Legislature(2021 - 2022)BUTROVICH 205
04/15/2021 03:30 PM Senate STATE AFFAIRS
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| Confirmation Hearing(s) | |
| SB39 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | SB 39 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
SB 39-BALLOT CUSTODY/TAMPERING; VOTER REG; MAIL
4:13:43 PM
CHAIR SHOWER announced the consideration of SENATE BILL NO. 39
"An Act relating to elections; relating to voter registration;
relating to ballots and a system of tracking and accounting for
ballots; establishing an election offense hotline; designating
as a class A misdemeanor the collection of ballots from other
voters; designating as a class C felony the intentional opening
or tampering with a sealed ballot, certificate, or package of
ballots without authorization from the director of the division
of elections; and providing for an effective date."
He noted the new committee substitute for SB 39. He said that
because this is largely a new bill, he would go through the new
sponsor statement.
4:14:12 PM
CHAIR SHOWER read [Original punctuation provided]:
Senate Bill 39, updates Alaska's decades-old election
statutes, strengthening voter access and improving
integrity so Alaskans may regain confidence in our
election system. We sometimes disagree with election
results, but rarely in our history have we refused to
accept them. A troubling trend has emerged where
entire segments of our nation not only disagree with
election results, but refuse to acknowledge them as
legitimate. It happened in 2016, and again in 2020.
Whether these concerns are real or perceived, we must
find a way to restore all people's faith in our
election system as it is a cornerstone to our
Constitutional Republic.
"I began working on election issues in 2018, involving
the accuracy of Alaska's election data and our voter
rolls. Problematic areas within our system created
integrity concerns and irreconcilable errors which
limited citizens from qualifying their ballots when
the Division of Elections questioned or rejected
them."
Alaska's current election model is built on a
foundation of disqualification and rejection of
ballots. A significant aspect of SB 39 is to shift
toward greater voter inclusion with the qualification
of ballots. "Voters should know when their ballots are
questioned or rejected and be informed of it
immediately. Ballot curing is a two-part process that
includes immediate voter notification and then
providing voters reasonable time and opportunity to
correct identified technical deficiencies. Once
notified, the voter should have an opportunity to
correct technical issues rather than the Division
disqualifying the ballot and not counting their vote.
Curing of ballots is an essential component of SB 39."
Improvements to voter access required extensive
additional work on existing statutes that have
contributed to limiting all voters. Before the 2020
elections, only two states had clear regulations and
policies for vote-by-mail procedures. A new measure of
inclusion is amending the current statute to accept
additional types of qualifying identification such as
Tribal identification as one example. Alaska is a
diverse state, and our Indigenous First Alaskans are
an essential segment with unique needs not experienced
in urban communities. "My goal is to include
additional provisions for increased Tribal
participation and for more opportunities for
communities to take a greater role in their local
voting systems, just as many larger communities
already practice across Alaska."
4:16:35 PM
Consistency and standardization of protocols is an
overarching objective, and communities that already
practice vote-by-mail are enhanced by improved
security and authentication. Additionally, absentee
voting improvements expand the option to voters where
they may request an automatic absentee ballot.
Alaskans should be able to vote in the manner which
suits them and feel confident that their vote is
secure and counted. If we shift to one type of voting
or another we risk alienating a significant portion of
the population and inadvertently suppressing votes.
This is not a bill to suggest one method of voting
over another. SB 39 addresses the quality of the voter
data, security standards, and chain of custody.
Another major area SB39 improves is voter registration
roll accuracy. Alaska checks only a few databases
against eligible voter lists; SB39 enables the state
to clean the voter rolls more often and cross-
reference a broader segment of other available
databases. It requires third-party supervised bi-
annual audits of our voter rolls. Municipalities such
as Anchorage use state data for their vote-by-mail
system. It is self-evident that when the state's data
is not accurate, neither is their vote-by-mail system
based upon the over mailing of ballots. There are
thousands more people on our voter rolls than are
eligible to vote in Alaska. Currently the Division of
Elections checks our voter data with 31 other states.
Why are we not running it by all 50 states? Data is
also not checked with many local and national sources
that would certainly improve the quality of our voter
rolls. Do we want a 60% solution or a 100% solution?
Alaska voters deserve better than what we have now.
4:18:08 PM
A cornerstone to how SB 39 mitigates chain of custody
concerns, and vulnerable or compromised voter data, is
through a well-established methodology, Multi-Factor
Authentication (MFA), and blockchain technology, which
many of the most secure institutions utilize. Both MFA
and Blockchain have been around for a long time and
are used worldwide in many different ways. A Biden
Administration report and an independent Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology study recommend that
states implement Multi-Factor Authentication and chain
of custody protocols to strengthen election integrity
and ensure one voter equals one vote.
In addition to Multi-Factor Authentication, this bill
requires the Division of Elections to adhere to the US
Postal Service's best practice recommendation for a
vote by mail ballot chain of custody system. By
utilizing the USPS's existing ballot envelope barcode
procedure, voters can account for their ballot
anywhere it is in transit. Citizens should be able to
track their ballot from the time it is shipped from
the Division until received by the voter and until it
is returned to the Division. These systems also notify
a voter if their ballot has been questioned, rejected
and may even include ballot curing procedures. Nearly
everyone orders products online today. Most things can
be tracked, down to the minute, and a precise
location; we can also do so with ballots using
election-specific software readily available and
already in use in many states for ballot tracking.
4:19:29 PM
The platform for elections security is a three-legged
stool; data security, accurate voter rolls, and a
qualitative, secure chain of custody which is achieved
through Multi-Factor Authentication. In October of
2020, a data breach resulted in 113,000 Alaskans
having their personal data exposed. The Division
confirmed on the record that the stolen data could be
used to apply for and submit ill-cast ballots and lead
to identity theft. SB 39 addresses these concerns by
bringing Alaska into the 21st century.
4:20:06 PM
CHAIR SHOWER said this bill is not in its final form and other
committees will have an opportunity to make changes through the
process. He asked Mr. Ogan to introduce himself and walk through
the sectional analysis for SB 39, version O.
4:20:33 PM
SCOTT OGAN, Staff, Senator Mike Shower, Alaska State
Legislature, Juneau, Alaska, highlighted that version O does not
ban by-mail voting, but it does establish protocols. He
paraphrased the sectional analysis for SB 39, version O.
[Original punctuation provided.]
Sec 1. Perjury for false statement about citizenry.
Sec 2. Includes tribal ID, deletes hunt and fish
licenses.
Sec 3. Makes electronic transmission universal.
Sec 4. Shall (no longer may) adopt regs APA NVRA.
1. Block Chain requirement for data systems
2. Voter authentication process
3. Alternate process for digital MFA
Sec 5. New voters multi-factor authentication
education process.
He explained that this section directs the Division of Elections
to instruct voters on how the multi-factor authentication
process would work.
Sec 6. Adds process regulation information to existing
registration process.
Sec 7. New Section:
1. Nationally recognized best practices and
develop protocols to produce accurate voter
rolls.
2. Utilize nationally recognized expert to
biannually audit rolls, using multiple data bases
to cross check data.
3. Allows DOL and DOE to share with others-
including tribal.
Sec 8. Mandates multi-factor authentication security.
Sec 9. Adds notification requirement to cancel voter
registration.
Sec 10. Requires a watermark or other identifier on
most official ballots.
Sec 11. Required software for electronically generated
ballots to be open-source USA based servers.
Sec 12. New subsection requires electronic generated
ballots to utilize multi-factor authentication.
Sec 13. New Section requires robust ballot security
and chain of custody procedures.
4:24:15 PM
Sec 14. Clarifies guidelines for election workers
screening voters.
Sec 15. Requires multi-factor authentication, but
exempts those that are unable.
Sec 16. Allows tribal ID, but eliminate hunting and
fishing license as valid ID.
Sec 17. Ends practice of destroying a spoiled ballot,
and give director the ability to mark or punch a
spoiled ballot to preserve ballot chain of custody.
Sec 18. Director ay prescribe how to void ballot.
Sec 19. Guides exhibited ballot protocols.
4:25:17 PM
MR. OGAN explained that this provision preserves the integrity
of a private vote.
Sec 20. Mandates how the director handles ballots and
ends practice of destroying them to maintain chain of
custody.
Sec 21. New Section on Voter qualification.
Sec 22. New Section on when the Lt Gov can certify the
election and what disclosures need to be made.
Sec 23. Ballot chain of custody protocols stipulating
that all ballots remain in strict control of DOE for
22 months.
4:26:07 PM
Sec 24. New Section prescribing division support for
municipal support for elections as long as chain of
custody and multi-factor authentication protocol are
followed.
Sec 25. Outlining multi-factor authentication
protocols to voters.
Sec 26. Prescribes multi-factor authentication
procedures for absentee voting.
Sec 27. New Section prescribing disclaimers on
absentee ballot applications.
Sec 28. Requires multi-factor authentication protocols
on electronic voting procedures.
Sec 29. Changes the application deadlines to 14 days,
from 10 days, to allow for earlier returns of absentee
ballots, to allow for better accounting and ballot
curing.
Sec 30. Prescribes new protocols for absentee
signatures only if an authorized oath taker is not
available, and requires positive identification and
contact information, along with a statement verifying
why an oath taker was not available, and creating the
penalty of perjury for not being truthful.
Sec 31. Shortens time allowed for absentee ballots to
be received by DOL, allowing for earlier election
results. Matches Colorado, another state that has a
large military constituency.
4:27:55 PM
Sec 32. Voter inclusion measure to allow for rural
voters to vote when multi-factor authentication is no
possible. May need to phase to allow director to
eventually require non exclusionary multi-factor
protocols.
Sec 33. New Section. Allows a voter to sign up for
absentee voting for a four-year period.
4:28:21 PM
Sec 34. Guides review of absentee ballot envelopes.
Sec 35. Disallows removal of ballots from envelopes
before close of election.
Sec 36. Requires the vote to not be counted unless
postmarked or barcode tracked being mailed on or
before the day of the election; allows tribal ID;
prescribes new absentee ballot signature requirements;
and multi-factor protocols.
Sec 37. Prescribes that the ballot may not be
separated from the envelope until the division has
determined the voter has not voted more than once.
Sec 38. Ballot cure provision.
Sec 39. New subsection: Guides the director to allow
the last vote made to be counted if the voter did not
intentionally vote twice.
Sec 40. Prescribes that the vote may not be counted if
the voter was able to utilize Multi-factor
authentication, and voter fails to provide said
authentication.
Sec 41. Ballot Curing Section.
Sec 42. Chain of custody language to assure identifier
data is verified.
Sec 43. Expands grounds for election contest to
include breach of voter registration data, and ballot
accounting irregularities.
Sec 44. Codifies that the division's failure to
contact an absentee voter whose ballot is rejected, is
not grounds for a contested election.
Sec 45. Allows the director to conduct mail out voting
in a community of less than 750 people. Allows larger
communities to request mail out voting. Allows mail
out voting in emergencies.
Sec 46. Puts sideboards on mail out voting rolls, and
chain of custody protection and management through
block chain.
4:30:40 PM
Sec 47. Requires forensic examination of precinct
tabulators and bans internet connection before and
after election.
MR. OGAN clarified that internet connection is also banned
during an election.
Sec 48. Criminalizes ballot harvesting, but protects
those that assist others with limited drop offs of
ballots.
Sec 49. Defines "collects"
Sec 50. Protects people who are cognitively unable to
express their vote.
Sec 51. Adds to the crime of voter misconduct, for
those that attempt to corrupt the vote.
MR. OGAN noted that he had omitted Section 52 from the sectional
analysis.
SENATOR REINBOLD advised that Section 52 talks about election
fraud in violation of AS 15.56.060 thereby causing the outcome
of an election to change. This crime is a Class C felony.
MR. OGAN thanked Senator Reinbold for the lifeline. He continued
the sectional analysis.
Sec 53. Codifies the crime of disclosing unauthorized
election data before election day.
Sec 54. New Section that asserts that the legislature
is the constitutionally defined body with the sole
authority to prescribe election law.
Sec 55. Bans electronic signatures.
Sec 56. Requires the Lt gov to notify the legislature
and the public of a data breach.
Sec 57. Clarifies what "mark" of a person that cannot
write is acceptable.
Sec 58. Prescribes election fraud training at the
Trooper Academy.
Sec 59. Requires a Permanent Fund Dividend applicant
to identify the house district the applicant has been
a resident I for the last 30 days.
4:33:30 PM
MR. OGAN highlighted that the opt-in provision for the Permanent
Fund is not in version O.
Sec 60. Effective date of audit provision.
Sec 61. Effective dates and applicability.
Sec 62. Transition regulations .
Sec 63. Effective dates. Sec 64. Additional effective
dates.
4:34:05 PM
CHAIR SHOWER directed attention to Section 9 regarding the
notification requirement to cancel voter registration. He
explained that citizens are not trained to ask the Division of
Elections to remove their name from the voter rolls when they
leave the state. He cited the example of a former Alaskan who
holds office in Maine and still receives ballots from Alaska.
Section 9 requires the state to educate citizens about the
process to deregister.
He found no questions or comments and solicited a motion to
adopt the CS.
4:36:45 PM
SENATOR REINBOLD moved to adopt the work draft CS for SB
39(STA), work order 32-LS0204\O, as the working document.
4:37:02 PM
CHAIR SHOWER objected for discussion purposes and asked Mr. Ogan
to share why there is not an explanation of the changes.
MR. OGAN said he did not prepare an explanation of changes
because SB 39, version O, is essentially a new bill.
CHAIR SHOWER asked if there were questions or comments on the
CS.
SENATOR REINBOLD said she had no problem adopting the CS; she
would drill down on it in judiciary.
4:39:09 PM
SENATOR COSTELLO asked how the mail-in ballot provisions differ
between version A and version O.
MR. OGAN said version A had a ban on voting by mail and version
O switches the focus to ballot chain of custody. He described
ballot integrity as a three-legged stool. It must have good data
that is secure, good ballot chain of custody procedures, and
multi-factor authentication. He mentioned the Municipality of
Anchorage mail out voting efforts and said there was no
intention to usurp local control, but any community that uses
state resources to support an election must have those data
protection protocols in place to use mail out ballots. He
highlighted that version O expands the sources the state uses to
ensure data integrity and it directs that a third party,
nationally recognized expert assist the division with an audit
of the data rolls.
CHAIR SHOWER added that everything that was in the original
version of the bill reflected concerns from different
individuals or groups. That created significant debate and his
office worked with groups and local communities to distill what
would be good for local control. He said that was the goal all
along. Local governments should be able to choose how to do
business as long as the elections are secure, and all Alaskans
can trust the results.
SENATOR COSTELLO said she was pleased that mail in voting was
restored because that was the section that generated the most
emails to her office. She stated support for secure and
accessible elections.
CHAIR SHOWER emphasized that the bill does not restrict
municipalities from having mail in balloting. The focus is on
cleaning up the data rolls, chain of custody, and multi-factor
authentication to ensure that every eligible Alaskan is able to
vote and their vote counts. He said everyone should be cognizant
of the two data breaches in 2019 and 2020. "We're getting data
breaches as we go in this electronic world and we must move into
the 21st Century to get to the point where we can secure our
data," he said. Part of the effort with blockchain technology is
to protect people's data. He described other state's use of this
technology to track voting data and ballot location on a phone.
4:48:12 PM
CHAIR SHOWER removed his objection. Finding no further
objection, the CS for SB 39, version O, was adopted as the
working document.
4:48:45 PM
CHAIR SHOWER held SB 39 in committee for future consideration.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| SB 39 Oppose Written Public Testimony.pdf |
SSTA 4/15/2021 3:30:00 PM |
SB 39 |
| SB 39 Support Written Public Testimony.pdf |
SSTA 4/15/2021 3:30:00 PM |
SB 39 |
| SB 39 CS v.O.pdf |
SSTA 4/15/2021 3:30:00 PM |
SB 39 |
| SB 39 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology Article Vol 34, Digest Fall 2020.pdf |
SSTA 4/15/2021 3:30:00 PM |
SB 39 |
| SB 39 - Sectonal Analysis v.O 4.15.21.pdf |
SSTA 4/15/2021 3:30:00 PM |
SB 39 |
| SB 39 - Sponsor Statement v.O 4.15.21.pdf |
SSTA 4/15/2021 3:30:00 PM |
SB 39 |