "What do we mean by it? If we open it up beyond
sincerely held beliefs about the universe and its Maker, if that's
what we mean by it, we have it. If we mean something else by it,
I don't know what we mean, and I'm very worried about it."
Number 2263
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN cited examples from committee packets,
including Pennsylvania's Article I, Section 3, as well as the dual
freedom of religion and conscience in Indiana. Other states have
split, and in some there are two different things. Representative
Martin said, "And so, in this case here, I'm saying that in this
state, are we going to say that only those people of religion have
the superiority of freedom when they feel that something is morally
wrong? And those that do not declare a religion, you cannot use
your conscience? That is what's made clear in the Valley Hospital
case, then they'd say the nurses and others cannot use freedom of
conscience. That's why the Providence Hospital at first thought
they were safe, because they're a religious hospital; now, they're
not so sure they're safe, because freedom of conscience needs to be
brought in. People need both of them." Representative Martin
indicated that 45 states make clear three important things:
freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, and free exercise
thereof.
Number 2321
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE indicated Representative Martin first wins him
over, but then the dialogue goes further. He requested help in
understanding the practical application of this, without any
amendment. He stated his understanding that abortion clinic
bombers would still be subject to law, although their conscience
tells them that they are saving more lives by killing people.
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN said that's why they have the public safety
clause.
Number 2360
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE referred to Valley Hospital. He suggested
part of the genesis of this was some people being told to either be
involved or get fired. He asked if those people would be allowed
to keep their jobs under freedom of conscience, or if they would
have to suffer the consequences of not complying with the directive
of whoever is in charge.
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN indicated Valley Hospital has been told,
because it is quasi-public, that it must provide abortion services.
He asked, "From that point on, who is to do it? The board of
directors that is elected by the citizens in that community chose,
after a number of elections, not to provide abortion services.
Sitka went through that, Kenai went through that - I don't know
what other hospitals, but I know those three did - where the people
who elected a board of directors in that community chose, and this
is one of the reasons why they chose it."
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN suggested the courts said a right to privacy
equals the right to abortion. He asked, "But do they have a right
to force someone else to perform that operation? No, not on their
freedom of conscience, I say, but under freedom of religion, they
say no. But we don't have a freedom of conscience right in this
state."
Number 2422
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE said he understands all that but is not
getting the answer to his question. As he understands it, the
courts have said that if a hospital takes federal money, it must
provide this service. The consequence for following their
conscience, then, is not to take federal money. He suggested the
hospital wouldn't do that, because they need the money. So,
someone is working at the hospital, and the hospital must perform
the abortion. If a person with a strongly held belief chooses not
to be involved in the procedure, does that person then suffer the
consequences of disobeying his or her superior and being subject to
dismissal? Or could such people say that the organization cannot
make them perform abortions or fire them if they choose not to?
[Representative Martin's reply was cut off by the tape change. Log
notes indicate he said the person would have the right to go to
court over it.]
TAPE 98-26, SIDE B
Number 0006
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ clarified that the Valley Hospital case
does not compel people to perform abortions. It quite clearly
states that people who have a conscientious objection to abortions
need have no role in the performance of those services.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES pointed that a hospital cannot have a
conscience. She then referred to the phrase, "does not excuse acts
of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the State." She suggested a vegetarian working at a
meat market could have to sell meat but wouldn't have to eat it;
otherwise, that person could find another job. She agreed that in
the Valley Hospital case, there was no demand that anybody violate
his or her conscience in performing those duties. She restated
that the hospital itself can't have a conscience.
Number 0080
CHAIRMAN GREEN said that is a point well-made.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said he had been going to make the same point
about the Valley Hospital case.
Number 0094
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said a person may not be compelled to do
something contrary to his or her conscience, but a hospital is a
certified state organization. If they are compelled by the court
to act, then what duties do they have under the rule?
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT replied that on that point, Representative
James had phrased it exactly right: A hospital can't have a
conscience. He mentioned the previous example of immunizing
children. Although some people don't believe they should for
religious reasons, a person can also make that decision for himself
or herself without having the government force it upon anyone,
although it may result in a quarantine, for example. If a group of
Christian Scientists took over a hospital board and said they
didn't want to provide immunizations anymore to a community,
however, they couldn't do that. No particular Christian Scientist
serving in that hospital has to give immunizations, but they can't
shut it down for the whole community.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated, "If we're trying to fix Valley
Hospital, I don't think that's appropriate; but if you want to do
it, let's do that, and we can fight about that, instead of
something that I think is going to open up a huge, uncontrollable,
really, can of worms."
Number 0159
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN responded, "My part in beginning this - and
this legislation's been around for at least ten years - was not the
Valley Hospital decision. It was the individual's rights of
freedom of conscience, that to me is far more -- and we keep up
bringing up religion. The Valley Hospital case made it very clear:
There is a different between ... freedom of religion and freedom of
conscience. In this state, the only way it's even suggested that
you have any freedom of conscience is in the right to privacy. But
it does not give a right -- pertaining to abortions, I should say.
No one, against their conscience, has to participate in abortions.
Well, now we're seeing that that may be not so, because the court
says that 'directly in abortions.' So, the doctor performs the
act, the nurse has to clean up, the janitor has to clean up and
everything else."
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN continued, "And we got gobs of letters from
the Valley Hospital people; you heard the testimony last week from
nurses who were forced into doing something that they ... felt
very, very strict about. That's where conscience come in. So, the
Valley Hospital kind of brought up the subject again, inflamed the
idea: Do we need to protect people - freedom of conscience? Yes,
because they said, very clear, there's a difference between
conscience and religion. And I believe in that, too."
Number 0215
CHAIRMAN GREEN noted that the states cited as examples by
Representative Martin don't have Valley Hospital as an issue.
Number 0222
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE said he keeps wrestling with this; he thinks
he has a grasp, but then more questions come up. He stated,
"Representative James said, if you don't want an abortion, don't
have one, that's freedom of conscience, but you can't prevent other
people. Now, Representative Martin says freedom of conscience says
... the janitor, who is only tertiarily involved, he has to mop up
the halls where abortion patients walk or he has to clean up the
operating room. He is not actively participating in providing the
abortion, but he's an employee of the hospital, and ... we can go
as far as want: the cook who makes the meal that the doctor eats
who provides the abortion. I still don't have an answer to my
question: ...If that janitor, or that cook, refuses to do their
assigned duties, are they subject to dismissal? Or can they say,
'My freedom of conscience does not allow me to clean that floor,
but I can clean this floor, or cook for this guy, but I can cook
for that guy'?"
REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN responded that throughout 300 years of
American history, that has been the challenge in state courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court. At least the people in most other states
have the guaranteed right in their constitutions; but in this
state, people don't have anything to hat their hats on.
Representative Martin proposed examples: "I'm not a religious
person, but I have my own morals, and therefore, I'm not going to
do what that doctor tells me to do; and then I get fired. And then
I can say, 'Hey, the state fired me, too, from my job. I did not
want to ... put someone to death, because I didn't believe in it;
that person does, let them do it. They insisted I give the lethal
injection. I didn't want to do that. So, you're fired."
CHAIRMAN GREEN announced that following the testimony of Sarah
Felix, there would be a wrap-up and vote.
Number 0315
SARAH FELIX, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division (Juneau),
Department of Law, informed members that her office had testified
on HJR 5 the previous year. She stated, "We believe that there are
serious problems with the joint resolution, such as the ones you
have articulated. We're not quite sure how it would be enforced.
We're not quite sure what we would do in the situation that
Representative Bunde has raised, where someone is going to raise
that ... in their wrongful employment termination lawsuit against
the state. We're not sure how this would work with people who are
morally opposed to paying child support. ... Alaska is a big state,
full of a lot of people with a lot of ... fervently held beliefs,
and we're not quite sure how this would work. And we're very
concerned that it wouldn't work."
Number 0376
CHAIRMAN GREEN noted that this is not addressing the Valley
Hospital case, but it is an example. Although one person making
beds might not adversely impact the operation, if the place is not
cleaned up, a janitor might adversely affect the operation. He
asked, "Would you see, from the AG's [attorney general's]
viewpoint, that peace and safety of the state not being held in
jeopardy because of your belief would protect and distinguish
between various occupations?"
MS. FELIX replied that they aren't sure what "the peace and safety
of the state" would mean, as it is a broad expression. She stated,
"I'm not certain that it would cover your example. I mean, I think
that person would have some 'wiggle room' to say that their action
is not inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state, so that
therefore their belief should be protected." She noted that the
Valley Hospital case specifically said that nothing in the
permanent injunction required anyone affiliated with the hospital,
to participate directly in the performance of any abortion
procedure, if that person, for reasons of conscience or belief,
objects to doing so.
CHAIRMAN GREEN said, "Directly." He mentioned the janitor.
MS. FELIX replied, "Indirectly. I know. ... I think that's open to
question, open to litigation, and one of the problems that we'd
have to address, were this to become law."
Number 0467
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES read from Oregon's Bill of Rights, as attached
to the sponsor's memorandum of February 11, 1998: "No law shall in
any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of
religeous (sic) opinions, or interfere with the rights of
conscience." She said she grew up in Oregon and had never known it
to be a problem. She asked whether Ms. Felix would see any problem
in that language.
MS. FELIX replied that she would see a lot of the same problems
that she sees in this language. "Oregon's lucky, I guess," she
said. "Maybe ... that hasn't been discovered as a possible defense
to prosecution for various offenses. I could see, in this state,
someone using this, HJR 5, as a defense to prosecution for not
paying child support, not paying taxes, any of those things. ... I
can't tell you why it hasn't happened in Oregon. I can only say
that our projection is that it would happen here."
Number 0536
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES suggested the reason for this struggle is that
Alaska didn't have this first, before all these examples where
people refuse to do things. However, she doesn't think it means
that, at all. The other reason for confusion is that when the
United States was first founded, it was based on Christianity,
although the country has come to understand that there are lots of
other religions, as well as people who are religious but not
attached to any particular religion. Representative James said
that religion means what a person believes; religion and conscience
are actually the same thing, but there is a misunderstanding tying
religion to churches. Representative James said she feels
comfortable putting conscience in with religion, because then it
includes people whether they are members of a regular church or
not. One can have a religion without any church affiliation, she
concluded.
Number 0594
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he thinks it is important to respect
the diversity of belief systems and ways of worshiping. A law like
this, on its face, seems to promote some kind of freedom. However,
it really leads to an anarchy that erodes everybody's freedom,
because one can take individual freedom of conscience in such a way
as to impinge upon the freedom of one's neighbor. "And that's the
root of my objection to this bill," he concluded.
CHAIRMAN GREEN said the amendment would preclude that. He
suggested that other states have articles far more permissive,
without anarchy or a plethora of lawsuits. He cited Arkansas and
Delaware as examples. He submitted that perhaps the legal minds
are seeing problems, which is what they should do, that may or may
not exist and that don't seem to exist in other states.
Number 0678
MS. FELIX said she not familiar with the materials provided to the
committee regarding other states. Perhaps the distinguishing
factor in HJR 5 is the language that says, "may not be compelled in
a manner that violates the individual's conscientious objections to
the act," which is more specific than broader language of other
states; that may be something that a litigant could latch onto and
use to advantage when the state tries to get that person to pay
taxes or child support, or to do whatever the state has enacted
laws about. "And then they would say they had a firmly held
conscientious objection to that act," she concluded.
Number 0740
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT pointed out that the provisions for the bills
of rights for Arkansas and Delaware are both titled, "Freedom of
Religion." Both start similarly, addressing the right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of one's own conscience. He
suggested that in using "conscience" in this way, it means an
aspect of freedom of religion. He offered Ms. Felix a copy of
those attachments to the sponsor's memorandum of February 11, 1998.
He asked if that is the way Ms. Felix would read those.
MS. FELIX said it does seem as if these clauses are more similar to
the clause Representative Berkowitz had read earlier from the
Alaska constitution on freedom of religion; perhaps that would be
the distinction. She explained that her office is not saying that
individuals don't have the right to exercise freedom of conscience.
People do it all the time in individual cases, in litigation on
individual acts. She suggested that right already exists, and
people can still exercise those rights.
Number 0809
CHAIRMAN GREEN withdrew his amendment.
Number 0824
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE made a motion that on line 9, they delete "of
licentiousness" and insert "contrary to existing law". He
requested Ms. Felix' input.
CHAIRMAN GREEN noted concerns about a law passed the next week, for
example.
MS. FELIX responded, "I think that that is a problem: What does
existing law mean? And I think that all the interpretations that
were mentioned are equally valid, and they could be upheld. I
think that the broader concern is the concern raised by
Representative James ... and Representative Berkowitz, in that if
we're going to put this 'existing law' language in a constitutional
amendment, we get even more confused because of the hierarchy of
the laws, and the constitution then being subordinate to other
laws. And then what does it mean?"
Number 0890
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE withdrew his amendment.
Number 0899
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether Ms. Felix sees something that could be
inserted there to circumvent the concern of not wanting people to
run amok.
MS. FELIX replied that she understands the concern, and the
department shares that concern. However, she cannot think of a way
to do this.
CHAIRMAN GREEN commented that maybe that's why the other states
don't have it in, either, and they seem to be all right. He asked
the wish of the committee.
Number 0929
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES made a motion to move HJR 5, Version E [0-
LS0199\E, Cook, 2/25/98], from committee with individual
recommendations and attached fiscal note(s).
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected and requested an at-ease.
CHAIRMAN GREEN called an at-ease at 2:15 p.m. He called the
meeting back to order at 2:16 p.m.
Number 0961
CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting to move the
resolution from committee were Representatives Rokeberg, James and
Green. Voting against it were Representatives Croft, Bunde and
Berkowitz. Representative Porter was excused. Therefore, HJR 5,
Version E, failed to move out of the House Judiciary Standing
Committee by a vote of 3-3.
HB 390 - CHARTER MARRIAGES
Number 1046
CHAIRMAN GREEN announced that for the second time that day, the
committee would take up HB 390, "An Act relating to marriage; and
amending Rules 54 and 56, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure." He
noted that they had not yet adopted the proposed committee
substitute.
Number 1046
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES made a motion to adopt Version Q [0-LS1062\Q,
Lauterbach, 2/26/98] as a work draft. There being no objection, it
was so ordered.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES made a motion to move HB 390, Version Q, as
amended, from the committee with individual recommendations and
attached fiscal note(s).
Number 1130
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected.
CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting to move the bill
from committee were Representatives Rokeberg, James, Bunde and
Green. Voting against it were Representatives Croft and Berkowitz.
Representative Porter was excused. Therefore, CSHB 390(JUD) moved
from the House Judiciary Standing Committee by a vote of 4-2.
HJR 50 - PERMANENT FUND PUBLIC CORPORATION
[Contains discussion of HB 81.]
CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the next item of business would be HJR 50,
proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
relating to a public corporation established to manage the
permanent fund.
Number 1135
PATRICK LOUNSBURY, Legislative Secretary to Representative
Jeannette James, Alaska State Legislature, presented HJR 50 on
behalf of the sponsor. He explained that it is an amendment that,
if passed, will go before the voters at the next election. It
essentially accomplishes two goals, one of which is to provide
continuity within the board of the permanent fund. Mr. Lounsbury
reminded members that former-Governor Hickel had come in and simply
wiped out the board; four years later, Governor Knowles did
essentially the same thing. With the Alaska Permanent Fund
Corporation being such an important corporation and having more
liquid wealth than any other asset in the state, continuity would
be a reasonable goal. Equally important, HJR 50 also provides
accountability by allowing board members to be confirmed by a joint
session of the legislature. This would give Alaskans a little more
access and improved scrutiny. Mr. Lounsbury described the
resolution as straightforward.
Number 1224
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE referred to the executive director of the
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation and asked how the directorship is
achieved.
MR. LOUNSBURY said HJR 50 would not affect that.
Number 1247
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE asked about the provision for removing board
members.
MR. LOUNSBURY explained that presently, board members may serve at
the pleasure of the governor, which is how entire boards have been
eliminated. This language would allow board members to be removed
as provided by law. There is enabling legislation, HB 81, now
before the House Finance Standing Committee.
Number 1293
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT referred to HB 81 and asked whether these are
two-year, staggered terms, with members appointed by the governor
but not confirmed by the legislature.
MR. LOUNSBURY said no, he believes those two-year, staggered terms
would have removal for cause.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked if they are confirmed by the
legislature.
MR. LOUNSBURY said yes.
Number 1348
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to an unsigned letter in the bill
packet dated January 6, 1995, from Governor Knowles to Mr. Carl F.
Brady, Jr., removing him from the Board of Trustees of the Alaska
Permanent Fund Corporations. He asked how this legislation
overcomes the right of the governor to appoint.
MR. LOUNSBURY explained that the letter is an example of how
arbitrarily some appointees can be removed. He added, "Don't get
me wrong. I believe in our constitution. I believe in a strong
constitution. I believe in a strong governorship. However, when
dealing with the permanent fund board, I think fiduciary
responsibility, and acting in the best interests of the fund for
the people of the state of Alaska, is more important than a
politician's philosophy of government."
Number 1438
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked whether HB 81, the enabling
legislation, provides for the removal of the head of the board.
MR. LOUNSBURY answered that it is the entire board.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked whether they could be removed for
cause.
MR. LOUNSBURY said they hadn't wanted to change the constitution.
They had tried to do it in statute, but were thwarted. Mr.
Lounsbury stated, "Article III, Section 26, of the constitution,
provides that you have to be the head of a principal department, a
regulatory agency or quasi-judicial, which clearly the permanent
fund does not lie under any of that jurisdiction. So, to deal with
the permanent fund corporation, it ... has to be in the
constitution. And that's why we chose this course."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked for clarification.
Number 1517
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES explained, "Basically, this was a bill that we
passed in 1996 and was vetoed by the Governor because of its
unconstitutionality. ... So, I put the bill back in again. We
tried to work around the constitutionality of it. The problem is
that we wanted to be sure that the permanent [fund] board could
only be removed for cause, because we wanted to maintain the
continuity on the board, as having such an important
responsibility. And it can't be, under the current constitution,
because what allows us to do that in the constitution doesn't
include the permanent fund board."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES further explained that they had to make the
permanent fund board subject to legislative confirmation in order
to make a law that says members only can be removed for cause.
Otherwise, members serve at the pleasure of the governor, and any
governor could come in, take the board completely apart and put
another one in. She concluded, "We have support from all of the
previous board members since the beginning of the permanent fund,
plus Oral Freeman, who is the father of the permanent fund, and the
current board members support this policy and this procedure. The
reason why we have the constitutional amendment is to be able to
pass HB 81."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG mentioned language referring to a member of
the board of the corporation who is not the head of a principal
department. He asked what the intention is, and whether they are
adding to the board.
Number 1638
MR. LOUNSBURY replied that they are trying to dovetail the Alaska
Permanent Fund Corporation into the constitution, so that the
legislature may insert the provision, "as provided by law," to get
to removal for cause.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG expressed his understanding that what Mr.
Lounsbury had stated earlier is already in the constitution. He
asked whether it is to make sure it is not contrary to another
portion.
MR. LOUNSBURY said yes.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG expressed understanding that the bill then
provides "for cause" authorization, as for the Alaska Public
Utilities Commission and the few quasi-judicial bodies in the state
that would have "for cause only."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said that is correct.
Number 1695
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested HB 81 should have been provided.
He then mentioned that the notion of cause exists in a universe
with the idea of expanding fiduciary duty. The question of what
the reasonably prudent investor would do is also evolving. It used
to be that the reasonably prudent investor was investing for the
highest rate of return. Now, however, there might be a more social
agenda, such as the question of whether to invest in tobacco stock.
Representative Berkowitz said, "And in my estimation, that kind of
philosophical difference to the notion of what constitutes a
reasonably prudent investor means there's a difference in the
expectation of what the fiduciary responsibility would be, and that
would amount to cause."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said that is arguable.
Number 1792
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked whether it is Article III, Sections 25
and 26, and particularly the latter, that limits them in this area.
MR. LOUNSBURY said yes.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said, "So, we're not allowed to establish that
any executive agency appointee serves for good cause, or any other
restriction, except if they fit under Section 26?"
MR. LOUNSBURY replied that if it is not in the constitution, they
can't do it like that. He cited the Alaska Railroad as an example.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT noted that the previous try had been vetoed by
the Governor. He asked whether there had been any other
determination, such as by the court, that it was unconstitutional.
MR. LOUNSBURY answered that Bradner v. Hammond had addressed that
specific issue.
Number 1869
CHAIRMAN GREEN agreed that the committee needs to see the companion
bill, HB 81. He announced they would hold over HJR 50.
HB 430 - AUTOMOBILE CIVIL LIABILITY
[Contains discussion of HB 95.]
CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the final item of business would be HB
430, "An Act relating to noneconomic damages resulting from an
automobile accident."
Number 1990
JAMES HORNADAY, Legislative Assistant to Representative Pete Kott,
Alaska State Legislature, presented HB 430 on behalf of the
sponsor. He first read from the sponsor statement:
"This bill denies recovery for noneconomic damages (such as pain
and suffering) to drunk drivers, if they are subsequently
convicted, and to uninsured motorists who were injured while
operating a vehicle. The bill provides one exception: when an
uninsured motorist is injured by a subsequently convicted drunk
driver. With this one exception, an insurer is not liable for
noneconomic damages.
"This bill would limit the liability of certain people to recover
losses suffered in accidents. It prohibits the recovery of
noneconomic losses in certain car accidents. Specifically, an
uninsured driver or a driver subsequently convicted of driving
while intoxicated at the time of an accident could not sue someone
at fault for the accident for noneconomic losses. These drivers
could still sue for economic losses. However, an uninsured
motorist injured by a drunk driver in an accident could still sue
to recover noneconomic losses from the drunk driver.
"... The legislation should reduce the number of lawsuits handled
by the courts, reducing court-related costs. The legislation
should also result in fewer lawsuits filed against state and local
governments, with savings as a result of avoiding these lawsuits.
... And it could result in a lower cost or premiums for auto
insurance."
MR. HORNADAY informed members that a sectional analysis had been
provided. The bill would become effective to a cause of action
occurring on or after the effective date of the Act. It is the
sponsor's intent to encourage people to become insured; to
discourage drunk drivers; to reduce costs and legal fees; to save
state and local governments, as well as businesses, money; and to
reduce premiums for auto insurance. He noted that Mr. George and
others were present to answer specific questions.
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether there were any questions for the
sponsor's representative. He then called upon John George.
Number 2193
JOHN GEORGE, National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII),
came forward in support of HB 430, specifying that the NAII is a
trade association of property casualty insurance companies that is
responsible for slightly less than half of the automobile insurance
written in Alaska. He and his clients support this legislation.
They believe it is a matter of fairness, and that people who obey
the law and buy the insurance will feel much better when this law
is passed. California did something similar by initiative; a year
following its passage, a survey found that almost 80 percent of the
people with insurance thought it was a great idea and working well.
In addition, almost the same percentage of uninsured drivers
thought it was fair and the right thing to do. "Very few issues
can you find where 80 percent of the people on both sides of the
issue think that it was the appropriate action to take," Mr. George
commented.
MR. GEORGE stated his belief that HB 430 will encourage motorists
to obtain the required mandatory automobile insurance, which the
legislature has previously determined to be a laudable goal. If
there are more insured drivers, by definition there will be fewer
uninsured drivers; therefore, premiums for uninsured motorist
insurance coverage should go down. In addition, there should be
less disputes with uninsured drivers "going after each other."
Number 2311
MR. GEORGE told members this is self-enforcing; it will not require
hiring more state troopers or judges. One either has insurance or
doesn't. If not, the adjuster for the insurance company on the
other side will determine that the person is not eligible for
those, and that portion of the claim will "go away." Although it
could go to court in case of a dispute, Mr. George believes such
cases would be easily resolved and there should be fewer of them.
MR. GEORGE said those who pay for insurance get more out of the
system than those who don't pay. However, this is not a cutting
off of people without insurance. It is relatively easy to
determine economic damages, such as for fixing a car or paying
medical bills or lost wages. What they are saying is that a person
cannot claim noneconomic damages such as for pain suffering,
disfigurement and the things that are generally argued over in
court.
Number 2432
MR. GEORGE informed members that HB 430 will not affect someone who
is not the owner or operator of the car. Passengers will have the
same rights as before, as will bicyclists and pedestrians. They
are only talking about the person required to have insurance. The
person at the steering wheel is required to drive cars that are
insured, by having his or her own insurance or by driving a car
that is insured. People that own the vehicles are also required to
have insurance.
TAPE 98-27, SIDE A
Number 0006
MR. GEORGE told members a co-owner of the vehicle who is a
passenger would still be responsible to have that vehicle insured;
in his opinion, that person would be excluded.
MR. GEORGE indicated Ms. Hensley had posed a question to him before
the hearing that day, which he would try to answer; he asked Ms.
Hensley to correct him if he misstated her concern. She had stated
what he believes is a legitimate concern. She has an obligation to
suspend someone's license if that person was at fault and had
failed to pay damages. If a person was allegedly drunk, stopped at
a stoplight, and someone plowed into the car and hurt him, the
police report would say this guy sitting at the light was drunk.
The police would issue a citation for drunk driving, file the
report, and then the insurance company would come along to settle
the case and say, "Well, we aren't paying your noneconomic damages
because you were drunk." However, he hasn't been convicted.
MR. GEORGE said the question is whether Ms. Hensley has to suspend
the license of the person that hit him, because his insurance
company had not paid the noneconomic damages, "and/or, if they
said, 'We're not going to pay anything until you give us a full
release,' and the guy says, 'I'm not going to give you a release
for my noneconomic damages, because I wasn't drunk, they haven't
proven I'm drunk.'" Mr. George asked how that works.
MR. GEORGE continued, "And if, indeed, she is required to suspend
the license, I think maybe that's the flaw in the law. In my
opinion, a person that buys insurance, whether their insurance
company ever pays or not, has met the requirements of mandatory
auto insurance, and that should meet the requirements of financial
responsibility. Now, if they've got a flaky insurance company that
didn't pay when they're required to pay, then I think the Division
of Insurance has an obligation to go and take some action, and they
can take severe action. But I'm not sure that it should be [the
Division of] Motor Vehicles' responsibility to suspend someone's
insurance if their insurance company fails to pay, when they bought
the insurance." Mr. George asked whether he had represented that
fairly; Ms. Hensley said she would talk about it later.
Number 0280
MR. GEORGE continued, "And certainly if ... it's not a disputed
amount, the guy says, 'Yeah, I was drunk, pay for my car, pay for
my medical bills,' then it's not a problem. It only becomes a
problem when he says, 'I will not sign a release for the physical
damage and my medical bills until you pay my noneconomic damages.'
And I think there are ways that that can be dealt with, the
insurance company making an offer. And it happens all the time now
where there's a disputed amount, where someone says, 'I think my
noneconomic damages are half a million,' and the insurance company
says, 'No, they're $2.98.' The way you resolve that is to file a
civil case."
Number 0335
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked how many cases in Alaska annually
would invoke this statute.
MR. GEORGE said he doesn't have statistics on that. According to
the Division of Motor Vehicles, in discussions out in the hall, 13
percent of the drivers in Alaska do not meet the financial
responsibility law. Of those, he believes 7 percent are failing to
buy insurance. Mr. George noted that there are small, rural
communities in this state without mandatory insurance requirements,
having to do with how many vehicles pass a certain point daily, for
example. He said he believes Ms. Hensley's statement was that 7
percent of those people who they recognize as really having to have
insurance do not. "How many of those are involved in these
accidents, I can't tell you," he added.
Number 0435
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked if they have any idea whether the
magnitude of cases per year is in the tens, hundreds or thousands.
MR. GEORGE replied that he didn't have a specific number, but any
case is too many because people are required to have mandatory
automobile insurance.
Number 0450
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked how many uninsured drivers got
insurance on account of this provision in California.
MR. GEORGE said he didn't have any statistics on that.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked how much the insurance rates in
California went down.
MR. GEORGE indicated the belief that statements he has seen from
the insurance commissioner in California said it was 5 percent. He
himself has clients who write in California as well as Alaska, and
who say they have seen a dramatic drop in uninsured motorist claims
being filed. Mr. George recalled hearing about something like a 20
percent reduction, which he thinks is a lot; he can't verify that.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he would appreciate seeing those
numbers.
MR. GEORGE offered to see what he could develop.
Number 0541
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE indicated he has concerns about that also.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES commented that rates never go down, but they
may not go up so much if costs go down. She referred to the
example of the drunk driver sitting at the intersection, with
somebody else hitting that person. Representative James said she
didn't understand in this bill that drunk drivers don't get
noneconomic damages. She asked whether in that scenario, the other
person had insurance.
Number 0594
MR. GEORGE at first said there are two times that drunk driving
comes into it. If the person who came up to the intersection and
ran into the stopped car was drunk, then regardless of whether the
person in the stopped car had insurance, that person could collect
noneconomic damages because the driver at fault was drunk. "If you
had no insurance, it wouldn't apply it any event," he then said.
"If you had no insurance, you could not collect for pain and
suffering, whether you were drunk or not. True. Now I see why it
was confusing."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said Jim Sourant had just reminded her that
State Farm Insurance had reduced rates 2.7 percent in Alaska. They
had sent her a check, which she had forgotten.
Number 0677
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT referred to Mr. George's example. If a drunk
driver was stopped legally at the stoplight and was hit, that
person could not recover noneconomic damages under this bill.
MR. GEORGE asked, "An insured drunk driver or an insured?"
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said either one.
MR. GEORGE said he believes that is correct; it is the driver
and/or the owner of the vehicle, and so, an owner in the passenger
seat would be precluded, as well. If they were drunk, even if they
had insurance, the driver couldn't collect. If they were
uninsured, neither could collect.
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked why the passenger could not.
MR. GEORGE answered that it is because he is an owner with no
insurance. It becomes convoluted, because if he is a passenger in
a car that he doesn't own, and he's drunk, it doesn't matter; he
can still collect for pain and suffering because he is an innocent
rider in the car. But if he is an owner of the vehicle, the owner
is required to have insurance.
CHAIRMAN GREEN said, "And if he does, then he can collect, even
though he's drunk. But if he doesn't have insurance, and he's
drunk, he can't."
MR. GEORGE said he thinks that is right.
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked, "If he's uninsured and sober, can he?"
MR. GEORGE said no.
CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested if a person is uninsured, it doesn't
matter what the state of inebriation is.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT replied, "Right, so we can leave that out.
And if he's drunk, it doesn't matter what his state of insurance
is, so we can leave that out. We can just say, 'If you're drunk
and operating the vehicle, or you're uninsured, you're not going to
get these noneconomic damages."
Number 0785
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT further explored the example. He asked, "It
doesn't matter, the culpability of the drunk driver, if the person
was proved negligent who hit me, proved it wasn't my fault? If it
was proved the other person was trying to killing me, ... a mad
constituent, intentional torts, it doesn't matter, I don't get any
noneconomic damage?"
MR. GEORGE replied, "If you were driving in violation of the law,
without automobile insurance, as this is written, I believe ...
that you're correct."
Number 0831
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT described an example: He is driving his wife
home, and they are co-owners of the car; he has had too much to
drink, either slightly or totally, but over the legal limit. They
are hit, either negligently, recklessly or intentionally. Both
suffer damages.
MR. GEORGE asked whether this car has no insurance.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT replied, "The car has no insurance, let's say
that, or I'm drunk."
MR. GEORGE said he thinks there would be different answers. If the
car has no insurance, his wife as an owner has failed to buy
insurance and therefore would not recover damages. If she had
bought insurance but was not the driver, he believes she would be
entitled, although the driver would not.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said he hadn't understood that distinction
before.
MR. GEORGE asked whether that makes sense.
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT replied that it doesn't make any sense, but it
is consistent. He stated his understanding that if he and his wife
are driving as uninsured motorists and are catastrophically
injured, and she is working as a housewife but he is working
outside the home, he would get economic loss. Neither would get
noneconomic loss, no matter how great the pain and suffering they
could prove to a jury and regardless of loss of consortium, loss of
enjoyment of life and so forth.
Number 0923
MR. GEORGE affirmed that, saying that is the incentive for obeying
the law and buying the mandatory auto insurance.
Number 0952
REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE noted that HB 430 denies recovery of
noneconomic damages to a drunk driver or to an uninsured motorist.
However, it says that an uninsured motorist who gets hit by a drunk
driver gets noneconomic damages; that seems inconsistent. He
suggested that to be consistent, noneconomic damages should be
denied to all uninsured motorists. "It's sort of like we're trying
to get rid of drunk drivers, but maybe you'll get lucky and get hit
by one," he commented.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES agreed.
Number 1010
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to Representative James' comments
and told members that as the chairman of the House Labor and
Commerce Standing Committee, he had other examples of insurance
rates going down over a period of years. He also expressed concern
about the numbers and experiences in California, agreeing that
having that information would be helpful. Representative Rokeberg
noted that there seems to be some confusion about the intent, then
expressed hope that they could take testimony and move this along.
He expressed the belief that anything they can do to encourage
Alaskans to get insurance should be looked upon favorably.
Number 1071
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ posed a situation where an unlicensed and
therefore uninsured mother has an emergency at home and jumps in
the family car with her child. Stopped properly at a stoplight,
the car gets rear-ended. Under this bill, it would seem that she
couldn't collect noneconomic damages.
MR. GEORGE questioned whether being uninsured and having no license
necessarily go hand in hand, adding that he isn't sure an
unlicensed person driving an insured car would be excluded. Mr.
George pointed out that he is not an insurance agent, nor does he
underwrite insurance policies. He then suggested the woman in that
situation should have called an ambulance or a taxicab, or
contacted a neighbor. The goal is to have people acting
responsibly, and to him, it is not responsible for an unlicensed,
uninsured person to drive a child to the hospital.
Number 1225
JUANITA HENSLEY, Chief, Driver Services, Division of Motor Vehicles
(DMV), Department of Administration, came forward to testify,
saying as she sees it, HB 430 has some flaws. For example, if a
drunk driver is at fault in an accident, under last year's tort
reform that person could not recover noneconomic losses. She
doesn't condone drunk driving, about which she has gone on record
for years; however, if a victim stopped at a light is hit by an at-
fault driver, that victim cannot recover damages for noneconomic
losses under this bill.
MS. HENSLEY posed another scenario: The person who hit the not-at-
fault drunk driver has insurance for property damage and injuries,
which are legitimate economic losses. Ms. Hensley asked, "Would
the insurance industry not pay him for his economic losses pending
the criminal case on the drunk driving, which can take up to a
year, possibly even more in some cases, ... to convict a person of
drunk driving, especially if there is injuries involved or felony
assault-type charges or something else against the other party,
too? What if you've got two drunk drivers hitting each other ...?"
Number 1346
MS. HENSLEY continued, "In this circumstance, I view Chapter 28.20
of Alaska Statutes as being I would have to take suspension action
on the insured driver - the at-fault driver - until the insurance
company or until they pay the injuries, the legitimate cost of the
drunk driver's claim." Ms. Hensley said she doesn't know what
happens in that scenario; she had posed that question to Mr.
George, to State Farm's representative and to the bill sponsor, and
now she was posing it to this body. Would she come back and
suspend the at-fault driver, who is insured, because that insured's
insurance company fails to pay the damages to the individual
pending a conviction for drunk driving on the person?
MS. HENSLEY noted that HB 430 does not address the differential
treatment given to persons under the influence of illegal drugs,
who are not covered under the bill. That is still under the drunk
driving provisions of law. But if the other party is under the
influence of drugs, how do they handle that?
Number 1409
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested it would be best to choose one's
use of intoxicants carefully.
Number 1420
MS. HENSLEY next pointed out that if a single mother, for example,
must choose between buying groceries that month or buying
insurance, she will buy groceries for her family. If something
happened that she had to drive that car and was involved in a motor
vehicle accident, she would not be covered for noneconomic losses.
The state would have to step in with welfare, if the woman was too
injured to work. Ms. Hensley said these are just questions that
she poses. She commented, "And we thought we had this covered last
year in the tort reform bill. And we wanted to give time enough
for everything to settle down and look and see what kind of
premiums were going to be reduced, and things of that nature."
Number 1465
CHAIRMAN GREEN posed his own example. If he were a 20-year-old
college student driving an old but safe car, he would have
liability insurance but no collision insurance. If someone who is
insured hits him, how would he be covered?
MS. HENSLEY explained that under Alaska law, only liability
insurance is required, not comprehensive collision. The other
party's insurance would be required to pay for his damages under
that scenario. If an uninsured motorist hit him, the DMV would
suspend that person's driver's license until they paid it. She
specified that by having liability only, that is insurance coverage
under the bill. "Under the collision coverage, it would be your
loss," she added.
MS. HENSLEY referred to the 13 percent uninsured motorist rate
mentioned by Mr. George. She stated, "That is true, but in 1984 or
1982, we had a 25 percent uninsured motorist rate. After we had
the mandatory insurance law that went into effect in 1986, that
dropped down to approximately 7.7 percent and has kind of
fluctuated between 7.7, 11.9 and 13 percent of uninsured motorists.
Now, that does not mean that it's all motorists that are
financially responsible. These are some people that are not
responsible for the accidents. This is just a total number of
uninsured motorists, based on the collisions that we have in this
state."
Number 1564
MS. HENSLEY brought up HB 95, which is in the House Finance
Standing Committee and which this committee had heard last year.
Noting that it creates an insurance data base, she suggested that
HB 95 would essentially fix Section 2, subsection (2) of HB 430, in
that it would allow the DMV to verify insurance before registering
a car. That would cut the uninsured motorist rate even further.
MS. HENSLEY told members that the financial responsibility law
requires that anyone who is at fault in a motor vehicle accident be
able to pay for the damages of the victim. There are sections of
the state that are exempt from the mandatory insurance law; these
are villages and communities with fewer than "499 average daily
traffic," based on the Department of Transportation and Public
Facilities (DOT/PF) traffic studies. However, those people are not
exempt from meeting their financial responsibility, if they are at
fault in an accident. That 13 percent includes those who are not
insured but who are financially responsible.
Number 1633
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES asked whether Ms. Hensley had said the tort
reform the previous year provided that drunk drivers do not get
noneconomic damages. She asked for confirmation that it is already
in law.
MS. HENSLEY said that is correct; a drunk driver involved in a
crash does not get noneconomic losses.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said this bill doesn't change that at all.
She referred to the law that requires the DMV to suspend the
license of someone without insurance. She noted that Oregon also
has a financial responsibility law; people can lose their licenses
if they cannot prove financial responsibility by either posting a
bond or providing proof of insurance. She suggested there is a
flaw in the law, if the DMV must suspend a person's license for not
having paid but it is simply a case of waiting on the insurance
company for payment. She said it seems that by buying the
insurance, the person has protected himself or herself. "If that's
not the case, we need to fix it," she concluded.
Number 1705
MS. HENSLEY replied that Alaska has basically the same financial
responsibility law that Oregon has. She explained, "You have an
option: You either have to have insurance, you can post security,
or you can get a release of the party ... that was the victim. In
the cases where the security is posted, the only way that the
victim then can come back and get that security is with a civil
judgment against the at-fault party. ... That has been law since
1959; the financial responsibility has been in place, so that we do
have that same mechanism here, that it does require me to suspend
the driver's license unless they post security or they have paid
damages or they have shown insurance. And in most cases, if
they're insured and the insurance company is not paying the damages
off like they should, then the person could come back and request
suspension of the driver's license of the insured party, until they
either posted security or have some means of (indisc.--simult.
speech) financial responsibility."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said that is a flaw in the law, and that it
can't be right.
Number 1762
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG suggested that contradicted earlier
testimony that if a person has insurance, the DMV doesn't have to
make the suspension. He further suggested that whether the
insurance company is paying the claim is a different issue.
MS. HENSLEY replied that in most cases, the insurance companies pay
up. She is thinking of a hypothetical situation. If there is
someone whose insurance company refuses to pay a legitimate
economic loss claim pending a conviction for drunk driving, she
doesn't know whether she will required to invoke Chapter 20 of
Title 38, which says "you have to file security, or you have to
have your insurance company pay, or you have to pay the damages
yourself, or you're going to get your license suspended."
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG asked whether the statute says that if a
person has insurance coverage, as required under financial
responsibility, then he or she should be okay.
MS. HENSLEY explained that there are two different chapters they
are dealing with here: Chapter 22, the mandatory insurance law
that says everybody must have insurance, and Chapter 20, the
financial responsibility law that says a victim in an accident is
entitled to have injuries and property damage covered.
REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG agreed with Representative James that
something is flawed and that they should look into it.
Number 1851
REPRESENTATIVE CROFT clarified that what tort reform did was say
that when a person is drunk, or under the influence of a controlled
substance, and if that is the cause of the action, that person gets
neither economic nor noneconomic recovery. He noted, "But the key
there is some link between the behavior we're trying to punish and
the harm. Because we already have that, we're essentially only in
this bill dealing with the innocent, if you will, drunk driver:
the drunk driver who is not at fault for the accident. We've
already covered the ones where it's linked to the accident. Now,
we're just saying, 'those sitting at the stoplight or at .011.' ...
And where the alcohol had nothing to do with the accident, we've
taken away a major element of their damage."
Number 1891
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ mentioned the owner/operator under the
insurance provision. He said it seems there is a pretty strong
equal protection argument. It denies someone the right to recover
if that person is uninsured and is a victim, as opposed to someone
who is insured and is a victim. "And it doesn't seem that there's
a compelling state interest involved in making that distinction
which would justify that constitutional distinction," he added.
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether, by encouraging insurance coverage,
they were thereby protecting other people, which would be a benefit
to the state.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ replied that he himself isn't an expert in
this area of law. However, if seems that if that is the objective,
there are more direct means of reaching that objective. He stated
that HB 95 seems like a more direct means, whereas this is a little
arbitrary and haphazard.
Number 1935
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES explained that her objection to HB 95 had been
because of the massive amount of reporting that the insurance
companies had to do, which would result in increased costs to
consumers, including herself, to cover it. "I liked the idea, but
the implementation was too expensive, and I didn't support it for
that reason," she concluded.
Number 1954
MS. HENSLEY reported that Utah uses a third-party vendor to do that
data-base program. She told members, "Their bill sunsetted this
year, and they had to go back to the legislature to reenact it. It
was reenacted overwhelmingly by both bodies. ... It is working, and
it has not cost their insureds any money."
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES pointed out that there are a lot more people
in Utah to cover it. She restated that she liked the idea of the
law [HB 95].
CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether there were further questions, then
announced that HB 430 would be held over.
ADJOURNMENT
Number 2005
CHAIRMAN GREEN adjourned the House Judiciary Standing Committee
meeting at 3:16 p.m.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|