Legislature(2019 - 2020)ADAMS ROOM 519
05/04/2019 12:00 PM House FINANCE
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB49 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | HB 49 | TELECONFERENCED | |
HOUSE FINANCE COMMITTEE
May 4, 2019
12:00 p.m.
[Note: meeting continued from May 3, 2019, 1:30 p.m. See
separate minutes dated 5/3/19 1:30 p.m. for detail.]
12:00:02 PM
CALL TO ORDER
Co-Chair Wilson called the House Finance Committee meeting
to order at 12:00 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Neal Foster, Co-Chair
Representative Tammie Wilson, Co-Chair
Representative Jennifer Johnston, Vice-Chair
Representative Dan Ortiz, Vice-Chair
Representative Ben Carpenter
Representative Andy Josephson
Representative Gary Knopp
Representative Bart LeBon
Representative Kelly Merrick
Representative Colleen Sullivan-Leonard
Representative Cathy Tilton
MEMBERS ABSENT
None
ALSO PRESENT
John Skidmore, Director, Criminal Division, Department of
Law; Jen Winkelman, Director, Probation, Parole, and
Pretrial, Department of Corrections; Nancy Meade, General
Counsel, Alaska Court System; Kelly Goode, Deputy
Commissioner, Department of Corrections; Sylvan Robb,
Administrative Services Director, Department of
Corrections, Office of Management and Budget;
Representative Ivy Spohnholz; Kelly Howell, Special
Assistant and Legislative Liaison, Division of
Administrative Services, Department of Public Safety;
Representative Bryce Edgmon; Representative Steve Thompson;
Representative Louise Stutes; Representative Grier Hopkins;
Representative Josh Revak; Representative Matt Claman;
Representative Sharon Jackson; Representative Jonathan
Kreiss-Tomkins; Representative Geran Tarr; Senator Peter
Micciche; Senator Lora Reinbold; Representative Adam Wool.
PRESENT VIA TELECONFERENCE
Laura Brooks, Deputy Director, Health and Rehabilitation
Services, Department of Corrections; Steve Williams, Chief
Operating Officer, Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority;
Jeff Edwards, Executive Director, Parole Board, Department
of Corrections; Andrew Greenstreet, Deputy Director, Alaska
State Troopers Division, Department of Public Safety;
Kathryn Monfreda, Director, Statewide Services, Department
of Public Safety; James Stinson, Director, Office of Public
Advocacy, Department of Administration; Beth Goldstein,
Acting Public Defender, Department of Administration.
SUMMARY
HB 49 CRIMES; SENTENCING;MENT. ILLNESS;EVIDENCE
HB 49 was HEARD and HELD in committee for further
consideration.
Co-Chair Wilson reviewed the meeting agenda. She
highlighted the committee had previously heard HB 145, the
House Judiciary Committee bill on the same topic. She
reviewed other crime bills sponsored by the governor that
had been included in a new committee substitute (CS) of HB
49 including SB 32, SB 33, SB 34, and SB 35. The concepts
were not new and had been rolled into one document.
HOUSE BILL NO. 49
"An Act relating to criminal law and procedure;
relating to controlled substances; relating to
probation; relating to sentencing; relating to reports
of involuntary commitment; amending Rule 6, Alaska
Rules of Criminal Procedure; and providing for an
effective date."
12:00:47 PM
Vice-Chair Johnston MOVED to ADOPT proposed committee
substitute for HB 49, Work Draft 31-GH1029\E (Radford,
5/3/19). There being NO OBJECTION, it was so ordered.
Co-Chair Wilson acknowledged Representatives Bryce Edgmon,
Chuck Kopp, Steve Thompson, Grier Hopkins in the audience.
She reviewed the meeting agenda.
Co-Chair Wilson invited the Department of Law (DOL) to
review the changes to the bill. The committee would also
hear from the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, the
Public Defender Agency, Office of Public Advocacy, Court
System, and the Department of Corrections. She intended to
hear draft fiscal notes from each of the impacted agencies.
12:03:06 PM
JOHN SKIDMORE, DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF
LAW, reported that the CS was a compilation of what he
considered to be the most important provisions in the
governor's four crime bills. He highlighted there were at
least nine areas where the provisions were different than
what the governor had introduced. He noted it was not to
say that the governor was not interested in seeing
provisions in the way he had introduced them; however, the
department believed it could work with the proposed
provisions. He believed the bill would be a substantial
step towards "getting us back in the game to be able to
help with some of the really important concepts." The bill
would effectively repeal and replace the negative aspects
of SB 91 [omnibus crime reform legislation passed in 2016].
He intended to highlight the nine major differences from
the governor's original legislation as he reviewed the CS.
Co-Chair Wilson acknowledged Representative Louise Stutes
in the audience. She noted the committee would have an
opportunity to ask questions at the end of each section.
Representative Carpenter asked DOL to communicate whether a
section maintained or repealed provisions of SB 91
throughout the meeting.
Co-Chair Wilson recognized Representative Ivy Spohnholz in
the audience.
12:05:21 PM
Mr. Skidmore intended to discuss the legislative intent
language originally found in the bill. He would also review
a document [titled "Draft CS HB 49" from the Department of
Law (copy on file)] that laid out concepts covered by the
bill (he would not review the bill by sections) in order to
help the public understand the legislation. The intent
language at the beginning of the bill was designed to do
important two things. First, the bill would overturn a
couple of cases that had been handed down by the Court of
Appeals. He elaborated that the intent language was meant
to explain why and what was going on with the cases. The
cases were Williams and Doe - the relevant sections were
listed in the intent language. The department had worked on
other intent language with the Court System that encouraged
the increased use of video teleconferencing. Any other
intent language had been found in some of the provisions
the Senate bills had attempted to work on.
Mr. Skidmore began with the bill's elimination of the
marriage defense for sexual assault. He explained that
current statutes included a provision where marriage was a
defense against sexual assault. The provisions addressed
when a person was mentally incapable, incapacitated, or
unaware that sexual activity was occurring to them. He
spoke to the critical importance of understanding what the
terms meant. He noted the committee had some previous
discussions about Alzheimer's and dementia. He read the
definition of mentally incapable under AS 11.41.470(4):
"mentally incapable" means suffering from a mental
disease or defect that renders the person incapable of
understanding the nature or consequences of the
person's conduct, including the potential for harm to
that person
Mr. Skidmore elaborated that Alzheimer's and dementia were
progressive diseases. He stated there were points in time
where a person could be diagnosed with the diseases but
still understand what was going on around them. He
explained it did not make it illegal for there to be any
sexual activity between spouses if the defense language in
the CS was adopted. The state would have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that at the time the conduct occurred the
individual had been rendered incapable of understanding. He
elaborated that if someone came forward claiming that the
individual had understood, it would be a defense. The state
would have to show they could not comprehend, that the
Alzheimer's or dementia had progressed to that point where
they did not understand at the time of the activity. Under
the bill, when a person had Alzheimer's or dementia that
progressed to the point where a person could no longer
speak, communicate consent, or control their movements, at
that point marriage would not be a defense to sexual
activity.
12:10:22 PM
Mr. Skidmore continued that the elimination of marriage
defense had not been part of SB 91 and had come up as a
separate issue that needed to be addressed.
Co-Chair Wilson acknowledged Senator Peter Micciche in the
audience.
Mr. Skidmore addressed sexual abuse of a minor in the third
degree. The crime occurred where a victim was 13, 14, or 15
years old and there was sexual contact and the offender was
at least four years older. Despite the fact that the crime
of sexual abuse of a minor included the term "sexual
abuse," the crime was not considered a sex offense under
current law. He elaborated that the crime was not subject
to sex offender registration and did not carry the enhanced
penalties that sex offenses did. The bill would establish a
subset of sexual abuse of a minor that should be
categorized as a sex offense for purposes of sentencing and
registration. The bill increased the age difference between
victim and offender from four years to six years. The age
range for the victim would remain 13 to 15. When there was
a six-year age difference the crime would be subject to the
enhanced sentencing penalties of 2 to 12 years and the
offender would be subject to sex offender registration.
Mr. Skidmore relayed that sexual abuse of a minor in the
third degree had not been a part of SB 91, but it had come
up in the conversation about SB 91. He explained that
presumptive sentencing had been adjusted for all offenses
except sex offenses under SB 91. He clarified that because
sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree was not
classified as a sex offense, the sentencing had been
adjusted under SB 91. The change was in part, a response to
what the state had learned during the SB 91 discussions.
12:13:15 PM
Co-Chair Wilson recognized Representative Josh Revak in the
audience.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked for more detail about the age
differential [regarding the offense of sexual abuse of a
minor in the third degree].
Mr. Skidmore replied that it would be a crime, but not a
sex offense, when a 17-year old engaged in sexual contact
with a 13-year old (an age difference of four years). The
crime became a sex offense when there was an age difference
of six years (e.g. a 19-year old engaging in sexual contact
with a 13-year old). He gave further age range examples
with the six year age difference. It would be illegal for a
19-year old to engage in sexual contact with a 15-year old,
but it would not become a sex offense until there was a
six-year age difference (e.g. a 21-year old engaging in
sexual contact with a 15-year old).
Representative Josephson considered the difference in
treatment between various ages. He asked for verification
that if the crime involved a 17-year old and a 13-year old
it would not be waivable to adult court; however, if the
offender was 18-years old and the victim was 14-years old,
the crime would be a felony for the 18-year old.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed. He explained that the two scenarios
were both crimes, but there was a difference in the way the
justice system managed juveniles and adults. Individuals
under the age of 18 would be handled in juvenile court; the
offense was not automatically waivable to adult court.
12:15:32 PM
Representative Knopp asked how the crime would be defined
if the offender was 18-years old and the victim was 14-
years old.
Mr. Skidmore answered that the scenario would be sexual
abuse of a minor in the third degree, but under statute,
the crime was not treated as a sex offense - it was not
subject to a greater penalty or sex offender registration.
Representative Josephson surmised that an 18-year-old
should not fall in love with a 14-year-old because even if
they entered into a consensual relationship it could become
felonious quickly.
Mr. Skidmore answered there was nothing wrong with falling
in love, but the individuals would have to wait until they
were older to engage in sexual activity. He provided a
personal example about the age difference between him and
his wife.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked about the differences in sentencing
levels.
Mr. Skidmore replied that a Class C felony for sexual abuse
of a minor in the third degree that was not a sex offense,
had a presumptive sentencing range of 0 to 2 years for a
first time offense. When there was a six-year age
difference, sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree
became a sexual crime and carried a presumptive sentencing
range of 2 to 12 years for a first time offense (there were
additional sentencing ranges for repeat offenses).
12:17:55 PM
Mr. Skidmore discussed the crime of online enticement of a
minor. Currently, the crime pertained to an adult trying to
entice a minor to engage in sexual activity via the use of
a computer. He explained that currently, if the same
individuals were to communicate face-to-face it would not
be a crime. The provision removed the term "online" from
the title and from the elements of the offense, making
enticement also illegal face-to-face.
Mr. Skidmore moved to the next provision related to the
crime of indecent viewing. He noted the complexity of the
statute that had confused practitioners for some time. He
noted that some of the penalties associated with the
particular concept should potentially be adjusted. He
explained that the crime could sound sexual in nature, but
it was not considered a sex crime for purposes of
sentencing or [sex offender] registration. The crime
involved two types of conduct pertaining to children and
adults. The first was the viewing of the private exposure
(defined in law) of genitals, anus, or female breast
without consent. The offense could happen by looking
through a window or peephole or via hidden camera. He
referenced a recent problem where some Airbnbs in Ireland
and other places had hidden cameras in homes people were
renting for vacation purposes.
Mr. Skidmore shared that he had prosecuted a case 15 years
earlier where a lifeguard had installed a camera in a smoke
detector in the women's locker room to view children and
adults changing clothes. The individual had been convicted
and the crime had not been considered a sex offense at the
time. He relayed that changes in sex offense laws had taken
place much after that case. Once the changes had been made,
he had been amazed to discover that type of conduct would
still not be considered a sex offense. Other recent
examples included individuals installing a spy camera in a
significant other's bathroom that captured images of the
significant other and their children. The bill would clean
up the statutory language to make it easier for
practitioners to follow. Additionally, the bill would help
explain the sentencing. He detailed there had always been a
different sentence between an adult victim and a child
victim.
12:21:44 PM
Mr. Skidmore continued to review the sentencing for
indecent viewing. He explained that the crime was a Class A
misdemeanor for an adult victim and a Class C felony for a
child victim. The Class C felony carried a sentencing range
of 0 to 2 years, did not require sex offender registration,
and did not have higher penalties. He detailed that the
bill aimed to take a tiered approach. The crime would
remain a Class A misdemeanor when it involved viewing an
adult directly, but no photo was taken. The crime would
become a Class C felony in cases where a photo was taken
and would be subject to a sentence of 0 to 2 years, but it
would not be classified as a sex offense. The sex offense
designation was reserved for when the victims were
children. The crime would be a Class C felony for direct
viewing and a Class B felony for taking a photo - both
offenses would be deemed registerable sex offenses and
carry higher sentencing ranges.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard asked Mr. Skidmore to
provide the bill sections for reference as he reviewed the
changes in the CS.
Mr. Skidmore agreed. He cautioned that the order of the
outline did not follow the order of the bill sections. He
highlighted that provisions pertaining to indecent viewing
were included in Sections 35 and 39 of the legislation.
Co-Chair Wilson acknowledged Senator Lora Reinbold in the
audience.
Mr. Skidmore moved on to discuss theft crimes. He informed
the committee that all of the provisions had been taken
directly from HB 49 referred by the House Judiciary
Committee. He noted that the online enticement and indecent
viewing had nothing to do with SB 91, whereas, theft was
one of the issues that occurred in SB 91. He explained that
in SB 91, the state had changed the value threshold
impacting whether the crime was a misdemeanor or a felony;
the value was currently $750 and every five years part of
the judicial branch was instructed to adjust the figure for
inflation. He shared that the current law created two
problems. First, it prevented the legislature from engaging
in the public debate about the appropriate level for the
dollar figure to be set at. He noted that the dollar figure
had been changed after significant legislative debate in SB
64 in 2015, SB 91 in 2016, and SB 54 in 2017. He explained
it was a policy call for the legislature, but it would
eliminate the policy debate in the legislature that seemed
to be significant to the public.
Mr. Skidmore reviewed the second problem with the current
theft provision. The theft dollar figure threshold had been
given to the judicial branch to notice everyone else - how
everyone in the public was to learn of the changes and
other things were issues the state had not yet encountered.
The item was the last piece of SB 91 that would go into
effect in 2020. The bill would remove that provision to
eliminate the problem. The relevant bill sections were 11
through 27. Additionally, there were several other sections
related to theft crimes, including the new crime of
possession of vehicle theft. The bill also included an
identification document, which was a good concept that came
from the House Judiciary Committee.
12:27:21 PM
Mr. Skidmore shared that the third concept included was the
aggregated value for theft (in Section 28) when it was over
a six month period for commercial establishments. He
explained it was a good concept from HB 49 by the House
Judiciary Committee.
Co-Chair Wilson clarified that there were no lower
committees, only prior committees.
Representative Knopp asked for detail on the vehicle theft
tools.
Mr. Skidmore answered that the provision on vehicle theft
tools was included in Section 21 on page 11. The section
discussed a motor vehicle theft tool that could include a
Slim Jim, a master key, an altered or shaved key, a trial
or jiggler key, a lock puller, an electronic unlocking
device or similar device adapted or designed for the use in
committing vehicle thefts. The section defined a trial or
jiggler key as a key designed or altered to manipulate a
vehicle locking mechanism other than the lock for which the
key was originally manufactured. He noted that because cars
were changing and evolving there were different mechanisms
to try to steal vehicles. The bill aimed at keeping up with
the new mechanisms by including an updated list.
Co-Chair Wilson did not want to give anyone any ideas.
Vice-Chair Ortiz surmised that the change reverted back to
the law pre-SB 91.
Mr. Skidmore agreed. The change would revert back to pre-SB
91 in terms of the method used for adjusting the value of a
property offense between a misdemeanor and a felony. He
detailed that the legislature could adjust the value in the
future via legislation.
Vice-Chair Ortiz thought Mr. Skidmore mentioned the intent
for a partial rollback in SB 54 [crime reform legislation
passed in 2017].
Mr. Skidmore replied that SB 54 had originally removed
inflation adjustment, but the provision had been deleted.
Instead, people had elected to talk about the dollar figure
that was the difference between misdemeanor and felony
levels.
12:30:49 PM
Representative Josephson spoke to the reinstatement of
potential jail penalties even for petty theft. He noted
that those penalties were removed in the CS and a new Class
B misdemeanor was created.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed. He noted that it pertained to
sentencing provisions, which he would address later in the
meeting.
Mr. Skidmore addressed the concept of the failure to
appear. The committee had previously talked about the issue
in a meeting on HB 49. The concept had been the 30-day
grace period, which had created issues. The CS would remove
the 30-day grace period and return the law to its state
prior to the passage of SB 91.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for the section numbers.
Mr. Skidmore replied Section 31 and 32.
Vice-Chair Ortiz had heard about the reasons why the
current 30-day grace period created problems because a
defendant could fail to appear. He asked why the grace
period had been implemented.
Mr. Skidmore recalled that prior to SB 91 there had been a
practice within the Court System (that he believed still
existed) where an individual failed to appear for a
particular hearing and courts would issue a warrant but
would hold it in abeyance. The court would grant a
designated timeframe (e.g. 24 hours, 48 hours, or other)
before putting the warrant into the system. He noted that
sometimes the court would schedule another hearing and
would not issue a warrant. The goal with the provision had
been to take the concept and put it into law.
Mr. Skidmore stated that the practice or concept was not
offensive; it was well within a judge's purview and was
appropriate. However, the creation of the 30-day grace
period swept other hearings or cases into the concept that
the judge would not have chosen to do. For example, a judge
may have said a particular individual had already failed to
appear two times previously and they were issuing a bench
warrant. He elaborated that the defendant could have failed
to appear (without consequence) for a trial or evidentiary
hearing that meant witnesses, victims, and others had been
called in to appear in court. The provision had required
the individual to report to the court within 30 days and a
hearing would be rescheduled. The process had been deemed
not to work well. He reported there had been approximately
137 prosecutions for failure to appear prior to SB 91; the
number had dropped to around 30 after the passage of SB 91.
He noted the change was significant.
12:34:48 PM
Mr. Skidmore moved to the violation of conditions of
release (Section 33). He detailed that prior to SB 91, it
been a Class A misdemeanor if the person violated
conditions set on a felony case. He elaborated that if a
person violated conditions of release on a misdemeanor, the
crime was a Class B misdemeanor. He detailed that under SB
91, violation of conditions of release had been eliminated
as a crime and was returned to a violation. He elaborated
that it had been reestablished as a crime under SB 54 in
2017. The change back to a crime had limited the penalty to
five days. Under the CS, returning the crime to a Class A
and B misdemeanor, would mean penalty ranges could be
applied to the offense. He mentioned the concepts where the
issue had been problematic. There were cases were
individuals had violated conditions and the only way to
keep them in jail up to a trial was to convict them and
have them serve the sentence of the particular crime.
12:36:33 PM
Mr. Skidmore addressed the concept of escape, which had not
been dealt with in SB 91. The crime related to individuals
on ankle monitors. He explained that individuals could
receive an ankle monitor pretrial or as a way to serve
their sentence post-conviction. The removal of the monitor
could be dealt with in a couple of ways. Pretrial, all the
court could do was charge a person with a 5-day penalty for
a violation of conditions of release. The bill would make
the cutting of an ankle bracelet a Class C felony for a
person wearing the monitor pretrial. Second, the CS would
elevate the conduct from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C
felony if the person removed the ankle bracelet when
sentenced and under detention for a misdemeanor. The goal
of elevating the crimes and showing consequences was to
increase use and encourage more use of ankle monitoring.
The provisions were included in Sections 29 and 30.
Additionally, the bill contained repeal language in Section
96, which would increase the crime to the felony level.
12:38:56 PM
Mr. Skidmore addressed the crime of terroristic
threatening. He explained that the crime occurred when an
individual made a false threat that caused a substantial
reaction from authorities. The concept was currently in
statute, but it did not address the threat that someone may
have intended to carry out a threat. He explained that
there was a crime of attempt, but it was not applicable
until a person had taken a substantial step. He detailed
that "substantial step" was a term of art found in the law
for the crime of attempt; it required a person to take real
concrete steps towards committing a crime. Adding the
concept of a real threat that had not yet been acted on,
allowed law enforcement to respond.
Mr. Skidmore elucidated that the concept had been generated
from the concepts seen in Ketchikan and Anchorage where
kids had made threats about something that may happen at
school, which required a significant response from schools.
Law enforcement could only be involved to a certain extent
if there was not some sort of crime associated. The change
allowed law enforcement to take the additional and
appropriate steps when there was a threat resulting in a
substantial response from law enforcement and the impacted
entity (e.g. the evacuation of theater or school).
12:40:57 PM
Co-Chair Wilson noted the provision was in Section 34.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard asked about the different
penalties for juveniles and adults for the crime [of
terroristic threatening].
Mr. Skidmore rephrased his understanding that
Representative Sullivan-Leonard was asking how the legal
system dealt differently with children and adults. He
detailed that an adult would be prosecuted in an adult
court, whereas a juvenile would be prosecuted in a juvenile
court and their name would be kept private. He added that
the state's juvenile courts protected the privacy of
juveniles and did not share the vast majority of the
information. He noted there were a couple of exceptions,
but terroristic threatening did not qualify. The second
difference dealt with the way sanctions were imposed. He
elaborated that when sanctions were imposed on adults the
system looked at five factors called the chain of criteria.
When the crime involved a juvenile, the system considered
the best interest of the child. He expounded that sometimes
a juvenile had to go to a detention facility, but it was
not always the case. He detailed that more often than not,
things were resolved through probation, discussions with
parents, and other. He explained there was a host of ways
the system dealt with those things related to juveniles
that looked very different from the adult world. He noted
it was the reason it was very significant when a juvenile
was waived into an adult court.
Vice-Chair Ortiz requested to hear which section of the
bill was being discussed prior to Mr. Skidmore's review.
Mr. Skidmore agreed.
Representative Knopp returned to the crime of escape
related to electronic ankle monitoring. He referenced Mr.
Skidmore's discussion that the Department of Corrections
(DOC) would decide post-conviction [about incarceration or
electronic monitoring]. He thought the judge was
responsible for making the decision.
12:43:50 PM
Mr. Skidmore confirmed that he had said DOC. He explained
that once a judge issued a sentence or a judgement, it
would be up to DOC to determine what risk the individual
posed; DOC would determine whether the individual should
serve their sentence in a low, medium, or maximum security
facility, whether or not they could be on ankle monitoring,
and whether they could be in a halfway house/community
residential center (CRC). He noted DOC had policies in
place (he was uncertain whether policies were set in
regulation) and discretion to determine the appropriate
place for a person to serve their sentence.
Representative Knopp stated he was beginning to wonder what
judges were doing. He elaborated that prosecutors and
defense attorneys entered an agreement for the judge to
approve and then DOC decided how and where an individual
would serve their sentence. He wondered if the system had
stripped all authority away from the judges. He referenced
Mr. Skidmore's mention that escape from electronic
monitoring was a Class C felony. He asked for verification
the sentencing range for the crime was 0 to 2 years.
Mr. Skidmore responded affirmatively.
Representative Knopp provided a scenario where a person cut
off their ankle monitor after being sentenced and was
retried and found guilty on a Class C felony charge. He
asked if the individual would be put back on electronic
monitoring.
Mr. Skidmore replied that he did not work for DOC, but he
found it highly unlikely the scenario would occur. His
impression based on how the policies had been executed over
the years was that once someone had committed the violation
of removing an ankle bracelet, it meant they were no longer
a good candidate for electronic monitoring.
Co-Chair Wilson requested to hear from DOC. She believed it
was important to understand the likelihood of someone being
released on electronic monitoring after convicted of
removing the device previously.
Representative Knopp thought it was important to know
whether a person would be ineligible for electronic
monitoring under the scenario.
JEN WINKELMAN, DIRECTOR, PROBATION, PAROLE, AND PRETRIAL,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, answered that a risk matrix was
completed for anyone who applied for electronic monitoring.
If the person had been charged with a prior escape, they
were given a certain number of points that precluded them
from being a candidate for electronic monitoring. The
individual could appeal the decision through the
commissioner's office, but she had not seen an individual
win an appeal under the scenario provided.
Representative Knopp asked for verification that the
opportunity was still available for a person to be eligible
for electronic monitoring under the scenario he provided.
Ms. Winkelman replied that individuals turned in
applications all of the time; however, once the scoring was
completed individuals could be denied. For example, by
statute a person in on a domestic violence charge could not
be placed on electronic monitoring, but they could still
turn in an application even though the department would
deny the request.
Co-Chair Wilson surmised individuals were all given the
same opportunity to the process.
Ms. Winkelman replied affirmatively.
Co-Chair Wilson requested to hear about judges'
responsibilities from the Court System. She pointed out
that two parties could make a deal, but that did not mean
the judge had to agree to it. She continued that at the end
of the day the judge considered all evidence and there was
no circumventing the judge's authority through any kind of
plea deal. She did not want there to be a misconception
that judges did not make a determination; they had a
process they were required to go through.
12:48:15 PM
NANCY MEADE, GENERAL COUNSEL, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, replied
that the judges were very busy. She believed the question
pertained to the authority the court had in relation to
plea bargains. She detailed that a judge may reject a plea
bargain. Generally, the courts ensure that defense counsel
and prosecutor had presented a legal agreement that
sentenced the person within the appropriate ranges and that
it was not something patently unreasonable. In general,
plea bargains were approved by judges because judges at
that point in the case had much less information about the
circumstances of the case than the attorneys. She
clarified, that did not mean the judge did nothing; the
judge reviewed plea bargains to ensure attorneys had
entered a legal and appropriate appeal.
Representative Knopp clarified he did not mean to imply
judges were not doing anything. In earlier testimony the
committee had heard that judges seldomly rejected plea
agreements and did not have the option to change
sentencing.
Ms. Mead agreed that judges could accept or reject a plea
agreement. She elaborated that a judge did not have the
authority to tell a prosecutor they should have pursued
charges that the prosecutor had determined ought to be
dismissed. She added that at that point in the case when
plea bargains were entered there had not yet been a trial
and the attorneys had much better facts about the case than
the judge; therefore, there was a supposition that the
attorneys knew a bit better about what was going on in a
case.
Representative Josephson noted that the judge also had to
make a probable cause finding. He asked if the judge had to
hear basic facts of the allegation and make a pro forma
finding that the allegation seemed to fit the charge.
Ms. Mead answered that she was not terribly familiar with a
probable cause finding happening during a change of plea
hearing (the hearing to accept or reject a plea bargain),
but the court typically heard a brief explanation of the
case to get a sense of what was going on. The court
typically had something in the file, even if it was limited
to a half page police report. She noted that the
information the court had about a case at that point was
not in depth.
12:51:50 PM
Representative Merrick asked what percentage of cases
resulted in a plea deal and how the parties decided a case
would be pled or tried.
Mr. Skidmore answered that approximately 95 percent of
cases were resolved through plea negotiations. When the
prosecution entered into a change of plea or plea
negotiations, it considered the strength of the case and
the likely outcome if a person was convicted as charged.
Additionally, the prosecution consulted with victims and
law enforcement. All of the items went into determining
what the prosecution believed to be a reasonable outcome.
Plea negotiations always required some incentive for a
person to agree to giving up rights to go to trial and
having witnesses brought in front of the court.
Ms. Mead agreed. She had recently looked at the information
about how cases were resolved (referred to by the courts as
dispositions). She shared that fewer than 5 percent of
cases went to trial; the number had been around 3 percent
in the last several years. The dismissal rate for
misdemeanors was about 42 percent in the past year, which
left less than 60 percent to be resolved in plea deals. The
felony dismissal rate had been around 30 percent in the
past year, with a couple percent going to trial, it left
the percentage of cases resulting in plea deals in the high
60 percent range.
Mr. Skidmore clarified why he had identified the rate of
cases resulting in a plea negotiation as 95 percent. He
explained that many of the dismissals were the result of
plea deals. He noted that was not the situation for all
cases.
Co-Chair Wilson recognized Representatives Matt Claman and
Sharon Jackson in the audience. She asked a question
related to the crime of threats. She provided a
hypothetical scenario where a middle school student posted
on Facebook that they planned to shoot certain people at
school. She elaborated that the post was shown to the
principal and law enforcement was called. She asked if the
scenario was a crime currently; if not, she asked if it
would become a crime under the CS.
12:55:23 PM
Mr. Skidmore answered that he was cautious about responding
to hypothetical scenarios. He considered the scenario
presented by Co-Chair Wilson.
Co-Chair Wilson clarified that in the scenario, the police
had been called to the school, but the school was not
evacuated, and no further action had been taken by the
student making the threat or by the school. She was trying
to determine whether the situation was considered a crime
under current law and the CS.
Mr. Skidmore answered that under current law, law
enforcement could respond to try to determine whether it
was a real threat; if they believed the threat to be real,
they would take steps to try to intervene. The difficulty
was that law enforcement was limited in the steps it could
take if the treat was real. He referred to Section 34 on
page 17 of the CS and reported that the CS would enable law
enforcement to take additional action. He read from the
section:
(a) A person commits the crime of terroristic
threatening in the second degree if the person makes a
threat that
(1) places...a person...in reasonable fear of
serious physical injury to any person with
reckless disregard that the threat may cause...
Mr. Skidmore explained that in the situation, law
enforcement would have to evaluate whether the person who
had made the Facebook post had done so and that it resulted
in placing someone in fear of serious physical injury (he
assumed that was the case in Co-Chair Wilson's scenario).
He referenced the bill's language "disregard that the
threat may cause," and explained that even though the
school was not evacuated, the prosecutor would be obligated
to show that the person who made the Facebook post was
reckless in disregarding the fact that there could have
been a more significant emergency response that includes
the initiation of emergency protocol for a building, public
place or area, or business premises that causes a serious
public inconvenience or the public or substantial group of
the public to be in fear of serious physical injury. The
fact that the threat may result in one of those things
would be a crime and would allow police to take additional
steps that they could not currently take.
Co-Chair Wilson commented that unfortunately the issues
were actually happening in schools.
12:58:22 PM
Representative Carpenter asked for verification the
consequences would be different for a threat made by a
child versus a threat made by an adult as they would be
heard in different court systems.
Mr. Skidmore responded affirmatively.
12:58:37 PM
Mr. Skidmore moved on to discuss provision dealing with
drugs under Sections 41 through 48 of the legislation.
There were a couple major compromises found in the CS that
were still very important aspects. He noted that Sections 2
and 3 included some conforming language given the changes
in statutes for drug offenses. He cautioned that when
reading the bill, it may appear certain sections were
repeated, but it was necessary to read the sections in
conjunction with the repealers in Section 96. He explained
that SB 91 had reduced drug offenses from a Class A or
Class B felony to a Class B or Class C felony. The bill
would increase drug offenses back to a Class A or Class B
felony. He advised that the language was not shown as
deleted in Sections 41 through 48; it was necessary to read
the sections in conjunction with the repealer to understand
when a section was deleted.
Mr. Skidmore addressed drug possession. He explained that
the governor's legislation proposed to return all
possession to a Class C felony. Whereas, the CS specified
that the first two offenses would remain a misdemeanor. He
explained that the provision qualified as a "must have" and
a substantial step in the right direction because under
current law, the first two possession charges had zero
active jail time. The CS would allow the first two
possessions to result in a Class A misdemeanor that had a
sentencing range of 0 to 1 year.
Mr. Skidmore explained that the change in sentencing was
significant for two reasons. First, when law enforcement
responded to a drug call, they would likely take the drugs
and paraphernalia and destroy them, but not arrest the
individual. Law enforcement had the authority to arrest the
individual, but it was essentially meaningless because the
sentencing provision carried zero active jail time. He
explained it was the same concept that had been encountered
for Class C felonies when it had been adjusted in SB 54 -
people had not been arrested for the crimes because the
jail potential had been zero; the penalty had been
probation only. Consequently, the judge would immediately
release a person if the jail sentence was zero. He
explained that under the scenario, the penalty was greater
for holding a person than the potential consequence at the
end of the trial. Adjusting the sentencing to 0 to 1 year
would allow officers to make an arrest; the judge would
still have the discretion to determine whether a person
should be held.
Mr. Skidmore highlighted the second significant difference
related to possession charges. He referenced testimony he
had given in a prior meeting related to the need to
incentivize people to get treatment. The CS would provide
incentive that was dramatically different from current law.
He noted that the change did not go as far as what the
governor had asked for. He underscored that the change was
a critical step in the right direction.
1:03:42 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if the adjustment would revert back
to the law pre-SB 91.
Mr. Skidmore responded in the negative. He explained that
prior to SB 91 any possession of a drug was a Class C
felony. He noted that under the CS, the first two offenses
were misdemeanors and the third offense was a Class C
felony. He added that a suspended entry of judgement (SEJ)
could be used as well. Under the CS, for those individuals
who were addicted, there would be more tools available to
law enforcement and prosecutors to try to incentivize an
offender to get clean. He understood that getting clean may
not happen immediately. The individual would have two
chances (potentially more changes when factoring in SEJs)
to try to get clean. A third offense would be a Class C
felony, which was a change from current law where the crime
always remained a misdemeanor. He reiterated that the
compromise was a substantial step in the right direction.
Mr. Skidmore referenced a study given to the committee at a
recent meeting reporting that 77 percent of the people
released from a drug crime committed a non-drug related
crime in the next nine years. He stated that individuals
struggling with addiction needed help and recognized that
they could substantially impact communities by committing
crimes that included theft, assault, criminal mischief, and
other. He restated that the change was a substantial step
in the right direction.
Vice-Chair Ortiz recalled that when the legislature had
debated SB 91 there had been consensus that locking up
individuals who use drugs was not working. He shared that
it had been one of the motivators for looking at a
different approach. One of the other factors had been that
the state was incarcerating people at a rate that would
require another prison. He asked whether the incentives for
treatment and other things be maintained if the sentencing
range was 0 to 180 days instead of 0 to 1 year as proposed
in the CS.
1:07:46 PM
Mr. Skidmore answered that 180 days would be 180 days more
than what was offered under law currently. He could not say
it was not also a step in the [right] direction. He did not
believe the increase to 6 months jail time was significant
enough. Going up to one year was substantial and he stated
it was a significant step that prosecutors and law
enforcement would like to see. He did not know how others
would view the idea of a 6 month jail sentence.
Co-Chair Wilson recognized Representatives Geran Tarr and
Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins in the audience.
1:08:38 PM
Vice-Chair Johnston asked for verification that throughout
the process, prosecutors could use an SEJ as a tool to push
towards treatment.
Mr. Skidmore agreed and clarified that an SEJ was a
suspended entry of judgement. The tool would allow a
prosecutor to direct a defendant to complete a certain set
of conditions during a specified time period. One of the
conditions could be to go to a residential treatment
program that an expert deemed appropriate. He explained
that if the individual complied with all of the designated
conditions, the case could be dismissed. He explained that
there would be an arrest but no conviction on record even
for a Class A misdemeanor. He confirmed that the tool would
still exist under the CS.
Vice-Chair Johnston stated that currently the tools were
not in place. She asked if the current system contained
elements to promote treatment if a person was arrested
under any of the offenses discussed.
Mr. Skidmore replied that the option for an SEJ existed,
but there was no incentive to utilize it. He explained that
a prosecutor could direct a defendant to complete a
residential treatment program and comply with other
conditions for up to a year; however, the individual would
likely take their chances at trial because they would not
get jailtime. He underscored there was currently no
incentive. He elaborated that the SEJ was not impactful
without having the potential of jailtime. He returned to
his statements in response to a question by Vice-Chair
Ortiz that jailtime of 1 year was more significant than 6
months. The sentence had to be substantial enough for a
defendant to be motivated to follow conditions. He added
that he would prefer a Class C felony charge with
sentencing of two years, but he believed the Class A
misdemeanor proposed in the CS was much better than the
current law.
1:11:51 PM
Vice-Chair Johnston directed a question to DOC. She asked
about the difference between a 6-month and 1-year treatment
program [in the DOC correctional system]. She asked about
the availability of treatment during the two time periods.
KELLY GOODE, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, asked for the question to be repeated. She
thought it may be better answered by the department's
Health and Rehabilitative Services director.
Vice-Chair Johnston noted that currently there was a 0 to
1-year sentence [for drug possession]. She wondered about
the tools available in the DOC system for drug treatment
within prison. She asked about the availability of
treatment and the difference between a 6-month and 1-year
program.
Ms. Goode noted that it was a great question for her
colleague Laura Brooks. She noted the topic had been
covered to some extent with the committee in the past. She
offered to have Ms. Brooks call in to answer the questions.
Co-Chair Wilson requested to have Ms. Brooks call in. She
expounded on Vice-Chair Johnston's question. She requested
to hear about the backlog in the DOC treatment program
availability. She noted that a person may have jailtime of
6 months to a year, but treatment may not be available for
three years.
1:14:25 PM
Representative Josephson remarked that a 12-month sentence
was really an 8-month sentence and a 6-month sentence was
really a 4-month sentence due to the good time factor. He
thought it appeared there were two other parts of SB 91
that were good and would remain in the bill. He asked for
verification that the first item was the SEJ, which had not
existed prior to SB 91.
Mr. Skidmore agreed.
Representative Josephson addressed the second part of SB 91
that would remain in the bill. He provided a hypothetical
scenario where a person did not believe they had a drug
problem and recreated with cocaine twice a year. He asked
for verification that if caught, the person would not be
charged with a Class C felony, which could be a barrier
crime and badge of dishonor; the individual would receive a
wake up call and escape a felony charge under the CS.
Mr. Skidmore replied in the affirmative, as long as any
prior usage or convictions were outside the timeframe that
would elevate the crime to a felony. The charge would be a
Class A misdemeanor the first two times a person was
caught; for a third offense, the charge would increase to a
Class C felony.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard remarked that the
particular change in the law would be a big step to help
local enforcement agencies to make significant changes in
neighborhoods. She referenced a recent situation when a
person had heroin on them and had passed out in their
vehicle in a neighborhood. The incident had been called in
and the troopers had released the individual. She wanted to
stop the distribution and use of drugs in the state's
neighborhoods. She asked if the particular change would
give tools to state troopers who were trying to fight the
problem.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard thought that rehabilitation
services in the prisons fell under Salvation Army. She
added that DOC was using Vivitrol that seemed to be
effective for heroin and OxyContin addictions.
Vice-Chair Ortiz had a question related to the costs
involved in starting to return to locking people up. He
asked when the appropriate time would be to discuss the
costs.
Co-Chair Wilson communicated her preference to address
costs during the fiscal note portion of the meeting. The
current portion of the meeting was related to policy. In
response to a comment by Representative Sullivan-Leonard,
she noted that the Department of Public Safety (DPS) would
also weigh in on the bill.
1:18:33 PM
Mr. Skidmore moved to the distribution of drugs. He
discussed that under SB 91 distribution had been reduced
from Class A and B felonies to Class B and C felonies, and
the concept of weight had been introduced to decide when a
crime should be a Class B or C felony. He explained that
the weight concept did damage to the way in which the
framework for drugs had been set up in Alaska. He
referenced an opinion that talked about the different
factors that were important for a judge or prosecutor to
evaluate when looking at a case on drug distribution. The
differences that could exist around the state from
community to community and the various factors were thrown
out the window when an exact weight was put into statute
that would treat all communities the same.
He explained that the CS removed the weight quantity and
returned to the original concept. Additionally, the CS
reinstated the methamphetamine manufacturing and
distribution protections that were previously in statute.
The changes would return the law to its pre-SB 91 status
related to distribution. He explained that distribution
charges allowed prosecutors and law enforcement to
aggressively attack the problem from the demand and supply
sides. The changes would work in conjunction with other
steps taken in recent years, such as creating Alaska as a
high intensity drug trafficking area, which brought in
substantial money to fight and prosecute drugs.
1:20:52 PM
Mr. Skidmore turned to arraignment in Section 49 of the
bill. The bill would allow 48 hours after arrest to arraign
a defendant and set bail. He explained that SB 91 had
reduced the timeframe from 48 hours to 24 hours. He
explained that prior to the change made in SB 91,
defendants appeared within 24 hours in the vast majority of
cases. He explained it was the preference of the Court
System and he expected the same would happen again even
with the change. The change allowed a bit of flexibility in
two areas. First, the change provided flexibility if there
were other reasons it was not possible to get someone
arraigned within 24 hours. Second, the change allowed
conversations and to evaluate whether or not having judges
and prosecutors work 365 days a year was appropriate. He
considered whether it was appropriate to take a break on a
Sunday and holidays. He did not know the answer, but it
allowed for the conversation. The change would put Alaska
in the "middle of the pack" in terms of other states. He
believed there were only a couple of other states with the
24-hour timeframe. All other states had something above 24
hours; he noted the outside number was 72 hours.
Mr. Skidmore moved to pertaining to presumptions for
release on bail in Sections 50 through 54. He noted it was
the second major area where there was a deviation from the
governor's bills. The presumptions would return to the pre-
SB 91 law, but with a significant difference. The current
risk assessment tool could continue to be used, gather
data, and be improved into the future; however, due to its
imperfect nature, the tool would not be the driving factor
in bail release statutes. He explained the tool would
merely be a factor for the courts to consider.
1:23:41 PM
Vice-Chair Johnston believed the risk assessment tool was
supposed to be reviewed annually. She asked if the review
process would continue.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed. He detailed that the risk assessment
tool was currently being evaluated and was supposed to be
validated by June 2019. The concept was to continue to use
it and validate it into the future to determine whether it
could be improved. The concept of the tool was not a bad
one, but the way it had been executed was flawed. He
explained that adjustments were needed. The change would
allow the system to consider improving the tool without
doing further damage to the justice system in the way it
handled pretrial release.
Vice-Chair Johnston communicated her understanding that
data collection would continue, the state would continue to
improve on the tool, and it would continue to be used as an
advisory tool until all parties felt it could be
implemented as desired.
Mr. Skidmore agreed it was the intent. He relayed that the
provision allowed the state to continue improving the tool.
He was not in a place to commit anyone in the future to
something.
1:25:22 PM
Representative Carpenter asked for verification the tool
would be used, but it would not be a mandatory requirement.
He elaborated that the judge would have the discretion to
consider the tool results and decide to go in a different
direction. He believed the change would give discretion
back to the judges (pre-SB 91).
Mr. Skidmore answered in the affirmative. He cited the
argument that the courts currently had the ability to use
discretion. He explained the problem was that statute
constrained the courts in relation to the low, medium, and
high score designations. He stressed that the tool showed
five scores, not three, and the state had to pigeonhole the
data to fit into the law that only had three categories.
The categories created presumptions about what the court
was supposed to do. He clarified that the change in the
bill would decouple the law from the presumptions. The
change would return the law to its state pre-SB 91, but
with the addition of the assessment tool. Additionally, the
bill would leave the additional pretrial supervision
available from DOC, which had not existed pre-SB 91.
Co-Chair Wilson summarized that the tool was advisory.
Vice-Chair Ortiz referenced the following language [from
page 3 of document from Department of Law titled "Draft CS
HB 49" (copy on file)]: "removes inability to pay as a
reason for the court to review a bail setting."
Mr. Skidmore replied that when a person appeared before the
court and conditions for release were set, if the person
did not get out of jail within 48 hours, they had the right
to another hearing. He noted it was true pre-SB 91 and
under current law. He highlighted some differences and
explained that when a person came in for a second hearing
there was supposed to be some new information the court did
not previously hear. Under SB 91, a person's inability to
pay or to post bail could be considered new information
(even though the court had considered it originally). The
CS would change the law to its previous state (pre-SB 91) -
it specified that a judge considered a person's inability
to pay or post bail at the first hearing and did not need
to reconsider it as new information at a subsequent bail
hearing. He added that in his 20 years of practice he had
attended many bail hearings where there had been a pitch
for an individual to be released from jail based on other
conditions and for bail to be reduced. He noted bail was
always reduced in that scenario. The concept that new
information was required to have bail adjusted was a
fallacy.
1:30:11 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked what the motivation would be for
dialing the provision back. He asked if the new provision
had created problems. He asked why there was a need to dial
the law back to a pre-SB 91 setting if the judges were
always considering a person's inability to pay bail.
Mr. Skidmore replied it was the reason a person could get a
subsequent bail hearing. He stated the court did not want
to end up with a daily bail hearing Monday through Friday
and when a person's inability to pay could be new
information, it could be new information at each bail
hearing on Monday through Friday. At some point there had
to be acknowledgement that the fact that a person could not
post bail was not new information; it was necessary to give
the judge new information in order to revisit their initial
decision.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked why the provision had been included
if the ability for a person to pay bail had always been
considered. He thought the provision must have been
included out of fear or recognition that there was a
disadvantage in the system for low income individuals.
Mr. Skidmore answered that the rationale for putting the
provision in law was as he had articulated. He explained
there had been multiple bail hearings occurring time after
time. There had been recognition that the number of bail
hearings taking place needed to be controlled. He clarified
they were not saying just because someone was of a certain
socioeconomic status they should not be released from jail.
He elaborated that the judge had made an appropriate
determination about where they thought the bail should be
and that determination already considered a person's
ability to pay. A subsequent hearing should be reserved for
cases where new information was brought forward, and
something had changed to indicate the person should be
released. He characterized monetary bail was going out of
vogue. He believed much information had been presented to
the courts about the topic. He did not know whether courts
would dramatically change their process related to monetary
bail if the statute was changed.
Representative LeBon discussed that the DOC commissioner
was required to determine a pretrial risk assessment as
part of the process. He read the following excerpt from
language on page 28 of the bill: The unavailability of a
report prepared by the pretrial services officer under AS
33.07." He asked for verification that the unavailability
did not hold things up and the risk assessment
determination may not be part of the process in the first
24 to 48 hours. He asked if the language was eliminated
from the bill. He wondered how the language impacted the
risk assessment score. He kept hearing that part of the
problem was the risk assessment score was not effective in
treating repeat offenders.
Mr. Skidmore replied that the CS proposed to eliminate the
language Representative LeBon was referencing on page 28.
He explained that the provision could remain in statute
because the pretrial risk assessment tool would continue to
be used. The language would be eliminated if the pretrial
risk assessment no longer existed; however, if the tool was
kept, the language could be kept. He affirmed the concerns
with the tool were based on the lack of data used to
develop it to begin with. The tool had been limited in the
number of years and it had not considered [an individual's]
out of state history. There were many other types of data
that needed to be collected to refine and improve the tool.
1:35:49 PM
Co-Chair Wilson acknowledged Representative Adam Wool in
the audience.
Mr. Skidmore turned to pretrial electronic monitoring and
credit against sentences found in Section 56. The provision
was a change from the governor's bills. The governor's
bills would have made any electronic monitoring pretrial
ineligible against a sentence. The CS allowed electronic
monitoring pretrial credits available to be used against
sentences for specific offenses.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for verification there had to be a
determination made by the courts and that [applying
electronic monitoring pretrial credits to be used against
sentences] was not automatic.
Mr. Skidmore confirmed that a determination had to be made
by the courts. He noted he had never seen it done.
Co-Chair Wilson thought there were other attorneys who had.
1:37:09 PM
Representative Josephson asked if the administration had
any carveouts related to the provision. For example, he
believed the Senate had been considering that sex offenses
would not be eligible. He thought that would suggest that
assaults may be eligible. He wondered if the administration
had an opinion on the matter. Secondarily, he wondered if
wearing the electronic monitor was part of treatment.
Mr. Skidmore responded that he believed there were some
significant policy calls required by the legislature on the
subject. He did not know that the administration had drawn
a hard and fast line on which ones should not be [eligible
for treatment], but the administration would be paying
close attention to decisions made by the legislature.
Co-Chair Wilson directed attention to Section 56, page 34,
lines 23 through 31 and page 35, lines 1 and 2 that
included a list of crimes that would be ineligible for the
credit. She asked Mr. Skidmore to review the items.
Mr. Skidmore explained there was an existing provision in
law specifying the amount of credit to be applied towards a
sentence from pretrial electronic monitoring was limited to
a year for the offenses [listed on pages 34 and 35]. The CS
changed the provision to prevent any credit for the
offenses [listed on pages 34 and 35] including a felony
crime against a person under AS 11.41 (i.e. murder, felony
assaults, sexual assaults, sexual abuse of minors,
coercion, kidnapping, robbery, and other), a crime
involving domestic violence as defined in AS 18.66.990
(i.e. misdemeanor assaults, violations of domestic violence
protection orders, domestic violence involving criminal
mischief for damaging property), sex offenses as defined in
AS 12.63.100 (the sex offense was significant it would
preclude whether a misdemeanor or felony outside of AS
11.41), an offense under AS 11.71 involving the delivery of
a controlled substance to a person under 19 years of age,
burglary in the first degree under AS 11.46.300 (i.e.
breaking into a residence with the intent to commit a
crime), and arson in the first degree under AS 11.46.400
(i.e. setting a residence on fire and causing someone to be
injured including a first responder).
1:41:46 PM
Co-Chair Wilson noted that Ms. Brooks from DOC was
available online to answer an earlier question.
Vice-Chair Johnston discussed that the CS changed a number
of approaches related to drugs. She explained that it was
an effort to help the public and potentially improve the
offender's life via drug treatment. She detailed that in
Sections 41 to 48, sentencing for drug possession had
changed to 0 to 365 days. She asked if there would be a
difference in treatment availability for a 6 month sentence
versus a 1 year sentence. She wondered if the treatment
capacity existed and if there was a waitlist.
LAURA BROOKS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HEALTH AND REHABILITATION
SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (via teleconference),
answered that DOC determined who went into treatment based
on a substance abuse assessment. The department had a
number of different types of substance abuse treatment
programs available. She detailed that the intensive
outpatient substance abuse treatment was only 15 weeks
long; however, there had been about 30 people on the
waitlist the previous week. The residential substance abuse
treatment program was 6 months long and currently there
were approximately 60 individuals on the waitlist. She
confirmed there were treatment programs for individuals who
were incarcerated for less than one year; however, the
department and community as a whole struggled to find
treatment providers. She explained that waitlists continued
to grow, because there were not enough treatment providers
to meet the demand.
Ms. Brooks highlighted there were also waitlists for the
treatment assessments, which were required before an
individual could be referred to a program. Once an
individual was on a waitlist, the department prioritized
individuals on the list who were closest to release and had
a court order for treatment. She elaborated that someone
with a shorter sentence would move to a higher place on the
waitlist than another inmate with a couple of years left to
serve.
1:45:21 PM
Co-Chair Wilson referenced the SEJ tool and questioned how
the incentive would work if the individuals were on a
waitlist.
Vice-Chair Johnston thought it was important to compare the
current system with any changes they may try to put in
place. She spoke to her concern about providing treatment
to the best of the state's abilities. She asked if the
assessment waitlist was variable or a snapshot in time.
Ms. Brooks answered that there had been approximately 100
individuals on the assessment waitlist the past week.
Co-Chair Wilson asked how long it took to get through the
waitlist. For example, she wondered how long individual
number 50 would have to wait for an assessment.
Ms. Brooks replied that it depended on the facility; there
were a different number of providers in the various DOC
facilities. On average it would take about 60 days for a
person to get an assessment.
Co-Chair Wilson asked Mr. Skidmore if SEJ was the
appropriate acronym.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed. The term stood for suspended entry
of judgement.
Co-Chair Wilson explained the SEJ incentive to Ms. Brooks
that was supposed to enable an individual to have a reduced
sentence if they underwent treatment. She was trying to
determine what the incentive would be if a person could not
get through the program. She reasoned the option was only a
tool if the system worked. She reviewed the potential wait
time to get into a program including 60 days to get an
assessment and another 30 to 60 days to get into treatment.
She wanted to know how the tool worked.
Mr. Skidmore clarified that regarding SEJ and placing
someone on conditions to comply, he was speaking about a
person who was out of custody.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if individuals (out of custody) who
agreed to the terms of an SEJ had to go through an
assessment. Additionally, she queried the average wait time
to get into a treatment program.
1:48:08 PM
Ms. Brooks replied that a substance abuse assessment was
required before a person could enter any treatment program
including the 15-week intensive outpatient program or the
6-month residential program. She explained that the
assessment determined the level of need. She noted there
were assessment waitlists in the community as well. In
Anchorage, the waitlist for an assessment was approximately
60 days. Once an assessment had been completed, it took an
additional 30 to 45 days to get into treatment.
Co-Chair Wilson remarked that it sounded like completing a
sentence may take less time than the incentive option.
Vice-Chair Johnston addressed pretrial and stated that
under the current system, "we have nothing." She asked what
the treatment options would be under the proposed "carrot
and stick" approach. She wondered if the Alaska Mental
Health Trust Authority should weigh in on the subject.
Co-Chair Wilson stressed the importance of addressing
concerns when considering any bill.
Ms. Winkelman answered that under pretrial status, if the
court ordered an individual or they had an agreement to get
an assessment, even if the underlying charge indicated an
alcohol or drug problem, DOC did not have all of the
individuals in a treatment program or signing up for one.
She explained that in pretrial status signing up for a
program may appear that the defendant was admitting
something. She relayed that, similar to the situation for
individuals on probation and parole, when a defendant in
pretrial was ordered to get an assessment or treatment the
shortage of treatment providers caused delay in program
availability.
1:51:18 PM
Vice-Chair Johnston spoke to the current program where
individuals were released and there was no incentive to go
through treatment. She surmised that if an individual did
not go to the courts, DOC had no provisions to help them
with treatment.
Ms. Winkelman answered that as a pretrial service officer,
DOC enforced the conditions the court placed on an
individual. She elaborated that if the court ordered an
individual to get a substance abuse assessment or go
through treatment, the pretrial service officer would
follow through to ensure the defendant complied. She
reported that DOC saw many individuals who did not have an
assessment or treatment ordered. She explained that
pretrial service officers would give urinalysis testing,
breathalyzers, etcetera, if ordered by the court. The
officers visited defendants in the community to check in
and ensure they made it to their next court date. She did
not have an exact number, but DOC did see individuals
ordered into treatment in pretrial status.
Vice-Chair Johnston believed the CS would give the Court
System more flexibility and encouraging the treatment (even
though there was not much treatment available).
Mr. Skidmore agreed. He thought the committee's questions
centered around what the state was offering in terms of
assessment when someone was supervised by DOC. He clarified
that was not what he was talking about when he spoke about
an SEJ. He explained that an SEJ would allow the court to
direct a defendant to get a risk assessment done. The
defendant would return once the assessment was complete to
talk about doing treatment - whatever time it took for the
individual to get through the treatment, the court could
work with them on the SEJ. He explained that if the
individual successfully completed treatment, the case could
be dismissed and would not appear on the person's record.
He clarified the issue was not about the treatment
available at DOC.
Co-Chair Wilson believed the concern was about the scenario
where a person's sentence was shorter than the time it
would take to undergo treatment. She thought it went
against the goal.
Vice-Chair Johnston added that she was trying to determine
how effective the new statute would be. She wondered what
[treatment] would be available pretrial and with the tool,
if a sentence was one year and was hanging over someone's
head. She noted that drug addiction was a terrible disease
with no great fix. She was trying to find the right
approach to provide an option for individuals who were
ready to get treatment.
Mr. Skidmore replied it was not about the length of time a
person had to serve in jail versus how long it would take
them to do treatment. He clarified that two things were
offered. First, not being in jail at all. Second, avoiding
a conviction on a person's record. He explained the two
incentives were available to people if they utilized an
SEJ. He addressed the amount of time and the size of the
incentive being offered. There was a difference between
having a Class C felony with a sentence of 0 to 2 years and
the potential of a felony conviction versus a Class A
misdemeanor. From the prosecutor's standpoint, the Class C
felony was preferred and there was more incentive for the
prosecutor to offer. However, he believed a conviction on a
Class A misdemeanor and jailtime of one year was much
better than the current law.
1:56:49 PM
Co-Chair Wilson noted the concern was that addicts had a
small window of opportunity. She thought it sounded like
the window closed before it even opened. She asked if DOC
could utilize telehealth to get caught up with its
assessments.
Ms. Brooks answered that DOC had started using some
telehealth options in the past year. For example, when DOC
lost its program in Seward, it had also lost the individual
who provided assessments. The department was now able to do
assessments via telehealth. She reported that DOC was
looking at how to expand telehealth to impact the
assessment waitlist and wait time. She shared that DOC was
moving to a software-based national standardized assessment
tool for substance abuse. The Department of Health and
Social Services (DHSS) was also looking at implementing the
tool. She explained that standardizing assessments would
enable individuals to take the assessment with them when
they left custody and all treatment providers in the
community would accept the assessment, which would reduce
wait times and increase efficiency.
Representative Carpenter asked about the length of time for
substance abuse treatment offered in prison.
Ms. Brooks answered there were a couple of types of
treatment. The residential treatment program was the
highest level of treatment available and lasted six months.
For individuals who did not require the highest treatment
level, there was an intensive outpatient substance abuse
program that lasted 15 weeks.
Representative Carpenter highlighted a scenario where a
person was sentenced to eight months for first-time
possession (the maximum sentence for a Class A
misdemeanor). He believed that given the time it took to
get assessed and undergo inpatient treatment, the person's
treatment would be about three months longer than their
actual sentence.
1:59:52 PM
Ms. Brooks answered that the waitlist fluctuated. She
explained that priority was given to individuals who were
closest to their release date. She agreed that the scenario
provided by Representative Carpenter could potentially be
the case. She elaborated that moving individuals closest to
their release date up on the priority list sometimes made
the wait between the assessment and getting into treatment
a bit shorter.
Co-Chair Wilson asked when the standardized assessment tool
would be done.
Ms. Brooks answered that the training process had begun,
and she believed the system would start in July.
Representative Josephson observed that the law answered
many of the questions on suspended entry of judgement. He
referred to statute specifying that through agreement with
DOL, defense counsel, and the court, an individual could be
put on probation for a period as long as was allowed by
law. He noted the governor's bill would expand that law. He
surmised that some of the urgency of the queue and timeline
was not as exigent as it may sound, albeit those items
needed to be monitored and funding was necessary. He
pointed out that a court could not discharge an individual
from probation prior to one year under the statute. The
statute specified that the court could not grant an SEJ if
a person had violated the terms of their treatment. He
thought the statute covered much of what was desired.
Mr. Skidmore agreed that current statute provided the
leeway. The concept he had heard from others in the
committee was striking while the iron was hot. He would not
dispute that idea. He confirmed that the statute was
written so there was a tool available; there were
substantial periods of time, far more than what was needed,
even for the treatment waitlists. Whether a person was
still incentivized was the prudent question. He stated the
issue was a policy call - the CS made the first two
possession charges a Class A misdemeanor with jailtime of
up to one year, whereas, the governor's bill made
possession a Class C felony across the board.
Representative Josephson referenced Mr. Skidmore's response
to a question from Representative Carpenter. He shared his
understanding of Mr. Skidmore's answer that under the plan
proposed in the CS, an offender would be living and working
in the community and would be going to treatment, which was
the difference from the governor's plan.
Mr. Skidmore clarified that whenever he was speaking about
an SEJ it involved a person who did not serve a jail
sentence or have a conviction on the record. The SEJ had
been set up with those two incentives, which he believed
were substantial.
Co-Chair Wilson noted recognized Representative Ivy
Spohnholz (co-chair of the Health and Social Services
Committee) in the room. She noted that Representative
Spohnholz had suggested looking at the DHSS Division of
Behavioral Health website to view opportunities. She asked
if the backlog in the programs was zero.
REPRESENTATIVE IVY SPOHNHOLZ, reported there was a real
time list online specifying the number of beds, the
waitlist, and the number of days it would take to get into
any one of the inpatient facilities throughout the state.
There were currently facilities with open beds. She
detailed that if there were people needing treatment who
were not incarcerated and had been presented with the
possibility of jailtime or the alternative treatment, there
was a way to get the individuals into treatment
immediately.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the Health and Social Services
Committee was looking at the specific issue more in depth
in terms of what the state had to offer and where the holes
were.
Representative Spohnholz replied that the Health and Social
Services Committee would hold a hearing on the topic on
Thursday at 3:00 p.m.
Vice-Chair Johnston asked for verification that the SEJ
could be used at any time. She provided a scenario where an
individual had gone to treatment for an addiction and had
done well for a long period of time, but they were
approaching a third strike. She asked if it was a
circumstance the prosecutor would look at the SEJ. She
explained that it was a scenario where someone was trying
hard to deal with their addiction and they fell off the
wagon.
2:06:11 PM
Mr. Skidmore asked for clarification.
Vice-Chair Johnston clarified that in the hypothetical
scenario the person had two prior misdemeanors and were on
their third strike.
Mr. Skidmore stated his understanding of the question. He
believed Vice-Chair Johnston was asking when a person would
be eligible for the prosecution on the felony. He confirmed
that prosecution on the felony was available at that time.
Vice-Chair Johnston thought a prosecutor could use the SEJ
as a tool under the scenario. She was concerned about a
person trying desperately to get on the right track. She
pointed out there were options and it was not merely a
penal colony approach. She wanted the process to try to
work with the addiction as best as possible.
Mr. Skidmore answered it was an excellent point. Under the
CS, the first two offenses would be a Class A misdemeanor.
The third offense had a stronger penalty and the incentive
was larger. He explained that on the third offense the SEJ
incentive would enable a person to avoid up to two years in
jail and a felony conviction. The bill provided a path for
the option that did not exist under current law.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if an individual arrested for
possession would have different levels of access to the SEJ
tool and treatment facilities. He asked if the person's
waitlist would be longer if they were arrested in some
communities versus others. He asked if the prospect of
getting effective treatment would be different depending on
where a person was.
Representative Spohnholz confirmed that the prospect of
getting treatment was different in different communities.
She explained that the availability was elastic and changed
over time depending on what was happening in different
communities. For example, Akeela had two programs with no
waiting list in the Anchorage area. Additionally, there
were currently no waiting lists in the Bethel or Yukon-
Kuskokwim regions. However, individuals in the Mat-Su
Valley or Fairbanks would have difficulty getting into
treatment. She noted that an individual could travel to get
into treatment. She clarified that the information she had
provided was about inpatient programs. She noted there were
outpatient programs in addition to the inpatient slots that
were available. Additionally, there were other treatment
programs in the community that were based more around the
12-step model rather than a clinical model. There were a
wide range of options available to participate in addiction
treatment in Alaska.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked for verification that if a person
had to travel to get treatment, it would be at their
expense and not the state's.
Representative Spohnholz replied it could be, but she
thought it could be an element of the negotiation with the
court as well. She noted that the topic of payment for
travel to addiction treatment was outside of her purview.
Co-Chair Wilson stated that Medicaid expansion may also
qualify for an inpatient facility.
Representative Carpenter agreed that the option in the CS
looked better on paper and that it resulted in more
jailtime. However, he questioned whether it would solve the
problem. He considered that under the maximum jail time a
person had between 8 and 10 months to finish a drug
treatment program while incarcerated. He was setting aside
the SEJ option of doing treatment outside the prison. He
believed a judge would have to give a maximum sentence in
order for a person to be in prison long enough to get
through treatment. He explained that if an individual was
given a 90-day sentence, they would not be able to get
through treatment by their mandatory release date. He
stressed that while the CS increased the sentence range, it
did not improve the opportunity for individuals to complete
treatment. He would like to see the process sped up and
encouraged reducing the amount of time it took to get an
assessment and get into treatment. He questioned whether
the law would be improved under the provision.
2:11:38 PM
Co-Chair Wilson thought it was a policy call. She discussed
that in the past when there had been an incarcerated
individual with the ability to get treatment in an
outpatient facility it could take weeks to get the person
into treatment even when beds had been available. She did
not want government to get in the way of individuals
getting treatment. She asked Representative Spohnholz to
include it in discussions.
Representative Spohnholz agreed.
2:12:40 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz appreciated the comments by Representative
Spohnholz. He wondered if it was accurate that Alaska was
facing a significant shortage of treatment options overall.
Representative Spohnholz confirmed that there was a
shortage of available treatment options in Alaska. She
encouraged Co-Chair Wilson to share the website information
with the entire committee. She detailed that the website
was updated about every 24 hours at regular intervals. The
local providers provided the inpatient treatment
information to DHSS. She reported that there continued to
be some challenges with capital facilities for inpatient
treatment in Alaska. The state had refinanced the way it
paid for addiction treatment.
Representative Spohnholz explained that in the past the
state had funded addiction treatment solely by grants - the
legislature gave DHSS a certain amount of funding for
treatment and after the money was spent there had been no
more treatment available regardless of what the opioid,
alcohol, or other substance addictions there were. The
state had refinanced several years back and had gone to a
Medicaid billing model for addiction treatment. The change
allowed the state to pay for more addiction treatment in
response to the opioid epidemic. Once the problem was
resolved, the state would spend less money on addiction
treatment; the model was very efficient. The model allowed
the state to pay for services and operations of the
facility, but it did not allow for any investment of the
capital facilities needed to ensure there were enough
slots. There was still a capital problem that needed to be
addressed.
Representative Spohnholz relayed there had been some
federal money over the past several years that had been
granted out to the communities in Fairbanks and Juneau. The
state needed more in order to meet the need. The state also
needed to address workforce shortage needs; there was a
shortage of behavioral health providers available to do
substance abuse treatment. She highlighted that the Health
and Social Services Committee would hear about the topic at
its Thursday afternoon meeting.
2:15:17 PM
Co-Chair Wilson asked to hear from Mr. Steve Williams with
the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority (AMHTA). She
queried what AMHTA was doing regarding treatment.
2:15:53 PM
STEVE WILLIAMS, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, ALASKA MENTAL
HEALTH TRUST AUTHORITY (via teleconference), appreciated
the conversation that was occurring because he did not
believe the particular dialogue had received the weight it
deserved in discussions on the bill. He believed the
conversation highlighted the necessity between looking at a
criminal justice problem through a public health lens. He
noted that public safety had to be first and foremost, but
it was necessary to consider what was driving the
underlying issues for the individual causing contact with
the criminal justice system. It was necessary to consider
how to respond and how to get the individual access to the
needed treatment. He thought Representative Spohnholz was
accurate in her description of the access issues and
available access to treatment.
Mr. Williams believed it was important to remember that
having the leverage of a sentence did not necessarily mean
someone was going to access treatment. He stated that
addiction is a disease and the motivations and use of
particular substances vary. The organization had been
engaged in the issue for several years and had partnered
with DHSS on increasing access to treatment. Additionally,
AMHTA had partnered with the Court System, DOL, and the
Public Defender Agency on different diversion approaches to
address those interested in treatment. The organization was
working to provide opportunities for individuals to engage
in treatment, when public safety was not at risk. He
referenced therapeutic courts. He relayed that AMHTA
partnered with DOC on several of the programs Ms. Brooks
had discussed earlier, in addition to some release
programming.
Co-Chair Wilson thanked Mr. Williams for being available.
She noted it was only the beginning of the conversation.
2:18:31 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked Mr. Skidmore about the SEJ tool. He
wondered how long the tool had been available.
Mr. Skidmore responded that the SEJ tool had been enacted
under SB 91 in 2016.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked for verification that the district
attorneys and defense weighed in on the issue.
Alternatively, he wondered if it was up to the prosecutor
to determine whether to use the SEJ.
Mr. Skidmore answered that use of the SEJ required the
prosecution and defense to agree on its use.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if there were any statistics showing
how often the tool had been used by district attorneys or
prosecutors since it became available.
Mr. Skidmore replied that the SEJ had not been in use for
issues related to drugs and drug prosecutions because
possession crimes had zero jailtime available since the
implementation of SB 91; therefore, there was no incentive
for anyone to try to engage in an SEJ for a drug possession
crime.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if the tool would be used frequently
if the jailtime was increased to one year. He surmised it
would still be up to the prosecution to decide whether they
wanted to use the tool. He thought there may be some good
reasons why the prosecution may not want to use the tool.
Mr. Skidmore agreed that the SEJ required both parties to
agree to its use. He expected there would be an increased
use of the tool, but he did not know what the increased
percentage would be. He elaborated that the criminal
justice system was based on discretion because the facts
and defendants varied in each case; the tool may be
appropriate in one case but not another. Without the
increased sentencing, the SEJ would not be used for drug
offenses. He stated that the current system was not
working.
Representative Josephson referenced the current law as it
related to the SEJ. He referred to an earlier comment by
Representative Carpenter that it appeared a person would
opt to go to jail if it was shorter [than an option with
the SEJ]. He observed that under subsections (a) and (e) of
the law, it was not possible to know what the sentence may
be. He thought it was only possible to know the sentence
may be up to one year.
Mr. Skidmore replied that the SEJ process began with a
change of plea hearing. He explained that a defendant would
plead no contest or guilty and before the judge entered a
judgement, the entry of the judgement would be suspended.
He explained no conviction or sentence was entered; no one
knew what the outcome would be. He explained it was a
person's opportunity to try to avoid potential jailtime and
a conviction. He elaborated that if the outcome failed, the
individual would go before the judge again and the judge
would accept the plea, enter judgement, and hand down a
sentence.
2:23:06 PM
Representative Josephson asked if he was correct in saying
that all of the bills (including Representative Chuck
Kopp's HB 10, HB 49, and the CS for HB 49) moved to a
felony on the third offense. He asked if the question under
consideration was whether jailtime should be available for
the first two misdemeanor offenses as incentive for
individuals to go through treatment.
Mr. Skidmore confirmed that of the bills listed by
Representative Josephson, the CS was the only one to have
jailtime associated with the first two offenses.
Representative LeBon asked if the provision was a "3
strikes, you're out" approach to treatment. He provided a
scenario where a person tried and failed at treatment after
their first two [drug] offenses. He asked if the third
offense was a Class C felony.
Mr. Skidmore confirmed that the CS would make the third
offense a Class C felony.
Representative LeBon asked how the individual would be
treated by the court if they failed on their third attempt
and came back a fourth time.
Mr. Skidmore responded that if a person was convicted of a
Class C felony for their third offense, on a fourth offense
the parties would evaluate the timeframe in which the
person came back. He explained that two of the first three
offenses would need to be within the timeframe the offense
would be a Class C felony (set at 10 years in the CS); if
within the 10-year period, the fourth offense would be a
second-time Class C felony. He believed the sentence range
was 2 to 4 years, but he would have to double check.
2:25:34 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked Mr. Skidmore if any of the
governor's bills included the SEJ tool as a means of
criminal reform.
Mr. Skidmore responded that none of the governor's bills
removed the SEJ from law; it would remain in the law and
had been one of the items discussed by the administration.
Co-Chair Wilson indicated the committee would break until
2:35 p.m.
2:26:33 PM
AT EASE
2:36:11 PM
RECONVENED
Co-Chair Wilson noted they would begin with probation
lengths.
Mr. Skidmore addressed probation lengths in Section 58 of
the bill. He detailed that the CS would return probation
lengths to the maximum period that existed prior to SB 91 -
25 years for sexual felonies and 10 years for all other
crimes. He noted that for an SEJ, the amount of time an
individual had time to comply with conditions such as
treatment was based on how long the probation was
available. He stated that returning probation back to the
maximum periods was important for multiple reasons.
Vice-Chair Ortiz recognized the severity of sex offense
crimes; however, he thought 25 years seemed to be a long
time on probation. He asked if statistics showed the length
of time was necessary in order to prevent recurrence or
promote rehabilitation. He remarked that probation of 25
years taxed the system including the probation officers. He
asked if that timeframe was necessary.
Mr. Skidmore answered that the containment model used for
sex offenders was based on probation and based on what an
offender does on probation. He underscored the success of
the model. The lengthy probation allowed the justice system
to keep offenders on the containment model to reduce the
risk of reoffense. He could not say whether 25 years was
the magic number, but the longer someone was kept on the
containment model, the better.
Co-Chair Wilson expressed appreciation for the
conversation.
Mr. Skidmore turned to caps on sanctions for technical
violations or absconding from probation (Section 55) or
parole. He noted that some of the caps were addressed in
the repealer section of the legislation. The caps on
sanctions for technical violations referred to the concept
that someone was placed on probation or parole with a
series of conditions. Conditions could include the
requirement for an individual to report to their probation
or parole officer on a periodic basis, maintain employment,
notify the justice system of any address change, not
consume alcohol, treatment, no contact with children, and
other. A violation of the conditions, other than committing
a new crime or failing to comply with sex offender
treatment, was deemed to be a technical violation.
Mr. Skidmore explained that one of the efforts under SB 91
was to model the whole system on PACE [Probationer
Accountability with Certain Enforcement]. The idea was that
when people violated their probation or parole, they would
immediately receive a sanction. He noted there had been
studies showing the success of the approach. The state had
attempted to replicate the model, but the effort had
failed. He explained that failure had occurred for several
reasons. First, the state could not make the timeframe to
get to adjudication fast enough. Second, in PACE programs
the offender agreed to be on the program so they recognized
what the sanction would be and that it would happen quickly
when they committed a technical violation. Third, it
responded to a single allegation and the caps were not
written into the law under the PACE program the way they
were in statute.
2:41:55 PM
Mr. Skidmore explained that when a person committed a
violation of probation or parole, a petition was filed. He
detailed that it did not matter if the petition alleged one
or multiple violations. When the person was arrested and
placed in jail, there were statutes that prohibited the
person from being held in jail longer than the cap
available for the particular petition (currently 3, 5, and
10 days for the first three violations respectively). Once
the person was released, their adjudication hearing had not
yet happened, and some individuals ended up violating
probation or parole again. He explained that the cap was
still 3 days under the scenario because the individual had
not yet been adjudicated - they were still under the same
petition and it did not matter how many allegations they
had.
Mr. Skidmore clarified that the situation did not happen in
every case, but he illustrated scenarios that could happen.
He stressed there were times when an individual committed
10 different violations before getting to their
adjudication, yet the cap was limited to 3, 5, and 10 days.
He explained it had created a scenario where there was no
incentive to follow the conditions while waiting for
adjudication. He underscored that the system did not work.
The CS would return the law to its prior state without
caps. He reminded the committee the bill contained a number
of compromises. The governor's original bills talked about
eliminating administrative sanctions. He elaborated that SB
91 had required DOC to develop an administrative sanctions
program specifying that if an individual violated probation
or parole, the department would attempt to address the
violation without filing a petition. The department would
attempt to address the violation administratively.
Mr. Skidmore reported that the CS did not eliminate
administrative sanctions. He detailed that administrative
sanctions had been utilized 21,000 times in the two years
they had been available. He emphasized that administrative
sanctions were the vehicle to get to swift sanctions and
something other than jail. Once the sanction was used,
there would no longer be a 3, 5, and 10-day cap limitation.
He noted that the court or parole board could determine
there would be no jailtime for a petition, but they would
have full discretion to determine the appropriate action.
2:45:30 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked whether a new sanction level could
be added for individuals who violate at higher levels,
instead of the approach outlined by Mr. Skidmore.
Mr. Skidmore responded that the CS attempted an approach
that would include something in statute. He explained that
the system was built on discretion and when it was limited
too much, particularly through statutes, it broke. Caps on
technical violations was probably one of the top two things
that prosecutors communicated had been broken via criminal
justice reform [SB 91]. He emphasized the high amount of
litigation over the particular concept. He stressed that
the change needed to take place in order to repeal and
replace aspects of SB 91. He reiterated that administrative
sanctions would remain in place, but the caps on technical
violations would be eliminated.
2:47:10 PM
Co-Chair Wilson asked the director of the Parole Board to
weigh in on the topic.
JEFF EDWARDS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PAROLE BOARD, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS (via teleconference), reported that Mr.
Skidmore had accurately portrayed the concerns the Parole
Board had with the existing caps, which the board referred
to as the "3, 5, and 10 system." He elaborated that the
caps had been a dueling system with PACE, which was a swift
and certain sanctions program adopted for the paroling
authority. He explained that PACE had been intended to deal
with violations swiftly with most certain arrest; it had
been an efficient way to deal with violations to prevent
them from dragging out for months. The board found that
when an individual committed a technical violation (e.g.
drug or alcohol use or failing to report to a parole
officer), 3 days had turned into part of doing business for
those individuals on supervision. He furthered that by the
time the individuals had reached their third or fourth
violation, the board had discretion to impose significant
jailtime; whereas, the 3, 5, and 10 system was part of
doing business.
2:48:57 PM
Mr. Skidmore moved to early termination of probation and
parole. He explained that prior to SB 91, a probation or
parole officer had the ability to make a recommendation
either to the court or Parole Board respectively. He
explained that the officers could report that their
probationer or parolee was doing well and no longer needed
to be on probation or parole; the officers could recommend
ending an individual's probation or parole early. Under SB
91, instead of having a recommendation by an officer, it
would be called a recommendation, but it would be required
to occur in statute after a certain period of time.
Mr. Skidmore elaborated that it was no longer a judgement
call made by the probation or parole officer but would be
automatic under statute. As long as a person did not have a
violation in a specific period of time (e.g. 12 or 18
months), the officer had to recommend their probation or
parole should end. He pointed out that the recommendation
was not based on progress or anything left to be
accomplished by an individual. He did not believe the
process made any logical sense. The CS would eliminate the
provision, but the probation and parole officers would have
discretion to make a true recommendation to end probation
or parole early. He explained the change would end a one
size fits all provision.
2:51:37 PM
Mr. Skidmore turned to felony sentencing in Sections 60 and
61 in the bill. He explained the felony sentencing
provisions in the CS contained multiple compromises from
the governor's original bills. The provisions applied to
Class C, Class B, and Class A felonies. He reviewed that SB
91 reduced Class C felonies to probation only. He
elaborated that SB 54 had returned to the law prior to SB
91 that carried a sentence of 0 to 2 years for a first time
offense. The second and third [Class C] felonies were also
reduced in SB 91 and were not adjusted in SB 54. He pointed
out that Class C felonies were not listed in the bill. He
expounded that although the governor's bills would adjust
the [presumptive ranges for] second and third time Class C
felonies to their pre-SB 91 status, the CS left Class C
felonies alone. The sentence ranges were 1 to 4 years for a
second offense and 2 to 5 years for a third offense (5
years was the maximum sentence for a Class C felony). The
sentencing ranges had not been changed in the CS because
they were deemed sufficient for courts to exercise
discretion appropriately.
Mr. Skidmore reported that Sections 60 and 61 of the
legislation addressed Class A and B felonies. For Class A
felonies, SB 91 the sentencing range had been reduced by 2
years - from 5 to 8 years to 3 to 6 years for a first time
felony. The CS would increase the sentencing range to 4 to
7 years for a first offense. He stated that the pattern was
repeated for a second and third offense.
Mr. Skidmore addressed Class B felonies. For Class B
felonies, SB 91 the sentencing range had been reduced from
1 to 3 years to 0 to 2 years for a first time offense. The
CS would return the sentencing range to 1 to 3 years. The
CS would increase the sentencing from 2 to 5 years to 2 to
6 years for a second offense and from 4 to 10 years to 5 to
10 years for a third offense. Those changes concluded the
significant deviations in presumptive sentencing for
felonies from the governor's bills.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if the proposed adjustments had been
made with the goal of deterring crime.
Mr. Skidmore asked if Vice-Chair Ortiz was referring to
adjustments in the CS or prior adjustments.
Vice-Chair Ortiz clarified he was asking about proposed
adjustments in the CS.
Mr. Skidmore answered that national studies demonstrated
for the last 30 years crime rates had been reduced by
increasing incarceration. The bill focused on Class A and B
felonies (the more serious offenses), not the Class C
felonies (lower level offenses). The bill aimed to do what
proponents of SB 91 wanted, which was to focus resources on
the most serious offenses. He explained that SB 91 had
reduced all felony sentencing, excluding sex offenses and
murder. The CS would focus resources on the most
significant crimes - Class A and B felonies - to combat the
escalation in crime rates.
2:56:54 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz surmised the answer to his question was
yes and it was the belief of the administration and/or the
prosecution that increasing sentences for "these types of
felonies" acted as a deterrent to crime.
Mr. Skidmore agreed.
Representative Josephson highlighted that when the
legislature had restored first-time Class C felonies in
November 2017 (through a floor amendment), it had brought
the offense at parity with the first-time Class B felony
offense. He understood it was allowable but did not create
the normal gradation.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed.
Mr. Skidmore turned to misdemeanor sentencing; Class A and
B misdemeanors were the two sentencing levels. He explained
that prior to SB 91 the ranges had been 0 to 365 days for a
Class A misdemeanor and 0 to 90 days for a Class A
misdemeanor. Under SB 91, a large portion of Class A
misdemeanors had been reduced to a new presumptive range of
0 to 30 days. The previous version of HB 49 had proposed to
increase the range to 0 to 90 days. The CS would return the
sentencing range to its pre-SB 91 range of 0 to 365 days.
Mr. Skidmore addressed sentencing for Class B misdemeanors.
The provision had not been altered from the original HB 49
and would increase the sentencing range from the current 0
to 10 days to 0 to 30 days (prior to SB 91 the range had
been 0 to 90 days). He pointed out the change was a
difference between the governor's bills and the CS.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for the section references.
Mr. Skidmore replied Sections 64 and 65.
2:59:35 PM
Mr. Skidmore reviewed presumptive sentencing for sex
offenses in Section 66. He referred back to the Williams
case he had mentioned early on in the meeting that the
legislative intent addressed. He explained there was a
sentencing range for a first offense. The CS clarified that
any prior felony counted as a prior felony for presumptive
sentencing in sex cases. In the Williams case the court
specified that the law was written in such a way that an
offense could be elevated to a higher sentencing level if a
prior felony was a sex offense only. For example, if a
person was convicted of sexual assault and they had a prior
burglary felony, the burglary could not result in an
increased sentence. He stated [that for sentencing
purposes] it was as though the prior felony did not exist.
He stressed it did not matter if it was burglary, a
physical assault, arson, or other. Only sex offenses would
elevate the presumptive sentencing. He underscored that
when the law had passed, it had not been what the
legislature had been told. The CS would mean prior felonies
of any kind would trigger an increased presumptive range
for a sex offense.
3:01:55 PM
Mr. Skidmore turned to a path to restore a driver's license
that was suspended or canceled due to a felony DUI. Under
current law, an individual's license was suspended or
revoked permanently for committing a felony DUI. The
provision would allow a person to obtain a driver's license
if they had been convicted of a felony DUI that was not
associated with a crime against a person (e.g. vehicular
assault), their license had been revoked for 10 years and
in the preceding 10 years the person had not committed a
new criminal offense. It was the same provision in HB 49
from the House Judiciary Committee.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the provision was in Section 74.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed. He referenced Sections 74 and 75
related to felony DUI and felony refusal respectively; both
used the term criminal offense (any criminal offense
applied). Statutes also specified there were certain crimes
where a person would not have the ability to obtain their
license. He detailed that the crimes included murder under
AS 11.41.200 to AS 11.41.210 and other crimes in AS
11.41.280 and AS 11.41.281. He shared that the provision
had not been included in the governor's bills, but it was
included in the CS and in other bills under consideration
by the House and Senate. He added that the administration
supported the concept.
Co-Chair Wilson believed an individual was required to go
through some type of treatment as well. She pointed to
Section 74, page 51 of the bill.
3:05:10 PM
Mr. Skidmore replied by reading the requirements listed in
the bill (Section 74, page 51):
(1) may restore the driver's license if
(A) the license has been revoked for a period of
at least 10 years;
(B) the person has not been convicted of a
criminal offense in the 10 years preceding the
request for restoration of the license; and
(C) the person provides proof of financial
responsibility
Mr. Skidmore believed the concept mentioned by Co-Chair
Wilson was in subsection (2):
(2) shall restore the driver's license if
(A) the person has been granted limited license
privileges under AS 28.15.201(g) and has
successfully driven under that limited license
for three years without having the limited
license privileges revoked;
(B) the person has successfully completed a
court-ordered treatment program under AS
28.35.028 or a rehabilitative treatment program
under AS 28.15.201(h)
Co-Chair Wilson asked if an individual would try to get
their limited license in year 7 or 10.
Mr. Skidmore clarified it had been some time since he had
studied all of the statutes. He believed limited licenses
were provided under particular circumstances as outlined
under subsections (1) and (2) [of Section 74]. There were
two paths an individual could take: subsection (1)
addressed the 10-year timeframe and subsection (2)
addressed what an eligible person would have to do to get
their limited license restored.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for verification that the first path
pertained only to the 10-year timeframe.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed.
Co-Chair Wilson considered the second path.
Mr. Skidmore interjected that the second path was available
when a person had [successfully driven under the limited
license for] three years.
Co-Chair Wilson needed more clarification.
Mr. Skidmore queried if Co-Chair Wilson was asking when a
person was eligible for a limited license.
Co-Chair Wilson replied in the affirmative. She observed
that Ms. Mead was available to answer the question.
Ms. Mead confirmed that under [Section 74] subsection
(o)(1) if 10 years had passed and no other crime had been
committed, a person was eligible to have their license
restored by the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV).
Subsection (2) had been added in SB 91 because the bill had
added a means for individuals in therapeutic court to get a
limited driver's license if they participated successfully
in therapeutic court for at least 6 months or had graduated
and they fulfilled other responsibilities (e.g. the ability
to show proof of insurance). She continued that SB 91 also
added a provision allowing individuals in locations without
a therapeutic court to seek a sobriety hearing that
required a person to show they had been sober for 18 months
and that they had been through a treatment program that
mirrored or imitated the requirements of therapeutic court.
The outlined options reflected the two avenues individuals
could obtain a limited driver's license after a felony DUI.
She noted that an individual could have their full license
restored if they had been successful under the limited
license for three years.
3:09:01 PM
Co-Chair Wilson referenced the DMV's administrative
process. She asked if the DMV could still require certain
things to be on a person's car (e.g. a breathalyzer or
other). She was trying to determine how or if the statutory
requirements connected with the DMV process.
Ms. Mead answered that after a felony DUI part of the
required judgement included a fine and jailtime.
Additionally, if and when an individual got their license
back, they were required to use an ignition interlock
device for a set period of time. The timeframe varied
depending on which felony DUI it was [i.e. first offense or
other]. Individuals who were eligible to have their license
restored would still have the ignition interlock device for
the court ordered timeframe specified when they had
received their sentence.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for verification the order came
through the court and not the DMV.
Ms. Mead confirmed that the order was required to come from
the court at the time of sentencing.
Mr. Skidmore moved to the topic of out of state sex
offender registration.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if Mr. Skidmore had covered the
provision pertaining to driving with a license
suspended/revoked/canceled.
Mr. Skidmore answered that he had accidentally skipped the
provision in Section 73 of the legislation.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if the provision pertaining to
driving with a license suspended/revoked/canceled related
directly to the previous provision regarding a driver's
license after a felony DUI. He considered that the bill
returned driving with a license suspended (DWLS) to a
crime. He asked if the clock would be reset at another 10
years if a person caught driving without a license had
previously been convicted of a felony DUI.
Mr. Skidmore replied affirmatively. He relayed that driving
with a license suspended/revoked/canceled had been a crime
in 2015. He detailed the crime fell under two categories:
1) a license could be suspended/revoked/canceled by the
court because of a DUI, and 2) a license could be
suspended/revoked/canceled because of points, a person had
not paid for insurance, and for numerous other
administrative reasons. Under SB 91, the revocation based
on a DUI remained a crime, but all of the other revocations
had been turned into violations. The CS would return
driving with a license suspended/revoked/canceled to a
crime. Under SB 91, the mandatory minimum sentencing was 10
days with 10 days suspended for a first offense and 20 days
with 10 days suspended. There had been other provisions for
DUIs and numerous cascading provisions. Additionally, there
had been issues related to a mandatory fine and community
work service.
Mr. Skidmore explained that Section 73 of the CS would
return all DWLS to a crime, but it would limit sentencing
to 10 days with 10 days suspended or the mandatory minimum
of 10 days for a subsequent offense. He referenced the
question from Vice-Chair Ortiz and confirmed that driving
with a license suspended/revoked/canceled would be a new
crime, which would require the 10 years to start over.
3:13:30 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz remarked that a DUI is a very serious
crime, yet he believed there was a recognition that when
possible, individuals should have options to get to work
and be more self-sustaining. He thought there was a sense
the state needed to provide a pathway for that possibility.
He asked if adopting the provision [returning driving with
a license suspended/revoked/canceled to a crime] would
create a barrier that may go against the intent to create a
path forward for individuals.
Co-Chair Wilson asked which section Vice-Chair Ortiz was
referring to.
Vice-Chair Ortiz replied he was referring to the section on
driving with a license suspended/revoked/canceled.
Co-Chair Wilson interjected it was Section 73.
Vice-Chair Ortiz explained he was trying to connect it to
the overall goal of enabling an individual to get their
license restored after 10 years under the section on
driver's license after a felony DUI. He noted he was
referring to a document [provided by DOL titled "Draft CS
HB 49" (copy on file)]. He clarified that returning driving
with a license suspended/revoked/canceled to a crime would
reset the clock. He asked if the change raised the bar to a
level that all parties believed was reasonable.
Mr. Skidmore answered that recriminalizing the DWLS meant
there would be enforcement when individuals drove with a
license suspended/revoked/canceled because they did not
have insurance or other. He explained the change would only
impact the path above if a person violated the law.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the governor had put forward the
provision to return driving with a license
suspended/revoked/canceled to a crime.
Mr. Skidmore replied that the provision had been added by
the Senate; it had not been included in any of the
governor's original bills.
3:16:33 PM
Representative Josephson addressed Section 73 of the bill.
He noted that Mr. Skidmore had put the DWLS crime into two
categories: 1) resulting from a DUI or 2) resulting from
all other reasons. Previous to SB 91, if a person drove in
the 90-day window that was typical of a first DUI offense,
there was a 10-day jailtime imposed. He asked for
verification the provision was not restored in the CS;
there was not a suspended sentence if a person drove a car
while being suspended for a DUI.
Mr. Skidmore replied that the statute was AS 28.15.291. The
subsection Representative Josephson was referring to under
the previous law was (b)(1)(d). The penalty had been a
minimum of 30 days in jail and a fine of $1,000.
Representative Josephson recalled a 10-day provision.
Mr. Skidmore answered that the 10-day provision had been
for a subsequent offense. He explained the sentence had
been 20 days with 10 days suspended if a person had
previously been convicted of DWLS. Whereas, the DUI had
resulted in a 30-day penalty.
Representative Merrick asked how returning driving with
license suspended/revoked/canceled to a crime may be a tool
for law enforcement regarding "revolving door" issues
(picking up someone who may have normally been let go).
Mr. Skidmore answered that DWLS had been a significant
issue in many places around the state including Fairbanks,
Mat-Su, and the Kenai Peninsula. The issue had accounted
for approximately 17 percent of the misdemeanor caseload in
2015. There were a substantial number of individuals who
came into contact with law enforcement because of the
issue. He elaborated that when people came into contact
with law enforcement it could also mean that law
enforcement ended up discovering additional information. He
would not categorize it as a tool, but he agreed that when
someone was stopped for DWLS it could result in officers
finding additional information and could lead to other
charges.
Representative Merrick noted that based on Mr. Skidmore's
prior testimony she had been under the impression that
there were certain offenses that law enforcement could not
necessarily book a person for (e.g. drug possession), but
the provision under discussion would enable an officer to
book a person even if the other possession was not
considered a crime.
Mr. Skidmore replied that in the particular case, if a
person was driving with a license
suspended/revoked/canceled and it was a crime, whether or
not law enforcement would arrest the individual was a
discretionary call for the officer. He clarified that the
officer would have the ability to make an arrest, whereas
they would not have the ability to arrest a person if the
offense was classified as a violation.
3:21:00 PM
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the number would decrease if
individuals had the incentive to get their license back.
She reasoned that if an individual was told they would
never get their license back, they really had nothing to
lose. She thought that the addition of the provision may
provide incentive. She asked if the two items were
connected.
Mr. Skidmore responded that he did not know the statistics
breakdown of what portion of the 17 percent of the caseload
(around 2,500 cases) were the result of a permanent license
revocation from a felony DUI. He confirmed there would be
an impact, but he did not know the percentage.
Co-Chair Wilson noted that sometimes it was necessary to
provide people with hope to get something back. She noted
there were not other types of transportation in some areas
of the state depending on where a person could afford to
live. She noted that there were numerous people in
Fairbanks driving with a suspended license. She believed
many of the situations were related to DUIs.
3:22:14 PM
Representative Knopp asked if the language regarding
licenses added to SB 32 in the Senate was original or
modified.
Mr. Skidmore responded that the language in the CS was
identical to the language in the bill in the Senate.
Mr. Skidmore moved to Sections 69 through 72 pertaining to
out of state sex offender registration. He detailed that
Alaska's sex offender registration laws only required an
individual to register in Alaska if they came from another
state that required an individual to register if the crime
an individual was convicted of in another state had similar
elements to the crime in Alaska. He explained it was one of
three ways people addressed sex offender registration
between different states. The second option was to compare
the facts of the offense in the other state to the elements
of the offense in the receiving state. The third was
proposed in the CS and required an individual to register
in Alaska if they were required to register in another
state. The state did not want Alaska to be a place for
people to go to avoid sex offender registration
requirements. He reminded committee members that Alaska led
the nation in sex assaults. He stressed that the state did
not want to encourage anyone to come to Alaska to avoid
registration requirements in other states.
3:24:41 PM
Mr. Skidmore moved to earned compliance credits (ECC). He
explained that ECC provided an option to reduce the length
of an individual's probation or parole. He noted the
concept had not existed prior to SB 91. The CS would
maintain ECC, but at a reduced level. He detailed that the
reduction to a person's period of probation or parole would
be at one-third instead of the current 30 days for 30 days.
He explained that the 30 days for 30 days had resulted in
substantial litigation over how to calculate the 30 days.
Under the CS, an individual would start probation or parole
and would automatically be told what their release date
would be. For example, if a person was given three years of
probation or parole, they would be informed they would be
released after two years; if they committed a violation,
the state would start to claw back some of the ECC. The
change from one-to-one to one-to-three put the state in
compliance with recently adopted federal ECC law.
Additionally, the change would align Alaska with a number
of other states. He noted that some states used the one-to-
one structure, but more states used the one-to-three
structure. Second, the change altered the language of the
statute to help eliminate some of the litigation issues
over time accounting of 30 days for 30 days.
Vice-Chair Ortiz considered that the change would align the
state with federal ECC guidelines. He addressed the
complexity in calculating the time under current law. He
asked if it was possible to eliminate the calculation
problems if the time was cut to one-half instead of one-
third. He wondered if there was data driving the proposed
change.
Mr. Skidmore affirmed there were two different concepts
trying to be achieved in the sections. He noted that
probation was found in Sections 76 and 77 and parole was
found in Sections 89 and 90. He addressed the concept
between reducing ECCs to one-third or one-half and
confirmed that reducing the ECC to one-half would eliminate
the time accounting problem. He relayed that the choice
between one-third and one-half was a policy decision for
the legislature. He did not know there was data showing
whether one was better than the other.
3:29:02 PM
Representative Merrick asked about the recidivism rate for
people behind bars.
Mr. Skidmore replied that the overall national data listed
the recidivism rate at about 68 percent. The most recent
data he had seen for Alaska showed a rate of 61 percent. He
noted the category was broad and all encompassing.
Representative Merrick clarified that she referring to
people in jail.
Mr. Skidmore replied that he had misunderstood the
question. The information he had provided pertained to
individuals who had been released from jail. The recidivism
rate for people in jail was extremely low. He noted there
were people who committed crimes in jail, but the rate was
very low.
Representative Merrick asked for verification that
receiving ECCs at a rate of one-third instead of one-half
would keep the rate down.
Mr. Skidmore responded that the concept of probation and
parole pertained to individuals no longer in custody. The
one-third versus one-half applied to individuals out of
custody.
3:30:43 PM
Co-Chair Wilson noted that data showed that if someone had
issues on probation and parole it was typically on the
front end rather than the backend. She referred to SB 91
and thought that part of idea of the 30 credits was about
rewarding someone for doing well along the way. She noted
that the change in the CS did the opposite where the amount
[of time served on probation and parole] would continually
increase if someone committed a violation. She asked if it
took someone awhile on the front end to get their life
together, they may have already extended their time out.
She reiterated that data showed people tended to have
issues at the start of probation or parole.
Mr. Skidmore confirmed the data indicated that the larger
number of violations occurred more frequently within the
first six months. He reminded the committee that the
national data showed the recidivism rate went from 68
percent to 97 to 83 as time went on. He agreed that people
did continue to commit violations, but the vast majority
occurred in the first six months. He addressed Co-Chair
Wilson's concern that the proposed change would eliminate
the incentive. He did not know how the incentive would be
impacted. He explained that an individual would still
receive credit. They would begin with one-third; if they
offended in the first several months it would result in
less credit.
Co-Chair Wilson considered that the situation was like a
situation involving young children. She explained there
were individuals who had never been structured until being
in prison. She thought many individuals believed they would
be fine upon release because they had not known anything
else for some time. She thought the purpose of the 30 days
was to give incentive. She believed the change went in the
opposite direction by giving an individual a reward ahead
of time with the assumption they would have no issues along
the way. She stated that the data showed issues typically
occurred at the beginning of a person's time [on probation
or parole]. She felt it seemed like a person could end up
losing all of their credit because it took them time to get
the system. She thought it was the opposite of what they
had tried to do with the 30 day option. She did not
understand why there was not an electronic data program
that could give or not give the 30 days. She imagined the
state would end up with the same problem if an individual
committed a violation and a probation or parole officer had
to add time back to their probation or parole. She believed
there would still be an accounting nightmare.
3:34:32 PM
Mr. Skidmore replied that he was not an expert on time
accounting for DOC.
Co-Chair Wilson did not understand the time accounting
aspect. She liked the reward concept under the 30-day
option that provided incentive for an individual. She
believed there were many good parole and probation
officers; however, she noted that sometimes it was the luck
of the draw for a person to get someone who was much better
and understanding versus someone who was a stickler and
gave individuals violations for any little thing. She was
concerned about getting away from a structured plan to an
unstructured plan. She stated it was a policy call for the
legislature. She explained that she did not like the 30-day
credit at first, but had learned that for individuals
needing structure, it seemed to work much better. She
thought if the time accounting was the only problem, it
could be addressed somehow.
Mr. Skidmore clarified that he had not stated DOC had any
difficulty counting. He had indicated there was substantial
litigation where people wanted to argue about how the
system worked and operated. The issue was more about the
litigation than time accounting.
Co-Chair Wilson pointed out that the litigation had to do
with counting.
Mr. Skidmore answered that the litigation had to do with
arguing about how the statutory and regulatory language was
applied.
Co-Chair Wilson preferred to look at clarifying the
provision versus eliminating it.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard asked if DOC would present
to the committee in the future.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if Representative Sullivan-Leonard
was interested in data on the particular issue or overall.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard replied that she would like
more overall information.
3:37:17 PM
Co-Chair Wilson asked to hear from DOC. She asked if
clarifying the provision could solve the issue instead of
completely changing the program.
Ms. Winkelman answered that she did not know that the
timeframe made a difference. There was an ease in the one-
third language versus the one-half language. She stated the
option fell in line with how DOC treated good time. She
knew there had been countless litigation issues in regard
to the calculation. She highlighted issues such as defining
what compliance was. She elaborated that if an individual
lived in a community where something was unavailable, they
were not complying by their conditions of probation. She
questioned whether the individual would earn compliance
credits and they would be kept on probation longer or be
off sooner. The idea of frontloading the one-third off from
the beginning allowed individuals to know the system
believed in their ability to do well. When a violation rose
to the level of the courts, similar to a disciplinary
process in an institution, time would be added back on. The
idea was to mirror the system.
Ms. Winkelman did not know that it was necessarily a
calculation issue, as it was about defining the period of
compliance. If someone was noncompliant with their
probationary period at the beginning of the month, DOC lost
the "carrot/stick" for the rest of the month versus dealing
with a violation on a case by case basis.
Co-Chair Wilson thought there could still be the same
counting issue [under the proposed provision in the CS].
She pointed out there would be a process to determine
whether something was a violation and a person could argue
with credit time given or taken away. She asked if it the
language could be changed to clarify. She believed there
would be an argument over whether something was a true
violation. Additionally, whether the amount of time lost
fit the violation.
Ms. Winkelman answered that if the bill passed, DOC would
write policies and regulations to adhere to the new law.
She did not yet know what the policies or regulations would
look like.
Co-Chair Wilson clarified she was asking whether the
current law could be fixed to make the system clearer.
Alternatively, she wondered if it would continue to be
litigated from within. She wanted to avoid changing the
policy and ending up in a different type of litigation. She
thought it came down to whether a violation was committed
and whether the penalty fit the violation (whether on the
front or back end). She did not expect the department to
have an answer on hand.
3:40:32 PM
Mr. Skidmore moved to parole eligibility in Sections 80
through 82. He noted that parole eligibility and subsequent
provisions including parole release presumptions and parole
application fell under Sections 79 through 85. Parole
options included mandatory or good time and discretionary
parole. He explained that discretionary parole was not
automatic and involved applying to the Parole Board to be
released. He explained that in 2015, prior to criminal
justice reform, discretionary parole was limited to certain
offenses, and based on certain criminal histories a person
was not eligible to apply. Limitations included non-sex
Class A felonies including robbery, assault I, arson I,
escape 1, misconduct involving a weapon I; Class B felonies
if the person had one or more prior felony convictions;
Class C felonies if the person had two or more prior felony
convictions; and Class B and C sex felonies (sexual assault
2, sexual abuse of a minor 2, distribution of child
pornography).
Mr. Skidmore continued that in 2016 with criminal justice
reform, all of the offenders included in the list above
became eligible to apply for discretionary parole. The CS
would return to the system prior to 2016 that restricted
eligibility for discretionary parole.
Mr. Skidmore moved to parole release presumptions. Prior to
SB 91, the Parole Board comprised of five individuals,
would exercise its discretion and evaluate each applicant
to determine whether the person was a good candidate. He
elaborated that based on the preponderance of the evidence,
the board would decide an individual was a good candidate
for release. He highlighted that the presumption had been
changed under SB 91; the bill had instructed the board to
presume that everyone was a good candidate for release. He
noted that individuals no longer had to apply for release.
He stressed that individuals were not released only if
there was clear and convincing evidence showing they were
not a good candidate for release. He stated the change had
inverted the whole system on its head.
Mr. Skidmore shared that he had heard Mr. Edwards
(executive director of the Parole Board) testify previously
that the board had a fairly good success rate with the
individuals it chose to release on discretionary parole. He
underscored that the success rate had been established pre-
SB 91. He did not believe all of the data was available on
the success rate post-SB 91 because it took at least three
years to look at the recidivism rate. He reiterated that
instead of picking a good candidate, the Parole Board was
currently instructed to presume everyone was to be
released; individuals were not released only if there was
clear and convincing evidence that they were not a good
candidate.
Mr. Skidmore stressed the change was a very different
exercising of the board's discretion. The presumption had
changed, the number of offenses eligible for discretionary
parole had expanded, no one was required to apply for
parole anymore. Under current law, once a person was
eligible for parole there was an automatic parole hearing.
He expressed doubt that the system was working as well as
it had in the past. The CS would revert all three concepts
back to pre-SB 91 status. He encouraged members to direct
questions on how the system functioned to Mr. Edwards.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard asked to hear from Mr.
Edwards regarding the parole release process.
Co-Chair Wilson asked Mr. Edwards to address parole release
presumptions and what tool the CS would return to the
Parole Board.
Mr. Edwards confirmed the accuracy of Mr. Skidmore's
description of the current law. He reported there was
currently a presumed presumption of release. He stated it
was geared towards Class A, B, and C felonies; if a person
met certain criteria (i.e. compliance with a case plan) and
complied with all facility rules, the board was directed to
presume release unless there was clear and convincing
evidence at the time of the hearing that an individual
posed a risk. The board felt that the current law was
overly restrictive. He noted that a case plan was comprised
of things like an individual's compliance with substance
abuse treatment or mental health counseling. He continued
that if an individual completed substance abuse treatment
while in custody, the board would consider that in its
decision.
Mr. Edwards expressed frustration on behalf of the board
that the current law took away its discretion. One of the
key factors in the board's release decision making was the
discretion of whether to release or not release an
individual from discretionary parole. He detailed that pre-
SB 91 the Parole Board convened 200 to 300 hearings per
calendar year. In 2018, the board convened just under 1,000
discretionary parole hearings. He stressed there had been a
significant expanse of cases eligible for parole in
addition to mandated release hearings. The number of
hearings had increased by over 180 percent, which was a
significant number the board had to accommodate. He
reported that the Parole Board concurred with the proposed
changes in the law to revert closer to the law prior to SB
91.
3:49:10 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if returning the discretion to the
Parole Board was based on evidence that taking away
discretion had caused problems and/or higher rates of
recidivism. He wondered if the decision was data-based.
Co-Chair Wilson asked Mr. Edwards to address the question.
She thought he had indicated the board's extra workload was
substantial.
Mr. Edwards answered that he did not know if there was data
that analyzed the process of the presumed release section
in statute.
Co-Chair Wilson asked what the Parole Board had seen change
and how its workload had been impacted when its discretion
had been removed. She wondered how the proposed change
would impact the board's workload.
Mr. Edwards answered that the proposed changes would reduce
the Parole Board's workload. He explained that when the
board convened a hearing under the presumed release statute
for an eligible individual who had committed a Class A
felony, the board discussed whether the individual was in
compliance with the case plan and facility rules and
regulations. He stated that the discussions should occur,
and the board often talked about the issues in each of its
hearings. The board also talked about the presumed release
or clear and convincing evidence of a risk. The board
considered the risk and whether an individual was a repeat
offender who frequently returned to prison for new crimes.
The board would continue to have the discussions even if
the requirement was removed, but it would reduce the number
of hearings the board convened annually.
Co-Chair Wilson stated her understanding that currently
people could apply for probation or parole even if they
were not eligible. She thought the change would mean the
board could decide whether a person was eligible prior to
taking any action. She explained that the committee was
trying to better understand how the caseload portion would
change.
3:53:10 PM
Mr. Skidmore believed a question that would be enlightening
for the committee was to inquire about the average number
of people released on parole prior to SB 91 versus after SB
91 and what type of offenses individuals were released on
pre-SB 91 and post-SB 91. He thought the answers should
give the committee a sense of the effect of the changes. He
did not believe answers about recidivism would be available
yet. He reported that the administration had analyzed how
the types of crimes involved and the individuals who were
being released had changed and whether the change was good
or bad.
Representative Carpenter asked Mr. Edwards to address the
concept of parole for a person who had not yet completed
treatment and had reached discretionary parole. He asked if
the Parole Board took that into consideration and opted not
to release a person if their court ordered treatment had
not been completed.
Mr. Edwards replied that when an individual became eligible
[for discretionary parole], the Parole Board convened a
hearing and the individual was either on the front, middle,
or back end of their treatment program. He reported that in
most cases the board mandated the completion of treatment
prior to release. The board may agree to release an
individual from parole in four months' time, but only upon
successful completion of treatment. He shared that the
scenario was independent of a court order. He explained it
was different from scenarios where a judge gave a court
order for an individual to complete treatment while
incarcerated. He clarified that he was only speaking about
general discretionary parole applicants in midst of a
treatment program. He informed the committee that in almost
every scenario the board would mandate the individual to
complete treatment prior to release.
3:55:44 PM
Representative Josephson asked if there had been situations
in where the Parole Board found that a person could be
likely to reoffend, but because the board had not been able
to meet the clear and convincing standard it had granted
discretion.
Mr. Edwards answered that he did not have an example on
hand. He would have to discuss the issue with the board and
look at the difference between 51 percent and 99 percent.
He reported the board would err on the side of public
safety and caution.
Representative Josephson thought the Parole Board had to
write an order where it either found or did not find clear
and convincing evidence. He thought it would be litigate-
able otherwise.
Mr. Edwards agreed that the board explained its findings
and what evidence was used in writing when deciding to deny
discretionary parole. The board also explained what an
individual needed to do to mitigate the risk while they
were incarcerated pending their release to mandatory
parole. The board was legally required to put the findings
and explanations in a letter.
3:57:41 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if the Parole Board decided whether
there was clear and convincing evidence.
Mr. Edwards answered in the affirmative.
Vice-Chair Johnston asked if "this" was in the repealer
section.
Mr. Skidmore asked what Vice-Chair Johnston was referring
to.
Vice-Chair Johnston clarified she was asking about parole
release presumptions.
Mr. Skidmore responded there were sections of the repealer
that implicated the concepts. There were also other
sections in the bill that were implicated.
Vic-Chair Johnston referred to section 96, line 20 and
thought it appeared to be repealing all of the pretrial
risk assessment tools. She asked if it was a clerical
error.
Mr. Skidmore replied that line 20 of the repealer section
related to the Pretrial Enforcement Division (AS 33.07). He
explained that the division was folded into [the division
of] probation and parole, which was addressed in the
sections. He thought the pretrial risk assessment tool was
mentioned in those sections because they were originally
the ones exercising it. He clarified that it was not
repealed to get rid of the risk assessment tool; it was
repealed because of folding in the pretrial supervision
into probation and parole.
Vice-Chair Johnston asked for verification that the bill
did not repeal the assessment tool.
Mr. Skidmore confirmed that the bill did not repeal the
assessment tool. The point of the bill was to keep the
assessment tool, but it would not be found in the sections
under discussion.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for verification that DOC had already
put pretrial, probation, and parole into one section. She
asked to hear from DOC.
4:00:50 PM
Ms. Winkelman responded that there were two separate
divisions. She explained that she oversaw both divisions
that each had a deputy director. She explained that
pretrial service officers were probation officers by
statute. She clarified that probation officers under the
Division of Probation and Parole only had authority in
superior court, whereas, pretrial service officers had
authority in superior and district courts.
Representative Josephson observed that the risk assessment
was located in AS 12.30.006 and AS 12.30.011 and not the
repealers.
4:01:50 PM
Mr. Skidmore talked about the use of criminal history in
the grand jury process to establish an element of a crime
(Section 93). Currently, when a prior conviction for a
felony DUI was an element of the offense, prosecutors were
allowed to use an Alaska Public Safety Information Network
(APSIN) printout showing an individual's criminal justice
history. The printout could serve as the basis to move a
case beyond grand jury to trial. The prosecutor would need
to provide a certified copy at that time. He explained that
if a crime presented to a grand jury was something other
than a felony DUI, prosecutors were required to obtain the
certified judgement at the time of the grand jury. The CS
would adjust the rule to allow prosecutors to use the same
process for any crime in which a prior crime was an element
of the offense.
Mr. Skidmore moved to Section 94 and 95 regarding the
increased use of video teleconferencing. He relayed the
sections included adjustments to court rules. The
provisions gave courts greater discretion to use video-
teleconferencing in pretrial hearings. He believed Section
94 was predominately a conforming language amendment. The
more substantive change was in Section 95.
Co-Chair Wilson moved to a provision related to involuntary
commitments and asked Ms. Mead to explain what the October
1, 1981 date would do compared to 2011. She clarified that
the provision would require the Court System to transmit
information regarding involuntary commitments that had
occurred since October 1, 1981 to the Department of Public
Safety.
Ms. Mead was looking at Section 98 of the CS. She
understood the provision to require the court to transmit
the information required for all orders issued after
January 1, 2011.
Co-Chair Wilson asked Ms. Mead to explain why the date was
January 1, 2011.
Ms. Mead answered that January 1, 2011 was the date after
which all court records were available electronically and
retrievable electronically. Previously, some records were
on CourtView and some were not and prior to that time no
records were on CourtView. The change to 2011 meant the
court could comply with the provision fairly easily and
without a fiscal impact.
Co-Chair Wilson asked what the cost would be to go back to
1981.
Ms. Mead responded that the cost would be approximately
$141,000 and would require the Court System to hire a
couple of staff to do the work for a year. She explained
that the records from that time were on microfiche and it
would require going through 20,500 potential records that
may have the information.
4:05:56 PM
Representative Knopp stated that the purpose of a grand
jury was to consider the prosecutory evidence to decide
whether there was enough to forward charges against a
person. He was concerned about the use of a person's prior
rap sheet. He believed the focus should be on the evidence
in the particular case. He asked when there was an element
of an offense that required proof of a prior conviction.
Mr. Skidmore responded that the types of crimes included a
felon in possession of a firearm; it would be necessary to
demonstrate the offender had a prior felony. In cases of
recidivist theft, it would be necessary to show the prior
crimes of theft to elevate the crime. Additionally, in
cases of recidivist assaults, it was necessary to show the
prior assaults to charge the higher level of assaults. He
explained that if the CS passed, the provision would apply
to drug offenses that became a Class C felony, which
required establishing past misdemeanor convictions for drug
possession. The rap sheet (contained in the APSIN system)
was the mechanism that prosecutors and law enforcement used
to determine when someone had a prior criminal history. He
explained that after grand jury, at the time of trial, it
would be necessary for the prosecutor to have a certified
copy of the judgement to admit during trial. He clarified
that no one would be convicted based on the concept, but it
would allow the ability to conduct a grand jury, which was
the early stage of a prosecution.
4:07:53 PM
Representative Knopp understood about needing to prove
prior offenses to include an aggravator in a charge. He
asked for verification that the APSIN sheet would not be
used to show a pattern if a crime did not require proof of
a prior offense.
Mr. Skidmore agreed. He stated that using a person's prior
history in the scenario provided by Representative Knopp
would be improper and would violate the rules of evidence
and cause a host of other problems. He suggested that the
provision only allowed the use of a person's prior criminal
history when it was an element of the offense that needed
to be proven.
Representative Josephson addressed the provision on
involuntary commitment. He noted that Ms. Mead had
highlighted that the lookback period in the memo
summarizing the bill [DOL document titled "Draft CS HB 49"
(copy on file)] was different than the bill. He referenced
a bill sponsored by Representative Pruitt that had passed
the legislature 57 to nothing in a previous session. He
stated it was conceptually supported by the National Rifle
Association. He considered whether an agency could help to
fund the effort. He thought it appeared to be a remarkable
moment where there was widespread agreement about wanting
to know who had been involuntarily committed and not had
the finding removed, to prevent them from doing massive
harm on a large scale (as had been experienced nationally).
He asked whether the undertaking became more manageable if
resources could be found to help the Court System.
Ms. Mead responded it was a policy call for the
legislature. The provision was an attempt to be more
fiscally responsible with respect to the bill. She informed
the committee that any of the information provided by the
court on individuals committed in the 1980s and 1990s would
be disqualified from possessing or purchasing firearms. She
reiterated it was a policy call for the legislature to
decide whether it wanted the court to pull records from the
1980s and provide them to DPS and the FBI to disqualify the
individuals from possessing firearms. She shared that the
Court System was able to do that. She believed the 2011
forward date was an effort to be more fiscally responsible.
She stated it would be up to the legislature whether it was
worth the investment.
Ms. Mead understood from DPS that it may have funds to
undertake the effort; however, it was not sufficient to
cancel a fiscal note because it was not certain enough. She
elaborated that regardless of the funds, it was a
substantial amount of work that the Court System could not
put on a fiscal note. For example, the court's staff would
have to identify all of the microfiche files that could be
anywhere; the work would have to be done by court staff and
not someone outside the agency. She stated the work was
substantial and it was in the legislature's purview to make
the determination.
4:11:40 PM
Co-Chair Wilson thanked Mr. Skidmore for his presentation.
She indicated that the next portion of the meeting would be
to give agencies an opportunity to discuss how the bill
would work.
Mr. Skidmore noted there was one additional provision on
sexual assault examination kits (Section 92) that was not
included on the DOL document. He reported that the
provision was also in the House Judiciary Committee version
of HB 49.
Co-Chair Wilson moved to the Court System.
4:12:38 PM
Ms. Mead indicated that the Court System would leave the
policy decisions in the bill to the legislature. The
primary changes for the Court System resulting from the
bill pertained to bail decision making. She reported that
it did not matter to the court fiscally or operationally
whether a sentence range was 5 to 7 years or 6 to 8 years;
the court could apply the ranges as written in statutes. In
general, the bill would not be difficult for the court to
implement or comply with. She would talk with Mr. Skidmore
about the pretrial assessment tool because she was not
understanding that the tool and supervision were to remain
in the law despite the repealers. She would try to get a
better understanding of the proposal.
Co-Chair Wilson had heard that some judges used the risk
assessment tool and others did not. She asked if the tool
would still exist under the CS, but in an advisory
capacity. She asked if Ms. Mead was questioning whether the
bill would completely repeal the tool.
Ms. Mead replied that she was questioning whether the
assessment tool was repealed in the CS. She noted the
repealer section of the bill showed the tool was repealed.
She also saw under the bail decision making section (page
34, lines 6 to 7) that the court may consider the risk
assessment score. However, she did not see in the DOC
provisions in Title 33 that the department would continue
to do the risk assessments and supervision. She was not
seeing the tool added to the probation officers' duties
either. She thought perhaps the issue could be addressed in
drafting. She noted she had only seen the CS for a couple
of hours, but she was seeing a bit of a disconnect.
Co-Chair Wilson appreciated the comments and would make
sure to get the issue on the record.
4:14:57 PM
Co-Chair Wilson invited the Department of Public Safety to
address the committee and discuss how the bill would
hopefully help the troopers.
KELLY HOWELL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT and LEGISLATIVE LIAISON,
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, indicated that the bill would positively impact
public safety and crime in Alaska. She communicated there
were other testifiers available online to provide a boots-
on-the-ground perspective of how the provisions in the bill
would impact public safety.
4:16:13 PM
ANDREW GREENSTREET, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ALASKA STATE TROOPERS
DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (via teleconference),
expressed excitement about the bill and what it would offer
to law enforcement. He reported that the legislation would
provide troopers with the tools to be effective. He firmly
believed the bill would restore the trust in the criminal
justice system. When troopers responded to investigations,
they had opportunities to meet with victims of crimes and
often the interaction occurred on the worst day of a
person's life. He explained that victims relied on the
troopers and what they had to say about the criminal
justice system and the investigation itself. Under SB 91,
he had seen the ability to reassure victims in their time
of need degrade over time. He was excited about the
potential and what it could mean for law enforcement and
the victims they interacted with.
Mr. Greenstreet noted that if the bill passed, the state
may see an increase in crime because more crime would be
reported. He shared that many individuals such as
contractors had told him they did not call the troopers any
longer because they had lost faith in the criminal justice
system. He communicated that the situation was
disheartening to the law enforcement community. He stressed
that officers put on a uniform every day to do their part
and seek justice. He reported that when law enforcement was
not effective, it negatively impacted their morale.
Officers wondered why they were putting themselves in
danger if they were just arresting the same criminals
repeatedly. He reiterated his support for the bill.
4:18:50 PM
Representative Carpenter had heard some anecdotal evidence
that under the current system, if an officer saw drug
paraphernalia after stopping an individual in a vehicle,
they would seize it and let the person go. He asked if
changes in the bill would result in an immediate increase
in the number of people being taken to corrections
facilities.
Mr. Greenstreet answered that there could be an increase.
He had spent most of his career in narcotics investigation
and reported that SB 91 had significantly hampered efforts
related to drug possession. He explained that under a
system without strong repercussions, when there was
evidence of possession or distribution, defendants were
unwilling to cooperate with any investigation. He explained
that while law enforcement may not be interested in the
user, it was certainly interested in the distributors. He
elaborated that if there was no incentive to work with law
enforcement, it impeded the ability for law enforcement to
continue an investigation up to the supply.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard did not see anything in the
legislation regarding vehicle theft. She asked if the bill
would assist the troopers with the high rate of vehicle
theft.
Mr. Greenstreet answered that he had not had an opportunity
to thoroughly review the bill and was not well versed on
that particular portion. He deferred to Mr. Skidmore.
4:21:11 PM
Ms. Howell indicated there was a provision regarding
possession of motor vehicle theft tools. She suggested that
perhaps Major Greenstreet could speak to how the provision
would help. She thought he could speak to one of the crimes
associated with vehicle theft and how it tied into some of
the drug crimes.
Mr. Greenstreet answered that the additional tools to
enable law enforcement to work investigations would be
beneficial. He did not recall a vehicle theft that had not
involved drugs.
Representative Carpenter asked whether vehicle theft was a
felony or misdemeanor.
Co-Chair Wilson did not think the answer to the question
was easily answered; it depended on the situation and value
involved.
4:22:49 PM
AT EASE
4:23:25 PM
RECONVENED
Representative Carpenter asked whether vehicle theft was a
felony or misdemeanor.
Mr. Skidmore replied that a vehicle theft had been and
would continue to be a Class C felony.
Representative Knopp mentioned special provision for an
auto theft. He thought sentencing had been increased for
Class C felonies. He did not recall whether misdemeanors
had been changed to felonies or the felony sentence had
been increased for the crime. He noted that he had spoken
with Mr. Skidmore recently about the impact to car theft
crimes.
Mr. Skidmore agreed that originally under SB 91, a Class C
felony for vehicle theft had probation only. He explained
it had created substantial problems when trying to combat
vehicle theft. He elucidated that the issue had been
addressed in SB 54 in October 2017, where a first time
offense had been returned to a presumptive range of 0 to 2
years.
Representative Josephson believed that any frustrations
with vehicle theft after the passage of SB 54 were a result
of a lack in police and resources issue. He explained that
the law, interest, and desire to deal with the problem all
existed. He thought it was a matter of having enough people
to enforce the law.
4:26:03 PM
Mr. Skidmore answered there was nothing in the current law
that dramatically changed vehicle theft. The only thing
that changed was that repeated offenses for a Class C
felony had the lower presumptive ranges, but not by a
substantial amount. The key for Class C felonies was the
first time presumptive range, which had been restored in SB
54. He agreed that if a significant concern continued about
vehicle theft, it was a community by community issue of
prioritizing the issue and directing resources in that
direction.
Co-Chair Wilson asked Major Greenstreet to discuss vehicle
theft and drug use. She noted that he had discussed that
vehicle theft typically involved drugs or other issues. She
asked if individuals were usually arrested on one or
multiple charges. She highlighted situations where a
perpetrator broke into a person's home or vehicle.
Mr. Greenstreet reported that in his experience vehicle
theft was part and parcel to the drug culture.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for verification that someone would
most likely be brought in on multiple charges, not just a
vehicle charge.
Mr. Greenstreet answered affirmatively. He confirmed that a
standalone charge was seldom; there were typically myriad
other charges that accompanied the crime.
4:28:06 PM
Representative Josephson recalled that it was tricky to
prosecute vehicle theft in situations where hand-me-down
vehicles were passed from "bad person A to bad person B."
He asked if there was a remedy that would be helpful.
Mr. Skidmore reported that Representative Josephson had
accurately described the struggle with the elements of
vehicle theft and the way people attempted to defend
against the cases. He was not prepared at present to offer
language or concepts to address the issue. He highlighted
the issue mentioned by Major Greenstreet that when law
enforcement found people in stolen vehicles and there was
evidence of drug use, the changes in the CS would give law
enforcement additional tools to more effectively respond to
the situations.
Co-Chair Wilson invited Kathryn Monfreda to provide
comments to the committee.
4:29:45 PM
KATHRYN MONFREDA, DIRECTOR, STATEWIDE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY (via teleconference), addressed issues DPS
had experienced with out of state offenders moving to
Alaska. There were currently just over 3,500 individuals on
the public sex offender registry website; about 2,600 of
the individuals were registered and out on the street, and
about 900 were either in jail or had clearly shown they had
left the state. She detailed that of the 2,600 on the
street about 475 had committed their offenses out of state
and subsequently moved to Alaska. Since a supreme court
hearing in August 2018, DPS had notified 22 offenders
specific to the offense found by the supreme court to not
be registerable sex offenses - those individuals no longer
had to register as long as they lived or worked in Alaska.
The department was taking any other requests for reviews on
a case by case basis to determine if they met the criteria
for registration under the court ruling.
Ms. Monfreda reported that DPS knew there were people
moving to Alaska [who had committed a sex offense in
another state]. She reported that Mr. Skidmore had
indicated the state received about 8 to 10 calls per month
asking if they would have to register if they moved to
Alaska. The department declined to analyze the individuals'
cases on a case by case basis. The department informed
individuals they needed to register and DPS would make a
determination once the individual moved to Alaska. The
department hoped it dissuaded some individuals from moving
to Alaska. She reported that the department informed about
20 people per year who had moved to Alaska that they did
not have to register once they got to Alaska.
Co-Chair Wilson thanked Ms. Monfreda for her comments.
Ms. Monfreda asked if the committee wanted to hear anything
about mental commitments.
Co-Chair Wilson affirmed.
Ms. Monfreda reported that DPS was receiving about 165 to
200 cases of involuntary commitments per year from the
court system. She relayed the number was on the low side
compared to the rest of the country. The federal government
had made a substantial amount of money available to states
and territories in an effort to get people who were legally
unauthorized to possess firearms from being able to possess
firearms. As of December 2018, states had entered over 5
million mental commitments into the system; Alaska had
about 780 records as of December 31 that represented 440
people.
Ms. Monfreda continued that the number put Alaska low on
the list of contributing to the section of the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) indices
(only behind the territories and three other states). She
reported that getting the commitments back to 2011 would be
very beneficial. She pointed out that the individuals were
currently barred from legally possessing firearms; passing
the law would not make it legal for the individuals to
possess firearms, but it would get the individuals in the
system, which would prevent them from buying a firearm if
they attempted to do so.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the federal government had gone
back as far.
Ms. Monfreda answered in the affirmative. She reported that
most states were going back as far as possible.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the federal government kept track
of the information as well.
Ms. Monfreda replied that records entered into the NICS
indices were entered by the states; the FBI retained the
information as long as the states retained the information.
4:34:28 PM
Vice-Chair Johnston asked if Ms. Monfreda was aware of any
federal funding the state may not be taking advantage of to
go as far back as possible.
Ms. Monfreda reported a $25 million grant opportunity had
become available about two weeks earlier to enable states
to get the records into the system. She detailed there was
a special emphasis on mental health records, and it was
available for all states to pursue.
Co-Chair Wilson requested the information on the grant.
Vice-Chair Johnston remarked on the importance of ensuring
the state's data was robust.
Co-Chair Wilson remarked it was another policy call.
4:35:27 PM
Co-Chair Wilson asked to hear from the Office of Public
Advocacy (OPA).
JAMES STINSON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY,
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION (via teleconference), thought
the bill did a pretty good job trying to balance numerous
interests. He characterized criminal justice as an art
versus a science. He focused his comments on issues he saw
with recriminalizing driving with license being suspended
or revoked (DWLR). He reported that one of the things that
could happen was that individuals could get sucked into a
DWLR black hole. He provided a scenario where a person lost
their license for failing to pay child support. He noted
that Alaska was a very difficult state to not drive in and
under the scenario the individual continued to drive.
Mr. Stinson detailed that when a person received a DWLR,
there was a mandatory 90-day license revocation even under
a first offense. He explained that the situation could go
on and on if they continued to drive to work and were
occasionally stopped. He elaborated that the individual
began racking up jailtime. In his previous experience as a
municipal prosecutor, it had been an odd feeling going to
some of the change of plea hearings and seeing someone on
their fifth or sixth DWLR get sentenced to six or more
months in jail. Comparatively, a person on a third
misdemeanor assault (even a domestic violence assault), was
potentially receiving less jailtime.
Mr. Stinson stated the issue was a tricky and political;
people did not like the idea of people driving with a
license revoked. He understood the issue and noted that
people did not like being hit by someone with a revoked
license. However, he believed it was important to recognize
that someone who did not have a license, could be not
violating traffic laws, could get pulled over, could get so
behind the curve they had stacked up license revocations,
and they were trying to make ends meet. He questioned
whether it was conduct that should be criminalized as a
Class A misdemeanor with a sentence of up to one year in
jail, or criminalized with a cap, or singled out in certain
instances. He noted the issue could also happen when
someone got their first DUI and could not afford an
ignition interlock device or SR-22 insurance. He noted the
person may wait until their mandatory OUI [operating under
the influence] revocation was over; once the individual's
OUI revocation was over, they could drive and get a
standard driving with license revoked.
Mr. Stinson did not have a perfect solution, but he
believed it was important to question, in a time with
limited financial resources, if the state wanted to
potentially send individuals to jail for six months or
longer as they stacked up driving offenses. He stated if
the answer was yes, that was fine, but he wanted the
legislature to be cognizant of the issue that could create
a disproportioned affect in a person's life who was really
doing nothing else but driving.
Representative LeBon asked for verification that a person
who had been stopped up to five times without a license
would not have auto and liability insurance.
Mr. Stinson replied that it was not necessarily true. He
detailed that a person could own a vehicle and have
insurance without having a valid driver's license. He added
it was possible a person could be driving someone else's
car that had insurance coverage. There was a separate
offense of driving without insurance, which he believed it
was a violation that had been criminal prior to SB 91 or
another time. He remarked that someone with a license could
be driving without insurance and vice versa. He stated that
the scenario presented by Representative LeBon may be
common, but there were plenty of drivers with licenses who
also drove without insurance.
4:40:20 PM
Representative LeBon provided a scenario where an
individual with an insured vehicle knowingly loaned it to a
person with a revoked license. He asked if the insured
individual's insurance company would consider the situation
covered.
Mr. Stinson answered that he could not necessarily provide
an answer. He relayed that run of the mill taxpayers had
uninsured coverage that covered getting into an accident
with an uninsured driver regardless of the status of the
person's license. He noted there were policies that had
broader coverage than others, but he did not know how an
insurance company would react to the situation.
Co-Chair Wilson stated she was fairly certain an insurance
company would not like the situation.
Mr. Stinson agreed.
Representative Josephson thought Mr. Stinson made a pretty
good argument on DWLR. He was more troubled about someone
with a DUI driving during the 90-day window of suspension
rather than someone who exceeded their points. He could see
making the latter an infraction or violation and the former
something more stringent. He asked for Mr. Stinson's
feedback.
Mr. Stinson answered that the issue outlined by
Representative Josephson became muddled. He suggested that
usually when someone was charged with a DUI their license
was administratively revoked by DMV within a week. He
elaborated that usually by the time a person had been
sentenced for a DUI, their mandatory revocation period may
have wound down significantly. After the 90 days was up,
the individual was no longer on active DUI revocation under
a first offense. He noted the length of time was longer for
subsequent offenses. Once a person was out of the 90-day
window, if they were stopped, they would be charged with a
regular DWLR.
Mr. Stinson reported that the situation became more muddled
because a person with a first DUI offense was required to
get an ignition interlock device installed on their vehicle
for the first six months. He explained that if the person
did not have the device installed and waited until their
90-day license revocation was over, the individual would
receive a standard DWLR (requiring mandatory community work
service but no jailtime). He furthered that if a person had
an ignition interlock in their vehicle and then drove a
vehicle without the device (e.g. a friend's car), they
would be exposed to the same mandatory minimum jailtime
associated with an active OUI revocation. He reported that
the way the statute worked could be confusing. Ultimately,
an individual could rack up DWLRs under the two different
scenarios and it became a question of whether or not a
person would get the mandatory jailtime.
4:44:03 PM
BETH GOLDSTEIN, ACTING PUBLIC DEFENDER, DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION (via teleconference), drew attention to
Sections 4 and 5 and reported the agency had a concern
regarding the removal of the defense of marriage act. She
stated that the bill did not limit the charging or
conviction in the way described by Mr. Skidmore with
respect to the person not being able to say no. She
explained that a person with dementia could speak and make
their wishes known. She noted she had previously testified
on the subject to the Senate.
Ms. Goldstein explained that with respect to dementia, the
concern was a situation where a spouse had guardianship
over another spouse. She explained that dementia was not
static; there could be clarity for days or weeks. She
continued that spouses may decide within the context of
their relationship and the spouse may have the ability to
give consent during that time. However, days later the
individual may not remember. She believed the law would
result in substantial litigation around whether or not a
person was able to give consent even though they had
something like dementia. Additionally, the wording removed
in the HB 145 version had a section on the mental
incapability of the offender. She noted it was not included
in the language in the CS for HB 49.
Ms. Goldstein explained that OPA had wards who had
guardianships and many times those wards married one
another. The court had determined they did not have the
capacity to handle aspects of their lives and need a
guardian (capacity at times could equate to mentally
incapable); the question became whether a person with an IQ
of 59 could understand and consent even though they may be
mentally incapable. She questioned where the legislation
left the situations where two wards were married, both of
which who may be mentally incapable under the law. She
explained that one or both could potentially be charged at
some point, depending on the factual circumstances. The
agency had concerns with the specific sections of the bill
and with the elimination of the marriage defense for the
particular situations.
4:47:22 PM
Ms. Goldstein moved on to discuss Section 44 and 45
pertaining to the recidivist [indecipherable] statute. The
agency was concerned that the statute still appeared to
capture misdemeanor marijuana prior convictions. She
pointed out that the state had decriminalized much of that
possession, but the bill would still capture individuals
prior to the decriminalization if they possessed the
substances under the section.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for clarification. She asked whether
capturing was good or bad.
Ms. Goldstein explained that the agency viewed the
situation as negative. She explained that currently a
person would not necessarily be charged with the same
amount of marijuana or obtaining that marijuana, whereas,
they had been charged with simple possession of marijuana
eight to ten years earlier, which had been decriminalized
later on. She stated the bill would mean the individual
would be charged with a felony based on those prior
convictions.
Representative Josephson asked which page and line she was
referring to.
Co-Chair Wilson pointed to pages 25 and 26, Sections 44 and
45 of the legislation.
Representative Josephson asked what needed to be changed.
Ms. Goldstein supported the lookback period, but believed
the bill needed to exclude the basic misdemeanor marijuana
convictions.
Vice-Chair Johnston thought the language had been included
in HB 145. She asked if the language in HB 145 would take
care of the issue.
Ms. Goldstein reported that she had the same concern with
HB 145. She had brought the issue to the attention of the
House Judiciary Committee, but the language had not been
changed.
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked Ms. Goldstein if she had concerns
with Section 55, page 34 that would repeal the caps on the
sanctions for technical violations (currently 3, 5, and 10
days).
Ms. Goldstein responded that her concern with the section
was from a fiscal perspective. She reported that the
section would result in more contested revocation hearings.
She had spoken to attorneys and the Public Defender Agency
and reported that currently when an individual violated and
knew precisely how much time they would get, many times
they made the decision to do the time and not contest. She
elaborated that an individual knew they would come in and
get three days, they served the time, and no hearing was
necessary. She explained that without a cap an individual
would not know what they may be sentenced to, meaning there
would be a higher likelihood an individual would contest
the revocations, which would result in increased
litigation.
4:51:04 PM
AT EASE
5:02:13 PM
RECONVENED
Co-Chair Wilson indicated the committee would continue
hearing input from the Department of Corrections.
Ms. Winkelman thanked the committee for the opportunity to
provide commentary on the bill. She reported that DOC
believed the bill would give it the tools to enhance public
safety. From a community supervision perspective, longer
periods on supervision would increase public safety and
help guide offenders on their way to rehabilitation. She
elaborated that supervision was a cost-effective way to
keep offenders away from drugs and alcohol and victims. She
referenced earlier testimony by Mr. Skidmore that SB 91 had
changed the criminal justice system across the board - it
had reclassified crimes, reduced sentences, reduced
probationary periods, added earned compliance credits, and
mandatory early termination.
Ms. Winkelman explained the changes had reduced periods of
incarceration and the bill had taken a "cookie cutter"
approach to human beings in the criminal justice system.
She highlighted the complexity of the system and offenders
should be dealt with on a case by case basis. She
communicated the department's support of the provisions in
HB 49 pertaining to rehabilitation and increased public
safety. Although earned compliance credits were altered in
the bill, the credits would be left in place, which the
department felt was beneficial. She noted that the system
would continue to have SEJs [suspended entry of judgements]
as well as early termination and pretrial supervision.
Ms. Winkelman reported that individuals would continue to
be released into the community in pretrial status and the
bill would give courts the option for pretrial officers to
provide supervision. She addressed the provision related to
discretionary parole eligibility. She reported that
limiting discretionary parole eligibility would impact
public safety. She referenced Mr. Edwards testimony about
the increase in hearings due to the expanded eligibility
(from around 200 up to 1,000). She explained that when
individuals were released on discretionary parole they went
to supervision. She detailed that in the past,
discretionary parole had been reserved for elite
individuals who had completed significant programming and
were at the tail end [of their time]. She furthered that
the discretionary parole system had become a reckless
disregard where DOC had found many people were not ready
for parole and much of its absconder population had
increased.
Ms. Winkelman had heard feedback from staff that it was
almost impossible, due to the volume of discretionary
parole, to assess risk on the applicants. The reports had
become streamlined and simplified instead of a robust
application process. The department believed the bill was a
movement towards a balanced system that relied on the
officers to inform the courts and parole board of conduct
of the offenders and would return the discretion back to
the court to impose what was relative to the violation or
the offender. She noted that the bill would still provide
the opportunity for rehabilitation for those who wanted to
engage in the process through early compliance credits,
early termination (that would no longer be mandatory),
SEJs, and pretrial supervision.
Co-Chair Wilson indicated the committee would move to
fiscal notes. She thanked Ms. Winkelman for her testimony.
5:07:15 PM
SYLVAN ROBB, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, introduced
herself.
Co-Chair Wilson reported that the committee would begin
with OMB Component Number 698 for administration and
support, information technology under DOC.
Ms. Robb pointed out that the DOC fiscal notes followed
fiscal notes from the Department of Administration (DOA) in
the packets. She believed note under discussion was the
third in the packet.
Co-Chair Wilson clarified that the fiscal notes were marked
draft. She explained that the notes only went through FY 20
because it was almost impossible to understand the impact
after that time. She reported that the governor's plan was
to talk about more treatment next session. She hoped that
if treatment options became more successful, there would be
less recidivism and safer places. The fiscal notes would be
considered one-time increments, which meant the discussion
would occur next session about whatever bill ultimately
passed.
5:08:38 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz asked if the fiscal notes should be
considered implementation costs or ongoing costs.
Co-Chair Wilson replied that most of the costs were related
to implementation. She would not characterize all of the
costs as ongoing because the bill was the first step in the
project. She believed the committee had done an excellent
job talking about the other parts and pieces associated
with the topic. The bill was about making sure crime
stopped, aligning punishment to fit the crime, and reducing
recidivism via providing options to enable individuals to
successfully get their lives back together. She noted the
bill was much different than others because typically costs
were ongoing, and programs did not change. She believed the
bill was just the beginning of changes that would impact
public safety. She added that the bill was the first step,
but treatment was just as important and was not included in
the bill.
Ms. Robb began with fiscal note with OMB Component Number
698. She explained that the note included money to enable
DOC to hire a contractor to make the necessary changes to
the departments database the Alaska Corrections Offender
Management System (ACOMS). The note pertained to the
proposed changes to the earned compliance credit. She
detailed that the programmers who worked on and maintained
the system did not have the capacity to make the change,
especially under the timeframe required by the bill's
effective date.
Co-Chair Wilson reported the committee would review the
fiscal note labeled OMB Component Number 2952.
Ms. Robb spoke to the fiscal note and explained that DOC
calculated cost with its cost of care (calculated annually)
of $168.74 per day. She detailed that $36.86 of the per day
cost was directed at healthcare. The fiscal note reflected
the $36.86 per day for inmates who would exceed the current
capacity of the system projected by the department based on
changes in the bill. The was $2.7 million.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if 204 inmates would exceed the
correctional institutions' current capacity.
Ms. Robb replied in the affirmative. She elaborated that
the department's projection was for an additional 554
inmates based on the proposed legislation.
Co-Chair Wilson wondered where the 554 number was
reflected. She pointed out that the fiscal note only showed
a projection of 204.
Ms. Robb answered that DOC currently had capacity for an
additional 350 inmates, which left 204 remaining.
Representative LeBon asked if the fiscal note assumed that
the Palmer facility would reopen.
Ms. Robb responded that the note did not assume the
reopening of the Palmer facility. The fiscal note was a
projection based on historical data. She explained that if
the bill passed and the projected increase in inmates came
to fruition, it would not happen simultaneously. She stated
that if facilities moved toward their current capacity,
there would be a reassessment at that time.
Representative LeBon asked if there was a fiscal note
reflecting the costs of reopening the Palmer facility.
Ms. Robb responded in the negative.
Representative Knopp understood things were a work in
progress. He noted that the original HB 49 had included a
fiscal note of $42 million. He had not reviewed that fiscal
note, but he assumed it had reflected reopening the Palmer
Correctional Center. He stated there had been numerous
versions of the bill and he recalled a later total of
approximately $22 million. He observed that the CS
incorporated numerous aspects of all of the other crime
bills. He had heard prior presentations that in a couple of
years the state would incarcerate 500 additional people. He
was surprised the fiscal notes did not reflect that
information. He asked for comment from DOC.
5:14:56 PM
AT EASE
5:17:43 PM
RECONVENED
Co-Chair Wilson invited Kelly Goode with DOC to the table.
She believed there was some misunderstanding about some of
the numbers. She noted there were other avenues besides
[reopening] the Palmer facility or sending inmates out of
state.
KELLY GOODE, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER DEPT OF CORRECTIONS,
communicated that she would respond to the question from
Representative Knopp and would also provide some overview.
She explained that the fiscal note looked different because
the department was anticipating a little over 500 new
inmates over the course of a year. The department
anticipated it would have a little over 350 beds in its
current facilities. She noted the remaining 200 inmates
would not be incarcerated all at one time. She added there
was legislative intent asking DOC to place individuals as
best as it could in community residential centers (CRCs)
and on electronic monitoring (EM); that number being
requested was currently over 200. The department believed
that DOC would be able to meet the numbers projected in the
fiscal note over the course of a year.
5:19:28 PM
Representative Knopp remarked that the first fiscal note he
had seen for the original HB 49 had a fiscal note of $42
million. He asked if that number included reopening the
Palmer Correctional Center.
Ms. Goode responded in the negative. She noted the
complexity of the situation and explained that the issue
was based on the time the fiscal notes had been created in
the system, when a budget had been in progress and other
things had been occurring. She detailed that the cost of
care projected in the $42 million was the full $168 per
inmate because DOC initially believed it would be above
capacity for any additional inmates projected. She
elaborated that the department had determined its capacity
would only be exceeded by 200 [if there was an increase of
500 inmates]. The 350 inmates had been calculated on the
marginal rate; the full $168.74 was applied to the 200
inmates over capacity. The change had resulted in a
significant difference in the fiscal note.
5:20:41 PM
Representative Knopp recalled that the previous week there
had only been 170 empty [correctional facility] beds. He
asked if the number had changed to 350 open beds.
Alternatively, he wondered if 350 was a projection for the
future.
Ms. Goode responded that there had been significant
discussion about projecting. She stated that unfortunately
DOC did not have a crystal ball and corrections was a bit
of a moving target. The department wanted to ensure the
committee was confident in the numbers DOC put forward in
its fiscal notes. She explained the department had
previously been using an average over a quarter, but the
average in the fiscal note used the calendar year 2018 for
clarity. The institution population was an average from
2018.
Co-Chair Wilson remarked on the department's ability to
utilize CRCs and EM, which had been included in the
operating budget based on current regulation. She clarified
it was not an over-crowding issue. She reported that DOC
had a process to identify inmates who did or did not
qualify [for CRCs or EM]. She reported that DOC believed as
new inmates came in and out of its facilities that the
department would be able to better utilize the options.
5:22:03 PM
Representative Josephson asked what DOC's total fiscal
notes had been under the governor's crime package (SB 32 to
36 or HB 49 to 53).
Co-Chair Wilson interjected that the committee would not
revisit old fiscal notes. She pointed out that the past DOC
fiscal notes had used the $168 rate instead of the marginal
rate. She stated that the current notes before the
committee were accurate for the CS. She stated that trying
to make a comparison to other bills that had many
differences from the CS would be unfair to the department.
She understood moving between the different bills had been
confusing. She assured the committee that the numbers were
as accurate as possible. She noted that the prison
population was changing daily. Additionally, DOC was doing
new contracts for CRCs, which would make a difference. She
hoped the state would be able to get some of the treatment
going before waiting until policy change next year.
Vice-Chair Johnston pointed out that the fiscal notes were
marked "draft." She assumed the information was a work in
progress because the CS had just been released the previous
evening.
Ms. Goode agreed. She explained that DOC only had a set
number of hours to look at the provisions and pull the
fiscal notes together. She remarked that Ms. Robb had
worked numerous hours on the notes. The department wanted
to ensure that it caught any potential errors.
Co-Chair Wilson emphasized that fiscal notes were always
drafts "when we have a bill that is like this." She
reminded the committee that the bill stiffened much of the
law, but individuals currently being charged and
incarcerated would fall underneath the old program. She
explained it would take awhile before some of the longer
[prison] stays in the new program, which made it difficult
to determine [what the fiscal cost would be]. She noted
that the new commissioner and deputy commissioner were
bringing their own touch to DOC and she looked forward to
hearing what the department was able to do during the
interim.
5:24:17 PM
Co-Chair Wilson moved to the fiscal note with OMB Component
Number 1381 for population management, institution
director's office, totaling $15.580 million for FY 20.
Ms. Robb relayed that the fiscal note included the bulk of
the costs related to DOC. The note was based on data pulled
from ACOMS. She remarked that the bill would make many
changes that would impact the corrections population
including increased sentences for Class A and B felonies.
She reported there were 5,000 individuals charged with a
Class A misdemeanor annually. Additionally, the bill would
increase sentencing for Class B misdemeanors, remove credit
for time spent on EM during pretrial status. She reported
that the eligibility changes for discretionary parole would
have a large impact on the department, as people would be
required to stay longer before they had the opportunity to
be on discretionary parole. She relayed that some of the
changes had a very small impact in terms of the additional
time individuals would be with corrections; in some cases,
it would only be a couple of extra days. However, when
applying that to thousands of people it would add up. In
other cases, such as discretionary parole, the impact on
jailtime would be significant.
Co-Chair Wilson appreciated that pages 2 through 4 of the
fiscal note corresponded to bill sections. She stated that
determining whether the costs were a good way to spend the
state's money was a policy call for the legislature. She
moved to fiscal note OMB Component Number of 695 for the
Parole Board.
Ms. Robb addressed the zero fiscal note and explained that
the Parole Board anticipated the ability to move forward
with existing resources as it related to changes in the
bill.
Co-Chair Wilson considered that the bill could lessen the
caseload of the Parole Board. She asked for verification
the agency was not paid more when its caseload was heavy.
She thought they received a set fee and characterized
members as somewhat voluntary. She thought it was the
reason there were not any projected savings on the note and
believed savings would really be in the form of timing for
the Parole Board.
Ms. Robb agreed. She explained that the board had absorbed
the extreme increase Mr. Edwards had spoken about earlier
in the meeting. She noted that the increase had been a
strain on the system; the changes proposed in the CS would
return the workload to a more reasonable level.
Co-Chair Wilson recommended committee members talk to board
members. She remarked the board put a significant time in
for the state and she believed it was one of the hardest
working groups.
5:28:13 PM
Co-Chair Wilson moved to fiscal note OMB Component Number
2826, for population management, statewide probation and
parole, totaling $546,000.
Ms. Robb relayed there had been a recent change in law
related to SB 91 that limited the caseload for probation
officers. She believed the effective date had been January
1, 2019. She explained that the changes in the CS would
increase the probation caseloads above the statutory limit.
To account for the increase, the bill would add a probation
officer in Anchorage, Juneau, Ketchikan, Kodiak, and
Kotzebue.
Co-Chair Wilson expressed confusion about the fiscal note.
She stated the note pertained to earned compliance credits;
individuals currently received 30 days for every 30 days [a
person went without a violation]. A change under the CS
would mean individuals received a reduction [to probation
or parole] ahead of time instead. She wondered why the
change would result in more individuals receiving the
credit. She thought the fiscal note should be zero.
Ms. Goode commented that she would like to review the note
and review it with the committee at a later time.
Co-Chair Wilson agreed. She did not see where there would
be an increase in individuals unless people were going to
spend their entire time on probation.
Ms. Goode agreed.
Co-Chair Wilson invited Ms. Meade to speak to the OMB
Component Number 768 totaling $1,136,500.
5:30:15 PM
Ms. Mead noted that she had discussed some of the
provisions of the fiscal note in connection with other
bills that had gone through the committee. The changes in
the bill that would impact the Court System included the
reclassification of many drug offenses and increased
sentences. She detailed that it was mostly the impact from
reclassifying the drug offenses that resulted in DOL's
fiscal note seeking six new prosecutors to start
prosecuting felony drug offenses that had been unprosecuted
over the past few years. With six new prosecutors the Court
System would need the resources to handle the cases the
prosecutors would bring; therefore, the fiscal note sought
the equivalent of two full-time pro-tem judges (retired
judges who would come back to handle the increased
caseload) who would travel around the state (a small travel
budget was included). Additionally, an in-court clerk would
accompany the judges, which would result in travel costs as
well. Secondly, the fiscal note reflects an addition of
five new clerical positions in response to the agency's
requests for attorneys and clerical staff. She explained
that if 750 new drug cases, the courts needed the resources
to handle the cases and enter the data into CourtView. The
third component of the fiscal note was attributable to the
increased use of videoconferencing as reflected in the
legislative intent in the two court rule changes. The
courts had been doing videoconferencing with existing
staff, but there were substantial associated costs. The
courts would also seek one trial court statewide
coordinator and one technical person to fix any
videoconferencing equipment problems in any court
facilities.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the need for two retired [pro tem]
judges was for catchup purposes. She surmised it did not
sound like the positions would be permanent.
Ms. Mead indicated that the cost was included through the
life of the fiscal note. The Court System had opted to use
pro tem judges because a new judge would be incredibly
expensive. The idea was to handle the additional caseload
with lower cost positions who were also able to travel
(full-time judges were assigned to a judicial district).
She anticipated sustaining the positions for as long as
necessary. She clarified the two judges would be needed to
handle the anticipated 750 new case filings that would come
with the legislation.
Co-Chair Wilson remarked that she had been confused by the
proposal to use retired judges; she thought it meant the
positions would not be permanent.
Ms. Mead responded that the positions would be fungible.
For example, some of the retired judges would work for two
months and another person would come in for another six
months. She explained that sometimes a retired judge wanted
to work for a limited time period or location. The funding
would allow the Court System to utilize whomever was
available for whatever term was available; the hope would
be to avoid a gap in coverage.
Co-Chair Wilson communicated her hope there would be a
financial savings with the use of videoconferencing. She
understood it may not be in courts.
Ms. Mead confirmed that the savings did not help the Court
System. In theory, videoconferencing would help DPS because
it was statutorily responsible for transporting prisoners
to court hearings. She expounded that DPS could save money
by not having to transport as many people; she deferred to
DPS to explain how or why the change would have a fiscal
impact on the department.
Co-Chair Wilson was trying to figure out how the
videoconferencing would work. She did not want the courts
to have the equipment set up but have no desire to utilize
it.
Ms. Mead replied the courts would respect the legislative
intent asking the Court System to try to use
videoconferencing more. In order to try to use it more,
improved troubleshooting was necessary. For example, one of
the reasons the equipment may not be used was due to an
equipment failure. She elaborated it would be necessary to
have someone look globally at the program, where the
equipment existed, and what the barriers were, to determine
how to adjust the systems to remove barriers.
5:35:14 PM
Representative Carpenter stated there were other branches
of government with videoconferencing systems and people who
maintained them. He hoped the state would have the ability
to find synergy between videoconferencing systems and
individuals who managed them instead of having systems
siloed within each branch or portion of the government. He
thought the problem may be solved in a different manner.
Co-Chair Wilson agreed. She did not know whether the
concept needed to be in statute or would merely require
everyone working together. She suggested finding out where
the equipment was located and what needed to be upgraded.
She thought it may just be a needed operating cost
increase.
Ms. Mead relayed that the Court System personnel handled
all the videoconferencing used for court hearings even
within the DOC facilities. She explained that DOC did not
dedicate its staff resources to the troubleshooting. The
work was not siloed - Court System staff went to DOC
facilities to set up, troubleshoot, and maintain the
equipment.
Co-Chair Wilson wondered why DOC was requesting money for
ten additional people for videoconferencing if it was the
court's responsibility.
Ms. Mead replied that it was not necessarily the court's
responsibility to do videoconferencing, but it had taken
the task on because it had an interest in increasing
efficiencies in pretrial proceedings. She believed the
request for ten additional DOC staff was because DOC needed
to supervise defendants in its facility who were in a room
on the videoconference equipment talking to the courthouse.
Representative Carpenter believed the ten employees were
correctional officers and not specifically related to
videoconferencing equipment.
Co-Chair Wilson noted that she had not recalled what the
ten positions would do because they had been removed from
the budget.
5:37:41 PM
Co-Chair Wilson relayed that the Department of Law would be
reviewing its fiscal note, OMB Component Number 2202
totaling $1,488,100 with 13 new full-time positions.
Mr. Skidmore explained that the DOL fiscal note focused on
two components of HB 49. The first component was drug
offenses. He reported that when SB 91 had passed, drug
prosecutions had dropped by over 700 per year. He explained
that by returning the law to its previous state (even under
the recidivist approach to possession where the first to
offenses were misdemeanors), DOL anticipated an increase of
approximately 700 or more given the opioid epidemic. The
fiscal note included 5 prosecutors and support staff. The
additional prosecutor and support staff were related to the
driving while license suspended/canceled/revoked. He noted
that the offense previously accounted for 17 percent of the
misdemeanor caseload. He acknowledged the number was large,
but the department believed it could handle it with the
additional resources because the cases were not labor
intensive. The department did not anticipate substantial
work, but there was some associated with the 2,000 cases.
The remainder of the fiscal note described what was going
on in the bill - the department did not anticipate the need
for any additional resources. The cases and changes to
sentencing, probation, or various other items were all
being worked on by the department; the bill merely adjusted
the tools to increase the department's efficacy.
Co-Chair Wilson observed that pretrial, probation, and
parole were divided out on pages 3 and 4 of the fiscal
note. She asked if there was a way to break the information
out further to see the fiscal impact of the changes in the
bill.
Mr. Skidmore clarified that the needed positions were
related to changes in drug statutes and in the driving
while license suspended/canceled/revoked. The remainder of
the note described changes, but none of those additional
changes resulted in a fiscal request from DOL.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the money would be divided equally
between the two components.
Mr. Skidmore replied in the negative. He explained that the
note included five prosecutors and associated support staff
for drugs and one prosecutor and support staff for driving
while license suspended/canceled/revoked. He clarified that
in the latter case, support staff was needed to handle the
volume.
Co-Chair Wilson highlighted OMB Component Number 512, a
zero fiscal note for the Alaska State Troopers, prisoner
transportation and OMB Component Number 3200 for statewide
support, criminal justice information systems program. She
invited DPS to review the notes.
Ms. Howell began with the zero fiscal note, OMB component
number 3200 for the criminal justice information systems
program. The note related to sections of the bill dealing
with sex offender registration requirement changes and
information related to the transmission of mental health
records from the Court System to DPS. The department
anticipated the number of sex offenders that would be
required to register in Alaska would be manageable and it
was not requesting additional staffing. She noted that Ms.
Monfreda had testified there were about 20 to 22
individuals who had to register in another state, but the
department had determined they did not have to register in
Alaska because their crime had not been similar to one
requiring registration in Alaska. The bill required DPS to
adopt regulations to further clarify the process for
determining the duration of registration for those
individuals; the estimated timeframe for the adoption of
the regulations was 12 months (included in the note).
Ms. Howell addressed the portion of the note related to the
Court System transmitting records to DPS to include in the
national instant check system. She reported the Court
System was currently transmitting the records to DPS from
October 2014 forward. The bill would move the date to
January 1, 2011 forward, which would allow more records to
be provided to DPS and federal databases. The work required
to enter the information into databases could be handled
with existing resources. She clarified that records being
put into the system were for individuals who were currently
federally prohibited from possessing firearms. The change
in the bill did not impact a person's ability to own or
purchase a firearm. The change would enable DPS to give the
information to the databases to give the ability to make
accurate determinations. She added that the department
could handle the change with existing resources.
5:45:23 PM
Representative Josephson asked about the funding source for
the sexual assault kit portion of the bill. He asked if the
cost was reflected in a separate fiscal note.
Ms. Howell relayed that the bill before the committee
included a provision requiring law enforcement agencies to
submit sexual assault kits within six months of collection
to the crime lab. The department's policy was for troopers
to submit the kits within 30 days after collection. There
would be no fiscal impact to DPS related to the bill
provision.
Representative Josephson thought Representative Geran
Tarr's bill would clean up kits that had not been tested.
He assumed there were associated expenses.
Ms. Howell answered that HB 20 had more provisions included
that required kits to be submitted to the lab and tested
within a certain timeframe and that victims be notified
when tests were complete. She reported that the provisions
were not included in the CS for HB 49.
Co-Chair Wilson clarified that she was not certain the
provisions were supposed to be left out of the bill and
noted the issue would be reviewed. She acknowledged the
importance of testing the kits. She wondered if individuals
could be charged a fee to register as a sex offender.
Ms. Howell replied that it was within the discretion of the
legislature to include a fee; DPS did not currently have
the authority to charge fees to register sex offenders.
Co-Chair Wilson thought it was a concept that should be
considered.
Ms. Howell spoke to fiscal note OMB Component Number 512
for the Alaska State Troopers, prisoner transportation. She
addressed cost savings associated with increasing the use
of videoconferencing for pretrial hearings. She detailed
that DPS was statutorily responsible for transporting
prisoners. She noted it was the discretion of the court and
DPS had very little control over which prisoners were
transported and when. The department aimed to create
efficiencies in terms of transporting as many prisoners as
possible at one time via car, prisoner transport vans, or
aircraft.
Ms. Howell shared that the legislature's recommendation to
increase the use of videoconferencing would result in some
cost savings, but because the department was transporting
prisoners regardless, it was not possible to anticipate
what the cost savings, if any, would be. She reiterated who
was transported and when, was out of the department's
control. She added that the provision created efficiencies
in terms of manpower and resource allocation. The provision
also helped mitigate any risk to law enforcement or the
defendants as they were being transported. There were some
very positive things that would result from the provision,
but a cost savings was not one of them.
Co-Chair Wilson relayed that the Department of
Administration would be reviewing its fiscal note, OMB
Component Number 43, legal and advocacy services, Office of
Public Advocacy totaling $694,700.
Mr. Stinson reviewed fiscal note for the Office of Public
Advocacy. He reported the two main drivers of the fiscal
note related to the increased drug prosecutions. He noted
that Mr. Skidmore had made it clear the administration
intended to take prosecuting drug crimes very seriously,
which was in line with the governor's mission. The note
also accounted for the increased prosecution of driving
with license revoked (which had previously been reduced to
a violation). There were a number of changes to the bill
that would likely increase litigation and the strain on the
defense side more than the prosecution side.
Mr. Stinson believed much of the bill was about giving more
tools to prosecutors and law enforcement. He pointed out
that it could make defending the cases much more difficult.
For example, it was more difficult to defend a client in
custody. There would be more attorney time taken doing jail
visits and things of that nature. He detailed that
petitions to revoke probation were more likely to be
contested. The easiest things to monetize were the increase
in felony prosecutions and the increase in driving with
license revoked prosecutions.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the five full-time positions were
all attorneys or included support staff.
Mr. Stinson responded that there were three attorneys and
two support staff. He elucidated that OPA's structure was a
series of independent law firms. He explained the structure
enabled the agency to internalize conflicts. He detailed
that if there was a conflict with the public defenders it
came to OPA. While there may be a conflict with an
individual OPA unit, the agency was still able to place the
case within OPA. He relayed that the agency had to rely on
contractors to some degree, but he was working hard to find
efficiencies. Ultimately, the agency would need three
attorneys given that structure. He did not know with
certainty where they would be placed, but he assumed it
would probably be Fairbanks, Palmer, and Anchorage. He
noted that one of the positions could go to Kenai instead
of one of the other locations.
Co-Chair Wilson appreciated that OPA was using its
resources the best it could. She moved on to fiscal note
OMB Component Number 1631, legal and advocacy services,
Public Defender Agency, totaling $1,300,900.
5:52:33 PM
Ms. Goldstein echoed Mr. Stinson's statement that the bill
was in line with the governor's mission and the increased
defense cost that would create numerous things the agency
could not monetize; however, it was able to monetize the
increased felony drug crimes and the driving with license
revoked crimes. The agency was requesting ten positions.
Five of the positions were for attorneys based on the
anticipation that 600 of the 750 projected new cases would
go to the Public Defender's Office. She explained that the
American Bar Association set a standard of 150 felony cases
per attorney per year, which put the agency at four
attorneys for the felony drug cases. The agency also
anticipated the need for one attorney for cases pertaining
to driving without a license. She expounded that because
the agency was more centralized, it was requesting
additional support staff. She explained that the agency was
a paperless office and saved cost by archiving its records
electronically. With increased cases the agency would need
another centralized person and four support staff for the
felonies.
Co-Chair Wilson asked if the agency kept track of repeat
offenders served by the agency.
Ms. Goldstein responded that the agency may have the
ability to keep track of individuals coming in - it had a
new database as of August [2018] and it was able to track
things it could not track in the past. However, repeat
individuals going through the system may not all stay with
the Public Defender Office because it may have represented
them in a previous case, but may no longer have the ability
to represent the individual due to conflict issues. She
explained it would be necessary for the agency to work with
OPA to track the repeat offenders.
Co-Chair Wilson asked Ms. Goldstein to look into the issue.
She asked for the most recent change in statute pertaining
to a person's eligibility for a free attorney.
Ms. Goldstein answered that she did not know the most
recent time the statute had been reviewed. In the past
couple of sessions, the topic had been discussed in terms
of whether fees could be increased.
Co-Chair Wilson asked for verification that just because a
person had used a public defender due to a criminal
offense, did not mean they would automatically conflict
them out to OPA [in the future].
Ms. Goldstein agreed. She explained that more often than
not, when a public defender had represented an individual
previously, they would be able to represent the individual
again in the future. The driver of the conflict process
pertained primarily to witnesses involved in cases and
whether the agency had represented one of the witnesses in
a new case (meaning the agency would likely not be able to
represent the person in a future case).
Co-Chair Wilson indicated there were no additional fiscal
notes that she was aware of.
Vice-Chair Ortiz calculated that the total for all of the
fiscal notes equaled approximately $23.5 million or so. He
acknowledged the significance of the figure and remarked it
was a statement about priorities and where the state's
dwindling resources would be spent. He was puzzled by the
amount in comparison to the Senate versions totaling $43
million. He remarked that the current bill included parts
of the Senate bills and additions from other bills.
Co-Chair Wilson explained that the DOC marginal rate was
not used in the other fiscal notes. She detailed that in
previous fiscal notes DOC had multiplied all of the new
inmates by the larger amount. She highlighted the
significant difference between $48 and $187 [per day per
person], which accounted for the majority of the difference
in the fiscal notes. Additionally, all of the provisions in
the governor's bills were not included in the CS. She
reported that the CS was a compromise bill. She considered
the money put into the bill and the expected outcome. She
pointed out that the bill was the first step. She
understood that with no treatment and a place for someone
to go when released from jail with a support system, it was
likely they would end up back in jail. She stated it was a
money issue, but it was also about quality of life and
public safety.
5:58:30 PM
Vice-Chair Ortiz thought the process was happening very
quickly and he spoke to the importance of feeling confident
about the financial numbers and impact of any bill the
committee adopted.
Co-Chair Wilson underscored that the fiscal notes reviewed
during the meeting were draft versions. She reported the
committee would receive final fiscal notes prior to
reporting the bill out of committee. She indicated
amendments were due Sunday by 4:00 p.m. to Legislative
Legal Services. She hoped to hear amendments on Monday at
9:00 a.m. She encouraged members to review the fiscal
notes. She highlighted the offense of driving with a
suspended license and considered whether a citation or
criminalization was the right course of action and what it
would cost.
Representative Josephson asked if the amendment deadline
could be to Legislative Legal Services.
Co-Chair Wilson replied the deadline was 4:00 p.m. on
Sunday to Legislative Legal Services. She thanked
Legislative Legal for all of their efforts to make sure the
committee had the CS to review in the current from. She
clarified she was not intending to rush the committee. She
highlighted that the content included in the bill had been
discussed over the past ten days.
Representative Knopp asked about Co-Chair Wilson's plan for
public testimony.
Co-Chair Wilson answered that the committee had previously
held public testimony for HB 49. She reported that public
testimony would not be reopened. She believed the public
would be emailing committee members.
Representative Sullivan-Leonard asked if public testimony
could be heard again.
Co-Chair Wilson would take the request under consideration
depending on the schedule for the week.
6:01:57 PM
AT EASE
6:21:56 PM
RECONVENED
Co-Chair Wilson asked Mr. Skidmore to review the repealers.
Mr. Skidmore directed committee members to page 63, Section
96, lines 16 through 21 of the CS. He began with AS
11.41.432(a)(2) regarding the marriage defense. He
explained that the bill would repeal the section that dealt
with the defense as it applied to several statutes; it did
not repeal the concept of the other person that was
mentally incapable. The bill would repeal the following
language "married to the person and neither party has filed
with the court for separation, divorce, or dissolution of
marriage." The bill would change subsection (b) to insert
the desired language. He clarified that the language "if
the offender was mentally incapable" was still included in
the statute under subsection (a)(1).
Mr. Skidmore highlighted the additional repealers
including, AS 11.46.980(d) and AS 11.46.982 related to
inflation proofing; AS 11.56.330(a)(3) dealing with escape
(escape had been changed from a Class A misdemeanor to a
Class C felony; the offense had been inserted in the Class
C felony statute and was being deleted from the Class A
misdemeanor statute); AS 11.71.030(a)(1) through (a)(8)
related to misconduct involving a controlled substance for
the distribution of drugs (the bill moved the offenses from
a Class B or C felony to Class A or B felonies); AS
12.25.180(b)(3) was an authorization to arrest for the
violation of conditions of release (the bill changed the
offense back to a crime and the section was no longer
necessary); AS 12.30.055(b) dealing with the ability to
hold someone on bail for a petition to revoke probation
(the technical cap setting a limit for how long a person
could be held was repealed and the section was no longer
necessary); AS 12.155.110(c) through (h) dealt with the
caps on technical violations in the sentencing provision
(the elimination of the cap meant the sections could be
deleted); and, AS 12.55.135(l) dealt with misdemeanor
sentencing and set it at 5, 10 and 15 days for theft in the
fourth degree (the subsection was eliminated and whatever
the legislature set the range at would apply to theft in
the fourth degree).
6:27:12 PM
Mr. Skidmore continued to review the repealer section of
the bill including AS 12.55.135(n) that limited the
misdemeanor penalty for controlled substances to zero days
in jail (the limit on the sentence that could be imposed
would be eliminated); 12.55.135(o) was an aggravating
factor necessary to exceed a presumptive range found in the
misdemeanor statutes of current law (the section would be
eliminated when the law was returned to [jailtime] of zero
to 365 days); 12.55.135(p) established the aggravating
factors used in the misdemeanor sentencing (the subsection
was no longer needed); and, AS 33.07.010, AS 33.07.020, AS
33.07.030, AS 33.07.040, and AS 33.07.090 established the
Pretrial Enforcement Division (the responsibilities of the
division were being shifted to probation and parole). He
noted that one of the statues may have described the risk
assessment tool. He reported that the tool was referenced
in other places in statute. He explained that in the bill
cleanup process they could move the statute referring to
the risk assessment tool to another location.
Mr. Skidmore reviewed the remainder of the repealers
including AS 33.16.100(f) that dealt with the presumption
of release (the offense was returned to its previous
state); AS 33.16.215 related to technical caps for parole
(the caps were repealed); AS 33.16.220(j) pertained to a
parole hearing having to occur within 15 days for a
technical violation (the technical violation had been
eliminated and the subsection was no longer needed); AS
33.16.240(h) specified a parolee could be released if they
had met the 3, 5, or 10-day technical cap (the technical
cap was deleted and the provision was no longer needed);
and, AS 33.20.010 related to good time if a person was
sentenced to less than 10 days on a technical violation
(technical violations had been eliminated and the section
was no longer necessary).
6:31:10 PM
Representative Josephson addressed the AS 33.07 repealers.
He expressed confusion about the administration's position
on the Pretrial Enforcement Division. He had heard that it
would be a standalone entity as envisioned, but he had also
heard it would become a subset or additional probation
officers. He asked for detail.
Mr. Skidmore responded that the 30 to 60 PCNs under
Pretrial Enforcement Division were being shifted to the
Division of Probation and Parole. The responsibilities of
supervision pretrial were shifted and added to the
responsibilities described for probation and parole
officers in the statutes in the CS. He clarified that the
division would be dissolved in terms of a separate division
with separate management. The responsibilities would
remain, and the people would be the same, but the bill
would shift its location in statute.
Representative Josephson asked for confirmation that the
principle behind the Pretrial Enforcement Division would
remain. He stated his understanding that employees would be
in the field monitoring individuals on their conditions of
release.
Mr. Skidmore confirmed that it was the precise intent as
drafted in statute.
Co-Chair Wilson indicated the repealers had been reviewed,
the sectional had been presented, and public testimony had
been heard. She remarked that the bill was a compromise
bill with parts of the governor's bills included. She
reviewed the amendment process and reported the committee
would receive final fiscal notes on Monday. She emphasized
that the bill was the first step in criminal justice reform
pertaining to jailtime. The second step would focus on
treatment and what happened within communities with reentry
programs.
HB 49 was HEARD and HELD in committee for further
consideration.
ADJOURNMENT
6:34:50 PM
The meeting was adjourned at 6:34 p.m.
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